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Abstract
From the late 19th to the late 20th century, the cities and industries of the world became
increasingly reliant on fireproof materials made from asbestos. As asbestos was used
more and more in building materials and household appliances, its harmful effect on
human health, such as asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma, became apparent. The
dangers surrounding the mineral led to the collapse of the industry in the 1980s. While the
market demand and medical rejection of asbestos were international, they were also
experienced in the mining and processing communities at the core of the global industry.
In the town of Asbestos, Quebec, home of the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in the
world, we can see how this process of market boom and bust shaped a fierce local cultural
identity.
This dissertation examines the global asbestos industry from a local perspective,
showing how the people of Asbestos, Quebec had international reach through the work
they did and the industry they continue to support today. This thesis explores how the
boundaries between humans and the environment were blurred in Asbestos as a strong
cultural identity was created through the interaction between people and the natural
world. This work advances our understanding of the interdependence of the local-global
relationship between resource industries and international trade networks, illustrating the
ways it shapes communities and how communities shape it. Bringing bodies of land,
human bodies, and the body politic of Asbestos, Quebec into the history of the global
asbestos trade helps demonstrate how this local cultural identity grew to influence
national policy and global debates on commodity flows, occupational health, and
environmental justice.
Keywords: Asbestos (Quebec), asbestos, Johns-Manville Co., mining, asbestosis,
mesothelioma, lung cancer, chrysotile, Asbestos Strike, 1949, history, cultural identity,
Canada, Jeffrey Mine, environmental history, medical history.
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Introduction: Asbestos and Cultural Identity
If you want to understand Asbestos, the place, you have to understand asbestos the
mineral. While I was researching Asbestos in December 2007, G. Claude Théroux of the
Société d’Histoire d’Asbestos took a piece of raw asbestos from his pocket and threw it
onto the table between us. “You want to know Asbestos? Now you know it.” Looking at
the table in shock, I asked, “Aren’t you afraid of getting sick?” At the start of my
research, before I had begun to understand the strong connection the townspeople had to
asbestos, this was an understandable question. The people of Asbestos are unafraid of the
mineral that not only gives the town its name, but also its past, its cultural identity, and its
hope for the future. A retired history teacher who put himself through university by
working at the Jeffrey Mine, Théroux handled the mineral with a familiarity passed down
to him through generations who made Asbestos their home. His actions attest to
something I quickly learned: Asbestos and asbestos, the people and the place, are
unpredictable and interconnected.
Asbestos is a small community located in the l’Estrie region1 of Quebec, halfway
between Montreal and Quebec City, north of Sherbrooke and south of the St. Lawrence
River. It is the site of the Jeffrey Mine, the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in the world,
which once met 80% of the global demand for the mineral and was owned for a large part
of its history by the American Johns-Manville Company (JM).2 The mine is the source of
the community’s pride and sorrow, success and collapse, but to those from outside
Asbestos, the town is widely known for two other reasons. Within a historical context, it
is known as the scene of a dramatic strike that occurred there from February to June 1949,
which some historians claim started Quebec’s Quiet Revolution, which was a sociopolitical movement during the 1950s and 1960s in which the French Canadian majority in
the province became increasingly secular, gained control of the province’s major
industries and businesses, and rallied their political strength and ambitions to affect major
changes within Quebec and the rest of Canada through waves of neonationalism and

1

This region of Quebec has been referred to in a number of different ways, starting with the “Eastern Townships” in
1806. Then, with the increased French Canadian population due to extremely high birth rates and a need for new land
later in the 19th century it became the “Cantons de l’Est,” and finally, in the 1940s, what it is known as today, “l’Estrie.”
2
The Canadian Mining Journal, 22 January 1919, p. 31.
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reform liberalism.3 Within a more contemporary context, Asbestos is known for the
support it continues to receive from the federal and provincial governments in order to
keep the Jeffrey Mine, and therefore the community, alive.4 While both associations
mention Asbestos, neither of these perspectives adequately take into account the complex
history of the community and how this history informs present realities and debate.5 Just
as Théroux explained that in order to know Asbestos I had to understand the mineral, one
cannot fully understand the current asbestos debate in Canada without understanding the
cultural identity and history of the community.
Cultural identity is an important element of this dissertation. The term refers to the
constantly developing common values, expectations, and ambitions that were shaped
through shared experiences, success, and failure in Asbestos. Theorist Patrick Colm
Hogen writes that cultural identity is at the centre of both world politics and everyday
life,6 and this dissertation will show how this local-global relationship was negotiated in
Asbestos to shape the ways the local population saw itself in the community and in the
world. Social philosopher Stuart Hall also reminds us that cultural identity is constantly
changing with shifting situations and aspirations,7 and I will argue that in Asbestos, this
was also community identity, undergoing constant change as townspeople balanced local
needs with global industry. While it is often understood within a larger national or ethnic
context, a local cultural identity developed in Asbestos through a lived system of common
beliefs and practices. This system was informed and influenced by how the working class
French Canadian majority and the upper class Anglophone elite interacted with each other
3

Historical perspectives on the Quiet Revolution vary. See, for example, Michael D. Behiels, Prelude to Quebec’s
Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 1985), Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, Jean-Claude Robert, and François Ricard, Quebec: A History, 18671929, Robert Chodos, trans. (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 1983), Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change
and Political Crisis, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), and Pierre Vallières, White Niggers of America:
The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec Terrorist, Joan Pinkham, trans. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971).
4
The industry collapsed in the early 1980s, but as recent as 2010, the federal government gave pro-asbestos lobby
groups a quarter of a million dollars, promoted the mineral in international markets, and prevented the United Nations
from banning trading of the mineral. The Quebec government also supports the industry, and in June 2010 it backed a
$58 million bank loan to further develop the Jeffrey Mine and sustain the dwindling local workforce for at least 25
more years. See, “Asbestos Mine Workers to Build Reserve Fund,” CBC News, 14 June 2010,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2010/06/14/asbestos-jeffrey-mine.html, accessed 15 June 2010, and Kathleen
Ruff, “Deathbed Reprieve for Killer Industry?” Toronto Star, 6 June 2010, p. 1.
5
This assertion is based on a thorough survey of the published materials on Asbestos, Quebec. The historical studies on
the community deal entirely with the 1949 strike and contemporary news items about Asbestos focus solely on
government subsidies of the industry.
6
Patrick Colm Hogen, Colonialism and Cultural Identity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), p. xi.
7
Stuart Hall, “Who Needs ‘Identity’?” Questions of Cultural Identity, Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay, eds. (London:
SAGE, 2003), p. 4.
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and the natural world, giving character and purpose to the land, the people, and the
politics of the community. While townspeople were often divided, their actions and
reactions were rooted in this cultural identity, and by tracing its development in Asbestos,
this dissertation will advance our understanding of the ways in which boundaries between
people and the natural world dissolve in resource communities.
What follows is a history detailing the lifecycle of a resource community, but
more than that, this dissertation will show how at a very local level, the people of
Asbestos developed a strong cultural identity by interacting with the natural world
through work, which they used as an important tool of global political influence. I intend
to advance our understanding of the interdependence of this local-global relationship and
illustrate the ways it shapes resource communities and how resource communities shape
it.
Origins of the mineral, the community, and the industry
Much of this dissertation is rooted in the mineral found deep inside the Jeffrey
Mine and how its extraction and production created a community and supported a global
industry. The term “asbestos” encompasses six different types of the mineral found
throughout the world. The chemical makeup changes due to origins and eras, and the
chrysotile, white asbestos found in North America and parts of Russia and South Africa—
Quebec’s two main competitors—is the only type that was made from geological shifts of
serpentine rock. The other five, amosite, athophyllite, crocidolite, tremolite, and
actinolite, were formed in amphibole rock, and while some of these possess longer fibres
that are more easily woven, they are more difficult to access and in some cases, much
more harmful to human health. The chrysotile found in Asbestos has a chemical makeup
of Mg3Si2O5(OH)4: magnesium, silicon, and oxygen.8 The magnesium makes the mineral
fireproof, able to withstand heat up to 3000°F and higher,9 but it also makes asbestos
carcinogenic.
The fact that asbestos causes cancer has severely damaged the marketability of the
mineral and is what makes the Canadian government’s continued support of the industry
so unsettling, but the mineral was once considered both magical and modern because of
8

Cornelis Klein, “Rocks, Minerals, and a Dusty World,” in Reviews in Mineralogy: Health Effects of Mineral Dusts,
Brooke T. Mossman and George D. Guthrie Jr., eds. (Chelsea: Mineralogical Society of America, 1993), p. 17.
9
W.E. Sinclair, Asbestos: Its Origin, Production and Utilization, Mining Publications Ltd., ed. (London: Salisbury
House, 1959), p. 11.
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its fireproof qualities. A fibrous rock that can be broken apart by hand until it resembles
raw cotton, asbestos was woven into a variety of goods that would not burn, rust, or decay
with age. Because it was fireproof and relatively easy to weave, asbestos was used
historically as a tool against the hazards of fire, to fortify ceramic cooking pots in the
Neolithic Age, as a wick in candles burning on holy alters, as the fabric of death shrouds
for ancient kings on funeral pyres, and as a prop in a parlour trick by Charlemagne, who
threw asbestos tablecloths into fires at parties, pulling them out clean and unscathed.10
The magical qualities of asbestos made the mineral an oddity until the invention
of electricity, which caused widespread fires throughout the major cities of the world. The
First World War also illustrated the importance of fireproof buildings, and the mineral
was a key component in reconstruction efforts following the conflict. Asbestos promised
safety and a better life for those who used it, and profits for those who sold it. This
combination of magical and modern has influenced the development of the cultural
identity in Asbestos, fully entwined with the mineral found in the Jeffrey Mine.
The Jeffrey Mine is the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in the world because of
how the mineral is laid out in the land on which the community was built. The deposit in
Asbestos was shaped during a process of geological shifts and collisions that began
during the Precambrian period 750 million years ago, when the supercontinent of Rodinia
broke into smaller landmasses that clashed together, then separated again.11 Major
tectonic shifts pushed mountain chains that were once part of the ocean floor into the
landmass that was to become North America during the Devonian period between 410
and 355 million years ago, creating the Appalachian mountain range that extends from
Greenland to the southern United States, passing through what was to become Asbestos.12
The intense heat and friction of this process splintered the serpentine rock at this

10

Rachel P. Maines, Asbestos and Fire: Technological Trade-Offs and the Body at Risk (New Jersey: Rutgers, 2005),
pp. 27-28, and Geoffrey Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 2.
11
Paul D. Ryan, “Caledonides,” in The Oxford Companion to the Earth, Paul Hancock and Brian J. Skinner, eds.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:
2048/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main& entry=t112.e99. Accessed 5 October 2007.
12
David A. Rothery, “Obduction,” in The Oxford Companion to the Earth,
http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048 /views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main& entry=t112.e622, and
D.L. Dineley, “Devonian,” in The Oxford Companion to the Earth, http://www.oxford
reference.com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca:2048/views/ ENTRY.html?subview=Main& entry=t112.e215. Accessed 5 October
2007.
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particular site,13 and in its re-crystallization, the chemical composition was changed and
veins of asbestos fibre were formed.
The majority of asbestos deposits throughout the world are found along a linear
plane, with veins usually several metres in length, which means that several mines need to
be established in the same area, often beside each other and by multiple companies, in
order to reach the entire deposit. Contrary to the norm, the mineral deposit in Asbestos is
found in veins that run in a circular pattern, forming a rounded knoll. This meant that the
Jeffrey Mine was the only pit needed in Asbestos to extract the rich mineral deposit,
which cut back on costs and time. From the beginning, the land at what would become
Asbestos was unique.
The knoll at Asbestos made the town one of the most profitable asbestos mining
communities in the world. Quebec chrysotile at one point made up 95% of the global
trade of the mineral and the Jeffrey Mine produced the majority of this supply.14 By
focusing on the massive movement of land and people that was required to extract this
quantity of mineral, amounting to 30,000 tonnes a day by 1960,15 I will show how the
focused examination of a small resource community can advance our understanding of
the ways in which people interact with the natural world. In doing so, I will challenge the
historiography of bodies, resource communities, occupational health and safety, the
asbestos industry, and working class-managing class relations in 19th and 20th century
Quebec.
Historiography
This study is rooted in the idea that bodies are historical, shaped by both time and
place. Bodies are also inherently physical, and this physicality and tangibility is a
recurring theme in the history of Asbestos. Medical historians M.S.R. Jenner and B.O.
Taithe criticize the historiography of human body studies for being too abstract and
narrowly focusing on the authority scientists, doctors, and politicians appear to have over
disease and disease management.16 This dissertation provides a more holistic examination
of different, yet complimentary bodies in Asbestos in order to highlight the ways in which
13

David S. O’Hanley, “The Origin of the Chrysotile Asbestos Veins in Southwestern Quebec,” Canadian Journal of
Earth Sciences, vol. 24, no. 1-3 (January 1987), p. 8.
14
Tweedale, Magic Mineral to Killer Dust, p. 2.
15
The Canadian Mining Journal, February 1960, p. 160.
16
M.S. R. Jenner and B.O. Taithe, “The Historiographical Body,” Medicine in the Twentieth Century Roger Cooter and
Johns Pickstone, eds. (Newark: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 193.

6
they participate in a process of mutual exchange that contributes to the complex local
cultural identity: bodies of land, human bodies, and the body politic.
“Bodies of land” refers to three interconnected physical realities in Asbestos: the
mineral, the Jeffrey Mine, and the property on which the community was built. The
global demand for the mineral relied on high extraction levels at the Jeffrey Mine, and
this level of production required the mine to continually expand into the community,
which was built on land rich with asbestos deposits. The need for more workable and
liveable land meant that the people of Asbestos were frequently moving away from the
edges of the Jeffrey Mine as it grew to eclipse homes, businesses, and neighbourhoods.
The examination of bodies of land in Asbestos establishes a foundation for how the
community interacted with the natural environment in such an intensely familiar way,
passed on by generations, that a cultural identity was formed. I will use a combination of
surveyor reports, engineer analyses, industry assessments, town council minutes, and
local newspaper articles to reveal how the land in Asbestos was managed and understood
in the community.
Historical studies of land have been fundamental to the field of environmental
history, which has the relationship between culture and the natural world as a key pillar.
In his article, “Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?” historian
Richard White urges scholars to re-examine the connection between work and nature to
recognize that through labour, resource workers have “achieved a bodily knowledge of
the natural world.”17 In The Organic Machine, White asserts that through labour, humans
and the natural world become inseparable, and argues that we cannot understand human
history without understanding natural history because of this connection.18 Using White’s
assertions as a foundation, I will take his idea further, showing that bodily knowledge of
nature is gained not only by those who work directly with it, such as the men and women
at the Jeffrey Mine, but also by those who lived around it. The people of Asbestos not
only knew the land through work, they—men, women, children, young and old—knew it
intimately, simply by living in the community: hearing the sounds of the machines in the
pit, seeing and breathing in the asbestos dust that hovered over neighbourhoods,
17

Richard White, “‘Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?’: Work and Nature,” Uncommon
Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, William Cronon, ed. (New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1995), p. 172.
18
Richard White, The Organic Machine: The Remaking of the Columbia River (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), p.
113.
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experiencing the terror of rocks crashing through their homes during blasting, and using
the mine as a focal point of celebration, community spirit, and play. In Clearcutting the
Pacific Rainforest, historian Richard A. Rajala describes how the rapid industrialization
of British Columbia’s forestry industry turned the forest into a “giant factory without a
roof.”19 This was true for Asbestos as well, but where Rajala’s factory occurred in the
distant woods, the one in Asbestos was in the heart of the community.
In making the Jeffrey Mine a “factory,” Johns-Manville constantly increased its
reliance on new technologies to improve extraction rates. In The Industrial
Transformation of Subarctic Canada, environmental historian Liza Piper writes that
international markets commoditized the land and separated it from local mining
populations,20 but this dissertation will question her assertion about how people in
resource communities were distanced from the resources they worked with and the ways
in which they challenged this distance. Piper’s northern mining communities differ from
Asbestos, and this study will further our understanding of how international markets can
work to strengthen and politicize the connection between people and the natural world
and influence a proud local identity.
While pride is a strong element in the cultural identity of Asbestos, so too is risk,
and this dissertation will lead to a renewed perspective on how pride and risk can
complement each other in resource communities. It will do so by showing how the
connection between people and land can negatively affect human bodies, and how those
affected can choose to confront or ignore this reality. My use of the term “human bodies,”
refers to the workers at the Jeffrey Mine who extracted and processed asbestos, and the
internal medical effects the mineral had on them and the community. Historian David
Cantor criticizes many medical histories because they tend to treat “the body and the
disease as two distinct entities,”21 but this study will humanize the diseases asbestos
19

Richard A. Rajala, Clearcutting the Pacific Rainforest: Production, Science, and Regulation (Vancouver: UBC Press,
1998), p. 30.
20
Liza Piper, The Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), p. 9.
21
David Cantor, “The Diseased Body,” Medicine in the Twentieth Century, p. 347. For more studies on occupational
health and industrial medicine that attempt to get away from this historiographical trend, see, Daniel M. Berman, Death
on the Job: Occupational Health and Safety Struggles in the United States (Monthly Review Press, 1980), Claudia
Clark, Radium Girls: Women and Industrial Health Reform, 1910-1935 (University of North Carolina Press, 1997),
Alan Derickson, Black Lung: Anatomy of a Public Health Disaster (Cornell University Press, 1998), Alan Derickson,
Workers’ Health: Workers’ Democracy: The Western Miners’ Struggle, 1891-1925 (Cornell University Press, 1988),
Bennett M. Judkins, We Offer Ourselves as Evidence: Toward Workers’ Control of Occupational Health (Greenwood
Press, 1986), George Rosen, The History of Miners’ Diseases: A Medical and Social Interpretation (Schuman’s Press,
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causes, analyzing the lived experiences of those whose health was directly affected by the
mineral and of those who were left to reconcile a cultural identity based on interaction
with toxic land. I will achieve this by relying on confidential medical files and reports,
never before used in studies of Asbestos, and international medical journals to bring
crucial context and perspective to the history of health in the community.
The three main diseases asbestos causes are asbestosis, lung cancer, and
mesothelioma. Asbestosis is a fibrosis, or hardening, of the fluid in the lungs that happens
when microscopic asbestos fibres are inhaled over an extended period of time and build
up in the lining of the lungs, preventing them from expanding and contracting as they
should, leading to death by suffocation. Lung cancer is something most people are
familiar with, but because of its association with the tobacco industry, asbestos
historically has been overlooked as a causal factor. Mesothelioma is another asbestosrelated cancer that manifests on the linings of major organs, resulting in a fast-acting,
rarely curable disease. All three take between 15 and 30 years to develop, and all three
have led to many deaths in Asbestos.
Environmental contamination and its effects on human health have been explored
in many disciplines including geography, natural science, history, and sociology. Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring focuses on the harmful effects of pesticides on the natural world
and urges us to rethink the connection between people and the environment. Her personal
experience with cancer also illustrates how the contamination of nature can negatively
affect human health.22 Since then, scholars have attempted to bring large corporations that
are responsible for environmental contamination to account, often employing an “us vs.
them” dichotomy. Within this framework, asbestos workers are victims to industry
leaders who exploit the land and the people who work it.
Investigative reporter Paul Brodeur has published several monographs on the
asbestos industry using this dichotomy, including Expendable Americans and Outrageous
Misconduct, and German reporter Günter Wallraff has followed suit with Lowest of the
Low.23 Historians Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner have also published on the
1943), James Whiteside, Regulating Danger: The Struggle for Mine Safety in the Rocky Mountain Coal Industry
(University of Nebraska Press, 1990).
22
Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (New York: Houghton Miflin Co., 1992). Original edition published 1964.
23
Paul Brodeur, Expendable Americans (New York: Viking Press, 1974), Paul Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1985), Günter Wallraff, Lowest of the Low (London: Methuen, 1988).
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negative health effects industry has on its workers and the environment, including Deadly
Dust and Deceit and Denial.24 Markowitz and Rosner write that, “the linking of health
issues with traditional environmental and labor [sic] concerns may be a potent force in
stimulating a new, grass-roots opposition to corporate power.”25 They hope that through a
reorganization of traditional American corporate structure, the health of the environment
and the working class will be improved. These studies are important in helping us
understand issues of environmental justice and how companies and governments make
decisions that put marginalized communities, minorities, and the working class at direct
bodily risk.
In her examinations of the South African asbestos industry, historian Nancy
Jacobs explains that, “it is necessary to recognize that environmental and social justice are
linked and that power imbalances will determine the ways men and women, rich and
poor, and blacks and whites live with each other and the natural world.”26 In the case of
Asbestos, this power imbalance could be seen between the working class majority and the
elite managing class of JM officials. This dissertation will show that as early as the 1920s,
JM knew of the severe health risks asbestos posed to human bodies, but actively
prevented this knowledge from reaching its workers and the general public. I will
demonstrate how the company intentionally treated the people of Asbestos as
experimental bodies to determine the full extent of how the mineral found in the Jeffrey
Mine can affect human health: the community became a perfectly contained test
laboratory.27
Because of the traditional lack of political influence people from lower classes
have had, medical and social philosopher Michel Foucault explains that they have always
been “the most suitable subjects for an experimental course,”28 and it is easy to see how
24
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this could apply in Asbestos. With this study, however, I intend to broaden our
understanding of environmental and social justice through a close examination of how the
people of Asbestos came to know of the risks they were subject to, and how they chose to
internalize this knowledge as a part of their cultural identity. In doing so, this dissertation
will show that, while important, studies such as Brodeur’s, Jacobs’, and Markowitz and
Roser’s, have put environmental and social justice in a “black box.” Philosopher of
science Bruno Latour explains that black boxes are often used to simplify complex issues,
and that instead of offering an explanation, scientists and scholars “draw a little box about
which they need to know nothing but its input and output.”29 At the moment,
environmental injustice is in a black box that tells us that corporations and governments
put marginalized and working class communities at risk for the sake of industry. This
dissertation will challenge this simplification.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental
justice as being “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people…with
respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies…It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of
protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decisionmaking process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.”30 JohnsManville has a history of suppressing medical knowledge and gaining government allies
to ensure industrial profits, while it knowingly put its workers at environmental and
occupational risk. By examining how the people of Asbestos internalized their knowledge
of the land and their own bodies in order to deal with the risks the industry posed to their
health, this dissertation will show that for much of its history, this was a community
where environmental justice was achieved. This assertion does not mean that I will
excuse JM’s deceitful practices, as it is clear from this study that company officials
intentionally and continuously put workers at risk. By giving the people of Asbestos
agency over their own bodies, showing when they learned about the negative health
effects of the mineral and how they internalized this knowledge as part of their complex
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cultural identity, I will argue that the understanding of risk in Asbestos is partly what has
given the local body politic global influence.
“Body politic” refers to the community of Asbestos, which has historically been
made up of three different factions sharply divided by class: workers, middle class
community leaders, and upper class company officials. I have used government
documents, town council minutes, company correspondence and local newspaper reports
to show how a dynamic body politic was formed through conflict and cooperation. This
body politic relied, and continues to rely, heavily on a local understanding of the
connection between people and the natural world. The symptoms of asbestos-related
disease are difficult to overlook or ignore, and this study will show that the people of
Asbestos knew the mineral they extracted from the Jeffrey Mine was negatively affecting
their bodies by 1949 at the very latest. Markowitz and Rosner write “at the heart of the
current struggle [for environmental justice] is the very difficult question of how industry
or the government decides what is safe,”31 but this dissertation will show that the body
politic in Asbestos—the people themselves—decided what was and what was not safe.
They did this through a community understanding of bodily risk.
The study of risk has a rich historiography that illuminate how the community
reacted to the health threats of the mineral.32 Theorist Mary Douglas emphasizes that the
question is not whether risks are real, but rather how they are politicized, and the
importance of local knowledge and accountability when it comes to the understanding of
risk.33 This dissertation will show that the people of Asbestos were aware of the dangers
the mineral posed to their bodies long before the general public was, but chose to accept
the risks rather than reject the industry and the cultural identity they had created around it.
Douglas’ analysis supports this argument, and she writes that people accept risk not
because they lack the knowledge necessary to properly assess danger, but rather because
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risk is a fundamental element of their community that can be ignored by focusing on the
benefits that come with living in a successful resource town.34
The understanding of risk in Asbestos can be attributed to the community being
what theorist Ulrich Beck describes as a “risk society:” a society organized in response to
the risks that it faces. For Beck, this requires a reorganization of local power and
authority to allow the exceptional condition—in this case, the people of Asbestos
choosing to live and work with a dangerous mineral—to become the norm.35 An
examination of the local body politic shows how the “exceptional condition” was
accepted in Asbestos and worked into the community’s cultural identity. In doing so, I
will further our understanding of how people in resource communities internalize the
connection between humans and the natural world, to show that the risk of a lost identity
can be more threatening than the bodily risk of a toxic land and industry.
The commitment to community survival in Asbestos is one articulated in actions,
not words. While the community does have a historical society, its archive consists
mainly of maps, company newsletters, and local newspapers. Private papers and personal
diaries are not available to researchers. Furthermore, the people of Asbestos have a
history of being wary of outsiders, which has become more pronounced since the industry
collapsed and the community has been attacked in the press for continuing to support the
Jeffrey Mine. Because of this, I was unable to obtain oral histories from community
members, despite their general support of my work, shown through telephone calls,
emails, and Christmas cards sent, checking in on how my study was progressing, and
possibly making sure I was not writing a scathing anti-Asbestos piece. The lack of oral
interviews and personal diaries is a problem cultural history has constantly come up
against, but despite this challenge, I have used the words of townspeople whenever I have
found them in newspaper articles or letters to government officials, and the other sources
I use have allowed me to closely examine how the actions of the people of Asbestos
reveal the shaping of a strong cultural identity.
Aside from source availability, my focus on actions in this study is largely due to
the belief that actions reveal a lived experience. Oral history can often tell how an event is
remembered, but by examining actions within their historical context, we can advance our
34
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understanding of how the people of Asbestos internalized their experiences as individuals
and as a community. Historian Joy Parr explains that this internalization is often done
through the human body. In Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the
Everyday, Parr writes that bodies “are not only being conditioned by circumstances, they
are also enduring reservoirs of past practice, which actively influence subsequent
responses.”36 The people of Asbestos continue to lobby the provincial and federal
governments to support the industry despite the dangers of the mineral and their
knowledge of what it does to their bodies. I will argue that they do so because the local
cultural identity was formed through a complex history of their bodies interacting with
the natural world, the mineral, and the Jeffrey Mine.
This connection and resulting identity is not one that is expressed in words, and
Parr reminds us that, “Our senses are the conduits through which knowledge of
technology and the environment flow and, through retuning habit and reflex…Most of
these adaptations are held beyond speech, often outside conscious awareness.”37 Studying
the actions of the people of Asbestos will allow me to access the thoughts and feelings of
community members that they may not even realize they had. Foucault calls this
“unconscious knowledge,”38 and it describes the way people instinctively react to the
situations that surround them every day. The way the people of Asbestos instinctively
react to events and ideas in this history will contribute to our understanding of resource
communities and how local identities are formed through a connection between humans
and the natural environment.
The focus on bodies and the unconscious knowledge they can reveal distinguishes
this study from other histories of mining communities.39 I have used these studies as a
foundation for my own, but the differences between the communities other scholars
examine and Asbestos are striking and help us understand the development of a complex
local cultural identity. Like many other mining towns, Asbestos began with a transient

36

Joy Parr, Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the Everyday (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), p. 8.
Ibid, p. 1.
38
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York, Vintage Press, 1973), p.
xi.
39
See, for example, Thomas G. Andrews, Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge & London:
Harvard University Press, 2008), Karen Buckly, Danger, Death, and Disaster in the Crowsnest Pass Mines, 1902-1928
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2004), and Barbara Ellen Smith, Digging Our Own Graves: Coal Miners and the
Struggle Over Black Lung Disease (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
37

14
male-dominated population, but quickly grew into a community of families.40 The way
Asbestos differs from these other histories, however, is that the Jeffrey Mine was a place
for both male and female labour. In her study of Arizona mining communities, Linda
Gordon discusses the militancy of miners’ wives in reinforcing white family values and
racial divisions,41 but the inclusion of women workers in Asbestos created a different
community character than the one Gordon describes. Female employees were restricted to
the dusty textile department at the factory beside the pit, but the Jeffrey Mine quickly
became a place of romance, with JM newsletters advertising the attractiveness of its
single female workers—referred to as “Asbestos beauties,”—and the habit of its male
employees to look to the department to find wives.42 Families often began at the Jeffrey
Mine, and many local women were not completely dependent on the wages of their
fathers or husbands for their wellbeing. Women were also actively involved in the politics
of the community, participating in strikes, protests, and even violence. The action and
inclusion of the women of Asbestos in traditionally male realms of class conflict affected
the entire community and influenced the development of the local cultural identity.
In addition to the inclusion of women in the Jeffrey Mine’s workforce, Asbestos
differed from other mining towns in that although it was a single company and single
industry community, the major decisions regarding the mine and those who depended on
it were not always made from head offices far away.43 JM did have its headquarters in
New York City, with an office in Montreal, but because of the strong cultural identity in
Asbestos, decisions regarding the operations of the Jeffrey Mine were often negotiated in
the community amongst workers, town council, and company officials. The people of
Asbestos insisted again and again on keeping issues surrounding land and people local,
resenting any action that breached the community’s borders. According to labour
historian Gregory S. Kealey, “[c]lass is to be studied as a relationship, an effect of
40
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struggles, in constant motion and reorganization,”44 and this study of Asbestos will show
us that class relationships are also time and place dependent, with the balance of power
continuously shifting.
The shifting balance of power influenced the local cultural identity, and in 1949
Pierre Elliott Trudeau noticed, “the whole working class at Asbestos seems to possess an
unprecedented self-confidence.”45 This dissertation will show that confidence of Jeffrey
Mine workers during the 1949 strike Trudeau was referring to was a direct result of the
historically grounded cultural identity that was formed in Asbestos through the interaction
of people and the natural world. Their confidence has since grown and the community has
maintained a common front in their global pursuit of industrial success. Although
Trudeau was impressed by the confidence of the workers, this is the first study that
examines its roots. In fact, aside from a local history produced by the community in 1999,
this is the first study on Asbestos that focuses on more than the five-month strike of 1949,
and it is the only one that examines the subject from a holistic perspective. Despite the
occasional reference in labour and Quebec history textbooks,46 Asbestos remains absent
from historical analyses that are not focused solely on the 1949 labour dispute, and even
then, the community is barely present.
Trudeau’s 1956 collection on the strike is a reason for this absence, as he wrote
that, “It is the date, rather than the particular place or the industry that is decisive. The
strike might well have happened elsewhere…”47 Although he diminished the importance
of the community, Trudeau acknowledged that the “foundations of Quebec society were
shaken at Asbestos,”48 due in part, to the confidence of Jeffrey Mine workers. He also
stated that the conflict was “a violent announcement that a new era had begun…[and] a
turning point in the entire religious, political, social, and economic history of the Province
of Quebec.”49 Although his rhetoric was powerful, the context I provide in this
dissertation shows that Trudeau was wrong: the people, the place, and the industry
involved in the 1949 strike were what made the dispute matter, not just in the history of
44
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Quebec, but also in the history of Canada and the history of international trade and labour
issues. The strike was a local conflict with global ramifications because of the industry’s
global reach, and the goals of Jeffrey Mine workers differed greatly from the ones
Trudeau described.
Because of Trudeau’s attention-garnering personality and politics, however,
studies of Asbestos since 1956 have been overshadowed by his interpretation of the
strike, which has led to a historiographical pattern that has placed the community on the
periphery of the conflict and Quebec history. Very little scholarship has been produced on
the strike since 1956, with nothing adequately contradicting Trudeau’s conclusions. In
2004, Esther Delisle and Pierre K. Malouf wrote Le Quatuor d’Asbestos: Autour de la
grève de l’amiante, which focuses on the political battle that arose over asbestos-related
disease rather than on the strike or the community.50 Although bearing the name of the
town in its title, Le Quatuor had little to do with the land or the people of Asbestos,
focusing instead on the mining community of East Broughton and the political discourse
of the era. Suzanne Clavette followed this publication in 2005 with Les Dessous
d’Asbestos: Une lutte idéologique contre la participation des travailleurs, which
promised to reveal the community’s experience of the strike, but again focused on events
and opinions happening outside of Asbestos, bringing community members into an
abstract ideological battle they were not concerned with.51 Even leading Quebec labour
historian Jacques Rouillard focuses his studies on the socio-political impact the strike had
on the province, not on the community,52 and Quebec historian Jocelyn Létourneau
provides a study of Asbestos focusing only on the historical memory of the 1949 strike,
not the lived experience.53
An explanation of this historiography is simple: the people involved in initially
publicizing the 1949 strike became major figures in Québécois and Canadian politics and
history. Maurice Duplessis, often taking on the villain’s role in these accounts, was
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Quebec premier for 18 years and had a major impact on the development of the province.
Jean Marchand, secretary for the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada
(CTCC), slept in the homes of the workers during the strike54 and went on to become a
federal cabinet minister, a senator, and a Companion of the Order of Canada. Gérard
Pelletier, university friend of Marchand and reporter for Le Devoir, also became a federal
cabinet minister, a Canadian ambassador and Companion of the Order of Canada. Pierre
Trudeau, who briefly joined Pelletier in Asbestos, was Prime Minister of Canada for 15
years. Both André Laurendeau and Pierre Laporte wrote on the provincial implications of
the strike for Le Devoir and later served in the Quebec legislature.
The role of these historical figures in the 1949 strike has dominated studies of the
conflict, overshadowing the real people and reasons behind the labour dispute, and
turning Asbestos into a place of symbols and myths concerning the state of Quebec on the
eve of the Quiet Revolution.55 The people of Asbestos are uncomfortable with this
reputation and this dissertation will bring them back into the history of the strike to show
how a local perspective can tell a broader history about resource communities,
industrialization, health, risk, and political influence. Asbestos was and is much more
than a labour dispute: it reveals the mutual exchange between humans and the natural
world, and the ways in which this connection can be internalized to shape an
internationally powerful cultural identity rooted in place.
Throughout this study, the term “place” will be used to describe the geographic
area of Quebec now known as Asbestos, as well as the various socio-historical
constructions of it that were created, debated, and championed. Place is a characterization
that reveals political, social, and cultural expectations and values,56 and it meant and
continues to mean different things to different people in Asbestos. Despite these
differences, what remains central is physical engagement with the land. Anthropologist
Tim Ingold notes that, “cultural knowledge and bodily substance…undergo continuous
generation in the context of an ongoing engagement with the land.”57 Expanding on
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Ingold’s understanding, this study will use place to show how bodies interact, change, and
grow within the framework outlined by anthropologist Keith H. Basso, who explains that
the way people understand the land influences how they understand themselves.58 In a
place named Asbestos, site of the largest chrysotile mine in the world, people use their
historical conceptions of bodies of land and human bodies to inform and influence their
collective body politic. Because of the way bodies interact throughout the history of
Asbestos, I will use these three entities—land, people, politics—as organizational tools in
order to frame this analysis in time and place.
Methodology
The main sources I employ in my analysis of how bodies interact in Asbestos are
local resources that have always been available to the public yet rarely used in previous
studies. In addition, I use confidential JM documents obtained through the JohnsManville Claims Resolution Management Corporation’s Asbestos Claims Research
Facility (ACRF) established by the company to facilitate workers compensation
legislation. The local sources have been invaluable to gaining an understanding of the
people who lived and worked in Asbestos, especially the local newspaper, L’Asbestos,
later Le Citoyen, and the town council minutes, which reveal the community’s growth,
triumphs, fears, and slow collapse. These sources bring the bodies of Asbestos to life.
For the confidential JM documents, I am indebted to David Egilman, an American
doctor and scholar working to ensure the success of class action lawsuits launched by
labour groups against asbestos companies, and Geoffrey Tweedale, a global asbestos
trade historian based in the United Kingdom. Both Egilman and Tweedale allowed me
access to the files they had collected via subpoenas throughout the course of their own
research, a great deal of which focused on Asbestos. The files Egilman provided mostly
come from JM’s ACRF in Denver, Colorado. These include confidential medical reports
concerning the workers at the Jeffrey Mine and the people of Asbestos, but others,
compiled in an “Asbestos Chronology” document, reveal the systematic pattern of
discovery, panic, and denial that JM officials practiced in Asbestos between 1918 and
1983. The documents Tweedale provided were of a similar nature, and included the
confidential files of the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association (QAMA)—a lobby group
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made up of company heads—which reveal secret medical studies, cover-ups, and
attempts by company officials to prevent the industry from collapsing. QAMA has
destroyed these files, but Tweedale was able to subpoena copies of them first. Tweedale
also provided me with the private collection of Dr. Irving J. Selikoff, who led Mount
Sinai Hospital’s Environmental and Occupational Health Division and was seen as one of
the biggest threats to the asbestos industry because of his commitment to exposing the
negative health effects of the mineral in the 1960s and 1970s. Neither Egilman nor
Tweedale have used the documents relating to Asbestos in their work because they
focused on different aspects of the global industry,59 thus this study is the first time much
of this information will be used. Following the lead of both Egilman and Tweedale, I
have given these documents to Théroux at the Société d’Histoire d’Asbestos, who gave
me one of my first lessons on how to “know” the community.
This study advances our understanding of how we can know Asbestos by
illuminating the ways people and the natural environment connect in the community and
how this connection becomes the backbone of a local cultural identity with global
repercussions. Chapter 1 will provide an analysis of how the Jeffrey Mine and the town of
Asbestos were established via geological shifts, human migration, and the development of
a local community completely reliant on one natural resource. This chapter will end in
1918, when JM purchased the Jeffrey Mine and irrevocably changed the character and
direction of the community. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 each cover the same time period, 19181949, but from different points of view: the history of Asbestos as told from the
perspective of the land in Chapter 2, human bodies in Chapter 3, and the community in
Chapter 4. This division in perspective will help illustrate how the people and the land
became interconnected in Asbestos and the ways this connection influenced community
dynamics and identity. Chapter 5 will unite these three perspectives once again in a close
examination of the 1949 strike, told from the point of view of the people of Asbestos. The
strike, much like JM’s arrival in 1918, fundamentally changed the community, and
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impacted the development of the local cultural identity that had the survival of the
community as a fundamental characteristic. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 will follow the pattern of
Chapters 2, 3, and 4, each from the perspective of a different “bodily” aspect of Asbestos:
the land, the people, and the community. These chapters will cover the period following
the strike of 1949 until 1983, when the industry collapsed and JM filed for bankruptcy
and left the town. These final chapters will show how the local population internalized the
industrial collapse of their community from the perspective of the land they worked and
lived on, their own bodies, and their collective identity, built on generations interacting
with the Jeffrey Mine.
In telling the history of Asbestos in this way, I will rely on the methodological
frame laid out in Judith Walzer Leavitt’s Typhoid Mary,60 in which she describes the
same history in each chapter, told from differing perspectives. I chose to do this to
emphasize the importance of each of these bodies in the history of Asbestos. Taken
together, these chapters form a cohesive, chronological understanding of the ways bodies
interact to shape a local cultural identity with global reach that has been greatly neglected
in previous studies, and adds texture and depth to the past and present of Asbestos. I
hope, as Leavitt does, to “encourage readers to engage, as I have, in the process of
interpretation, and to find their own integrated meanings”61 within these perspectives, and
each chapter will begin with a brief look at Asbestos today, showing how the past is
reflected in the present. The effects of the connection between people and the natural
world on the body politic are not contained in Asbestos, and the mutual exchange of
bodies can be seen in resource communities throughout Quebec, Canada, and the world.
By using Asbestos as an example, we as a society can re-evaluate other resource
communities, past and present, with a fuller understanding of the challenges, dangers, and
triumphs they must confront. We can also reassess Canada’s continued support of the
asbestos industry with a more holistic, physical, and local understanding of what it was,
what it is, and what it should become.
Through the process of working the Jeffrey Mine and establishing a community
around it, the people of Asbestos entered into a relationship of mutual exchange with the
land, shaping it, and being shaped by it. This relationship, driven by global markets yet
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intensely local, produced a complex cultural identity in Asbestos that has been politicized
on national and international levels. How does a connection to the natural environment
develop into a strong cultural identity? How does a local identity develop global
influence? Can one small community affect national and international politics? To answer
these questions, this study will examine the history of the Jeffrey Mine and the culture the
people of Asbestos created around it by balancing their needs with the needs of the land,
and developing a connection to the Jeffrey Mine that surpassed the comforts of a steady
paycheque. By analyzing the land, the people, and the politics of the community in this
history of place, we will see how people with a fierce local cultural identity came to
influence national policy and global debates on commodity flows, occupational health,
and environmental justice.
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Chapter 1: Creation Stories, 1791-1918
In the beginning, there was asbestos. Well, not exactly, but looking at the Jeffrey
Mine in Asbestos today, it is easy to think that the land has looked like this forever,
waiting beneath a surface of trees and grass, the mineral deposits running as deep as the
surrounding Appalachians are high. Asbestos, Quebec and the massive deposits of the
mineral that gave the town its name had many “beginnings” that depend on which
creation story you align yourself with, as they have undergone several starting points that
rely on differing perspectives and change according to people, time, and agendas. The
land has not always looked like it does now, as it was shaped and reshaped over long
periods of time.
The multiple creation stories of Asbestos reveal the changing values and
aspirations of the people who took interest in the land where the community would be
built, ranging from surveyor assessments to the expectations of families. This chapter will
show how the foundations for the community that would become Asbestos were
constantly changing as the land was defined and redefined time and again. I will bring
this change into a larger context of evolving land, people, and community, in order to
establish the beginnings of a complicated and complementary local cultural identity. In
doing so, I will establish a foundation for this history of Asbestos and trace the
foundations of how people and the natural world interact to create a resource community
with a strong identity that influences how the local population sees its past, present, and
future.
While working through the ways land, people, and politics interacted to form
these stories, this chapter will address broader histories and larger contexts when
conflicting creation stories built upon each other from 1791 to 1918. I will show how
radically the land was changed in order to establish the Jeffrey Mine, and how much
physical human effort was required to do so. The period covered by this chapter was one
of struggle for the waves of migrating workers who attempted to make the Jeffrey Mine
profitable. Much of this history is one of disappointment, but when a fuller understanding
of the land and how people should work it was achieved, the local industry and
community began to thrive. Asbestos fibre was born of geological friction and heat.
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Asbestos the place would follow suit, being created and re-created with the friction and
heat of clashing cultures, ideologies, and aspirations.
Ownership and Purpose, 1791-1879
After the land of Asbestos was formed by massive geological shifts, what is now
the province of Quebec became a place on which diverse peoples would imprint their
conceptions of what the environment could offer. While these conceptions often differed
from culture to culture, person to person, they all believed in the benefits the natural
environment would bring them. Now 21,400 square kilometres,62 l’Estrie has been
somewhat of a “floating” region with boundaries fluctuating in the space south of the St.
Lawrence River, north of the American border, west of the Chaudière River, and east of
the Richelieu region.63 The Abenaki First Nations, who had been pushed northward from
the eastern United States due to an increase of white settlers in the early 18th century,
were one of the first peoples to place cultural expectations and aspirations on the region.
The Abenaki used this territory as hunting and fishing grounds and a village was
established on the banks of the St. Francis River. The British attacked the village in 1759
during the Seven Years War and kept prisoners there after killing 200 Aboriginals.64 As
the territory switched hands from the French Crown to the British with the Treaty of Paris
of 1763, the Abenaki population went into rapid decline due to disease and war. L’Estrie
was about to be redefined based on distinctly British cultural values.
While the British won the vast territory of New France in the Conquest of 1763,
its management of the area was cautious. Confronted by a growing Francophone
population in the area surrounding what was to become l’Estrie, and an increasingly
restless American colony to the south that was about to break into revolution, British
officials remade the region a “buffer-zone” between the two groups,65 afraid of what
would happen if they were to meet. The natural resources of the territory went largely
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unexplored as the Abenaki population dwindled and the region became a deliberately
unsettled space under British rule.
The way the region was used by the colonial government was changed after the
American Revolution. British Loyalists headed north in search of territory still held by the
Crown and colonial officials were confronted by the problem of finding them a place to
settle while keeping a firm hold on the rest of their North American colonies. This led to
the Royal Constitution Act of 1791, which established elected houses of assembly in
Upper and Lower Canada to appease any rebellious sentiments that may have been
prevalent following the American and French Revolutions. British officials decided that
the unsettled buffer-zone was the ideal place for a strong and loyal Anglophone
settlement to neutralize radical American sentiments and the growing French Canadian
population. In many ways, the British saw this region as “empty land” waiting for what
they believed to be the proper type of settlers. The presence of the Abenaki was
negligible. Lower Canada was to become pacified and civilized through a British
understanding of the land in l’Estrie.
The Abenaki used the land for small hunting and fishing communal settlements
along rivers, but the British method was more widespread and focused on individual land
ownership and use. In addition to these two systems was yet another land-based ideology
in the surrounding area based on the French seigneurial system. British officials wanted
the region to be in sharp contrast with the Francophone seigneuries found in Lower
Canada, which they saw as the product of an antiquated land management system.66
Seigneuries were rectangular tracts of land lining the banks of the St. Lawrence and other
rivers, which were necessary for communication and transportation. No new seigneuries
were formed after the Conquest as British officials were committed to a strict land
management system in which land was purchased rather than granted, and square lots
were sold far from access roads and rivers. Townships were established in the buffer-zone
region of l’Estrie, and showed the British Crown’s determination to bring its North
American colonies into a different type of order.
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The townships of l’Estrie were first surveyed and mapped between 1792 and
1808,67 just before the region was opened to Anglophone settlers. The number of British
Loyalists who moved to the townships is disputed in the literature. Historian J.I. Little
writes that the region was a place where “land-hungry Americans,” not Loyalists,
settled.68 However, historian Gilles Parent claims, “l’arpentage des townships, terminé
vers 1796, est suivi par l’établissement de centaines de Loyalists en provenance des EtatsUnis.”69 Despite these conflicting perspectives, Americans, both loyal and independent,
settled in the region in the early 19th century and the boundary between the new United
States and British Lower Canada was blurred.
Settlement in the region was a complicated and slow process that involved a
leader-associate system of land purchasing,70 which required a group of interested settlers
to designate a “leader” who would make the journey to l’Estrie to survey the township he
and his fellow associates wanted to purchase. Purchasers were often overwhelmed by the
“wild” nature of the region.71 With its dense, dark forests, the land seemed too rugged,
too secluded, and certainly not ideal for farming because of the amount of work it would
take to clear fields. British officials needed to tame the region in order to draw people to
it.
The construction of roads was intended to make the region less isolated and more
accessible. The first of these was cleared by the British Army in 1810 and ran from
Shipton Township down to the American border where it connected with a more complex
transportation network.72 Named after James Craig, the Governor of Lower Canada,
Craig’s Road ran past the future site of Asbestos. However, both the Governor and the
road quickly became unpopular with French Canadians. Craig was removed from office
while the road was being constructed because of his vocal mistrust of the Francophone
population,73 and the road became unusable after the first thaw in 1811 washed it out.
British plans to use roads and immigration to tame the land of l’Estrie had failed.
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Following the Conquest of 1763 the Francophone population of Lower Canada
doubled approximately every twenty-five years.74 Because of this growth and the
subsequent overcrowding of seigneuries, the population looked towards l’Estrie as a new
place to settle, but the unfamiliar township system, the isolation of the region, and the
presence of British and American settlers prevented many from doing so.75 By 1839, the
British American Land Company (BAL Co.), in possession of 1,250,000 acres, had a
monopoly over the region’s land sales.76 In accordance with the colonial aspirations for
l’Estrie, BAL Co. was not interested in selling township land to Francophone farmers and
instead advertised heavily in major British urban centres during the 1830s.
BAL Co. promotional literature contained no reference to transportation problems
or the ruggedness of the land and instead focused on, “[t]he undulating nature of the
ground, and the fertility of irrigation from the numerous streams of running water…in
which respect its superiority over other parts of Canada and the United States is distinctly
established.”77 Settlers lured by these descriptions were confronted by a crude reality
when they arrived in the region, but it was often too late to back out of the sale.
While this was an effective way to sell land in l’Estrie, the Rebellion of 1837-38
in Lower Canada put a freeze on British immigration78 and gave the growing French
Canadian population a chance to respond to the colonial government’s township system.
Patriot leader Louis-Joseph Papineau drew up 92 Resolutions in order to advocate radical
changes in how Lower Canada was managed. Resolution 84 was an attack on how land
was sold in l’Estrie, and an insistence that seigneuries replace the townships.79 These
demands were discussed and debated throughout the province. Although the rebellion
failed, many of its goals were soon fulfilled. By 1840 the Francophone population in
Lower Canada had risen to 600,000 from 335,000 in 1815 and needed the land available
in l’Estrie to expand on.80 The rebellion was over, but the issues it raised remained.
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Rather than address the pressing issue of overpopulation in Lower Canada, the
colonial government focused on establishing the Canadian Geological Survey (CGS). The
CGS began in 1842 with the global recognition of the earth sciences and the wealth that
could come from understanding what lay beneath the land. The fact that gold was found
along the border of l’Estrie and the Chaudière River in 1823 also contributed to the shift
in how the region was understood by colonial officials: moving from a place of settlement
struggles and rebellious targets, the area became a potential gold mine.
This new way of looking at and using the land added to the colonial government’s
creation story of l’Estrie and reclassified the region according to new ideas of practicality
and use. William Edmund Logan, a Montrealer schooled in Britain, was appointed head
of the CGS in 1842 and he explored l’Estrie until his death in 1875.81 The region had a
geological past that captured his curiosity, and Logan submitted the CGS’s first survey
report on Quebec in 1849, offering a detailed description of the land where Asbestos
would be founded.
In charge of the survey assignments, Logan chose l’Estrie as his area of focus
because of the wide variety of minerals found throughout the region. His report focused
on the region’s most distinctive feature, the Appalachians, and what the land surrounding
the mountains offered to settlers and the colonial government.82 Fellow surveyor
Alexander Murray concentrated on what lay below the earth’s crust and examined the
geological history of l’Estrie, focusing solely on finding rocks and minerals that could be
of value. This was why, when he became the first to discover asbestos in the region, he
gave it only a brief mention in his report before moving on. The mineral held little
practical application and no economic value in this period. When Murray wrote about the
mineral’s presence in Shipton Township, where Asbestos came to be located, he stated,
The ranges of serpentine and some of their immediately associated strata
would probably afford a large amount and variety of material for
ornamental architecture and purposes of decoration…this rock, when free
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from veins of asbestus [sic], is in general susceptible of a very high polish,
and in the district displays a great diversity of the richest green colours.83
Murray’s dismissal of asbestos in favour of an ornamental rock demonstrates its lack of
value in the mid-19th century, but his observations offer a detailed description of how
asbestos appeared in its rawest form, deep within the earth. Asbestos hindered what
Murray otherwise considered valuable rocks and minerals, but his descriptions would be
crucial for prospectors looking for the fibre later in the century when it had increased in
value, because they gave key geologically-based indicators as to where it could be found.
Murray did not mention the mineral in his list of “various substances capable of
application to useful purposes,”84 and because he did not have the technology to dig
deeper beneath the surface and trace the asbestos deposits, the veins of fibre running
through the serpentine rock did not appear extensive. The winding nature of the asbestos
veins through and around more desirable rocks and minerals meant that the land in this
area of the region had little value. Logan’s and Murray’s surveys did not launch the start
of an asbestos industry in Quebec, but they did have an impact on how l’Estrie would be
reshaped to accommodate new aspirations for the region.
One of the initial goals of the colonial government when opening l’Estrie for
settlement, aside from creating a “truly patriotic” Anglophone presence in French
Canada,85 was to create a thriving agricultural community based on the British land
management system. After exploring l’Estrie, Logan reported that the region’s
agricultural prospects were limited because of the type of soil found there and the
difficulties that came with being so far from reliable transportation links and markets.86
Just five years earlier, BAL Co. had revised its promotional literature to highlight the
improvements that had been made to the roadways in the region, as well as the close
proximity of the townships to major cities like Montreal and Quebec, Boston and New
York,87 but Logan’s report challenged these claims, as it cost approximately fifty percent
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more to ship grain from l’Estrie to larger markets.88 Lack of access continued to hinder
the region’s economic success, and without major improvements to the transportation
network it would not meet the aspirations of the colonial government.
Acknowledging this problem in his report, Logan believed that seasonal fluxes
that made the land too wet or too dry were the main obstacle to maintaining reliable
transportation networks in the region until a railway could be established.89 Roads had to
be cleared and re-cleared every season to retain shape and structure on land that was in
constant motion, but a railway running through specific, well-suited parts of the region
could overpower the land. This idea complemented what colonial officials had already
been deliberating,90 and plans were made to bring the train to l’Estrie.
The decision to build railways through the region was made with a commitment to
social, economic, and environmental progress and change. The land would be radically
reshaped to fit new technologies that could withstand seasonal changes that had existed
for millennia. Although people traditionally settled new territory along riverbanks, the
technological changes the railway brought to the land trumped the advantages of living by
a river. With the opening of the Grand Trunk Railway in 1852, people flocked to l’Estrie
to settle along the line, which bypassed the future site of Asbestos by four miles.91 The
colonial government hoped that this improvement to the region’s transportation system
would help increase the Anglophone population in the area92 and high hopes were placed
on the “most gigantic railway in the world”93 as it spread throughout the region, reaching
the ports at Montreal, Quebec City, and Portland, Maine. The line ensured that
agricultural goods produced in the townships could reach larger markets, but more
important than the goods the Grand Trunk exported from the region were the people and
industry the railway brought into it.
As the CGS made its way through l’Estrie, the population crisis in the rest of
Lower Canada was worsening. No longer having any room to expand the seigneuries,
French Canadians of the area began to emmigrate to the north-eastern United States en
masse because land was easy to purchase and the obstacles that made settling in l’Estrie
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difficult were not present. In a report to the Legislative Assembly of the United Canadas,
a special committee on the issues of settlement in l’Estrie reported positively that, “before
thirty years are past, we may find more French Canadians in the States of Vermont and of
Maine, than in the Eastern Townships.”94 While this was something the government
applauded, the Catholic clergy feared that living among revolutionary Americans would
negatively influence French Canadians, and priests urged them to settle in l’Estrie
instead.95 Because of this, the region went from being sixty-six percent Anglophone
before the Grand Trunk, to a French Canadian majority just twenty years later.96
The change in the population of l’Estrie during the second half of the 19th century
was termed a “conquête pacifique” at the time by Quebec nationalist Jules-Paul
Tardivel.97 Although peaceful, this conquest over the land and the population that
controlled it revolutionized the way l’Estrie was perceived by those who had aspirations
for it to be an Anglophone safe-haven in Quebec, especially because it coincided with a
transformation of the environment. By 1862 the region had reached a population of
200,000 largely due to the influx of French Canadians,98 but although these new settlers
came from agricultural communities, the economic focus of l’Estrie was shifting towards
the industrialization of the land and new creation story.
While some of the French Canadians who emigrated to l’Estrie in the second half
of the 19th century began farms within the township system, many followed the railway
lines around the region, getting temporary seasonal work in the new industrial centres that
grew along them.99 This marked a radical shift in how the Francophone population of
Lower Canada chose to earn a living and use the land. The Grand Trunk brought a new
culture to the region in the form of French Canadians, while subsequent lines brought
industries that would exploit the land in new ways. The construction of a railroad tears up
the landscape, smoothes it down, and makes it “efficient.” Land in l’Estrie was altered
and built up so that seasonal fluxes in water levels would not sink or flood the tracks as
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they had done to the roads. This process mirrored the work of Logan and Murray during
their surveys of the region because it once again uncovered the valuable rocks and
minerals under the earth’s crust.
The construction of the Quebec Central railway, which ran through l’Estrie on its
way from Lake Huron to Quebec City,100 uncovered massive amounts of asbestos in the
northeastern portion of the region near the community of Thetford in the 1870s. The
claim to this discovery was contested between an Anglophone named Robert Ward and a
Francophone named Fecteau,101 which illustrated how the region was changing in the
second half of the 19th century with a new population and a new way of using the land.
The discovery at Thetford coincided with a growing marketability for the fireproof
mineral. While it was relatively valueless in 1848, by the time it was uncovered along the
tracks of the Quebec Central, American manufacturers had started to specialize in
asbestos-based building products to meet the growing demands of industrializing
America.102 L’Estrie was quickly becoming a region in which different factions of the
population—English, French, upper class, working class—would fight over who
controlled the land, and asbestos would often be central to this struggle.
For many years the deposits at Thetford, 100km away from Asbestos, were
considered the largest in the world and the area surrounding the growing community was
known as the “asbestos belt.”103 By the 1850s, the presence of asbestos was well known
in l’Estrie, and because of Murray’s detailed descriptions, the mineral was easily
identifiable to those without geological training, especially because it often appeared in
outcroppings of serpentine rock and required no digging. This was how gentleman farmer
William H. Jeffrey discovered the mineral at the site of Asbestos today in the late 1870s
and convinced Charles Webb, who owned the land, to go into business with him. Jeffrey
controlled the mine operations and Webb controlled the budget.104 While neither knew
they would be carving out what would become the world’s largest asbestos mine, Jeffrey
and Webb’s efforts in 1879 began a major redefinition of the land on which the town of
Asbestos would be established.
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A Land Revolution, 1879-1899
The sharp influx of French Canadians into the region led to a rapid rise in
urbanization and industrialization. The asbestos industry was one of the major factors in
this radical change to how the land was seen and used, as it altered the township system
and created small mining communities that grew and shrank according to profits.
Changes to the land and how people used it came quickly as farmers turned into industrial
entrepreneurs and drastically altered the ecology of the region by ripping up trees and
crops, and digging deep into the rock underneath. A year following Jeffrey’s discovery of
asbestos, the Acte général des mines du Québec was put in place to monitor the new
industries of the region and ensure the government received a portion of any profits that
came from the land.105 In 1881, the Quebec government appointed Joseph Obalski as
director of mining services. Obalski would help redefine how people and land interacted
in the region: if l’Estrie was not going to succeed as an agrarian, English society that
would eventually dominate French Canada, it would be a region where the land and the
people would be used to their fullest economic potential.
The way the Jeffrey Mine was created illustrated this new philosophy. Work
began in 1881, with Jeffrey and Webb employing fourteen men: seven French Canadians
and seven British immigrants.106 Although it is unclear which of these men were in
supervisory roles, and if one linguistic group was favoured over another, the blend of
English and French cultures in the 1880s established a foundation for the development of
a local cultural identity in Asbestos. The work was slow and arduous, and while asbestos
can be extracted via underground shafts, the Jeffrey Mine was to be opencast, an
economically practical method107 that had a tremendous ecological effect on the land and
landscape, and changed how it was understood by the people who lived around it.
The creation of the Jeffrey Mine was a long process that involved a real physical
struggle with the land. Operations could only be carried out in the summer months when
the earth was not frozen due to the extreme cold of winter, or soaking wet due to the
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thaws of the spring.108 The first stage in the process involved a crew of men clearing the
land of its surface soil with picks, shovels, and the occasional ox-driven scraping cart.
They dug between five and twenty five feet down into the land until the bottle-green
serpentine rock housing the veins of asbestos was uncovered. One man holding a drill-bit
and three or four others hitting the bit with sledgehammers then drilled holes into the
rock. Young boys were always present in mining operations at this time, and at the
Jeffrey Mine, they carried buckets of drinking water from crew to crew. Explosives were
then packed into these holes and large pieces of rock surrounded by asbestos veins were
blasted free.109 This was labour-intensive, hard physical work that allowed these men to
gain a firm understanding of the land from the inside out. Once the serpentine was twice
broken apart by explosives, “the pieces containing the asbestos are then removed to the
cobbing shop, where boys break them up with small hammers and assort the asbestos
according to quality.”110 The presence of boys during the creation of a mine illustrates
how a new mining culture was being created in the region: these boys were coming of age
as they helped industrialize the region and this was how they were taught land should be
used. No longer raised on farms, these young men came to know the land through mining,
and this knowledge influenced how the local cultural identity developed.
The dangers involved with blasting large rocks out of the ground also meant that
the culture growing around the Jeffrey Mine was one that understood physical risk from
the very beginning. In the 19th century, the medical profession in Quebec was deeply
divided along linguistic lines. Although the province was the first in Canada to form a
regulated medical society,111 until 1843 McGill University was the only institution in
Quebec with the ability to grant medical degrees in English.112 This limited the
accessibility of the profession until Francophone institutions were given the same
granting rights, but because of continued linguistic barriers, their Association des
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médecins de langue française de l’Amérique du Nord, established in 1902,113 exchanged
knowledge and theories with the medical community in France, not North America.114
Furthermore, because the Catholic Church was responsible for establishing and running
hospitals and clinics in Quebec,115 medical knowledge was often overpowered by
religious ideology, which distanced health care from the scientific method.116 Health care
was not a prime concern for the workers carving out the Jeffrey Mine and access to
doctors was limited in the region. Miners had to accept the risks that came with their
occupation and if they were injured, there was a chance they would die. The major health
threat associated with asbestos was the act of mining itself; there was no awareness of the
specific dangers the mineral posed to human health.
It was time-consuming and dangerous to create the opencast Jeffrey Mine. The
mineral can and has been mined using both underground and opencast methods, largely
depending on the technology available at the time and the way the deposit is laid out in
the land. Because market prices for asbestos were based on fibre length—with the longest
being the most valuable—opencast mining often provided the best access to full veins of
the mineral. Hard rock resources, such as coal and silver, have traditionally been mined
underground because their market value was based on quantity, not size.117 Underground
mining has historically only been used for the major asbestos deposits found in Canada,
Russia, and South Africa when opencast methods could not be employed due to lack of
physical space. In the time and place the Jeffrey Mine was being established, opencast
mining had strong advantages over underground. Engineer Fritz Cirkel explained to the
Canadian Department of Mines that opencast pits allowed for easier supervision, made
total extraction of the asbestos fibre possible due to the lack of underground structural
pillars, and provided clean air for workers to breathe, which suggests that the Jeffrey
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Mine did not threaten human health as underground mines did.118 The disadvantages of
opencast mining were that it was difficult to remove barren serpentine rock, operations
were often halted because of poor weather, and there was a limited amount of space
where waste rock and fibre could be dumped.119 Because of the amount of unused farm
land available to them, Jeffrey and Webb committed to the opencast method and a
community was created around the mine.
By 1884, a post office had been built close to the pit with a sign on the front of it
that read “Asbestos.”120 The town of Asbestos had officially begun, and the fact that it
was given an English name by a government agency, rather than the French equivalent,
“amiante,” suggests the extent to which Anglophone land ownership and government
connections dominated the increasingly Francophone-worked region. Change came
quickly to the new community and the families of the miners that once lived four miles
away in Danville slowly began to move to Asbestos as production increased and a local
identity began to take shape. As this happened, a renewed interest in the land grew. The
mineral’s valueless image of the 1840s had changed, and the CGS reported, “[n]ear
Danville, four miles from the Grand Trunk railway, a mine of considerable extent has
been operated for several years….This industry has already grown to large proportions,
and bids fair to become one of the most important in the Dominion.”121 Inspired by the
economic potential of the Jeffrey Mine described in the CGS, surveyors and prospectors
in the 1880s scoured l’Estrie for untapped asbestos deposits with which to earn their
fortunes, and they used the CGS to search for a more detailed understanding of how and
where asbestos occurred in the land. The CGS Report of 1885 noted that the deposits “are
extensive and probably continuous at certain depths nor far from the surface [as]
evidenced by the frequent outcrops, which often comprise large areas of twelve to twenty
square miles in extent.”122 This was promising information to those interested in taking a
lead role in the industrialization of l’Estrie, but making the region’s land useful and
profitable continued to be a challenge.
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The Jeffrey Mine was thriving, and went from employing 14 men working during
the summer months in 1881, to 70 men working all seasons and extracting 15 tonnes of
the mineral each week in 1885.123 This created a less transient community at Asbestos
than was common in the other industrial towns of l’Estrie and the mine’s constant use
drastically changed the rhythms of the land. While 15 tonnes a week was enough to
ensure the Jeffrey Mine was economically viable, it was a small amount compared to the
extraction levels at the mines near Thetford, where the real asbestos fever was centred.
The CGS reported in 1885 that in the four mines surrounding Thetford there were 250
men employed in “the largest and most important operations” in the region, extracting
1,100 tonnes during the summer months alone.124 The Jeffrey Mine was decidedly second
rate in comparison and was constantly being referred to as “the small mine near Danville”
long after Asbestos was incorporated as a village in 1899. No one had yet assessed the
true value of the land at Asbestos.
In 1886 Canada showcased the dominion’s natural resources at the Colonial and
Indian Exhibition in London, England. Referring to the Thetford display, the official
report noted that, “much attention was attracted by it, and many enquiries were made
concerning it. Several asbestos properties were sold as a result of the information
given.”125 This was a positive reception, but the properties sold were far away from
Asbestos because surveyors believed that although the Jeffrey Mine’s output was
“considerable,”
the serpentine [t]here is quite limited, with steep sides all round, and
contains a number of veins of asbestos, mostly of small size, though the
quality of the fibre is good. Faults have affected the value of this property
considerably, some very good veins with a thickness reaching two inches
having been cut off completely at a depth of 50 feet from the surface.126
The linear mineral deposits laid out like unrolled yarn at Thetford required multiple mines
to access the extent of the fibre, but the fibres at Asbestos, almost 100km west of the
region’s “asbestos belt,” swirled through a rounded serpentine knoll,127 resulting in short,
broken veins that resembled a brittle bird’s nest—and required only one mine. Because
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the value of asbestos in the late 19th century was based on fibre length to ensure quicker
processing and spinning into a wool-like yarn that could be woven into fabric, Thetford’s
mineral was more desirable.128 Furthermore, the area surrounding the Jeffrey Mine was
still used for farming even though land ripe for industrialization was being purchased at
$5 an acre.129 This was why the CGS stressed that “there is no apparent reason why
[asbestos] should not be found in paying quantity at other points, and it is possible that
subsequent exploration will largely extend the area where profitable mining operations
can be carried on.”130
Quebec’s Director of Mines matched this encouragement. Since his appointment
in 1881, Joseph Obalski had visited mines throughout Quebec and released a book in
1889 that promoted the province’s minerals to international markets.131 Because Obalski
was an engineer and not a geologist, his publications differed somewhat from those of the
CGS, but shared with them an overall excitement about the asbestos industry, that “has
already assumed so much development that the output, which only amounted at the outset
to a few hundred tons had risen...to 6,000 in 1889.”132 The Jeffrey Mine contributed 207
tonnes to this total, and 400 tonnes the following year, but these were insignificant figures
compared to those coming from Thetford, which mined 4,803 tonnes in 1890.133
The exponential increase in the amount of asbestos extracted in l’Estrie fuelled
Obalski’s excitement over its importance to the economic future of Quebec. He wrote that
the people of the region produced more asbestos than anywhere else in the world, because
of its sophisticated transportation network and abundance of the mineral. He also
expressed his enthusiasm for the industry when he stated that a “remarkable fact…is that,
while the production has increased with the demand, prices have also risen, so that, of late
years, asbestos lands have been eagerly sought after. This is owing to the new uses which
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are being daily discovered.”134 Because of rising prices and demand, there was a sharp
increase in prospectors throughout l’Estrie who hoped to take advantage of the land.
Although the Jeffrey Mine was profitable, by 1887 ambition had exceeded ability
and the amount of men employed in the pit was reduced.135 The industry was not growing
because it focused only on the extraction of the raw mineral, which when taken from the
Jeffrey Mine, was sent to the more industrialized United States or Great Britain to be
further processed,136 limiting the type and extent of employment in the mining
communities of l’Estrie. What happened to the fibres after they were extracted did not
interest mine owners or the Canadian government, and geologists constantly urged the
development of more asbestos pits, not factories. The industrialization of the region only
focused on the potential wealth of natural resources in their raw form, and factories did
not yet complement how people saw and used the land in l’Estrie. The lack of factories
remained even as the asbestos industry led the region in new extraction technologies to
boost the amount of fibre mined.137
The first mechanization of the industry came in the late 1880s with the
introduction of compressed air and steam power for drilling blasting holes and hoisting
ore in Thetford, not Asbestos.138 Production at the Jeffrey Mine had dwindled, and when
Obalski visited in 1889, he noted that the pit was approximately 100 feet deep and,
located on a plateau about 180 feet above the surrounding lands. The mine
has…yielded in all about 3,080 tons of asbestos. Its present annual output
is about 325 tons, with an average staff of 35 workmen. It is altogether
worked by hand labor, without the help of any machinery. The asbestos is
of very good quality, although the fibres appear short. This mine…is not
worked in winter time.139
In 1885, the Jeffrey Mine had employed 70 men, extracted over 700 tonnes of asbestos
annually, and was worked yearlong. Four years later, operations had not advanced
technologically and production had sharply declined in every other respect. Half of the
mine’s workforce had moved on, and while this was in part because the distance between
Asbestos and the Grand Trunk meant transportation costs were high, the main reason was
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that the mine was poorly managed. Neither Jeffrey nor Webb was an engineer or a
geologist and their understanding of the land at Asbestos was too rudimentary for it to be
worked to its fullest potential. However, their lack of knowledge was indicative of the
time, and British geologist Robert H. Jones wrote of them in his 1897 book on global
asbestos deposits, “it must not be supposed, that [Jeffrey and Webb’s] want of knowledge
was in any way blameable, because if this were so, then it must be said that all those
commercial and scientific men who had, year after year, examined the property, or
viewed it mineralogically, were equally so. Nothing of the peculiar nature and quality of
the serpentine in which [they] worked was then known.”140 Those who ran the Jeffrey
Mine—and the government engineers who studied it—did not yet know the economic
value of the land at Asbestos.
Despite the example of the dwindling Jeffrey Mine, surveyors and prospectors
continued to have faith in the land of l’Estrie. The Canadian economy was undergoing a
depression from 1873-1896,141 and the dominion had only its natural resources on which
to rely. Seeing an opportunity, the CGS report of 1887 stressed, “a thorough re-survey of
these areas is of great importance, since lands which now have a comparatively small
value may in a very short time be valued at very large sums.”142 Although it appeared that
some mines were failing, the rising value of asbestos in international markets made
prospectors look at the land in l’Estrie again. The result was an asbestos rush that left
many of those untrained in identifying profitable deposits financially ruined and the land
torn apart.
Obalski urged caution to those in search of asbestos when he wrote, “serpentine
fills a great place in the Eastern Townships, but workable asbestos only occurs in a very
small section.”143 Many prospectors wrongly believed that if they found a serpentine
outcropping, large asbestos deposits were not far away, which resulted in many failed
mines scarring the region. In response, Thetford engineer L.A. Klein wrote,
it takes more than the finding of the serpentine to have a paying asbestus
[sic] mine...While the undoubted success of some of the existing mines, in
combination with erroneous ideas…nursed by speculators, lead many to
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believe that they struck a fortune when a locality was shown to them
which contained serpentine…with occasionally a small asbestus seam in
it…not one enterprise has proved successful in this industry which has not
had anything else to look on than…a good colour.144
As though to reinforce Klein’s point, in 1892, just as the American asbestos
manufacturing companies amalgamated under the H.W. Johns Manufacturing Co., the
Jeffrey Mine went bankrupt and was shut down,145 despite the fact that just one year
earlier, it was known in the industry as “one of the best” producers of asbestos.146
Examples like this closure led Commissioner of Crown Lands E.S. Flynn to announce
that the mining industry in Canada had not reached a point in which it could be
considered profitable.147
One reason for the Jeffrey Mine’s closing was Jeffrey himself. He was not wellconnected and chose not to belong to the Asbestos Club, an association of mine owners
around Thetford who met monthly and who would have exposed him to new connections
and technologies that would have allowed him to mine the land more successfully.148 The
Asbestos Club was an important factor in the success of the Thetford Mines because it
facilitated an exchange of knowledge and extraction techniques among mine owners and
created a strong community identity amongst the local miners, regardless of which
company they worked for. The fact that Asbestos was located 70km away from Thetford
and that Jeffrey Mine owners never joined the regional collective, meant that the
community was both isolated and individual, which helped shape the local-global cultural
identity this dissertation will trace, despite the mine’s closure. Furthermore, Jeffrey was a
farmer, and did not understand the geology behind the unique deposits at Asbestos,
compared to later owners of the mine who would help channel this distinctiveness to
make the mine the largest of its kind in the world. Jones described Jeffrey as being
“somewhat obstinate and self-willed, and strictly a man of the old school—independent in
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his ideas, by no means highly educated, and never much inclined to move out of the old
grooves.”149
By 1892, Jeffrey was 83 years old and the four and a half to five tonnes of
asbestos extracted daily from his mine were not enough to pay the $4,000 in monthly
wages.150 Liquidators W. Farwell and F.C Thompson took possession of the land.151 This
was a shock to many in the region, as months earlier the Richmond Guardian visited
Asbestos and reported that
five or six years ago, Mr. Webb’s farm house, Mr. Morrill’s, and the
school house near by, were then the only buildings near the mine, while at
the mine itself, the office, a small slight wooden structure for the manager,
a blacksmith’s shop, and a couple of rough sheds for sheltering the men…
were all that was to be seen; there is now a village crowding round…and
substantial houses 80 in number…and between 600 and 700 people, all
dependent on the mine, inhabit them…152
A community had been established next to the Jeffrey Mine, but being completely
dependent on the industrial success of the land, families and single workers quickly left
Asbestos. The character of the optimistic mining town changed quickly in 1892 along
with the other failed mines in l’Estrie, as the workforce in the region became transient,
flocking to new pits when they opened and retreating back to the more stable mines at
Thetford when they closed. As the land became increasingly industrialized in l’Estrie,
worker transiency became widespread as industries rose and fell according to market
demand and successful management of land and people. Although Asbestos had a school,
a general store and a post office, when the mine closed, the community did as well.
Mine closures were common in late-19th century Quebec, and many industry
leaders blamed closures like the one at the Jeffrey Mine on the provincial government’s
management of the land.153 According to Honoré Mercier, premier from 1887 to 1891,
provincial revenue belonged to the Francophone population, not English colonizers who
controlled industrial development.154 The success of the province would lie in its ability
to do what it wished with its natural resources and reap the profits that resulted from these
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ventures. In 1890, Mercier imposed a 3% tax on the output of Quebec mines and a new
bill that mandated all mining land lying idle for more than two years would become the
possession of the state.155 This was widely unpopular with industry leaders who believed
it would “convert the Quebec mining men into straight anarchists”156 because of their
objection to government intervention in business. The Mining Bill amendments were
repealed under the new government in 1892 because of this outrage, which the Canadian
Mining and Mechanical Review deemed part of Mercier’s “race and revenge”157 style of
governing. Following in the tradition of Louis-Joseph Papineau, Mercier was not the first
leader in Quebec who emphasized the importance of the land to French Canadians, nor
would he be the last.
Despite new taxes and political disagreements, the Jeffrey Mine did not remain
closed for long. In 1893 the Danville Slate Co. bought the 75 acres of land given up by
Jeffrey and Webb the year before. Despite its previous bankruptcy, industry reports
indicated that this “property is one of exceptional value, and will be exploited
vigorously.”158 A new workforce was called to Asbestos and operations at the mine began
once more, but with a much different dynamic. After Confederation in 1867, the
provincial government of Quebec introduced policies to deter British immigration, which
resulted in a Francophone majority of 69% in the region by 1890.159 Another reason for
this was the increased development of factory and mining communities in the region that
drew young French Canadians away from the overcrowded farms of their fathers and into
an urban environment.160 L’Estrie was now being created as an industrialized,
Francophone region largely due to mining, and both Thetford and Asbestos were home to
French Canadian majorities by the 1890s.
This majority influenced the local cultural identity formed in the years of Jeffrey
and Webb by establishing a divided, yet connected, Francophone working-class majority
and Anglophone managing elite. As the Danville Slate Co. took over the Jeffrey Mine in
1893, Feodor Boas became the new man in charge operations and brought a different
understanding of the land than Jeffrey, Webb, or any of the engineers and geologists who
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had previously studied the deposit. Jones wrote that Boas was “not an asbestos man, nor
did he make any pretence to a knowledge of mineralogy, but all throughout the province
he was highly esteemed for his uprightness, shrewdness, and sound common sense.”161
His way of looking at the land created an asbestos revolution and impacted the local
cultural identity of Asbestos in ways still seen today.
Along with the pit, the Danville Slate Co. inherited all the waste rock that had
been taken from the mine over the previous fifteen years.162 While Jeffrey believed this to
be useless rock that hindered the success of the mine, Boas saw it as the source of its
future wealth. He discovered what Jeffrey did not notice because of his lack of training:
the piles of waste taken from the Jeffrey Mine since 1881 were actually piles of asbestic,
asbestos fibres thought to have little value because they were too short to be woven.163
The presence of asbestic was one of the reasons Jeffrey, who prided himself on his strict
grading system while being unaware of the wealth he was discarding,164 struggled and
why geologists did not believe the mine was as valuable as the pits around Thetford. The
way Boas looked at the rounded knoll in which the deposit was found led to yet another
redefinition of the land, the people, and the town of Asbestos.
Although asbestic could not be woven into cloth, it could, among other things, be
added to lead paint to fireproof walls and applied to roofing shingles to contain fires in
communities where houses were built close together. The once paltry demand for asbestic
had risen so much in international markets by the time Boas discovered it in Asbestos that
for years he had the workforce at the Jeffrey Mine focus exclusively on the piles of waste
that surrounded the pit.165 Boas’ discovery produced an asbestos revolution. He found that
once the surface rock was removed, up to 90% of the Jeffrey Mine was long asbestos
fibres surrounded by asbestic,166 which meant that most of what was taken from the pit
could be extracted and sold with little waste. The land was transformed into a place of
extraordinary value, even surpassing the deposits at Thetford.
Because of the sudden demand for asbestic, work at the Jeffrey Mine began again
and old employees mixed with new as the population of Asbestos rapidly doubled in
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size.167 After one year, Boas employed 150 men, and by 1895, 400 men worked the
mine.168 The village was home to 1,100 people, a chapel was built to accommodate the
growing community, and Feodor Boas’ discovery of asbestic began a period of marked
prosperity. As other mines in l’Estrie continued to fail due to misunderstood deposits and
poor extraction techniques, the Jeffrey Mine’s success increased exponentially, which
contrasted with the steady growth and gradual collapse of other mines in the region and
the communities established around them.
The discovery of asbestic at the Jeffrey Mine coincided with a boom in the market
for the product, and a “golden age of capitalism” in Quebec based on the rapid growth of
industries that exploited the province’s natural resources.169 This growth reflected the new
way the land was being used in the province and increased industrialization had a strong
impact on the ecology of l’Estrie. These changes could all be seen at the Jeffrey Mine,
which quickly grew to become the most profitable asbestos mine in the province:
this mine never till now attained any special significance, [but] it has
suddenly sprung into great importance, attaining also considerable
scientific interest…[I]n the shortest possible space of time, it has stepped
in front of all the other mines previously named, and effectually [sic]
revolutionized the whole asbestos industry, by bringing the use of the
important mineral it deals with within the reach of the whole world. Many
very important mines throughout the district are in consequence of the
discoveries here, now closed.170
By 1896, the Jeffrey Mine produced the most asbestos in the province.171
The dramatic increase in population and production at the end of the 19th century
radically altered the land at Asbestos and how people understood it. Bigger and better
factories were constructed, a railway line was built that connected the mine to the Grand
Trunk, and blocks of new houses, stores, and churches framed the outskirts of the pit as a
community was formed.172 This was not a mining town that anyone believed would go
bust again, and this sense of permanence was inspired by the success of the Jeffrey Mine,
which influenced a growing local cultural identity.
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In 1896, Boas continued his efforts to make the Jeffrey Mine profitable and he
applied to the United States Patent Office for his invention of asbestic wall plaster. He
found that when mixed with quicklime, asbestic forms a wall plaster that “is fireproof to
the highest degree and will not crack or curl under the action of heat…It is also…a bad
conductor of sound. As it is stronger than any other plaster, it is not necessary to have as
thick a coating applied as usual, and additional economy, with a reduction of weight on
the building, result.”173 The plaster Boas invented using Jeffrey Mine asbestic
revolutionized building materials at the turn of the 20th century, with hospitals, schools,
and homes containing this fireproof, soundproof, long-lasting mineral.
Boas went to Britain to secure new contracts and wrote that his invention was
based on the issue of land use: “[t]his waste material accumulates at the mines and around
the factories, and is a trouble and expense to the industry. Many attempts have been made
to utilize this waste, but previous to my invention without success. My invention
therefore provides a useful outlet for this waste material.”174 The overseas contracts
committed the Jeffrey Mine to extracting 5,000 tonnes of fibre a year175 and the new uses
Boas found for the ore extracted from the mine, now under the control of the British
Asbestos and Asbestic Co., complemented other innovations and assured community
members that they had a prosperous future ahead of them. When the pit was connected to
the Grand Trunk in 1897, this belief was confirmed in the minds of the 300 employees
and their families who had made Asbestos their home.176
The confidence in prosperity was the result of a sudden rise in the use of
electricity in industry and other walks of life at the end of the 19th century. Early electrical
technology was a major fire hazard and short asbestic fibres packed to make fireproof
insulation, combined with a layer of Boas’ wall plaster, was the perfect solution to the
problem. Electricity and asbestos, both readily available in Quebec, grew rapidly side by
side and changed Asbestos from a transient mining camp to a permanent community. The
local cultural identity was greatly affected by their industrial success, which only
continued to grow with the construction of a five-storey mill beside the open pit. Jones
described the mill as being “arranged by the hillside [so] that the laden wagons may drive
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straight through the doorways and along the passages, to deliver and take up their loads at
the required points, on four out of the five stories, the building in every part being
excellently ventilated, and well lighted by electricity.”177 The mill and its size were
indicators of how successful the land had become through the labour of the local
population. The fact that a mill was now present in Asbestos also demonstrated that the
ways workers interacted with the mineral were growing, allowing for a broader local
knowledge of asbestos, and a stronger connection to the land.
Due to these advancements, in 1899 the community was incorporated as a village
of 700 acres.178 While this was not the first time the area surrounding the Jeffrey Mine
was called “Asbestos,” there was a significant difference between an unofficial sign in
1884 and a solid declaration of place as the community experienced its first major boom.
Calling the village Asbestos symbolized how much the town was controlled by its
minority Anglophone population, which ensured that the name was English, not the
French equivalent, “amiante.” It also acknowledged how completely the local population
and the natural world were connected through labour and community life. Asbestos was
not just what its citizens mined; it was becoming who they were.
The Boom Before the Boom, 1900-1918
Industries that suddenly appear in the wilderness accelerate the process of turning
the land and the people who live and work with it into factories of change.179 In 1900 the
new village of Asbestos began to change rapidly as the demand for the mineral in
international markets sharply increased and, as Obalski wrote, “l’amiante est devenue
dans l’industrie mécanique un produit de première nécessité.”180 The international
demand for the mineral added to the cultural identity in Asbestos and gave the local
population a confidence not yet seen in the community. This confidence was expressed
when the townspeople was faced with tragedy: on 22 March 1900, the five-storey mill at
the Jeffrey Mine burned to the ground due to an electrical fire despite the fact that its roof
was made of asbestos.181 While this was a costly setback, it was the Jeffrey Mine that
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brought the people of Asbestos their success and identity, not the mill. Production was
increased at the mine and even more of the seemingly limitless deposit was extracted,
helping the community survive the economic threat that the destroyed mill posed. After
six months of stalled activity, weekly extraction levels were maintained and shifts were
worked in the mine day and night six days a week in order to meet market demands.182
When disaster struck the community, the people of Asbestos learned that the Jeffrey Mine
would carry them through. Because of this dedication to production, New York’s H.W.
Johns-Manville Co. began to financially back the Asbestos and Asbestic Co.,183 and the
majority of the fibre extracted from the Jeffrey Mine went directly to the American
company’s factories to be processed.
The company had initially become invested in l’Estrie in 1892 when it purchased
Lot 20, Range A in Coleraine Township, near Thetford184 during an economic trend at the
turn of the 20th century when Canada’s export of raw goods to Britain had dropped to
31%, and its exports to the United States had risen to 51%.185 By 1898, the Jeffrey Mine
was sending the majority of its fibre to the H.W. Johns-Manville Co. As the value of
asbestos continued to rise, it became an even more reliable industry in which to invest.
While Britain imported $106,989 worth of raw Canadian asbestos in 1892, the United
States purchased $375,956 worth, and became the leading manufacturer of asbestos-based
products.186 The H.W. Johns-Manville Co. made a deal with the Asbestos and Asbestic
Co. in 1898 to secure the Jeffrey Mine’s asbestic at a higher-than-market rate for its
manufacturing pursuits.187 Striving to capitalize on this deal, in 1901 Boas applied for a
patent for artificial stone, yet another asbestos-based innovation. Because of its ability to
contain sound and fire, this stone, made of asbestic, sand, and lime carbonate, was “a
great advantage in the manufacture of building materials, bricks, slabs,”188 and was
particularly desirable in the rapidly urbanizing United States.
The shift towards American markets inspired many Quebec nationalists, led by
Henri Bourassa, to lobby in favour of breaking away from the British Empire. Grandson
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of Louis-Joseph Papineau and follower of Honoré Mercier, Bourassa believed that all
empires, not just the British, were “hateful” because they restricted the “liberty and
intellectual and moral progress” of their dominions.189 A closer association with the
United States appealed to Bourassa because it suggested a break with Britain, but it also
made him worry that Canada, and Quebec specifically, was trading one empire for
another.190 Bourassa believed that the province’s natural resources were vital to Quebec’s
industrial revolution and so they had to be controlled by French Canadians, not an
Anglophone elite, regardless of where they came from.191 While foreign control seemed
wrong to nationalists, the people of Asbestos, having reached a population of 10,000 in
1901,192 saw the benefits of international investment. Their local identity was tied to
international demand. In 1902 the newly built mill was the largest structure in the district,
and facilitated a considerable increase in production as the global demand for the mineral
rose.193
With the financial support of the H.W. Johns-Manville Co., the Jeffrey Mine grew
at a rapid pace at the beginning of the 20th century, largely due to asbestic becoming
fundamental to a wide variety of manufactured goods. By 1905, mining had radically
altered the land and the pit was 1,200 feet long, 175 feet wide, and 175 feet deep, with
close to 80% of what was taken from the pit being sellable asbestos or asbestic.194 The
Jeffrey Mine became renowned for its production levels at a time when asbestos mining
was the most profitable industry in Quebec and l’Estrie provided 80% of the world’s
supply.195
The rectangular shape of the mine was seen as the most efficient way to facilitate
the extraction of asbestos because it exposed a variety of zones and allowed multiple
crews to extract the fibre at the same time.196 It also indicated that the land at Asbestos
would be devoted to mining: no other use was as profitable. Obalski confirmed this when
he excitedly wrote, “[p]ratiquement on peut dire que la quantité en vue est illimitée, et
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avec le matériel existant, la facilité et le prix limité de la main d’œuvre ainsi que les
facilités d’expédition, il n’y a guère de concurrence à redouter, et un bon avenir est
réservé à cette industrie.”197 The deposits at Asbestos appeared limitless, which was good
news to outside interests and indicated to the townspeople that work would be available in
Asbestos for generations to come.
The growth of the Jeffrey Mine was balanced by the growth of the village of
Asbestos, and as the mine expanded at the start of the 20th century, the community did as
well. In 1903 and 1904, curé Antoine Lebel successfully lobbied to have wooden
sidewalks constructed along the Danville Road from the train station to the church.198
Sidewalks were suitable for a community of families, and their presence in Asbestos was
a sign of a stabilizing local cultural identity, fostered by buoyant markets. By 1905, with
employees at the Jeffrey Mine working an average of 10 hours a day all year long,199 and
the Quebec government putting advertisements in mining magazines promoting the
industry,200 the village of Asbestos constructed an impressive 35,000 feet of wooden
sidewalks along a number of new and expanding roads.201
The community grew rapidly and reaped the benefits of the leading role the
mineral was taking in industrial markets, rising in value by 25% in 1905 alone, and
bringing in $2,162,528.202 As Canada became increasingly industrialized, many resource
industries boomed, but what made the growth of the asbestos industry especially
remarkable was that only a fraction of the mineral’s uses and applications had been
discovered at this time, and market demand and prices would only continue to rise. By
1908, the Shawinigan Water & Power Co. had installed electricity along the limits of the
village, the first telephone lines were being connected, 185 family homes had been
constructed, and the town council had made a commitment to make the “Village
d’Asbestos un centre prospere qui deviendra la Ville d’Asbestos et aussi, a ciel ouvert, la
plus grande mine d’amiante au monde.”203 A strong element of the local cultural identity
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was the global ambition of the people of Asbestos, fuelled by the economic prosperity of
the community’s land.
Throughout the beginning of the 20th century, the Canadian Geological Survey
continued to investigate the land surrounding Asbestos in order to more fully understand
the reasons behind its remarkable wealth. The industry had reached a turning point,
becoming more sophisticated, professional, and profitable, and land management in
Asbestos was unique in the region, focusing on only one mine, compared to the five to six
separate mines operating in Thetford at this time. The CGS reported in 1909 that “[a]side
from the abandoned pits incidental to early prospecting, the only closed works are those
of ill-judged enterprise that probably ought never to have been begun.”204 After the
asbestos revolution created by Feodor Boas, the Jeffrey Mine was no longer one of the
“ill-judged” ventures scarring the landscape of l’Estrie, and by 1909 the CGS noted that it
was, “cut into a series of benches, generally about 8 to 15 feet high, which afford a
number of faces from which the rock can be quarried at the same time...[with] some
underground work…carried on by night.”205 The land continued to be reshaped according
to new knowledge and ideas on the Jeffrey Mine deposits were formed. This had a direct
effect on those who worked in the pit each day. Not only were these workers responsible
for creating these benches around the mine, this new structure required a greater amount
of men to work at different areas and at different levels all at the same time. The mine
was rapidly becoming a giant “factory without a roof” and its workers were vital tools in
the industrialization of the land. These changes helped bring the industry $2,500,000 a
year by combining new extraction technology, this newly structured pit, and vast mineral
deposits.206 The leading newspaper in l’Estrie, the Sherbrooke Daily Record, noted this
industrial progress and reported in 1909 that asbestos was “king” in the region, with gold
and silver following behind, and that the mineral from the Jeffrey Mine was the best in
the land.207
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The Jeffrey Mine and the town of Asbestos, Quebec, 1909208

Impressive revenue and reputation contributed to changes in government policy at
the beginning of the 20th century. Previously, Quebec had made money off its natural
resources by selling the rights to them to private companies, but this changed by 1910, the
year Henri Bourassa founded his nationalist newspaper, Le Devoir, and rallied against
non-French Canadian ownership of Quebec’s natural resource industries.209 Bourassa and
his followers formed a powerful group and the province slowly began to lease rather than
sell rights to the land. The government’s change in policy came too late to capitalize fully
on the Jeffrey Mine and it missed out on a share of the £500,000 profit the British
Asbestos and Asbestic Co. gained for the H.W. Johns-Manville Company in 1910.210
Bourassa believed that the development of resource industries in Quebec was the key to
national and economic power, which were the “weapons of this century.”211 In the case of
asbestos, Quebec had surrendered its “weapons” to the United States: by 1907, the
industry was largely owned by Americans.
It was not only the government that failed to receive a share of this money,
however, and while the citizens of Asbestos were excited about the success of the Jeffrey
Mine and the sense of permanence and importance it gave the community, they were also
aware that their wages did not rise with company profits. This was a common experience
for industrial workers at the time and led to 142 strikes throughout the province between
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1901 and 1905, mostly in Quebec’s textile and railway industries.212 Companies were
able to keep wages low because replacement workers were available in abundance if
employees began to lobby for more money. This was especially true for asbestos, the
most profitable mining industry in Quebec by 1908,213 because it required only unskilled
labour and offered positions picking, breaking, and bagging asbestos to any man, woman,
or child who would not complain. Asbestos was not a transient mining town, however,
and if Jeffrey Mine workers were replaced, the community would suffer.
During this first industrial revolution in Quebec, the sharp cultural divide between
the ruling Anglophone elite and the Francophone working-class majority accentuated
labour issues in the province. This conflict was illustrated in 1912 when 36 workers at
Asbestos joined 600 other miners on strike the province to gain a higher salary and meet
the rising standards of living in an industrial Quebec. On average, the miners in Quebec
made between $1.50-$1.75 a week in 1912, wages having increased from $1.00 from
1883-1900 and $1.25-$1.50 between 1900 and 1905,214 but workers at the Jeffrey Mine
only earned between $1.10 and $1.60 each week.215 This was the standard unskilled
labour wage in Quebec, but did not adequately reflect the annual revenue gained from the
asbestos industry, which was $3,800,000 by 1913.216 It also did not match the rising cost
of living in l’Estrie, and the industry struggled to reconcile profits, fair wages, and
competition coming from the development of Russian and South African deposits.
The 36 employees who went on strike at the Jeffrey Mine worked in four groups
of nine, each working a shift in the pit and the mill. With the introduction of new
technology to the mining process, the Asbestos and Asbestic Co. attempted to reduce
their workforce to 32, with eight men in each group.217 The workers at the Jeffrey Mine
were successful in preventing the employee reduction through a short and peaceful
strike218 and they demonstrated that while technically unskilled, they would not be
replaced by machines. This first strike set a pattern for labour disputes to come in
Asbestos—including the 1949 strike—and shows that the community had developed a
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cultural identity based on reliable work at the Jeffrey Mine. As soon as machines
threatened the workforce, strikes would occur.
Despite being linked to miners throughout the province, the 1912 strike at
Asbestos was intensely local, and the workers did not rely on help from other strikers,
unions, government agencies, or company heads. Historian of Quebec Michael D. Behiels
writes that the workers union was “perceived as an institution central to the
modernization and democratization of Quebec society,”219 but this was not the case in
Asbestos. With the number of its employees growing from 750 in 1897 to 2,909 in
1913,220 it would seem as though the asbestos industry would be ready for a union, it took
decades for a union to take root in Asbestos because workers were used to relying on
themselves in industrial disputes and they feared unions would make the industry
unstable.221 This anti-union attitude was strong throughout the province, but especially so
in the asbestos industry, which was internationally known for having rich mineral
deposits that contributed 82% of the global supply, and a docile working class.222 The
Quebec working class was not yet ready for unions, but Jeffrey Mine workers were
becoming more confident in their ability to influence how operations at the pit were run.
The workers in Asbestos eventually received their first pay raise of the 20th
century because of war, not the 1912 strike. The mineral was already used widely
throughout the building supply industry, but this was paltry compared to the demand for
asbestos that was generated by the First World War. This had a significant effect on the
development of the Jeffrey Mine, the people who worked it, and the community’s
strengthening cultural identity. By 1914, the industry’s prosperity was bringing major
changes to the lives of the citizens of Asbestos as the road leading to Danville was paved
and the first cement sidewalks were poured, both signs of stability and modernity. The
town also set aside a new space for a larger cemetery, moving 431 coffins from the
original site to the new one in order to prepare for the future.223 Not only was this an
indication that the community was growing, but also that it was growing alongside the
Jeffrey Mine, which had forced the establishment of the new cemetery by expanding onto
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the land where the original graveyard was located. Moving the cemetery was not a
pleasant task, but it was one the community was willing to do if it meant giving their local
industry room to grow. This began a local tradition in Asbestos of sacrificing land to the
mine for the good of the community. In the process, Asbestos became a “moving
community,” similar to northern iron mining towns in Sweden, such as Malmberget and
Kiruna.
As the war in Europe continued and the demand for asbestos grew, changes to the
land intensified. In 1914 and 1916, the CGS sent a detachment of surveyors to l’Estrie
with assignments “best calculated to help the war effort: investigating and reporting on
problems of mine development, and discovering deposits of economically or strategically
important minerals.”224 While Shipton Township was known for the Jeffrey Mine
deposits, surveyors examined it once again to see if there was anything else that could be
put to use for the war effort, but “[a]ll valuable timber has been removed long since and,
as several fires have swept the district within the last twenty years, no new stand has
taken its place…The future of the district is bound up with the mining industry.”225 The
land surrounding Asbestos had undergone drastic change as its industrialization brought
in waves of new inhabitants who were only focused on what riches could be discovered
beneath the surface soil. While logging or agricultural pursuits could not compete with
the profits of the Jeffrey Mine, the destruction of these resources eliminated the potential
diversification of the local economy if and when the asbestos industry collapsed. The
threat of collapse was far from the minds of the people of Asbestos as the Jeffrey Mine
became of prime importance during the war. While many French Canadians chose not to
join the army, their wartime contribution in the form of industrial production, especially
with asbestos, was invaluable. At the outbreak of the war, the Canadian Mining Journal
acknowledged the importance of the mineral when it reported, “[t]he marked increase in
disastrous fires is directing more attention every day to the need of fireproof building
materials that can be relied upon.”226 The demand for asbestos wood, shingles, cement,
and wall plaster sharply increased, and Jeffrey Mine workers would help meet it.
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The demand for asbestos increased so considerably—to 133,339 tonnes by
1916—due to new uses,227 that the Jeffrey Mine needed new technology to expand and
extract the mineral quickly. W.G. Clarke, engineer at the Jeffrey Mine during this period,
described the long process of how the pit was expanded and the mineral extracted at
Asbestos:
Horses hauled dumpcarts which were loaded by hand, to the dump.
Sometimes the drivers, mostly young boys…would back the cart too close
to the edge of the dump and when the latch was released and the load did
not slide out easily, everything went, load of earth, dumpcart, and the poor
old horse. In most cases that was the end of the horse. The harness was
stripped off and the horse shot and buried by succeeding loads of earth.228
While horses were often used in industry, they were not quick or strong enough to meet
the rising demand when they were alive, and were a considerable disturbance to
production when they died. Furthermore, the industry was suffering from a severe lack of
manpower, which slowed production for the booming market.229 As profits continued to
rise during the war, action was quickly taken to modernize the Jeffrey Mine.
In 1914, the Asbestos and Asbestic Co. installed twenty-one derricks around the
open it. These were tall mast-like structures with wires to create a pulley-like system that
lifted 4x6 foot train carriage boxes full of men and mineral out of the mine.230 While the
derricks cut back on the use of horses, it was not until steam shovels were introduced at
the Jeffrey Mine in 1916, three years after many of the other mines in l’Estrie, that horses
were completely eliminated.231 Two years following this change, the derricks themselves
became obsolete due to the combination of steam shovels and a railway line running from
the bottom of the pit to the Grand Trunk at Danville.232 The land and the people who
worked it were becoming increasingly industrialized, which the people of Asbestos were
fine with as long as the workforce continued to grow. The 1912 strike demonstrated the
willingness of Jeffrey Mine workers to protest any threats an increased reliance on
machines posed. The fact that they did not strike during this period of transformation
indicates that their connection to the land through labour was maintained.
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With wartime technological advancements, the Jeffrey Mine attained a degree of
modernity, efficiency, and success that its initial owners could hardly have imagined in
1879. By 1918 the Canadian Mining Journal reported, “[n]ow the architect, builder,
steam-fitter and electrician recognize asbestos as a splendid material for resisting weather,
fire, acids and other agencies of destruction, and they use it for very many purposes. The
variety of uses is fast increasing and scarcely a month passes without some new
application being found…Now it is a necessary article of commerce.”233 These
improvements, combined with an international market that would only grow when the
First World War ended, led to the H.W. Johns-Manville Co. completely taking over
operations at Asbestos. Since 1892, this had been an umbrella company for all of the
asbestos manufacturing firms operating in the United States and it connected the Jeffrey
Mine to an immense industrial network that it would feed in the years following the war.
This would drastically change the community and industry of Asbestos, affecting the
politics of both land and people. If Feodor Boas created an asbestos revolution in the
1890s, the H.W. Johns-Manville Co. began an American revolution at the Jeffrey Mine,
far more technologically advanced, economically connected, and managerially cutthroat
than anything Quebec had experienced before. While this would not be the last time
Asbestos would be redefined, the American control over land and people was the most
formative for the developing local cultural identity, and continues to influence how the
town and the Jeffrey Mine function today, long after the company’s tenure there. The
ways in which the international aspirations, ideology, and reach of the H.W. JohnsManville Co. radically changed the land, the people, and the community of Asbestos will
be examined in the next three chapters.
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Chapter 2: Land With a Future, Not a Past: Bodies of Land, 1918-1949
In June 2010, the town of Asbestos was featured on the Australian comedy show,
The Gruen Transfer. The program’s host challenged two advertising executives to create
a new ad campaign for the community. Upon hearing the challenge, the audience
immediately began to laugh, continuing as the executives talked about how difficult it
was to put a positive spin on a town called Asbestos. One of the two contestants admitted
that he could not get past the name, so instead created a television commercial promoting
Asbestos by highlighting other communities around the world with off-putting names,
such as Accident, Maryland and Boring, Oregon. The tag line for the commercial was,
“Don’t let our name put you off. Asbestos: Bad Name, Great Destination.”234 The other
ad executive attempted to use the community’s name to its advantage and made a
commercial called “Speed Date a Town.” Competing with cities like New York and
Rome, represented by suave men in expensive suits, the humble Asbestos man, dressed in
a beige windbreaker, finds no dating success until the narrator says, “Great relationships
are built on truth, and the truth is, we don’t have a very attractive name. So spend some
time online with us first, and you’ll see what makes people like you fall in love with a
town like us.”235 The commercial ends with the Asbestos man meeting his perfect match:
a woman wearing a gas mask.
For the sake of comedy, neither commercial mentioned the Jeffrey Mine or the
community’s connection to it, established over generations of working the land and
raising families around it. The connection is what keeps the local community in Asbestos,
despite the current collapse of their industry, but it is also what keeps tourists and new
residents away. While the commercials were meant to inspire laughter, they also reveal an
important dilemma facing the people of Asbestos today: in order to create new interest in
the community, they have to somehow forsake the Jeffrey Mine, so important to the local
cultural identity and economy. The reluctance of the community to do so reveals that the
people of Asbestos continue to see the land as part of their past, present, and future.
When the Johns-Manville Co. took full control of the Jeffrey Mine in 1918, it
radically transformed the land and how the community was connected to it. This chapter
234

“How to Sell Asbestos, Canada,” The Gruen Transfer, http://www.abc.net.au/tv/gruentransfer/, accessed 16 June
2010. For access to the commercial in Canada, please see, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIpxelbkI0I.
235
Ibid.

58
focuses on how the land was used, understood, and changed in Asbestos between 1918
and 1949, and how these changes were negotiated within the community. By working the
Jeffrey Mine and living in such close proximity to it, the people of Asbestos developed a
complex connection to the mineral and the mine. Their shared experiences with the
prosperity the Jeffrey Mine gave them during this period influenced the local cultural
identity and gave the community a global confidence and ambition because of the
international reach of the industry. This understanding complements and contributes to
how community members viewed their health and demonstrated their collective strength
before 1949. The different factions of Asbestos negotiated comfortable patterns and roles
that will stand in stark contrast to how the land was treated and viewed after the 1949
strike.
Between 1918 and 1949, JM and the people of Asbestos negotiated a balance
between liveable space and workable space, with the Jeffrey Mine dividing and defining
the two. The community was built on top of a massive asbestos deposit, but the mine that
JM took over in 1918 exposed only a small fraction of the land’s wealth. Over the next 30
years, Asbestos would be shaped by how politics and people were set aside to
accommodate the increasing cultural and economic importance of the land. JM was
fundamental to this process. While Thetford became successful through a series of
smaller pits owned by different companies, JM believed that what Asbestos needed for
success was one giant mine. Based in New York City, company officials embraced a
“bigger is better” philosophy. The exponential growth of the Jeffrey Mine had a
tremendous effect on the land and on the community, and it loomed large in the local
identity. Because of the economic importance of the land and the excitement that came
from being such vital players in the booming industry, the few local objections to this
growth went unheeded and the people of Asbestos developed a tradition of sacrificing the
community to the Jeffrey Mine.
Small Sacrifices, 1918-1923
With his discovery of asbestic at the end of the 19th century, Feodor Boas
revolutionized how the Jeffrey Mine’s asbestos deposit would be used and understood.
Market forces limited the success of the inventions and new extraction techniques Boas
brought to Asbestos, but the First World War radically changed this situation as global
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demand for the fireproof mineral rapidly increased. Although European markets were
closed to imports during the conflict, the growing war industry in the United States more
than made up for the loss.236 Prices rose because of the demand for the mineral and
American manufacturing companies took a special interest in Quebec’s asbestos industry.
JM focused on the Jeffrey Mine, which was worked night and day following the
installation of floodlights around the pit after the outbreak of war.237 This American
interest in the land would change how the people of Asbestos viewed the mine and
themselves within an international trade network.
From its foundation, JM was primarily an asbestos manufacturing company, and
while it eventually owned a few other mines in Canada and the United States, the Jeffrey
Mine remained its main source for the raw mineral, and the company heavily relied on it
to supply its factories, processing plants, and customers with asbestos. This was an ideal
situation for the Quebec government, which under the premiership of Lomer Gouin,
actively sought to put the province’s natural resources into the hands of American
businessmen in order to secure Quebec’s future industrial success. Gouin believed that
French Canadians would learn from these experts and gradually gain control of the
industries that flowed from the land.238 The United States was seen as a good place from
which to learn because it was becoming an economic and industrial powerhouse without
any reliance on the British Empire, and this appealed greatly to French Canadians.
Asbestos was attractive to JM because it was a single-resource town in which
every member of the community was in some way connected to the industry and this gave
the company a great deal of power. As the Jeffrey Mine became more successful, the
population of Asbestos grew around the pit, with a town square, a hotel, a church, and
small businesses appearing on the roads that led from it. The lives of the townspeople
were lived according to the rhythms of the pit, with everyone coming to a halt each day at
noon and 5:30pm when blasting in the Jeffrey Mine marked the turnover of each shift.239
In 1918 when JM increased the number of employees, the hours the pit was worked, and
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the amount of asbestos extracted. Everything and everyone in the community was focused
on the mine.
JM’s purchase of the Jeffrey Mine was a sign of prosperity and permanence to the
people of Asbestos: under the company’s guidance, the community appeared to be
economically secure. One of the first lessons the townspeople learned from the American
company, however, was that the permanence that came with prosperity was unlike what
they expected. In May 1918, Asbestos town council established a committee to determine
the location of more sidewalks,240 but JM had other plans for the roads in Asbestos. Only
a few weeks after the committee was established, the company requested that instead of
sidewalks, they be allowed to run a railway line across rue St-Georges, one of the
principle streets of the town.241 In the opinion of the company, “permanence” meant that
all land in Asbestos should be devoted to the success of the Jeffrey Mine, not the comfort
of the community.
Town council granted permission for the railway, but reserved the right to change
the rail line in two years if it hindered the community. In the two trial years that followed,
however, council and most townspeople subscribed to JM’s way of looking at the land
and the town. Sidewalks and other community infrastructure were established over the
coming years, but the success of Asbestos was quickly and firmly linked to the success of
JM, and town council would root many of its decisions in what was in the best interest of
the company, not necessarily the local population. The railway acted as an extension of
the industrialized Jeffrey Mine into the community, and shipments of the mineral were
constantly taken via train across the main streets of town. The introduction of the railway
inspired JM officials to ask council if they could close the main roads surrounding the
Jeffrey Mine for 10 minutes several times each day to allow for the mineral to be safely
unloaded from the pit in large trucks and transported out of town.242 Because it was
proposed for the sake of safety, council approved this request, and an era of harmonious
company-community relations began, with JM gaining more and more control over the
land surrounding the Jeffrey Mine, blurring the boundaries between liveable space and
workable space.
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A rail line and temporary road closures were changes to the land that the people of
Asbestos could adjust to quickly. They were also signs that JM was willing to invest in
the community, even if in ways not immediately understood. The American company had
spread its influence throughout Asbestos and the community was indebted to it. JM
officials knew they had invested well when they purchased the Jeffrey Mine, and they
needed the freedom to do whatever they saw fit in the town to maximize their profits.
The province provided 80% of the world’s supply of asbestos by the end of the
war,243 but Americans were in full control of the industry on both a local and global scale.
Despite this, the Canadian Mining Journal wrote that “the future of asbestos is only
beginning, [and] the variety of its possible uses is immense, [so] that Canada, occupying
such a dominating position in the asbestos market, may very well look forward not only
to a greater production of the raw material, but to multiplication of the industries
concerned with the manufacture and marketing of asbestos in finished form.”244 The
asbestos industry was Canada’s key to modernization and international economic success.
The fact that American and British companies owned all the asbestos mines in country
while local workers remained in subservient positions was not seen as a hindrance to the
advancement of the Canadian economy even though it replicated the colonial systems of
years past.
The town of Asbestos prospered following the First World War because of
increased market demand, proving at the time that the American ownership of the mine
improved the local economy and the global reach of the industry. The reconstruction of
European cities destroyed during the war, such as Louvain and Douaumont, counted for a
percentage of this rise in demand, but it was the American automobile industry, which
required asbestos brake linings, that ensured the Jeffrey Mine would continue to grow in
importance. The rapid rise in the use of electricity, a “close ally” of asbestos,245
throughout North America and Europe, combined with new laws making wooden
shingles illegal because of the fires caused by the still new lighting and heating
technology,246 also suggested to contemporaries that the mineral had “undoubtedly
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unlimited scope and possibilities for future development.”247 These industrial advances
were especially favourable to the people of Asbestos because of the large quantities of
asbestic required for these products. The Canadian Mining Journal explained in 1920 that
“[w]hile high-grade asbestos is much sought after, probably the most encouraging feature
of the business at this time is the extension of uses for short fibre material and material
that formerly was regarded as waste and unsaleable,” and that “[w]ith depth the contents
of asbestos in the rock seem to increase rather than diminish.”248 The land and labour of
Asbestos was in great demand internationally, and the community took pride in meeting
it.
The Jeffrey Mine’s mineral was ideal for these new products and the people of
Asbestos saw this as a sign of future prosperity. In 1921 a new school for 215 children
was built out of wood and asbestos to accommodate the needs of the growing community,
as well as to keep young boys from working the mine until they were teenagers.249 JM
was also building at this time, and in June 1921 it announced that it was constructing a
manufacturing plant in Asbestos within the coming months.250 To the great excitement of
the community that already had 700 to 1,200 people working for the company, the factory
would require at least 100 new employees, and was a tangible sign that JM believed the
Jeffrey Mine would continue to be prosperous and it offered more members of the
community, including women, the opportunity to know the mineral through the work they
did.
The community was proud they possessed one of the largest asbestos mines in the
world out of their land now the first manufacturing plant for the mineral in Canada. In
1920, approximately $12,000,000 worth of raw asbestos was exported to manufacturing
plants in the United States and Britain, but the addition of the plant in Asbestos would
increase this number at least seven times over.251 The plant was to be the most modern
factory in the country and was a tangible sign that JM was taking the community down
the right path. The new plant was built in Asbestos at the beginning of what Quebec
mining historian Marc Vallières calls the province’s “revolution technologique,” which
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lasted until 1950.252 In just a few years of having JM run the Jeffrey Mine, the land in
Asbestos had become a place of modern technology and progress. In no way did it
resemble the land the Abenaki had relied on in the region, nor did it match the ordered,
agrarian township system the British Crown introduced in the 18th and 19th century. This
was now land made unsuitable for anything but the asbestos industry and a French
Canadian majority worked it.
Being at the forefront of Quebec’s industrial and technological revolution,
townspeople began to believe that the land was where the province would find its success
and Asbestos had a central role in the process. The Jeffrey Mine was reported to be one of
the best examples of this technological revolution, because the pit had been turned into
something resembling a machine “laid out in wide benches, [with] the rock being loaded
into cars of standard gauge by steam-shovels and hauled on trains to the mill by steam
locomotives on a maximum grade of three percent.”253 JM used the most technologically
advanced drills and shovels available. The benched method of asbestos mining was
especially efficient because it allowed for extraction on many different levels at once. In
order to prevent landslides, however, the pit had to expand in width as well as in depth,
which had repercussions for the community built alongside it. The new manufacturing
plant at the Jeffrey Mine was completed in 1923 and consisted of two buildings, each 150
by1000 feet.254 The company also increased its use of machinery in the pit, which the
mines at Thetford had not yet done; men who had once loaded chunks of broken rock into
carting boxes at the bottom of the pit were replaced by steam shovels, and given new
roles in the pit.255 These developments meant that both production and profits increased in
Asbestos, but also radically changed the land and the townspeople’s association with it.
By 1922, the increase of automobiles made the roads in Asbestos congested and
the bridge leading to Danville was consistently blocked due to shipments from the Jeffrey
Mine.256 This situation worsened with the manufacturing plant’s increased production. JM
attempted to solve the problem by extending rue Bourbeau across company property to be
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a transport route for trucks.257 While this seemed to be a solution, only months after the
town constructed new cement sidewalks, JM “moved” the main road of the community.
The Asbestos-Danville road was a core part of the town. It not only ran alongside the
Jeffrey Mine, but also was where the first residents chose to settle because of its
proximity to the pit. The benched method of fibre extraction, however, meant the Jeffrey
Mine was becoming wider and the townspeople were getting in the way of progress. After
appealing to council, JM’s proposal to relocate part of the Asbestos-Danville road from
its original location was approved. Council justified this decision when it stated,
la dite rue Asbestos étant présentement située trop près des puits ouverts
de la mine d’amiante, où des explosions des mines et les opérations à
vapeur, l’électricité et autres machines à pouvoir est requis, qu’offre un
danger appréciable au trafic passant dans cette rue comme elle est située
precautement, et reconnaissant en même temps, le fait officiel de
poursuivre les opérations minières, étant si essentiel à la vie et l’intérêt de
la communauté locale, il est de plus résolu.258
The success of the community depended on the success of the Jeffrey Mine and council
made it clear that if came to a choice between using the land in Asbestos for community
infrastructure or for industrial advancement, the industry would always win. A new road
was to be built by the company 66 feet away from the edge of JM property, which the
community, used to the risks of living so close to the mine, believed to be a safe distance.
This new road kept the name of the one appropriated by JM and a tradition began
in the community where a sense of stability was maintained through place names, even
though the land was constantly in flux. Moving the road because of rising production
levels at the Jeffrey Mine was an indication of prosperity for the community, but it was
also a great disruption to the townspeople, many of whom had to move their homes or
businesses. With town council minutes listing only eight people in Asbestos who
protested this move—all of them local businessmen not affiliated with the company259—it
appears that the majority of the community had subscribed to JM’s philosophy. The mine
was of principal importance and all other possible uses of land had to be secondary.
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Groundbreaking Success, 1924-1938
The industry suffered from post-war over-production in the early 1920s.260 The
asbestos market was opened once more to Russian and South African fibre, which had
been restricted due to wartime trade restrictions, and the resulting price wars that came
from this competition forced many Quebec mines to shut down. Despite these problems,
JM continued to invest heavily in the Jeffrey Mine. While the mine was temporarily
closed because of overproduction in January 1924, the Canadian Mining Journal reported
that “[o]ne can gain an idea of the magnitude of the mining operations of this company
when one learns that eight big steam shovels are used in the amphitheatre-like open-cast
workings; that to cope with the mine output, a new crushing plant had to be built, which
will take care of 500 tons of rock per hour; and that a new mill…is now ready to receive
the crushed rock.”261 Company officials believed that the “bigger is better” Jeffrey Mine
required bigger and better technologies. JM was established in the late 19th century when
New York City was undergoing an era that “viewed largeness itself as progress,” and
American businessmen saw consolidated monopolies as the fastest and surest route to
international success.262 This philosophy was applied to many resource industries in the
United States, including iron and steel, and JM saw the Canadian Jeffrey Mine as the key
to global success and dominance of the asbestos industry. In order to achieve this goal,
the land was increasingly industrialized in Asbestos, as were the people who worked it,
changing jobs in the pit to accommodate new technologies.
The Jeffrey Mine continued to bring an incredible amount of wealth to JM. In the
mid-1920s, the growing automobile industry consumed more than 50% of all
manufactured asbestos products for over a dozen uses.263 To maximize sales, JM, already
a world-leader in building materials, won contracts from the automobile, railroad, and oil
industries. While the Jeffrey Mine was not JM’s only asbestos property, it was by far its
largest and most profitable, allowing the company to expand its product line and
marketing. One result was that JM extended its presence in the town of Asbestos. Each
260

The Canadian Mining Journal. 17 August 1923, p. 650.
“The Canadian Johns-Manville Co. Ltd. Work on a Large Scale,” The Canadian Mining Journal. 4 January 1924, p.
30.
262
Thomas Kessner, Capital City: New York City and the Men Behind America’s Rise to Economic Dominance, 18601900 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), p. 318. See also, Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City
and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
263
The Canadian Mining Journal. 18 April 1924, p. 374.
261

66
winter, company equipment plowed the roads of the community264 and when the majority
of the streets were renamed in 1926, rue Asbestos and part of rue Nicolet were
rechristened “rue Manville,” which JM immediately began enlarging.265 Furthermore, in
1926 JM effectively lobbied council for the introduction of bilingual street signs in the
community;266 while the majority of Asbestos was Francophone, company officials were
Anglophone and they had an influence in local affairs that was larger than their minority
status. The linguistic divide in Asbestos mirrored and blended with the town’s class
divisions, and the Anglophone minority held great power within the community because
of its managerial role at the Jeffrey Mine. When relations between the managing class and
working class were good, relations between the English and French residents of the
community were also good. When they were strained, however, linguistic tensions rose in
Asbestos, as will be seen in later chapters.
With record profits being recorded for the industry and Asbestos’ population
growing to 3,602 by 1926,267 local class relations were good and the linguistic needs of
JM and its officials were easily met in the prosperous 1920s. In March 1927, town
council wrote to the Quebec government requesting permission to extend the boundaries
of Asbestos by 17,588 square feet for the future prosperity of the community.268 The
request was granted and the town soon covered 800 acres.269 This marked the first major
step towards the complete manipulation of the land surrounding Asbestos and the people
who lived on it. Following a request by council to extend the lease on the supply of
electricity the company provided the town, JM asked for a portion of this new land so that
it could extend company roads and operations.270
The request was for 55 acres and JM explained that the community was in the way
of the Jeffrey Mine’s necessary expansion. The global price of asbestos was increasing
and with Canada providing 85% of the fibre worldwide271 this was the perfect opportunity
for the company to increase its land holdings in Asbestos. In order to combat any negative
feelings towards this expansion, which would require many citizens to move further away
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from the mine as it grew into existing neighbourhoods, JM announced that it would
construct four new roads with houses for its employees with families, equipped with such
modern conveniences as running water, electricity, and streetlights.272 Single male
employees were housed in the Hotel Iroquois at the edge of the Jeffrey Mine where they
had their meals provided and rooms cleaned. JM also paid to have all the remaining roads
in the town covered with gravel. Asbestos was becoming indebted to the company and
used to the perks that came with progress.
The 1928 expansion was the first time the Jeffrey Mine, in the words of the
townspeople, “commence à grignoter le village.”273 For community members to describe
the pit as being something that “ate” away at the town gives the Jeffrey Mine agency and
personality in the history of Asbestos, but the local population did not necessarily view
this “eating” in a negative light, as the mine was what mattered, and if it needed to grow
to increase profits, the town would sacrifice. Pit expansion changed not only the land, but
also the way townspeople related to the Jeffrey Mine. For the first time since the mine
was opened, it had a barbed wire fence around it to prevent children from playing in the
pit when it was not being worked, clearly distinguishing land for work and land for
play.274 Many residents were upset over the destruction of the original section of the
community, but the late 1920s were an exciting time in Asbestos and the expansion was a
sign of greater things to come. In 1928, l’Estrie was internationally known as “the most
important asbestos producing territory in the world. The asbestos mined there is the
standard for the whole industry…[and] with it all other asbestos is compared.”275 The
majority of the citizens of Asbestos accepted that land with this reputation could not be
exploited enough and the international reach of Jeffrey Mine labour strongly influenced
the local cultural identity.
The global price for asbestos dropped sharply with the onslaught of the Great
Depression. While JM controlled almost half of all the asbestos mined in Canada in the
early 1930s,276 it drastically reduced its workforce at the Jeffrey Mine and operated only
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one shift per day because of the economic crisis.277 JM was so affected by the Depression
because it was inextricably tied to the collapsed automobile and construction industries.
The company’s foresight to combine mining and manufacturing under one umbrella could
not help the situation. The land at Asbestos suddenly lost its value and the community
was brought to a standstill.
Townspeople had been willing to sacrifice their land and homes to the progress of
the Jeffrey Mine in 1928, but the Great Depression and the severe reduction in
employment did little to convince them they had made the right decision. For JM,
however, the expansion had not been a mistake and despite global overproduction,
increased output of Russian fibre, and new geological surveys beginning in Quebec to
find other valuable minerals,278 the company pushed ahead on its agreed-upon plans for
expansion. The 55-acre enlargement of the Jeffrey Mine completely destroyed what locals
referred to as the “nerve centre” of the community, including Le Carré, the store opened
in 1890 by the first mayor of Asbestos, Henri Roux.279 In return for this loss, the town
received from JM an equal amount of land to construct a new commercial centre. The
merchants along the original commercial strip of the town protested the expansion more
in 1930 than they did in 1928, despite the fact that council had already given the company
permission to move ahead. Sacrificing the land to the Jeffrey Mine seemed necessary
when it was first proposed at the height of the industry’s success, but appeared less so
during the Depression when JM did not employ a full workforce.
In the opinion of town council, however, the expansion would generate work for
the community and sustain JM, which “apporte la presque totalité des revenues
d’Asbestos.”280 Local physician Dr. Elzéar Émard made an official protest against the
destruction of Le Carré in 1930, and stated that “les dit membres du conseil n’étaient pas
libres d’agir dans l’intérêt exclusif de la municipalité, ils étaient liés à la dite compagnie
minière et la résolution a été passée par eux dans le but d’être agréables à la dite
compagnie, sans songer aux droits des contribuables.”281 Although council demanded a
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retraction of Émard’s statement, the accusation was apt. While the community wanted to
encourage JM’s success, the company was not in control of town business, and distance
between the two was necessary. In order to avoid any more accusations of partiality the
mayor appealed to the provincial government for a final decision on the expansion.
In 1931 the Quebec government sided with JM and the first Bill of Expropriation
for Asbestos was put into effect. Locals were forced to sell their land to the company
because the success of the community relied on the success of the Jeffrey Mine. Since the
community depended on the mine for existence and JM was in charge of that mine, the
company was essentially in charge of Asbestos, and the law of expropriation solidified
this. It was clear to the townspeople that their emotional attachment to community land,
seen in their protests of the expropriation, did not matter. Under the rule of JM, the town
did not have a history preserved in buildings or roads, but rather a future to ensure by
unrestricted changes to the land.
Meanwhile, the population of Asbestos continued to grow with the mine. The
community experienced the sharpest increase in population of any other town in
Richmond County, reaching 4,396 in 1931.282 Even through the economic downturn town
council continued to put its faith in the company, and often asked JM officials for advice
and the use of their engineers when new roads were being constructed.283 Despite this
faith, JM was forced to close the Jeffrey Mine completely between May 1932 and April
1933 because of the continued collapse of the automobile industry.284 Many local
merchants and homeowners directly affected by the expansion of the Jeffrey Mine also
had their property severely damaged in the process of moving roads and buildings, and
had to appeal directly to JM for compensation. The industrial freeze in Asbestos
challenged the local cultural identity that had developed alongside the tremendous
international demand for the mineral found in the Jeffrey Mine.
Throughout the Depression, JM planed for the future, even though the Jeffrey
Mine was closed. It developed new markets for magnesia pipe and boiler insulation to
compensate for the decreased demand in the auto industry; this quickly became the
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company’s top selling product.285 Partly due to this innovation, and partly because of a
sudden revitalization in the automobile sector, by the end of 1933 the asbestos industry
experienced a 29% increase in production and 71% increase in monetary value over the
previous year, and the Jeffrey Mine opened once again.286 The effects of this were
immediate. Town council purchased additional acreage to prepare for community growth
and to tap into a new water source because the current one had become too
contaminated.287 While production levels at the mine did not reach pre-Depression
heights until after the Second World War, by 1935 employees were working an average
of 58 hours each week, compared to the 70 hours six years earlier,288 and there was every
indication that the industry, and the land that fed it, was making a strong recovery.
With production having increased by 19.2% in 1935, town council decided that it
would generate more growth in the community by extending and paving rue St-Aimé by
1,400 feet and rue St-Rock by 2,300 feet, each connecting to what was to be the new
commercial centre of Asbestos.289 While these expansions damaged some homes along
the roads, they were another sign of permanence and prosperity. Canadian production
continued to rise in 1936, increasing 43% in quantity and 41% in value from the previous
year,290 and by 1937, the village of Asbestos officially became a city because of its rising
population. These developments, both local and global because of the international reach
of the industry, were rooted in the value of the land: without it, and without JM’s
Depression-era management, the community could have collapsed. JM’s manufacturing
plants at Asbestos and Montreal could handle only 5% of the fibre being extracted from
the Jeffrey Mine,291 and the rest of the raw mineral went to the several hundred factories
the company ran in the United States, the world’s leading exporter of finished asbestos
products.292 The land at Asbestos was supplying more fibre than the local population
could manage and JM officials saw nothing wrong with this situation: Asbestos was
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connected to the company’s vast American network and as the Jeffrey Mine became
larger, the extent of the land’s global reach would also grow.
With the world economy pulling out of depression, Canada’s asbestos production
increased from 301,287 tonnes worth $9,958,183 in 1937 to 389,688 tonnes worth
$14,072,000 in 1938.293 The Jeffrey Mine had become the largest pit in l’Estrie, a
significant achievement for the land and the people of Asbestos. While JM increasingly
industrialized the mine, the men and women who worked in the pit and the manufacturing
plant maintained a close, physical connection to the land. In the bilingual Johns-Manville
News Pictorial distributed to its local employees each month from 1938 to 1949, the
company highlighted this connection by focusing on the work of Achille Boudreau and
Joe Letarte in the first issue. Boudreau was photographed sitting in the pit wearing his
denim jacket as he “cobbed” the long asbestos fibre out of large pieces of rock by
breaking it along the fibrous seams with a hammer. Latarte, also a cobber, was pictured
climbing out of the pit with a bucket of rock in one hand and a burlap bag full of handpicked fibre slung over his shoulder as though he was an asbestos Santa.294 Machines
could not completely distance the workers and the natural world.
The physical connection between the people of Asbestos and the land did not end
in the pit. The entire community was intimately acquainted with the Jeffrey Mine simply
through working and living in such close proximity to it, hearing, seeing, and breathing in
the sound and dust of progress, and this connection will be seen again and again in the
following chapters. As the industry recovered from the Depression many asbestos mines
in the region found it difficult to meet the increased demand because there was no
physical space to expand operations.295 This was not the case in Asbestos, where industry
trumped community when it came to issues of land-use, and in 1938 JM appealed to town
council with a proposal to expand the Jeffrey Mine once again.
Industrial Revolution Meets Natural Phenomenon, 1938-1949
The years following the Depression taught the people of Asbestos that if they put
their faith in the land and JM, they would prosper, and town council approved the
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company’s request for 14 undeveloped lots in 1938 without hesitation.296 The expansion
did not directly affect the homes and businesses of the town and was not as controversial
as the first major enlargement. It was clear that the pit had reached its physical limits, as it
resembled a steep inverted cone with limited access to fibre at the bottom,297 and workers
could not dig deeper without expanding wider first, due to the threat of disastrous
landslides. For the structural stability of the land and the financial stability of the town,
the Jeffrey Mine had to become wider.
The expansion was viewed as another example of progress after the economic
trials of the early 1930s, and in order to compensate for lost land, council purchased 7
unused lots from Joseph Isabelle in January 1939.298 The town needed more liveable land
to accommodate a growing workforce and a shrinking community space caused by the
expanding pit. The following spring, council purchased 14 additional undeveloped lots
belonging to Euginie Bolduc.299 The town was learning to balance mine and community
land use. These purchases were well planned, as 1939 saw great development in the land
of the community, and the Jeffrey Mine was declared to be the largest asbestos mine in
the world.300 By making the industrialization of the land a priority, the community
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attained global recognition. Creating the world’s largest asbestos mine was a great
achievement for the people of Asbestos, and further added an international element to
their local cultural identity.
The local identity in Asbestos was rooted in a land that was constantly changing.
The original hill on which Jeffrey and Webb found their first asbestos deposits had almost
disappeared by 1939, but the pit remained about 750 feet above sea level and was 510
feet deep and 300 feet wide with spiralling benches 35 feet high and at least 75 feet wide
to accommodate the trucks and trains emerging from the bottom.302 JM believed that the
pit could be deepened between 100 and 150 feet more, which meant that for a while at
least, the townspeople would not have to sacrifice any more land to the Jeffrey Mine.
According to the Canadian Mining Journal, the land in Asbestos told a tale of progress:
The first impression gathered from a tour of these workings is one of size.
Here is an operation that handles great quantities of material, and uses
mammoth machines in the process. [Here] is the largest power shovel in
Canada; along its levels run standard locomotives hauling trains of cars,
some of which are 30 yard capacity. Yet as one stands on the high side of
the pit looking down, these great machines look like toys in that immensity
of space. It is a big job worked in a big way because some 3,000,000 tons
of rock and stripping are handled from the pit in a year.303
The Jeffrey Mine had become a natural and a technological phenomenon, and the
increased use of large machinery took the land in Asbestos to a new level of
industrialization. Derricks mounted around the mine now held the drills that made the
blasting holes in five separate working areas of the pit to ensure precision and cut back on
staff. When JM officials came up with this cost-saving idea, drill manufacturers told them
that replacing men with machines was impossible,304 so the company invented a way to
do it and further revolutionize how the land and technology collided in the Jeffrey Mine.
Locomotives now carried steel, drill bits, explosives, and other supplies around
the pit and three four-yard electric shovels worked in tandem with one eight-yard shovel
to load the fibre into empty train cars heading back up to the surface. Because of the
influx of technology, it might appear as though asbestos extraction was a relatively
people-less endeavour, but this was not the case. Groups of men operated these machines
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and packed explosives into the mechanically drilled holes before taking cover. Shifts
operated 24 hours a day and groups of men appeared ant-like in the pit under the 1000watt floodlights that shone on the Jeffrey Mine all night. Employees were also required to
continuously move the pumps that extracted the estimated 500,000 gallons of surface and
underground water that filled the pit each day, as well as to pick through the rubble after
blasting to remove any pieces of wood, blasting wire, or other foreign objects that would
decrease the value of the mineral packaged at the mill. The connection between the
people of Asbestos and the mine was changing with the increased industrialization of the
land, but it remained a strong pillar in the local cultural identity.
Two-thirds of JM employees in Asbestos were Francophone, while company
officials were exclusively Anglophone. In addition to the employees who worked directly
in the Jeffrey Mine, 250 others (including 25 women) were employed at the factory by
1939, processing approximately twelve train cars of milled asbestos each day.305 While
socially, culturally, and linguistically different from company heads, by extracting the
majority of the company’s supply of asbestos, this workforce was a major factor in JM
controlling a significant portion of the market for the mineral termed “indispensable to
modern life” by the American government in 1939.306 The market for the fibre increased
exponentially after the outbreak of the Second World War and a thirty-year boom period
began. By 1941, JM sales had increased by 50% because of wartime industry 307 and the
temporary elimination of Russian fibre from competition. The closing of European
markets during the war did not severely affect the company or its operations at Asbestos
because its foundations were in Canada and the United States, both countries that
continued to manufacture and feed the machines of war with the fireproof mineral. In
fact, the United States wartime industrial boom more than compensated for the loss of
European sales308 and workers at the Jeffrey Mine often had trouble keeping up with
demand.
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It was an exciting era for Asbestos with new technologies and products being
developed with Jeffrey Mine fibre every day. This included asbestos cement, which saw
asbestic added to cement to reinforce its strength, and led many contemporaries to believe
that the “Asbestos Age” was just beginning.309 Asbestos cement was particularly popular
in America’s construction industry and the Jeffrey Mine’s short asbestic fibre was ideal
for this product. At the end of 1941, JM approached town council to purchase part of rue
St-Aimé and rue St-Georges for mine expansion. Although this bordered a central area of
the town, council granted the request in the spring of 1942: at this time of great local
prosperity the company could do no wrong and would not be second-guessed.310 In
return, the town would receive $5,000 for just under 500 feet of road. While the lack of
protest indicates that the majority of the community agreed mine expansion was a
positive development, on the same day permission was given to JM, homeowner Joseph
A. Lambert requested that he be allowed to move his house away from rue St-Amié at his
own expense. Not everyone was thrilled by living in close proximity to the noise and dust
that was produced by the Jeffrey Mine 24 hours a day, and between June 1942 and
February 1943, four other residents requested permission to move their homes away from
the growing pit.311 These moves demonstrate a quiet acceptance of how land was
managed in Asbestos. Rather than attempt to prevent mine expansion, residents simply
moved out of the way.
As had become custom whenever the Jeffrey Mine “ate” part of Asbestos, there
was a rollback effect in which the town moved homes and purchased new land located at
the edges of the community. JM officials typically lived on a knoll far away from the
Jeffrey Mine, owning cars that took them from their homes to the pit each day. The
workers, on the other hand, walked to the Jeffrey Mine and for financial reasons, many
rented affordable housing from JM that was located close to the edges of the pit. The
families in these homes were moved when the company decided to expand the mine at
JM’s expense, but residents who owned their houses also chose to continue living close to
the mine despite its constant growth. These homes were placed on logs and pulled by
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horses from one location to another each time the Jeffrey Mine grew. In June 1942, town
council annexed almost 3,000 feet of unused farmland in order to expand the

Moving homes in Asbestos, Quebec, circa 1940312

liveable limits of Asbestos.313 This expansion was important not only in providing new
land to those displaced by the growing Jeffrey Mine, but also for new residents who had
moved to the community to work for JM. The mine provided an excellent source of
wartime employment, operating three shifts working 24 hours each day, seven days a
week and still not meeting market demands.314 The wartime reduction in male employees
also allowed for an influx of women in JM operations and by 1943, 25% of the workers at
the manufacturing plant were female,315 which offered a new way of life to a significant
portion of the population.
In 1943, the Jeffrey Mine covered 115 acres of surface land, and 6,000 tons of
rock and mineral were extracted daily.316 Despite these impressive figures, JM was not
able to expand the mine quickly enough as the demand for the mineral increased with the
American entrance into the war in 1941. The Jeffrey Mine was already so close to the
residential portion of Asbestos that sewage from homes close to it began pouring into the
pit, contaminating the fibre.317 Until the company was operating with a full workforce and
with the proper amount of time to expand, a new way of looking at the land had to be
developed. Reports began to emerge stating that the shortage of asbestos fibre was the
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result of the opencast method used for extracting the mineral.318 In response to this, the
president of the Canadian Johns-Manville (CJM) branch, G.K. Foster, approached town
council at the beginning of 1944 and informed them of the company’s new wartime plan:
they were going underground.
Although underground mining was not typically used for asbestos extraction it
allowed JM to expand operations and increase production quickly, while not infringing on
the property of the townspeople because shafts required far less land than an open pit.
Underground operations also hid the drastic changes to the land that opencast mining put
on display. The first two shafts were built on the south end of rue Bourbeau and were
10x10 feet wide, about 750 feet deep, and each had a conveyor belt 25 feet high leading
out of the ground towards the mills in order to prevent rocks from flying into surrounding
neighbourhoods.319 Town council approved the building of these shafts and in return, JM
donated a portion of company land in order to extend Boulevard St-Luc. JM also built a
new Hotel Iroquois beside the shafts on rue Bourbeau in order to house 200 single male
workers who would be needed to help meet the rising global demand for the fibre.320
Although Canadian asbestos production rose by more than 100,000 tonnes during the
Second World War, there was little fear amongst industry insiders that the market would
collapse during peacetime because of the desirability of the mineral for everyday use.321
The new British invention of asbestos sheeting was able to withstand extremely high
temperature and pressure and suitable for fighter jets and commercial airlines, was an
example of this market transferability.322 In the transition from wartime to peacetime
markets, JM invested more money into the land at Asbestos to make sure levels of
production would increase.
Following the Second World War, employment at the Jeffrey Mine rose with
returning soldiers, and the development of shaft mining and mill expansion increased JM
profits by 50%.323 While opencast mining maximized fibre extraction on the largest scale
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possible, it was also expensive and time-consuming. Underground mining required less
space and manpower, and protected the fibre from being tainted by the elements and thus
ensured the highest quality of asbestos taken from the mine. Rather than aggravate the
local population through further width expansion, JM opted for the extraction method that
was the least expensive and least invasive for the community. The company’s decision to
change the way land in the Jeffrey Mine was used suggests that there was a growing
frustration in Asbestos due to the constant expansion of the pit and expropriation of town
land. Underground mining, combined with opencast methods, was a way JM could
increase production while maintaining good company-community relations in Asbestos
by minimizing changes to town infrastructure and land.
One group JM could not appease, however, was the local merchants in the
community. There was constant tension between the company and the smaller
businessmen of Asbestos. The majority of townspeople were employees at the Jeffrey
Mine and they usually sided with the company on land issues, but the independent
proprietors were a vocal minority against JM expansion. The original commercial centre
of Asbestos had been destroyed when the mine “ate” Le Carré, but local merchants
attempted to create a new centre on rue Bourbeau years before JM began underground
shaft mining along it. In November 1946, the company requested permission from council
to close a large section of rue Bourbeau and rue St-Georges to accommodate this new use
of the land. While JM offered to extend Boulevard St-Luc in return for this closure and to
“fournir toute l’aide nécessaire et à défendre les intérêts de la Ville d’Asbestos,” the
merchants along rue Bourbeau were not satisfied.324 At the same meeting of council, La
Ligue des Propriétaires d’Asbestos Inc. presented a statement that read, “Nous sousignés,
propriétaires affectés si jamais la rue Bourbeau venait à être bloquée dans la direction de
St-Georges-de-Windsor, désirons vous prier d’utiliser toutes les mesures légales afin
d’empêcher ce blocus qui causerait une grosse dépréciation à nos propriétés.”325 This was
the first sign of real local conflict over land use in Asbestos and it reveals how difficult
community relations could be in a single-resource and single-company town. Loss of
property value and loss of business were main concerns of the merchants when it came to
the industrialization of rue Bourbeau, but JM’s land management provided the
324
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community with stability and profits. Council chose to end the meeting without making a
decision in order to avoid choosing which segment of the population had the greatest right
to the land.
Although JM promised to pay for any damages that might occur during the
closure of rue Bourbeau, local merchants continued to protest the sale, firmly believing
that townspeople did not want to shop next to large mining shafts and conveyor belts
connected to the noisy mill. While they were concerned for their property, their
commercial futures as independent businessmen in a single-industry town were even
more important to them. By January 1947 Mayor Albert Goudreau had had enough of the
debate over rue Bourbeau and demanded council make a firm decision on the subject with
the interest of the community’s economic future in mind.326
In response to the mayor’s frustration, council approved JM’s request to close the
road, “à partir du point marqué par une borne au fer sur le côté est de la rue Bourbeau, la
dite borne marquant les coins des lots 5-90 et 5-211, et sur une longueur s’étendant
jusqu’à la ligne de jonction de la rue Bourbeau avec le chemin conduisant à St-Georgesde-Windsor.”327 Although JM would pay for any property damage, the displeasure of the
local merchants was noted in the minutes and Goudreau instructed them to address their
complaints through arbitration discussions with the company directly. It was clear that JM
had the primary right to both land and business in Asbestos, especially as the demand for
the fibre rose once again due to newly opened European markets following the Second
World War.
With post-war reconstruction demand for asbestos products rising to over
$25,000,000 a year328 and JM operations in the town growing underneath rue Bourbeau,
Asbestos once again needed to acquire more land. Between September 1947 and January
1949 the town underwent a period of immense physical growth, purchasing land from the
County of Shipton, local property owners, and JM, which was in possession of several
lots of land that did not contain profitable amounts of asbestos. This began with the
purchase of seven lots from the county for $700 in September, and was followed with
additional purchases that month of private and company land in order to extend
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Boulevard St-Luc, rue Bourbeau, rue St-Georges, Boulevard Olivier, and rue Roi.329
Council justified such large purchases, including 20,766.52 feet at the end of rue
Bourbeau, by stating that the town needed new and existing roads to accommodate the
growing community.330
The post-war market for asbestos did not abate and in 1947 the industry in Quebec
exported 10,785,189 tonnes of fibre with a value of $438,356,805.331 By combining open
pit mining with a new “block-caving” system that was just being introduced, extraction
levels at the Jeffrey Mine far surpassed those of its regional competitors, including mines
in Thetford and East Broughton. Block-caving is a form of underground mining
particularly suited to land that already has a working opencast pit. The benches that
spiralled up the Jeffrey Mine and allowed for locomotives and trucks to bring fibre to the
surface were hollowed and mined from the inside out. These blocks were 10x20 feet at
the beginning and were worked to about 10x35 feet, each being 200 feet from each other
to prevent the walls from caving in. Men operated giant double-drum mechanical slushers
that scraped the rock out of the caves and brought it to the surface, loading the ore into
train cars to be taken to the factory.332 JM was a leader in extraction technology and the
Jeffrey Mine was often used to test new techniques that would maximize profits. Blockcaving further industrialized the land without visible signs from above and changed the
structure of the Jeffrey Mine, weakening the benches on which trains and trucks brought
men and mineral to the surface.
Block-caving was an extremely efficient way to extract fibre, especially because
by 1948 the mine had grown to be 3,200 feet long and 2,800 feet wide, reaching the
absolute limits of JM property. The new method allowed the company to continue
operations without purchasing more land from the town, so it was a politically as well as
an economically efficient method that allowed for the immense extraction of between
19,000 and 22,760 tonnes of rock every 24 hours.333 This shift towards more underground
extraction once again suggests the unwillingness of JM to expropriate more town land on
which to expand the Jeffrey Mine, possibly due to a growing tension in company329
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community relations. The entire Jeffrey Mine was run on electricity and coal-fuelled
steam power, with even the blasting caps being electronically controlled from a tower on
the edge of the pit, and these technologically-advanced, incredibly noisy and dusty
methods were what helped JM extract so much fibre in so little time. While townspeople
grew accustomed to constant noise and dust coming from the Jeffrey Mine, workers did
not appreciate being replaced by these new machines. This level of production and
dedication to the industrialization of the land was why Asbestos town council continued
purchasing land for expansion throughout 1948 to accommodate the population that was
rising alongside production levels.
While the mineral had long been nicknamed “white gold” by those in the industry,
by 1948 asbestos was actually worth as much as gold to Quebec, with the two minerals
each bringing $430 million to the province since 1876.334 But the land in Asbestos still
had to support the people that worked it, and town council could not purchase acreage
quickly enough to meet the demand of the growing population. Moving several
kilometres away from the Jeffrey Mine onto surrounding farmland to avoid the
continuous expansion of the pit was never proposed or discussed by town council or the
local newspaper, which illustrates the close connection the local population had and
wanted to maintain with the mine335. In March and April 1948 the town purchased 16,605
feet of land between rue St-Georges and rue Bourbeau from JM and annexed 8 other lots
from the County of Shipton in preparation for major expansion.336 These purchases were
fairly straightforward, but when it came to buying land from local property owners, the
town began to have difficulty. Although council stated that “il est devenu nécessaire et
même impérieux, à la suite du développement considérable de la ville et en vue d’aide au
progrès,”337 three citizens refused to sell their land. The community was becoming less
willing to sacrifice itself to the Jeffrey Mine, suggesting that the local cultural identity
was changing, and townspeople were taking greater control of the way land was managed
and used in Asbestos. While this was problematic, council had learned much from JM,
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and stated that if these owners continued to refuse the sale, the town would begin legal
action against them in order to expropriate the property.
The Jeffrey Mine had become fully industrialized during the first half of the 20th
century and extensions of this industrialization were seen throughout the community.
Railway lines, new roads, new neighbourhoods, workers being replaced by machines that
caused more noise and dust coming from the pit, and town council’s willingness to rule in
favour of JM when it came to local land-use issues, were all signs of the widespread
industrialization of the land and community. In order to remain competitive in the global
asbestos industry, the local population had to sacrifice town infrastructure to
accommodate the Jeffrey Mine’s need for more mineral-rich land. The results of this
sacrifice were often positive and made the community proud of their industrial
accomplishments, as seen when the mine became the largest of its kind in the world after
it expanded into the original section of town.
The people of Asbestos enjoyed the economic gains the Jeffrey Mine brought
them, but while everyone appeared to be focused on the success of the community as a
whole, competing ideologies began to clash over how the land should be used and by
whom. The people of Asbestos did not like workers being replaced by machines, and
began to grow wary of the close ties town council had with JM. They were also becoming
frustrated with the constant moving of houses and shifting of community centres in order
to accommodate the needs of the company. JM attempted to appease this frustration by
beginning underground operations that were less invasive to the community, but this did
not fully address the problem of how decisions concerning land were made in Asbestos.
The labour of Jeffrey Mine workers is what made the pit the largest asbestos mine in the
world by 1939, and it also strongly connected the townspeople to the land, giving them an
ambition for success that convinced them sacrificing community space was often worth
the economic success and international renown they gained in doing so.
The contribution Jeffrey Mine workers made to the asbestos industry also gave the
community a confidence that was rooted in a connection to the natural world and was
expressed in the local cultural identity, which led townspeople to believe they had a right
to decide how their land was to be used. Machines replacing workers at the Jeffrey Mine
would shake their confidence, however, as did town council ruling in favour of JM

83
whenever an issue of land use arose. In January 1949 council purchased 55,125 square
feet of land to accommodate the growing population,338 but these plans were soon put on
hold when Jeffrey Mine workers went on strike to ensure their connection to the land in
the community—and the international industry it fed—was maintained despite the rapid
industrialization of the pit. The labour dispute would combine issues of land-use, human
health, and community, to drastically change the way the natural world was used and
understood in Asbestos.
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Chapter 3: Negotiating Risk: Human Bodies, 1918-1949
In 1995, Dr. Gerrit W.H. Schepers published a report on the time he spent at JM’s
secret laboratory in Saranac, New York. Interning there as a post-doctoral student in
1949, Schepers discovered the autopsied lungs of at least nine Jeffrey Mine employees
that JM attorney Yvan Sabourin smuggled to the lab between 1944 and 1946. A study of
these lungs was deemed necessary because “workers had begun to agitate for
compensation [for their asbestos-related diseases, and]...such a large number of cases in
such a small and well-defined group of industrial employees suggested a significant
problem.”339 JM doctors at Asbestos were only supposed to deal with “active employees,”
and the lungs Sabourin delivered came from retirees. Not only were these retirees secretly
autopsied in Asbestos, their lungs were also illegally brought across international borders,
dissected, placed on nameless slides, studied, and filed away. Schepers was prevented by
JM from publishing on his discovery for decades.
While the people of Asbestos did not know of these autopsies or of any diseases
the doctors at Saranac found in the lungs, they were aware of the state of their own bodies
and were constantly negotiating the health risks of living next to the world’s largest
chrysotile asbestos mine. Some risks, like those to the miners themselves, were
acceptable, others, like those to the women or children of the community, were not.
Furthermore, while the people of Asbestos knew they were getting sick, before 1949 they
were not fully aware of the types of disease the mineral was capable of inflicting, nor did
it occur to them that JM was using their community as a giant research laboratory, with
workers and their families acting as test mice.
Today, the cemetery in Asbestos is a place difficult for an outsider to find. While
homes, businesses, and churches are located on the easternmost part of the community,
the Cimetière de St-Aimé d’Asbestos is found to the extreme west. What divides the two
is also what unites them, giving reason for both: the Jeffrey Mine. Without the mine, the
living side of Asbestos has little reason to exist, having no other industry to sustain it.
Right next to the cemetery is the mill, historically the dustiest place to work. Located
beside the mill and behind the rows of tombstones, a large crucifix, and a statue of Jesus
with the inscription “Je ne meurs pas. J’entre dans la vie” looms the steep rise of the
339

Gerrit W.H. Schepers, “Chronology of Asbestos Cancer Discoveries: Experimental Studies of the Saranac
Laboratory,” American Journal of Industrial Medicine, v. 27 (1995), p. 600.

85
Jeffrey Mine, built up with waste that resembles the knoll where the deposit was
originally found in 1879. The pit is the heart of the community, bringing it both life and
death, and this is ingrained into the local cultural identity of Asbestos.
Over the past fifty to sixty years, asbestos has gone from being perceived as “one
of Nature’s most marvellous productions,”340 because of its remarkable fireproof abilities,
to being something that produced a “deadly dust” that slowly and painfully killed
thousands,341 roughly separated by a period of public ignorance and public outrage. The
people of Asbestos’ close relationship with the mineral and the industry meant they have
also celebrated and suffered through these two extremes. But the centrality of the Jeffrey
Mine to their lives changed their understanding of risk and death, and a unique cultural
identity was developed through bodily interaction with the mineral.
This chapter will examine the medical history of the people of Asbestos from
1918, when JM began to operate the Jeffrey Mine, to 1949, when the workers were
encouraged to come out against the health risks associated with the mineral and went on
strike partly to force JM to alleviate these risks. This is when the health of the workers
first became an international issue. The chapter will rely on sources never before used in
studies of the people of Asbestos, or of global asbestos-related disease, such as
confidential medical reports funded and hidden by JM.
This period is one of innocence and discovery in Asbestos. While JM suppressed
medical discoveries proving the mineral was dangerous, the townspeople nevertheless
knew their own bodies and knew something was wrong. They coughed up dust after only
short periods of work and generations slowly suffocated to death because of the long-term
bodily effects of the industry. This chapter will show how the townspeople deemed their
knowledge as secondary in favour of a trust in medical professionals, company officials,
and the land, which complemented their understanding of their own bodies and needs,
and the desire to maintain the success of the community and industry. Sacrifice became a
fundamental element in the local cultural identity during this period, but Jeffrey Mine
workers were not martyrs. Instead, they were agents, weighing their risks and needs, and
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acting as they saw fit. This chapter will advance our understanding of how and why the
community upheld risk and sacrifice as part of the local cultural identity between 1918
and 1949.
Discovery and Denial, 1918 to 1930
When JM arrived in Asbestos in 1918, it brought its own medical professionals
with it and established a clinic for employees. Not only were these doctors Anglophone,
they often reported the health conditions of Jeffrey Mine employees to the company
rather than to the patients themselves. JM doctors were a perk in resource communities at
this time and as mining historian Larry Lankton notes, they allowed paternalistic
companies to control workers from “cradle to grave.”342 While there were independent
doctors in Asbestos, the lives of JM employees were oriented towards the Jeffrey Mine
and they had mandatory, free yearly check-ups at the company clinic. Few had the
money, or felt the need, to seek an independent medical opinion. JM had a vested interest
in the bodies of the people of Asbestos, and their doctors were fundamental to the
preservation of a calm, healthy workforce. The medical professionals in Asbestos were
insular, segregated, and did what the company told them to do. JM had doctors stationed
in some of the company’s processing towns, such as Manville, New Jersey, but workers
at the Jeffrey Mine were their major concern because it was JM’s main source for the
mineral.343 Nowhere else were JM workers exposed to such a pure raw form of the
mineral, and medical professionals funded by the company could monitor the progression
of disease in Asbestos as though they were in an experimental laboratory, not a
community. As long as JM doctors reported that Jeffrey Mine employees were healthy,
the mineral, the industry, and the town, would be safe.
In 1924, JM opened Canada’s first mineral processing factory in Asbestos, which
increased profits, provided employment opportunities for women and children, and
created more mineral dust than the community had ever experienced before. This
coincided with the first reported asbestos-related death in international medical literature,
when Dr. W.E. Cooke reported in the British Medical Journal that Nellie Kershaw, who
worked in a factory processing asbestos near Manchester, England, had died because of
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her exposure to the mineral. Cooke explained that asbestos caused a fatal respiratory
disease,344 but the community was unaware of this discovery, and looked forward to the
prosperity the new factory would bring. Healthcare was changing in Quebec, however,
and JM officials, who knew of Kershaw’s death, had to adapt. An increased focus on
tuberculosis due to its wartime occurrence had initiated an aggressive health education
program on respiratory disease. The government of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau then
acted on the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Labour and made it
mandatory for companies to carry insurance against compensation claims.345
Because of this new law, JM partnered with the Sun Life Assurance Co. to keep
itself protected from any compensation claims. But this was not a simple business
arrangement. Sun Life medical director Dr. G.W. Wright wrote to his colleague, Dr.
Knight, in 1926 on how both companies could protect themselves by funding the
establishment of a Department of Industrial Hygiene at McGill University in Montreal.
Wright wrote that Sun Life and JM could provide “guidance in regard to matters affecting
community or individual health—such as, aid in preparation of publicity, occasional
research matters…field investigations…or industrial hazards....[T]he usefulness of the
University could be made apparent in relation to group insurance much more readily than
in any other way.”346 The department was established and ensured that the health issues
of JM employees in Asbestos would be addressed differently than elsewhere in the
province, free from the administrative hand the Catholic Church traditionally wielded in
such affairs. Asbestos was a single-industry and single-company town, and employees
trusted JM with their health the same way they trusted the company with the town’s land.
In 1927, W.E. Cooke continued his studies on British factory workers and coined
the term “asbestosis” to describe the hardening effect the mineral had on human lungs,
resulting in death by suffocation.347 Two years following Cooke’s new diagnosis, JM
received its first claim for compensation from textile factory workers in New Jersey
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suffering from asbestosis.348 The company was now on alert: the industry was becoming
increasingly lucrative, but JM would be ruined if workers began to die because of it.
In 1929, Metropolitan Life Assurance, which had taken over JM’s insurance
policy from Sun Life, urged Frank G. Pedley, one of the only doctors in Canada
publishing on asbestos-related disease, to approach McGill and “enter into an
agreement…to secure for the Company certain services and information relating to the
health of industrial workers.”349 Pedley understood what such a relationship would mean,
and he wrote, “[s]uch a plan involves a definite quid pro quo, payments specifically
conditioned upon a commensurate return.”350 Even though the Canadian Medical
Association acknowledged that the mineral was a possible danger, JM officials knew that
Pedley was the Canadian authority on asbestos-related disease and to have him on their
side was a coup.351
At the beginning of the Great Depression the death rate in Quebec was, much like
its medical care, divided along linguistic lines, and Francophones had a higher death rate
in the province than Anglophones.352 This was partly because of a general lack of medical
care given to French Canadians who could not afford it, but it was also because they were
more engaged in industrial activity, and so experienced the health problems, poverty, and
poor nutrition that tended to accompany it. This was a population that worked hard and
suffered for it, but because of JM, the situation at Asbestos was different, and medical
care was a definite perk of working at the Jeffrey Mine.
With the establishment of McGill’s new Department of Industrial Hygiene,
partially funded by JM, Pedley was hired by the university and in 1930 was invited to
work with company doctor R.H. Stevenson to assess the health status of Jeffrey Mine
employees. In his short report published in the Canadian Medical Journal, Pedley
summarized, “[a]sbestos is a mineral of interest to Canadian physicians.…If work with
asbestos presented a hazard to the worker it would be reasonable to suppose that cases of
disease would be reported from time to time, but so far as can be determined no cases of
348
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specific disease have been reported among asbestos workers in the Province of
Quebec.”353 While factory workers in America suffered from asbestos-related disease, the
heart of the industry, the Jeffrey Mine, did not seem to be causing it.
This was what Pedley was allowed to publish from his study of workers at both
Asbestos and Thetford, but it completely misrepresented his findings, and Pedley
expressed frustration at how much JM and Metropolitan Life edited out of his report.354
Pedley’s lengthy, detailed, unpublished report offers a valuable first look at how the
industry affected the bodies of the people of Asbestos. It has not been studied in great
depth because scholars either did not know of its existence or of its significance when
considering what and when JM knew about asbestos-related disease, and how many
medical professionals willingly censored their findings.
From the beginning, Pedley’s comparison between Jeffrey Mine and Thetford
workers was misleading. Every JM employee had to pass a physical exam before they
began working at the Jeffrey Mine. Thetford did not have this restriction.355 This meant
that any medical problem that a JM employee was diagnosed with occurred during their
time at the mine, which was important for compensation claims and for injuries such as
hernias, from which 4 men at Asbestos suffered in 1930.356 Furthermore, while Pedley
studied 141 men at Asbestos and only 54 at Thetford, the majority of those at the Jeffrey
Mine had worked in the industry for less than 9 years. This was in sharp contrast to
Thetford, where the average employee had worked more than 15 years. In addition to this,
the bulk of Jeffrey Mine workers were between 15 and 40 years of age, while at Thetford,
where the industry had experienced much more stable market fluctuations than Asbestos,
the majority of employees were over 40 and there was no dusty factory to deal with.357
This is vital information when placed within the context of asbestos-related disease,
which typically took at least ten years of industrial exposure to be diagnosed by doctors in
the 1930s.358
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While Pedley acknowledged that these differences would show an increased rate
of disability and disease in Thetford,359 he did not amend his examination methods to
compensate for the differences between them and those employed at the Jeffrey Mine.
This was especially significant when it came to the diseases asbestos was being linked to
in Britain at the time. Pedley found no occurrences of “asbestos corns” on Jeffrey Mine
employees, but admitted that he was uncertain of what these small, “pin head sized
elevations of the skin, somewhat like minute warts,” caused by fibres being implanted
like slivers, actually looked like.360 Twenty-seven men in Asbestos had infected tonsils,
but Pedley failed to connect this to the dusty conditions in which they worked. Pedley
was not an expert in the field of asbestos-related disease, but the fact that he was the only
medical professional focusing on it in Canada suggested he was.
Pedley’s lack of expertise became increasingly apparent when he focused on the
lungs of the men at Asbestos. He did not examine any of the workers personally, but
instead relied on already-diagnosed x-rays given to him by the company doctor. Of the
101 x-rays he examined, Pedley found only 4 cases of “definite” asbestosis but
immediately discounted them because of his “doubtful diagnosis.”361 Pedley was able to
justify his cursory examination of the x-rays because he believed “[n]one of the cases of
asbestosis appeared to suffer from disabling symptoms. Perhaps the most common
symptom was shortness of breath, but less than half the cases complained of this,” and
“very few of the men were coughing.”362 The workers were not complaining of disease,
so there was no cause for alarm, but Pedley’s reasoning overlooks the fact that
historically, miners have rarely complained about their poor health,363 and this certainly
was the case in Asbestos. Furthermore, the technology Pedley used to test for asbestosis
was rudimentary. Pedley augmented x-rays that were difficult to read with a test to
measure chest expansion, using nothing but a tape measure and a sheet covering the
employee’s torso. This test was soon given up because of its inaccuracy. Continuity in the
examinations was not considered of prime importance.
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In addition to the difficulty in establishing a firm diagnosis of asbestosis, Pedley
wrote that, “[c]onversation with physicians and mine managers in the asbestos regions
indicated that no hazard to health was suspected in connection with work in the asbestos
mining and milling industry.”364 While he was the only medical professional in the
country publishing on asbestos, Pedley trusted the expertise of company doctors enough
not to refute them, and wrote that “it is the general impression both among miners and
physicians that asbestos dust is not particularly harmful….From the public health
standpoint…it seems hardly likely that asbestosis will become of importance either from
the standpoint of morbidity or mortality.”365 According to Pedley, asbestosis was not a
terribly painful affliction despite the British medical reports that suggested different, and
furthermore, it was contained to the working class and did not present a risk to the general
public. Pedley’s conclusions had profound effects on how health was viewed by workers,
company doctors, and JM in the coming years, and remain part of the local cultural
identity in Asbestos today. Medical historian Charles E. Rosenberg writes that disease is
both biologically and socially constructed and “does not exist until we have agreed that it
does, by perceiving, naming and responding to it.”366 In the professional opinion of
Pedley, the workers, and JM, asbestos-related disease did not exist.
“the less said about asbestos, the better off we are,” 1930-1940
While Pedley’s report on the workers in Asbestos and Thetford Mines was not
published in its entirety, it did give JM cause for concern. While many men at the Jeffrey
Mine did not have severe cases of asbestosis in 1930, the fact that almost half those
studied in Thetford did367 was a sign that it was only a matter of time before the same
occurred in Asbestos. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, however, the mineral gained a
global reputation for being synonymous with safety. It was used to line electrified oxygen
bottles in airplanes, and as an additive to hospital and broadcasting stations ceiling tiles
because it made them soundproof.368 With these uses came increased profits and
reluctance on the part of JM to admit asbestos was dangerous.
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In a 1931 letter from Metropolitan Life to JM attorneys, a Dr. McConnell wrote
that Pedley’s unpublished report, “like the report on the American plants, will be given no
publicity by us except with the consent of the firms concerned.”369 Although Pedley did
not think the workers at Asbestos were suffering from any severe health issues, both the
insurance company and JM were aware of the potential financial loss that would come
from compensation claims if his full report was released. This awareness, combined with
the results of a secret JM study at New York’s Saranac Laboratory that found asbestos
dust caused asbestosis in mice after just sixty days of exposure,370 led the company to go
on the offensive: the medical knowledge its doctors discovered would be kept secret
while the evidence of others would be denied. No doctor outside of JM control examined
Jeffrey Mine employees for decades. Because medical care by company doctors was
provided as part of their contract, and because workers trusted JM, they did not seek
second, independent opinions. This does not mean the workers were free of asbestosrelated disease, but rather that it was underreported and unacknowledged by both the
company and the workers.
After Pedley submitted his full report to JM, the company began a campaign
against the conclusions made by British medical professionals about the health effects of
the mineral. Because the asbestos-related deaths of British factory workers could not be
ignored, JM claimed that it was South African blue asbestos that was dangerous, not
Canadian,371 and Jeffrey Mine asbestos was completely safe. British doctors immediately
refuted this claim, stating that 80% of the asbestos used in England came from Canada.372
Although this discredited the company’s claim that Quebec asbestos was safe, JM
maintained this argument for decades. The company was so committed to the false idea
that Canadian asbestos was safe that it permeated the local cultural identity and convinced
the community the mineral, and their land, was safe, which is an idea that many
townspeople uphold today.373
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While JM was not acknowledging publicly that asbestos caused severe health
effects, internally the company was in a panic over the potential lawsuits that could be
launched against it. In a letter from one JM vice president to another, E.M. Voorhees
wrote S.A. Williams that “[e]ver since dust suits have been brought against us at Manville
[New Jersey] we have considered, first, the possibility of installing the most modern and
improved dust collecting systems.”374 Asbestos-related disease in the 1930s appeared to
be contained to the factories that processed the mineral, so in mining and as an additive to
consumer goods and industrial products it seemed relatively safe. This was good news for
JM because if the disease could be contained to factories, it could be managed.
The disease-prevention plan was carried out in Asbestos, but not to the extent it
could have been. In a letter to S.A. Williams, Jeffrey Mine Vice President C.H.
Shoemaker wrote, “since September 1931, no new dust collection equipment has been
installed in the factory, chiefly because the equipment there meets ‘all practical
requirements’ [and] [i]nspection by the medical officers of the Quebec Board of Health
‘indicates a clear ticket.’”375 Shoemaker believed that the dust control measures already in
place eliminated 80% of the dust in the factory and mill even though it was difficult to
persuade workers to comply with the new requirements: “[they] do not find respirators
practicable. The dust in the mills is evidently less irritating and is more fibrous than in
[other] locations, resulting in less need for a respirator and more trouble with the filter
clogging when a respirator is used.”376 Shoemaker’s sentiments reflected those of Pedley
two years earlier: even though there was so much dust in the air at the Jeffrey Mine that it
clogged respirator filters, the workers did not complain, so there was not a problem. The
fact that the fibres clogged respirator filters should have been an indication to employees
and JM officials that more safety precautions were necessary, not fewer, but the company
did not make the use of protective devices at the Jeffrey Mine mandatory until 1975.
Respirator technology was constantly improving, and JM would increasingly stress the
importance of their use to employees in order to prevent litigation due to asbestos-related
disease. Clogged filters remained a problem because of the amount of dust in the mills at
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the Jeffrey Mine, however, and workers again and again chose not to wear respirators or
lobby for better dust control measures. The lack of action of Jeffrey Mine workers reveals
an acceptance of dust and an acceptance of risk in Asbestos, and illustrates an
occupational culture that greatly influenced local identity. Workers did not complain of ill
health and they chose not to take precautionary measures to prevent disease, even when
JM acknowledged the risk by providing respirators.
As health measures were carried out and contested in Asbestos, more work was
done to discover what exactly the mineral did to the human body. Members of the British
medical community wrote much of the literature emerging on asbestos-related disease at
this time377 because they had witnessed the deaths of British factory workers and were
convinced that the mineral was not safe. In 1933, British doctor E.R.A. Merewether
stated, “[i]f only the slightest exposure to the dust results untimely in death, then the
scope of the necessary preventive measures is summed up in one word—prohibition—for,
practically speaking, it is impossible to prevent such exposure.”378 Coinciding with this
was an article by Pedley, no longer under the censorship of JM, that claimed asbestosis
worked twice as fast as, and with symptoms more severe than, silicosis, a similar
industrial disease.379 Prohibition would ruin JM, as would statements about the severity of
asbestos-related disease. The company had to go on the offensive in order to save itself.
Aside from company doctors stationed in communities like Asbestos, JM had a
whole band of medical professionals under its control in Saranac, New York, who were
used to combat negative health reports on the mineral. Writing to Saranac Laboratory
head Dr. A.J. Lanza, company doctor Leroy Gardner stated, “the fat seems to be in the
fire,” because of leaked medical reports on JM factory workers in New Jersey that
resulted in compensation claims.380 If successful, these claims had the potential to result
in others and a growing awareness of the negative effects of asbestos. New health and
safety measures were put in place at the factory in Manville, N.J., and Vice President
Vandiver Brown wrote his brother, President Lewis H. Brown, that during the rest of
377
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1933, they must “bring other operations, especially Waukegan, Alexandria, Lompoc, and
Asbestos to Manville efficiency.”381 These places were of prime importance to the
company, but the safety measures in these locations were not as strict as they could and
should have been. The Jeffrey Mine was in definite need of improvement, but the people
of Asbestos were more secluded than those who worked at JM’s American plants because
of language barriers and a lack of concern for industrial disease within the Canadian
medical community. This seclusion allowed the company a degree of freedom and
patience when it came to dust control measures.
While factories were slowly brought up to health standards, Saranac Laboratory
doctors worked to dispel the idea that asbestos was a dangerous mineral. In an address to
the Home Office Life Underwriters Association in November 1933, Dr. A.J. Lanza
claimed, “I am going to make this a little bit dramatic. So far as we could ascertain, there
is no dust hazard or asbestos hazard in connection with the actual mining or quarrying
operations...in the open pit and quarry work there was no apparent pulmonary hazard.”382
While this did not address factory work, it was a small victory for the company and for
the town of Asbestos, where mining operations were crucial to economic survival. The
following year, Lanza met with Metropolitan Life officials to discuss the elimination of
dust in factories and stressed that knowledge of asbestos-related disease was still too
rudimentary to say for sure that the mineral posed a serious health risk.383 JM was
fortunate to have Lanza in its employ and the company knew it.
The connection between asbestosis and silicosis was something many doctors and
legislatures were exploring in the 1930s. Silicosis was a recognized, compensatable
industrial disease in the United States and Canada,384 but asbestosis was not, although the
diseases were similar. Silicosis was a recognized industrial disease because the hard rock
mining industry was older than the asbestos industry, which resulted in increased
occurrences and a stronger labour movement that could successfully lobby governments.
Diseases are both physical and political, and Vandiver Brown called on Lanza to write a
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report to be submitted to various government and union organizations denying the
similarities between asbestosis and silicosis, but stressed,
no one in our organization is suggesting for a moment that you alter by one
jot or title any scientific facts or inevitable conclusions revealed or
justified by your preliminary survey. All we ask is that all of the favorable
aspects of the survey be included and that none of the unfavorable be
unintentionally pictured in darker tones than the circumstances justify. I
feel confident we can depend upon you…to give us this ‘break.’385
Brown did not ask Lanza to alter his medical report, but implied that the company was
after a positive account of asbestos and its effects on the human body. While JM
continued to raise health and safety standards in its operations with new dust control
technology,386 Lanza released his report on the risk of asbestosis among American factory
workers and Canadian miners and millers. The report concluded that asbestosis was
milder than silicosis and caused only a “little,” occasionally fatal disability.387
This gave JM the proof it needed to defend itself against compensation claims
that, although only a few dozen at this time, were steadily rising in the United States and
the company could play the injured party to “the shyster lawyer[s] and the quack
doctor[s]”388 who were launching lawsuits against JM. Vandiver Brown was especially
skilled at this, and continuously stated that the claims brought against the company were
“not bona fide and…we are victims of the racket.”389 However, JM official Sumner
Simpson cautioned Brown against this and warned, “the less said about asbestos, the
better off we are.”390 Simpson’s statement shows just how much JM knew about asbestosrelated disease at this time and how much they were committed to covering it up.
Simpson urged caution because in the middle of the 1930s, as unions in both
America and l’Estrie were becoming more common and knowledgeable about asbestosrelated disease,391 the company had no definite idea of what the mineral could do to the
human body. As a result JM asked Saranac’s Dr. Leroy Gardner to study the effects of
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asbestos dust on mice so they could track the evolution of disease.392 Gardner was paid
for the study on the condition that JM had the right to “determine whether, to what extent
and in what manner [his conclusions] shall be made public.”393 JM officials were worried
about the possible outcomes of the study and the potential effects, which Simpson made
clear when he wrote, “[t]he reports may be so favorable to us that they would cause us no
trouble, but they might be just the opposite; which could be very embarrassing.”394
Throughout this period JM was concerned solely with its public image and financial
success. The pain and suffering of its employees, including those in Asbestos, was not a
problem on which the company focused.
Gardner agreed to the conditions the company set for his study. Meanwhile, JM’s
doctor in Asbestos became a spokesman for the industry. Dr. R.H. Stevenson had helped
Pedley in his 1930 examination of Jeffrey Mine employees, but it was not until 1938,
when Quebec officially recognized asbestosis as a compensatable industrial disease due
to pressure from the Fédération nationale des employés de l’industrie minière,395 that JM
asked him to take a more public role. In his 23 May 1938 address to Quebec’s asbestos
producers, Stevenson defended the health record of the Canadian industry, and insisted
that it was only South African asbestos that caused disease because of its high silica
content, absent in the Jeffrey Mine. Stevenson believed that asbestosis was “a rare case
among asbestos workers” in North America, and stated that this “has been experimentally
proved by…Dr. L.U. Gardner of [the] Trudeau Laboratory at Saranac. There is very little
clinical evidence of Asbestosis, and certainly not enough to even venture a diagnosis.”396
Stevenson was referring to both Gardner’s past and current research on asbestos, which
JM assumed would be favourable.
Stevenson relied on his own experience in Asbestos to show that the mineral did
no harm. He said that he had been studying asbestosis there for ten years, and “We have
been highly pleased to note the extreme rarity of asbestosis among our men.…As is to be
expected the cases discovered showing early Asbestosis were men who had worked a
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long time in the company service.”397 To Stevenson asbestosis was not a deadly
respiratory disease, but rather a part of getting old in the industry, like wrinkles or a bad
back. Those who suffered from it at the Jeffrey Mine were mostly men who worked in the
mill, which convinced Stevenson “that it is a good idea to transfer men away from the
mill after ten to twelve years of service to other departments. You will see…that our
position is very far from serious as far as actual damage to the men is concerned.”398 The
idea of rotating mill workers every ten years or so illustrates just how little medical
professionals understood the severity or pathology of asbestos-related disease at this time.
It also demonstrates just how little doctors understood the suffering associated with
diseases like asbestosis, which began with shortness of breath, but resulted in a slow and
painful death due to suffocation. For Stevenson to say the men with asbestosis at the
Jeffrey Mine were not “damaged” was grossly misleading, and his direct interaction with
the workers influenced the way they understood what was happening to their bodies.
According to Stevenson, the good health of Asbestos men, at least during their first
decade on the job, proved that the mineral, and the industry, was safe.
Despite Stevenson’s convictions, many of Quebec’s asbestos producers still had
doubts. C.S. Bell, lawyer for the British asbestos manufacturing company Turner &
Newall, which owned a mine in Thetford, forwarded a transcript of the speech to his
employers and stated that while Stevenson “appears to consider that Rhodesian asbestos
is more liable to promote Asbestosis than Canadian, by reason of the higher proportion of
SiO2…as far as I can trace from the published analyses the Silica content of Canadian and
Rhodesian fibre is almost identical, i.e. about 40%.”399 Experience dealing with health
problems in British factories trumped Stevenson’s convictions, but Turner & Newall
officials did not publicly refute his claims because it would damage the industry. The
unwillingness of company officials to challenge Stevenson’s claim that Canadian asbestos
was safe allowed many in the medical community to deem the doctor in Asbestos an
expert on the subject and his theory on the relative safety of the Canadian mineral has had
long lasting effects.
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Although Stevenson did not believe asbestosis was a significant problem, the
situation at Asbestos was worrisome. In 1938 the dust collection equipment in the mill
was only 50% effective and resulted in mineral dust hovering like clouds over the
community, being in general an “almost intolerable nuisance,” with complaints rising
from both the town council and individuals.400 JM officials reported that “so heavy at
times was the concentration of this dust in the mill area that it began to be regarded as a
safety hazard, and the familiar grey colour in town and country-side constituted a very
definite public nuisance.”401 Townspeople accepted high levels of dust at the Jeffrey
Mine, but not in the streets of the community because of effects on aesthetics and
visibility, not a great fear of what the dust was doing to their lungs. Townspeople did not
realize that dust-related disease was becoming a community-wide issue, not one
contained to the mine or mill. To solve the dust problem, JM spent $135,000 and five
months to construct a new Cottrell Precipitation Plant designed to eliminate dust both in
the factory and outside it. When the project was completed dust produced in the mill was
reduced to just 20% of the previous levels. This sounded impressive, but still meant that
ten tonnes of dust was released into the air of Asbestos each day.402 Dust was a fact of life
in the community in the first half of the 20th century, and while it was a nuisance, it was
not feared.
Canadian JM President H.K. Sherry received letters from Asbestos town council
thanking him for the improvements made in reducing the amount of fibre hovering over
the community, and for his commitment to beautifying the town.403 There was a level of
dust hovering over Asbestos that the community accepted, partly because they believed
JM was taking care of them. This belief was linked to the installation of new
technologically advanced equipment, such as state of the art x-ray machines, at the CJM
Hospital in Asbestos, designed to “take hazards out of industry.”404 The hospital was for
the entire community and JM officials stated that “Government authorities have
expressed interest in the discovery that workers here show remarkable freedom from dust
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diseases.”405 The people of Asbestos appeared to be the healthiest, most monitored
resource community in the province, and the presence of doctors and new medical tests
convinced workers yet again that the mineral would not seriously harm them. With this
positive image surrounding the company and the community, JM once again asked Dr.
Stevenson for a public assessment of his patients.
Whereas Stevenson’s 1938 address was designed to convince industry leaders that
Quebec asbestos was safe, he used little evidence from his own experiences working with
Jeffrey Mine employees. In his 1940 report, by contrast, Stevenson provided a detailed
account of the health of his patients. He began by once again stating that asbestosis was a
misunderstood disease and “the victim of a great many reports.”406 Stevenson continued
to assert that asbestosis was not serious, and even if it was, “in this country [it] is not the
serious hazard to labor that it was a few years ago believed to be.”407 The aim of this
report was for Stevenson to ease the growing concern over asbestosis by providing an
expert opinion on the recognition of it in theory and in practice.
Although the symptoms and significance of asbestosis was debated in the
international medical community, Stevenson compiled a list of nine generally agreedupon indications of the disease:
1. Dyspnoea [painful breathlessness], the most common, but cannot be
noticed except following violent exercise, such as stepping up out a chair
25 times in 30 seconds; 2. Cough; 3. Cyanosis (late) [unoxygenated blood,
poor circulation, blue colouration of the skin]; 4. Clubbed finger nails
(late); 5. Spitting of blood; 6. Loss of weight and emaciation; 7. Anorexia.
When a man cannot eat it is time to stop work; 8. Poor chest expansion; 9.
Substernal pain.408
These symptoms show how superficial knowledge on asbestos-related disease was in
1940 and the extent to which Stevenson could acknowledge, but not address, the pain that
some of the workers at the Jeffrey Mine experienced. While not all of these symptoms
occurred at once, and many could be signs of other diseases such as tuberculosis, or
simply of poor physical fitness, this list demonstrated JM’s willingness to push
employees to their bodily limits, a lack of compassion within the medical profession, and
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a desire to serve the industry, not the sick. These symptoms also help advance our
understanding of what some people in Asbestos experienced. Townspeople did not need a
doctor to tell them that turning blue and coughing up blood meant that they were sick, and
it did not take medical training to connect these often painful symptoms to the jobs these
men performed at the Jeffrey Mine. That the people of Asbestos possessed this
knowledge and chose not to wear respirators while at work or to lobby for better health
measures at the mine shows their willingness to accept bodily risk if it meant a steady job
and a prosperous community. The acceptance of risk was entrenched in the local cultural
identity at this time, and influenced the actions of the townspeople in the years to come.
Stevenson’s report changed focus halfway through when he wrote on the health of
507 employees who had worked at the Jeffrey Mine for over ten years, the minimum
amount of time believed to be required before asbestosis occurred. Of this cohort,
Stevenson found 17 with early asbestosis, 5 with moderate asbestosis, and none with
advanced asbestosis.409 While 22 incidents of asbestosis out of 507 men appeared
relatively small compared to occurrences of silicosis in hard rock mining communities
and suggested it was not a serious or widespread industrial disease, this was not good
enough for Stevenson. He reported that these “figures are arrived at by taking results of
Stereoscope examinations only. When these cases are studied from a case history and
physical examination standpoint, our percentage of those suffering from Asbestosis is
exactly zero. If we used all of our employees in making these figures, the percentages
would be about three times smaller.”410 These conclusions suggested that asbestosis was
not a problem at the Jeffrey Mine and medical experts outside the community that stated
the mineral was dangerous were wrong. Stevenson’s lack of trust in medical equipment
like the Stereoscope to properly assess disease illustrates his unwillingness to believe
asbestosis was a problem in the community. By disregarding his own medical evidence,
he denied the harmful health effects of the mineral and greatly influenced the opinions of
the suffering workers he treated.
While Stevenson gave a detailed review of the symptoms of asbestosis, he also
highlighted some of the customs of the community. Like all JM towns, Asbestos had a
Quarter Century Club to which every employee belonged once they had worked twenty409
410

Ibid, p. 4.
Ibid, p. 4.

102
five years for the company. Stevenson wrote that “a good percentage of these oldsters are
still doing as hard manual labor as they ever did, and with no more sign of fatigue than
any other men of similar age.”411 Whether these men were working so late in life due to a
dedication to the company or a need to support a family is unclear because the goal was
to portray them as tough, healthy, and happy members of the club. Stevenson also
mentioned the JM employees who had died since 1929: “I have investigated the cause of
death in all these cases, and not one of them have died of a lung affection [sic]…Of those
living, there is not one that displays the classical signs of Asbestosis.”412 Once again,
Stevenson’s conclusions were misleading. He did not perform any autopsies on the dead
workers of Asbestos, the exterior physical indicators he relied upon for diagnosis were
similar to a number of other diseases, and as a JM spokesperson, he had a vested interest
in denying any occurrence of serious health problems in Asbestos.
At the beginning of his report, Stevenson attributed the confusion over asbestosis
to the lack of human bodies to study,413 but he ignored the fact that he was the doctor in a
community that was built around the asbestos industry and had bodies available.
Although he admitted that autopsies were the one conclusive way to determine if an
employee suffered from asbestosis, Stevenson reported, “we have never had reason to
have autopsies on our men, owing to the absence of symptons [sic] suggesting
Asbestosis.”414 This statement showed unwillingness on the part of Stevenson to fully
investigate the diseases asbestos caused in favour of skimming the surface of signs and
symptoms without questioning them. No mention was made as to whether families in
Asbestos requested autopsies or if autopsies were seen as a violation of the body, but if
asbestosis had been discovered in the lungs of dead Jeffrey Mine employees and families
were told, JM would have been inundated with compensation claims. The people of
Asbestos knew many of them were becoming painfully ill after working at the Jeffrey
Mine but Stevenson’s assurances that they were healthy, or that their illnesses were
caused by other factors, he was able to convince community members that the bodily
knowledge they possessed through their own suffering was wrong. Because of
Stevenson’s cursory methods of diagnosis it is likely that more than 22 Jeffrey Mine
411
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workers had asbestosis in 1940,415 but no health-related protests or complaints were
launched and JM employees did not lobby for a safer work environment, internalizing
bodily risks as part of the local cultural identity.
Many asbestos industry heads read Stevenson’s 1938 report. Officials at the
British manufacturing firm Turner & Newall were unconvinced. Showing a lack of
respect for his medical authority, company man F. Bussy wrote to Turner & Newall that
“Dr. Stevenson has obviously had but little experience of post mortem examinations and
we shall therefore have to be guided more by men who have the opportunity of many
such examinations. I cannot but feel that with their experience of known cases if our
Medical Board were to examine the 507 men mentioned there would be more cases to
report.”416 Stevenson did not hold much authority within the global medical community
because he was a company-funded doctor who did not perform the most basic
examinations or autopsies to trace the progression of disease, which contrasted with the
practices of British doctors who were particularly concerned with industrial diseases like
asbestosis and devoted entire studies to autopsy results. He was more effective closer to
home, however, and after his report was submitted to the Quebec government, asbestosis
was removed from its list of compensatable industrial diseases; even the workers
association accepted the decision.417 Because of his authoritative role when it came to the
health of the workers at Asbestos, Stevenson was kept on retainer by JM after he retired
in 1945, “due to the number of asbestosis cases that will come up for consideration in the
next few years,”418 and he was elected mayor of the neighbouring community of Danville
soon after. While the company publicly denied the ill health effects of the mineral, it was
only a matter of time until the realities of asbestos-related disease became public
knowledge.
“A situation is developing with the miners in Quebec,” 1940-1949
Stevenson’s 1940 report emerged as the medical scene in Quebec was becoming
increasingly divided. English Canada’s medical association turned its attention towards
industrial diseases, mostly in Ontario factories, because of their increased occurrence in
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workers employed in the growing industry of war.419 L’Association des Médecins de
Langue Française du Canada did the same, but separately, and focused on asbestos. While
neither of these organizations had direct access to Jeffrey Mine workers because JM did
not allow outside medical professionals access to employee files, it became increasingly
difficult to hide the severity of asbestos-related disease. Doctors at l’Université Laval in
Quebec City were beginning to investigate the bodies of employees at Thetford, where
company restrictions were less severe.
The medical reports on asbestos-related disease emerging from Laval in the 1940s
were strong where Stevenson was weak: autopsies. These reports spoke of how quickly
and painfully Thetford asbestos workers died once they arrived at the hospital
complaining of difficulty breathing, and they included autopsy photos of diseased
lungs.420 The Laval doctors provided proof of disease Stevenson had not searched out and
reveal just how much the French Canadian medical community knew of asbestos-related
disease at this time. In the first report on asbestos in Laval médical, doctors wrote,
“l’amiantose est une affection dont le chapitre pathologique nous paraît encore incomplet.
Nous espérons que certaines conditions favorables d’observation et de collaboration
médicales nous permettront d’apporter une contribution intéressante à l’étude de cette
maladie professionnelle.”421 Laval medical professionals were able to independently
publish all of their findings and suspected those associated with JM were not.
The doctors at Laval demonstrated this freedom when two patients suffering from
asbestosis in their care died of lung cancer.422 While two cases were not enough to make a
firm connection, “il nous paraît logique de la croire, comme d’autres l’ont cru pour la
silicose, que l’amiantose peut être une cause prédisposant du cancer pulmonaire.”423 This
was radically different from the type of reports JM doctors released, but it coincided with
what Leroy Gardner was finding at Saranac. During his study on the effects of asbestos
dust on mice, Gardner accidentally found that the mineral caused lung and organ cancer
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81.8% of the time.424 Cancer was not something JM had thought to ask him to investigate,
and in a letter to Vandiver Brown, Gardner wrote that the
question of cancer susceptibility now seems more significant than I had
previously imagined. I believe I can obtain support for repeating it from
the cancer research group. As it will take 2 or 3 years to complete such a
study, I believe that it better be omitted from the present report….The
evidence is suggestive but not conclusive that asbestosis may precipitate
the development of cancer in susceptible individuals.425
If these results were released, repercussions for JM and the economy of Asbestos would
be catastrophic, and cancer was not something the townspeople had considered when they
accepted the bodily risks of the industry. Just as the company was making record profits
because of the necessity of the fibre to the war effort,426 the fact that asbestos caused
cancer had the potential to destroy the industry. Gardner’s findings were never released
and JM claimed that there was no proof the mineral caused cancer. After Gardner’s death,
Lanza thoroughly edited the report and published it as an effort to prove the relative
harmlessness of the mineral. The effects of asbestos on the mice in Gardner’s lab were
ignored, as were the effects of the mineral on the workers at the Jeffrey Mine.
Whereas JM had the authority over the release of studies at the Saranac
Laboratory, they had no control over the medical professionals at Laval. Francophone
doctors in Quebec were somewhat isolated from the rest of the North American medical
community because of linguistic boundaries,427 but were well aware of the studies on
asbestos-related disease written in English. In 1943 Laval’s Dr. Louis Rousseau believed
that asbestos was unique in the way it affected the human body: “[p]armi les maladies
professionnelles causées par les divers types de poussières… donnant des maladies
pulmonaires…il en est une qui mérite une place spéciale, tant par son étiologie, sa forme
histo-pathologique, que par son apparition relativement récente, comme syndrome
pulmonaire encore à l’étude.”428 The mineral fascinated these doctors because of their
proximity to the asbestos-producing region and due to its unusual pathology, not because
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they had a financial interest in the results of their studies like those at Saranac. Rousseau
believed that these edited studies prevented proper legislation in Quebec and wrote,
l’ouvrier lui-même n’est pas empressé de se prêter à l’étude de cette
maladie et, s’il désire des modifications de la loi actuelle en sa faveur, il ne
fera aucune revendication qui l’exposerait à un licenciement. Cette
opposition des compagnies, favorisée par la méfiance des ouvriers qui ne
se sentent pas protégés par une législation favorable est, dans notre
opinion, le principal obstacle à l’étude de l’amiantose pure.429
Rousseau believed that workers did not have the power to lobby for improved health
standards in the Quebec asbestos industry and that they mistrusted the companies that
owned the mines, but in the community of Asbestos, this was not the case. Workers at the
Jeffrey Mine experienced the painful symptoms of asbestos-related disease, but though
they went on strike six times, they never once chose to strike for improved working
conditions before 1949. After seeing what the mineral could do to the human body,
Rousseau could not understand how the people of Asbestos interpreted bodily risk as part
of their local cultural identity.
In a step towards improved occupational health legislation, in 1944 Liberal
Premier Adélard Godbout attempted to enact a new Labour Code in the province that
would help facilitate compensation claims and unemployment insurance. However, that
same year he was replaced by Union nationale leader Maurice Duplessis, who had no
intention of updating the province’s labour laws, especially if they infringed on corporate
rights.430 As far as Duplessis was concerned, companies needed the freedom to act in
ways they felt were best for business without worrying about government intervention.
Disease legislation was stalled.
The growing number of medical reports on asbestos-related disease in Laval
medical,431 combined with Gardner’s accidental discovery of the mineral causing high
rates of cancer in mice, meant that JM needed to know if the same was happening to its
workers in Asbestos and those in the numerous and dusty manufacturing plants that relied
on the Jeffrey Mine’s mineral throughout the world. In May 1944, Gardner wrote to
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Stevenson asking to visit Asbestos to review the x-ray films of his patients because the
population’s occurrence of asbestosis was so disproportionately low compared to JM
factories in America.432 Although Gardner was given permission for the visit, CJM
President H.K. Sherry made it clear to Stevenson that “[o]ur main interest should be in
any favorable findings” that resulted from Gardner’s examination of the films.433 JM did
not need another negative health report.
Fortunately for the company, Gardner confirmed Stevenson’s findings. After
examining between 200 and 300 x-rays with a New York State Department of Health
official, Gardner found only two possible cases of “questionable first degree
asbestosis.”434 This indicated to Gardner that Stevenson’s claims about the safety of the
Quebec mineral were accurate and that factory workers were dying because the fibre was
mixed with South African asbestos in the United States.435 Gardner failed to question why
he was only given a selection of old films chosen by Stevenson to study. The two cases of
questionable asbestosis may have been from many years prior and could have turned into
lung cancer or premature death by 1944, but Gardner did not follow up on them. The
workers at the Jeffrey Mine were not disease-free, but Stevenson’s selective method for
choosing films for Gardner to study made it appear as though they were.
Soon after Gardner’s 1944 visit, JM and its workers signed a new collective
agreement. The union demanded that a “dust clause” be included in the contract that
stated, “the Company will take necessary steps to eliminate as much as possible the dust
in its operations.”436 The workers were not as content about the effects of asbestos dust on
their bodies as Stevenson was, and this was the first time they expressed their concerns
through the union. CJM official G.K. Foster insisted that the dust clause was to be
accepted only if absolutely necessary and only if rephrased to read: “the Company
recognizes the desirability of progressive improvement in the alleviation of any nuisance
arising from the existence of dust in its operations, and will continue to pursue its policy
of adopting such measures as it may from time to time deem to be practical, having in
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view the accomplishment of that objective.”437 Altering the statement resulted in vague
allusions to dust control rather than an actual dust clause. JM’s ability to alter the clause
demonstrates that although the workers were concerned with the presence of dust, they
were not so worried that they would fight for the firmer version of the clause, again
showing their willingness to accept the risks associated with working at the Jeffrey Mine.
As the dust clause in the new contract was being negotiated in 1944, JM funded a
report on a forgotten segment of the Jeffrey Mine workforce: women. While company
doctors acknowledged that most cases of asbestosis were limited to those who worked in
the mill,438 they never mentioned the women who made up 25% of the workforce during
the war.439 In August 1944, JM official Joan Ross examined the female workers at the
Jeffrey Mine and noted that the Textile Department had the worst dust problem and the
highest absentee rate in the entire factory, so it should have been studied in the past.440
The reasons Ross gave as to why female employees at Asbestos were absent so often
were “dust and bad ventilation, fatigue, and higher absentee rate among women in
general.”441 Ross also noted that the “situation has become a topic of conversation
throughout the entire community and is a serious detriment to the reputation of the
company.”442 The local population’s understanding of risk was that it was something
contained to male Jeffrey Mine employees. Women were still to be protected from the
adverse effects of industrializing the land.
Gendered perceptions of who was allowed to be exposed to industrial risk and
disease were common in the 19th and early 20th century, especially in the textile factories
of Montreal and New England, but JM officials and doctors had previously ignored the
health of female employees in the asbestos industry, partly because mining was perceived
to be male-dominated and this overshadowed the women who worked in the industry.
Stevenson felt it was acceptable to move a sick male employee from the mill to another
part of JM operations. Women, on the other hand, could not be sacrificed to the industrial
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machine and asbestos dust could not be allowed to harm wives and daughters, which was
why townspeople complained. Later that year the province recommended that
improvements be made to control dust at the mill,443 but these suggestions were not
mandatory because of the Duplessis government’s unwillingness to infringe on the rights
of companies operating in Quebec. The care of female employees at the Jeffrey Mine had
to be negotiated between the workers and JM, and the company would not admit to any
hazard.
Although the Duplessis government was not worried about asbestos dust, the
doctors at Laval made it a primary concern. In 1946, Dr. Louis Rousseau once again
expressed his frustration over the lack of commitment to researching asbestos-related
disease: “si la silicose peut être étudiée dans tous les pays, il n’en est pas de même de
l’amiantose. Comme la région…produit environ 75% de l’amiante mondiale, l’on
comprendre facilement qu’une étude clinique approfondie n’a pu être faite par des
médecins ne vivant pas dans l’entourage immédiat de ces ouvriers exposés à ces
poussières particulières.”444 Rousseau believed asbestosis was a unique disease that
required further study because of its severity. He wrote, “[u]ne solution satisfaissante à ce
problème industriel ne m’apparait pas devoir être obtenue, tant qu’une commission
d’étude, indépendante de la politique et des compagnies intéressées, n’aura pas la liberté
de les ouvriers avant leur admission dans cette industrie et de faire des contrôles fréquents
de leur état pulmonaire par la suite.”445
Rousseau referred not only to Stevenson’s work, but also to Leroy Gardner’s
unreleased report, which had been greatly anticipated by the medical community.
Gardner, the “famed director of the Saranac Laboratory,”446 died in 1946 without
completing his study of the effects of asbestos dust but JM released an edited portion of
his unfinished report that stated the mineral was relatively benign, which Rousseau found
impossible to believe.447 In 1947, Vandiver Brown went even further with Gardner’s
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study and requested that any reference to cancer be deleted,448 and wrote to company
attorney J.P. Woodard that the discovery of cancer “looks like dynamite.”449
Because the threat of cancer had the potential to counter JM’s claim that Quebec
asbestos was safe, the company went on the offensive to overpower reports emerging
from Laval with findings of their own, believing there was “a need to complete Gardner’s
report before French Canadian researchers elect to write something themselves.”450 While
the doctors at Laval were convinced that asbestos dust raised death rates in the mining
towns of l’Estrie, workers at the Jeffrey Mine were not included in their studies and they
found no traces of cancer during their autopsies of Thetford employees.451 It appeared that
the results of Gardner’s study had been successfully contained, but to be sure it stayed
this way, JM installed a new doctor at Asbestos after Stevenson retired.
Dr. Kenneth Smith had worked for JM prior to being relocated to Asbestos and
knew what was expected of him, although he was not always comfortable with this role.
One of the first actions he took in 1947 was to remove mill employee Alexandre Bourassa
to a “non-dusty operation.”452 Although Bourassa was only 35 years old and did not
appear sick, he had worked in the mill for 20 years and “[s]hould he continue to work in
the dust much longer, I feel that we might have another case with a typical x-ray film and
typical physical findings of asbestosis.”453 Smith was a different kind of doctor than
Stevenson. He took the risks of Jeffrey Mine asbestos much more seriously than his
predecessor, and often became conflicted with his role in putting workers at risk. It is not
clear what an employee was told or not told when they were transferred from one part of
the Jeffrey Mine’s operations to another after visiting the doctor, or if they worried about
what the move might mean. What is clear, however, is that Smith believed the people at
Asbestos were at a much greater risk of disease than they had previously been told.
Despite this, Smith helped calm JM’s fears over what might be discovered by
Laval medical professionals studying Thetford workers. Although they worked for
different companies, he befriended Dr. Paul Cartier at Thetford and scheduled monthly
448
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meetings with him to ensure a “uniformity of procedure and results in the two clinics.”454
Smith was able to convince Cartier to keep Thetford health records from outsiders and
between 1947 and 1949 doctors at Laval had no subjects on which to study the health
effects of asbestos. Their studies were stalled.455 The two doctors became friends and
after the medical records at Thetford were closed, Cartier became Smith’s ally and
confidant. Smith felt free to express his frustration to Cartier over not having the freedom
to study only one aspect of asbestos-related disease. Instead, Smith had to address every
medical ailment in Asbestos and complained to Cartier, “I cannot do as good a job as you
are doing, but that is what J-M wants.”456 Despite his complaints Smith was in a position
of power at the Jeffrey Mine and JM did ask him to focus on only one thing there:
preventing knowledge and evidence of asbestos-related disease from spreading.
In March 1948, this duty became clear when JM allowed two independent doctors
from New York to visit Asbestos and assess a series of employee x-rays. Although the
selection of x-rays was supposed to be done by the Quebec Compensation Board to
ensure a fair report, Smith managed to bypass the restrictions and supply the visiting
doctors with slides taken of employees he had already deemed healthy: “we never have
let anyone know that this company (JM) had anything to do with the scheme; we are
merely co-operating with…the Board to the best of our ability….Even the head of the
union here thinks that…all I did was…help.”457 This deliberate deception of medical
boards, local union heads, and Jeffrey Mine workers was never uncovered.
It was particularly important to JM that Smith hide the effects of asbestos dust on
its employees at this time because the Congress of Asbestos Miners, a workers group
based in East Broughton, Quebec met each year to lobby for asbestosis awareness and
prevention.458 The general public was still ignorant of the adverse health effects of the
mineral, but the workers were becoming increasingly aware of the threats. Vandiver
Brown believed that a “situation is developing with the miners in Quebec that urgently
requires that a report based on Dr. Gardner’s experiments be made available as a counter
agent to opinions being expressed and conclusions arrived at by Quebec physicians and
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officials upon the basis of surmise, social ideology, and inadequate information. Time
therefore is of the essence.”459 Brown wanted a severely edited version of Gardner’s
report with every mention of cancer—in mice or men—removed.460
At the end of 1948, when another contract was being negotiated between JM and
the union at Asbestos, the company opened a new hospital supplied with the most
advanced x-ray technology.461 Government officials, company heads, and union leaders
celebrated the new CJM Hôpital et Clinic, but Kenneth Smith was not happy. Having
asked the company to do something about the dust problem in the mill,462 Smith advised,
“if any dust is raised, I believe that the men should wear respirators.”463 While he was
willing to hide x-ray results from employees and the public, Smith was not content to see
Jeffrey Mine workers continuously exposed to a severe health hazard. Employees were
each issued two respirators to use, but they again refused to wear them because they were
uncomfortable. Even though their knowledge of asbestos-related disease was growing,
Jeffrey Mine workers continued to accept the risks associated with the mineral and their
labour. Company officials believed the health issue was better addressed by new
technologies designed to eliminate rather than screen dust.464 The continued rejection of
respirators by employees even while they were advocating for better dust control in the
factory suggested that they felt the same way.
Smith was caught in the middle. It upset him that JM employees refused to protect
themselves, and he warned the company that his work had the potential to damage the
industry. And yet he wrote CJM President G.K. Foster that he did not want to increase the
number of autopsies performed on Jeffrey Mine employees who had passed away to learn
more about asbestosis, because he was sure this would automatically lead to successful
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compensation claims.465 Smith was committed to protecting JM even though he worried
for the health of his patients.
Smith’s dedication became crucial to the company at the beginning of 1949 when
a report from Burton LeDoux, an American investigative journalist of French origin,
brought the Quebec asbestos industry into a period of crisis. LeDoux published his exposé
on asbestos-related disease, L’amiantose à East Broughton: un village de trois mille âmes
étouffé dans la poussière, in pamphlet form and in Montreal’s Le Devoir in January 1949,
at the very moment that contract negotiations between JM and the workers at the Jeffrey
Mine had reached a deadlock. Because his report was published in a newspaper, not a
medical journal, it reached a much wider audience than anything that had come before
and the bodily knowledge of the people of Asbestos was suddenly confirmed. Although
LeDoux focused his analysis on the asbestos-mining community of East Broughton, about
120km from Asbestos, the first section of the report was a more general account of the
industry and the diseases the mineral gave to the workers of Quebec.
LeDoux wrote that a much more sophisticated understanding of asbestos-related
disease in the workers of l’Estrie was needed because demand for the mineral continued
to increase and Quebec had a monopoly on its supply. LeDoux stated that asbestos
companies in Quebec made millions of dollars while their workers died of terrible
diseases. He claimed that “[l]’argent a aussi ses camps de concentration,”466 and that
these were in the asbestos mining towns of l’Estrie: “l’exploitation des dépôts d’amiante a
surtout apporté à ce peuple des misères imméritées, de graves maladies qui auraient pu
être évitées, et des morts prématurées. Aujourd’hui, 30,000 personnes à peu près habitent
la région québécoise de l’amiante. Un quart d’entre elles environ sont exposées à
contracter une maladie mortelle, l’amiantose.”467 Equating communities like Asbestos to
concentration camps following the horror of the Second World War was shocking and
effective, especially because the “administration autoritaire” of JM was well known.468
Another of LeDoux’s goals was to educate asbestos workers on what the mineral
was doing to their bodies, which is why he wrote the pamphlet in French and in an
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accessible style. He claimed it only took two to three years for asbestosis to develop in
the lungs of workers both young and old, and that every part of the industry, not just the
mill, created dust that was too small for the eye to see. Anyone who “respire cette
poussière durant un certain temps est condamné à la mort.”469 While LeDoux was not a
medical professional, he was convincing and he put names to the symptoms generations
of people in Asbestos suffered from.
LeDoux devoted several pages to explaining, in a way everyone could understand,
what asbestosis was and how it affected the human body:
Cela ressemble à l’araignée qui tisse sa toile. La poussière d’amiante, une
fois qu’elle a pénétré en grande quantité dans les poumons, agit comme si
elle était sous la direction d’une araignée; elle se dépose par endroits où
elle forme de longs filaments de tissus fibreux vaguement reliés entre eux
en un dessin mal défini et irrégulier.470
Comparing the disease to a spider spinning a web tighter and tighter around the lungs was
easy to comprehend and terrifying. LeDoux wanted to get a reaction, to shake workers out
of their acceptance of risk so they would fight for their lives, and he was successful in this
pursuit, partly because he did not hide any of the frightening effects of asbestosis:
à mesure que la poussière envahit les poumons des lignes de destruction de
plus en plus nombreuses s’y forment. Conséquemment, le malade devient
de moins en moins capable d’aspirer assez d’oxygène pour répondre aux
besoins de son corps...très lentement et à travers les pires angoisses, ses
poumons sont progressivement détruits. Il finit par mourir étouffé.471
The graphic language LeDoux used in describing the type of death he believed was
awaiting the asbestos workers of Quebec countered the assurances company doctors had
given over the years to patients who knew they were not physically well, and who saw
their friends and family members slowly suffocating to death.
Company doctors were able to pacify employees in the past, LeDoux wrote,
because of the basic human desire to deny death as being imminent and inevitable.
Another reason was that asbestosis develops slowly in the body, so the victim develops
other ailments such as pneumonia, tuberculosis, and heart disease.472 This explained why
cases of asbestosis had not been reported in the past even though it was such a rampant
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disease. LeDoux also argued that the relative absence of asbestosis diagnoses was due to
companies and their doctors lying to workers. He provided a list of symptoms so
employees could self-diagnose without relying on the suspect motives of medical
professionals. These included irritation of the nose, throat, and the upper respiratory
tubes, shortness of breath, a wet or dry cough, loss of weight and appetite, physical
weakness, and chest pain.473 LeDoux also explained that when these symptoms became
noticeable, it was already too late to stop the progression of disease.
Despite the morbid tone of his report, LeDoux attempted to end on a positive note,
writing in all capital letters: “L’AMIANTOSE EST INCURABLE, MAIS ON PEUT LA
PREVENIR.”474 This statement placed responsibility not in the hands of the companies or
doctors, but the workers themselves. If equating asbestosis to a deadly spider spinning a
web inside them until they suffocated to death did not scare employees into action, if the
idea that just breathing near any of the Jeffrey Mine’s operations would condemn them to
death did not outrage them, and if the thought that companies had been lying about the
state of their health did not inspire workers to organize against them, it was their own
fault if they became fatally sick. The local newspaper in Asbestos urged townspeople to
read LeDoux’s piece and the union distributed copies of it.475 The community understood
the report’s implications and it had a direct effect on the local cultural identity, so used to
accepting the risks of the industry. Already confident because of their role in the global
reach the Jeffrey Mine had through trade networks, the workers at the Jeffrey Mine
believed it was time they took ownership of their bodies, and at the start of 1949, they
went on strike to do just that.
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Chapter 4: Essential Characteristics: The Body Politic, 1918-1949
In the past twenty years the population of Asbestos has declined about fifty
percent, and in 2006 the community was named one of ten towns in Quebec that would
disappear within a decade.476 This is what happens when a single-industry town suffers a
collapse. In 2006, the mayor of Asbestos, Jean-Philippe Bachand, attempted to change the
name of the community to Trois Lacs or Phoenix, in order to attract new industry because
he believed that “Asbestos as a name doesn’t sell.”477 The majority of townspeople
disagreed with Bachand and the name remains, while the mayor does not. Town
councillor Serge Boislard, whose father died of asbestos-related disease, explained that
changing the name would only “tell the world that we are ashamed of our product…[and
it would] be one more nail in our coffin.”478 Asbestos is part of the community’s identity;
the town by any other name would still be home to the largest chrysotile asbestos mine in
the world, which will not disappear.
As much as the mineral can be derided throughout the world and as much as the
townspeople of Asbestos can accept that it makes people—themselves in particular—
sick, the Jeffrey Mine remains fundamental to their identity. Over two kilometres wide
and deeper than the Eiffel Tower is high, the pit is where the town’s cultural identity
takes root, connecting the land and the people. By exploring how the people of Asbestos
oriented their lives, politics, economy, and faith around the Jeffrey Mine, this chapter will
track the development of the local body politic to more fully understand how the
community negotiated a longstanding, strong cultural identity by interacting with the pit
between 1918 and 1949. Identities and duties were formed alongside the mine as it grew
and changed the community. How this tradition took root in Asbestos contextualizes this
tradition and gives foundation to how the community envisions itself today.
Getting Acquainted, 1918-1923
In Working People, historian Desmond Morton writes that the “essential
characteristic of a worker was dependence. A worker is a hired person,”479 but this was
not the essential characteristic of those who worked the Jeffrey Mine. As soon as JM took
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ownership of the mine in 1918, the people of Asbestos went on strike to prove they too
had power and that the company would be dependent on them.480 Although the miners at
Thetford unionized in 1915,481 those at Asbestos acted independently and did not need a
union to give them bargaining strength following the war, when industry was booming
and there was a severe shortage of manpower to meet the rising global demand for
asbestos. Companies were suddenly dependent on the workers,482 and JM was in need of
more employees.483 The fifty men who went on strike were the dynamite handlers inside
the Jeffrey Mine and made $3.15 each day, but believed that in the post-war economy
they should be making 35 cents more. The 1918 strike was peaceful and the company met
the demands of the workers. Through the dispute the workers showed JM that they had
authority in the community and were fundamental to the success of the Jeffrey Mine. The
company could own the mine, but it could not own the workers.
The asbestos industry following the First World War was extremely profitable and
all signs pointed to it becoming even more so. Industry leaders declared the men who
chose to work at the Jeffrey Mine rather than enlisting in the army to be heroes, and
likened them to the soldiers who had performed so well in the war.484 This sentiment
affected the development of a cultural identity in Asbestos and gave JM’s employees the
confidence that was seen in 1918 and will be seen again and again in this chapter, leading
up to the 1949 strike.
JM went to Asbestos not because it believed Jeffrey Mine workers were heroes,
but because it was a good business decision and the Quebec government actively
recruited British and American investment in the natural resource industries of the
province.485 Company officials knew that Asbestos was a single-industry and singlecompany town, and JM immediately began a system of paternalistic company-community
relations that made the town indebted to JM. Even though the workers did not believe
they were dependent on the company, the town would be.
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On 4 June 1919, town council passed Règlement 81, allowing JM to pay for the
installation and maintenance of electricity at the mine and in the community. The town
would buy electricity the company bought from the Shawinigan Water and Power Co.,
taking the amount this would cost out of what JM owed in property taxes.486 Mayor
Victor Dubois was the first in the community to have his house equipped with JM’s
electricity. With this agreement, the town of Asbestos paid the company a percentage of
the cost it took to run the electricity and a percentage of the profits gained from it until
1929.487 JM also received a reduction in the amount the company had to pay to improve
the roads they used to ship asbestos out of the community. While the workers of Asbestos
greeted JM with a strike, town council sought a close working relationship with the
company, making deals and sacrificing the value of the land. In addition to the electricity
agreement, town council allowed JM Vice President and Treasurer J.P. Pearson and JM
Vice President C.H. Shoemaker to be voting members of the relatively small council.488
This solidified the close relationship between council and the company.
It was important for town council and JM to become allies because of the growing
worker unrest throughout Quebec and Canada in 1919. During this year there were at
least 68 strikes in Montreal489 and 210 throughout Canada, which was a steep increase in
the number of labour conflicts the country had seen before.490 The Winnipeg General
Strike of that year lasted over a month and brought worry to companies all across the
country. Furthermore, the Communist Party of Quebec was formed on May Day 1919 in
Montreal.491 JM needed allies in Asbestos if it was to maintain control over its workforce
at the Jeffrey Mine, and town council fit this need well before 1949.
The workers at the Jeffrey Mine made it clear to both JM and town council that
they were a force to be reckoned with in the community with their 1918 strike, and again
in October 1919, when they chose to form their first union. Although the majority of
unionized workers in Quebec, much like the rest of Canada, belonged to American
unions, the miners at Asbestos chose an alternative option: l’Union ouvrière Catholique
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du Québec. Sherbrooke’s LaTribune reported that Jeffrey Mine employees joined the
union because there was strength in numbers and it could improve wages and working
conditions.492 The miners in Asbestos differed from the communists in Montreal and the
radicals in Winnipeg: a Catholic union, headed by priests, meant that they had God on
their side in labour disputes. L’Union ouvrière Catholique du Québec was making
advances in the province due to post-war economic success and the aversion those outside
Montreal felt towards the radicalism of the international unions seen with the strike in
Winnipeg.493 Having the miners of Asbestos join was a coup for the union because by
1919 the mineral was making significant contributions to Quebec’s economy.494 The
industry was of great importance to the province and its workers were valuable to unions.
The Catholic union did not allow those of others faiths to join, but this was not a
major issue in Asbestos at this time, when only 15% of the town’s population was not
French Catholic, and most of those were JM officials and their families. This was in sharp
contrast to other areas in l’Estrie, including Shipton Township as a whole, which was
38% Anglophone, and Sherbrooke, the major city in the region, which was 29%
Anglophone.495 The community of Asbestos was divided along linguistic and class lines,
with the Francophone population making up the bulk of the workers and the smaller
Anglophone faction running JM. This put an extra communication barrier between the
workers and the company, which was solidified when JM refused to recognize the union
for decades after its establishment.496 JM did not want outside union officials changing
the dynamics of the community.
The workers tolerated this because they were united with JM in their commitment
to the asbestos industry. By the end of 1920, the major cities of Europe were rebuilding
after the First World War and asbestos was crucial to this reconstruction. For Asbestos,
this meant that operations at the Jeffrey Mine would grow despite the new tariff imposed
by the United States on all manufactured asbestos goods. The tariff meant that Quebec,
which supplied 89% of the world’s asbestos in 1921, would not profit fully from
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exporting manufactured products to the United States, one of the largest markets for the
fibre. In response, Quebec imposed its own 5% tax on asbestos exports.497 JM was
undeterred by the U.S. tariff and the Quebec tax, and in June 1921 announced that it
would open a manufacturing plant in Asbestos.
While building the plant was good for the town, international demand began to
decline after the post-war boom flooded the market with the mineral. Wages and shifts
were reduced throughout the mining communities of Quebec, a quarter of unionized
workers in the province were out of work,498 and the Canadian Mining Journal’s hopes
that “a brilliant page of History is about to be unrolled in this Dominion,” brought about
by industrial development, seemed to deflate.499
Despite the economic downturn, the Catholic union movement in Quebec had by
1921 grown to six times its size in 1914, and was united under the Confédération des
travailleurs catholiques du Canada (CTCC).500 By 1922 the CTCC represented 96 unions
and 26,000 workers, and both the Church and the provincial government approved of the
organization.501 This gave the CTCC strength, but its leaders were not interested in using
it. At its inception the CTCC was a conservative body committed to French Canadian and
Pan-Canadian nationalism through a celebration of both founding nations, a distancing
from the British Empire, and an adherence to the social doctrine of the Church.502 The
CTCC operated with a spirit of cooperation between workers and employers and on the
belief that labour issues were moral issues.503 While it was optimistic that both sides in a
labour dispute would do what was morally right as dictated by the Church, the idea was
based on the Rerum Novarum, an encyclical released by Pope Leo XIII in 1891 that
encouraged the formation of doctrine-abiding unions.504 It relied on the belief that
workers would accept their lower position on the class scale because the meek would
inherit the earth. The existence, and indeed the strength of the CTCC, the largest labour
organization in Canada based on cultural and religious values, indicates how deeply the
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Catholic Church permeated the lives of the Québécois in the 1920s.505 Because of its
exclusive membership requirements, the CTCC tended to pit French Canadian workers
against foreign, Anglophone, and Protestant officials operating companies in Quebec.
But during the economic crisis of 1921, employment was more important to
Jeffrey Mine workers than unions were, especially after their wages were cut and they
knew others would take their place if given the chance. Jeffrey Mine workers chose not to
fight for union recognition. Industrial relations in Quebec’s asbestos industry had changed
since 1918, and when Thetford workers went on strike in 1921, new employees replaced
the miners who attempted to hold out for a raise.506 Despite the economic situation,
geologist John A. Dresser continued to believe that “[w]hen one speaks of mining in
Quebec he is supposed to refer to asbestos, unless he specifies otherwise.”507 The asbestos
industry would survive.
While the workers at Asbestos were prepared to sacrifice wages and unions at this
difficult time, the miners at Thetford believed the industry’s importance meant that they
were important and at the end of April 1923 they went on strike again. While short, the
strike illustrated how militant the 500 workers at Thetford were when it came to their
economic value. Thetford had an older workforce than the Jeffrey Mine because of its
immediate success in the 19th century, and the stability of the community, combined with
five or six mines and companies in the town, created a local identity that differed from the
more moderate one found in Asbestos at this time. They demanded higher wages and that
the Assistant Manager of the Asbestos Corporation, Colonel MacNutt, be removed from
his post.508 The strike was not sanctioned by any union and quickly turned violent when
the workers raided a local hardware store for guns and dynamite and threatened to blow
up part of the town if their demands were not met.509 The strike was broken soon after and
the workers returned to the mines without any changes in management or wages. They
went on strike again in the middle of May, but were once again unsuccessful.510 The
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workers who acted outside the doctrine of the Catholic unions were more radical than
those who acted in accordance with the CTCC.
Growing Pains, 1923-1937
As Thetford miners were striking at the beginning of the 1920s, workers at the
Jeffrey Mine were content not disrupting the order of industry or community. This
allowed JM to construct its new manufacturing plant, hire more employees, and make a
new partnership with the Phillip Carey Manufacturing Co., another U.S.-based company
that manufactured asbestos-based products. In 1924, the two companies bought a factory
in Lennoxville, a small university community just outside Sherbrooke, in order to produce
asbestos paper with fibre extracted from the Jeffrey Mine.511
Aware that partnerships like this would help bring Asbestos out of its economic
downturn, town council further solidified its relationship with JM. Echoing the doctrine
of the CTCC, council agreed that “il est de l’intérêt de ce conseil de marcher en
coopération avec la dite compagnie minière en autant que justice soit rendue aux deux
parties concernées en ce qui concerne toute transaction qui sera faite entre les deux
parties.”512 There seemed to be only two factions in Asbestos—the company and
everyone else—and council wanted relations to be harmonious. Jeffrey Mine employees
were willing to make sacrifices for the good of the industry, but this did not mean that
they were in full cooperation with JM or council. The workers knew that the industry was
rebounding from an economic downturn by 1927513 and the town was growing alongside
JM operations. The J.P. Morgan Co. aided this rebound when it bought over half the
company’s shares and financially supported JM’s industrial ambitions.514
JM then constructed a Canadian headquarters in Montreal in 1927 and town
council extended their electricity contract for 10 more years. The new contract explained
that JM would receive “annuellement en taxes municipales, sur toutes ses propriétés
industrielles, terrains minières, moulins, manufactures, un montant d’argent égal à 45%
per cent des recettes totales provenant des taxes municipales.”515 Council sacrificed a
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significant portion of its tax revenue to maintain good relations: the company paid just
over $500 in taxes in 1927, much less than it owed as the largest landholder in town.516
Despite the good relationship being nurtured between town council and JM, the
community was wary of the changes it was experiencing so quickly due to the growing
industry. In particular, the local population was suspicious of newcomers that arrived in
Asbestos because of the growing demand for labour at the Jeffrey Mine. Council moved
to charge residents who had lived in Asbestos for less than a year extra municipal taxes
and defined them in Règlement 163 as “strangers.”517 This meant that council was able to
compensate somewhat for the reduced taxes paid by JM. It also showed how adverse to
outsiders the community had become. This aversion grew to be a strong part of the local
cultural identity in Asbestos.
By the end of the 1920s, the Quebec asbestos industry was extracting 300,000
tonnes of the fibrous mineral each year, a sharp rise from the 30,000 tonnes it produced at
the end of the 19th century.518 The seven asbestos producers around Thetford united under
the Asbestos Corporation in an act of “patriotic self-preservation” to control wages and
prices,519 but much like William H. Jeffrey and the Asbestos Club, JM officials chose not
to join the organization. Although it had to abide by U.S. anti-trust laws, JM instead
joined an international cartel that would be an asbestos “League of Nations,” with Phillip
Carey, Britain’s Turner & Newall, and Austria’s Eternit.520 The Asbestos Corporation had
power in Quebec, but because of this global alliance, JM had international influence and
was quickly informed of the latest mining technologies and new markets, which further
added to the success of the Jeffrey Mine. This influence permeated the local cultural
identity, but was soon put on hold with the onslaught of the Great Depression.
While the community had suffered hard economic times in the past, most recently
in 1921, the early 1930s were devastating, as they were to the entire nation. French
Canadian organizations formed throughout Quebec and demanded the government and
economists fix the situation.521 These organizations, such as L’Action française and Les
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Canadiens français, believed that if people from the province rather than international
firms had managed Quebec’s industries, the economy would not be suffering. Les JeunesCanada, a youth-based organization headed by future Le Devoir editor André
Laurendeau, agreed, and in 1933 articulated it with the phrase, “maîtres chez nous.”522
The sentiment behind this phrase was in accordance with Asbestos town council passing a
regulation that made those who had lived in the community for less than a year pay an
extra “newcomers tax,” as well as its refusal to allow Jewish families to live or work in
the community because they were not Christian and many were believed to be communist
radicals.523
Despite the good relationship fostered between the company and town council,
even JM was not exempt from the changes the Depression brought to the community.
With an increasing number of citizens unable to afford electricity, the town’s contract
with JM was suspended and the company was required to pay the full tax on its land. To
go from paying just over $500 in taxes in 1927 to $16,689.86 in 1932524 was a financial
blow to the company already suffering from the global economic downturn, and officials
cited it as one of the reasons they were forced to close the Jeffrey Mine from May 1932 to
April 1933.525
The closing of the Jeffrey Mine made life difficult for the community. Many
residents had few savings and a great deal of humility was needed when they turned to
town council for aid. Municipalities throughout Canada became responsible for
supporting their citizens during the Depression526 and Asbestos was no exception. At the
end of 1933 council applied to the provincially managed Secours-Direct for $800 to help
feed 30 local families and clothe and shelter 41 more.527 That 71 families were in need of
aid even after JM resumed operations demonstrates the extent to which a year’s worth of
lost wages affected the people of Asbestos. Requests for provincial money continued
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throughout the Depression, with the town asking for $950 on 9 May 1934 and $900 more
one week later.528
The process of distributing aid was entirely open: anyone who asked for financial
help from the town was listed in the minutes, their apparent need was discussed and voted
on by council, and if they received aid, the amount was made public.529 A single person in
Asbestos during the Depression who would have made over $3.00 a day in the 1920s
received $1.25 in aid each week and a married couple would get $1.60 per week.530 The
rate of aid increased according to the number of children a couple had. If they had one
child they would get $2.00, two children would grant them $2.20, and the amount would
increase all the way up to fourteen children, which would grant the family $7.20 in aid
each week.531 This was not a great amount of money for any family in Asbestos that had
experienced the wages of an industrial boom only a few years earlier.
JM paid its full amount of municipal tax throughout the Depression, making it the
largest contributor to municipal revenue by supplying 70% of the town’s income.532
While it hired many townspeople back after the closure, the company could not afford a
full workforce and operated shortened shifts with Sundays off.533 The lack of productivity
of the Jeffrey Mine frightened the people of Asbestos and in July 1934 the town voted to
try to get other industries to come to the community. The town argued that, “nous avons
une seule industrie dont tout le monde ne peut y travailler pour differentes raisons…[et] il
est de l’intérêt de tous les propriétaires, s’il y avait d’autres industries, pouvant employer
jeunes filles, jeunes hommes et hommes agés, ne pouvait travailler à la mine.”534 This
was the first of many times the town expressed its concern over being completely reliant
on one industry, but despite this resolution, and those still to come, no other major
industry ever came to Asbestos.
As council and JM developed their relationship with each other, Jeffrey Mine
workers were also changing. Although the Catholic union movement attempted to recruit
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more members in the early 1930s,535 the economic climate prevented much progress,
especially in Asbestos, where people were more concerned about the future of the
industry than wages. Understanding the aversion to unions at this time, Taschereau’s
provincial government passed a law in 1934 that was in accordance with the CTCC’s
doctrine of cooperation and dictated that the government would enforce agreements
established between workers and employers, whether a union was involved or not.536
Although it did not help membership, the law illustrated the CTCC’s continued belief that
all parties involved in labour issues should be willing to compromise.
Despite Taschereau’s willingness to reform labour laws, the Liberal hold on
Quebec was slipping and the CTCC began to change its policies in response to a
conservative movement sweeping the province in the middle of the Depression. Maurice
Duplessis, leader of the Union nationale, was elected Premier of Quebec in 1936, just as
Taschereau’s successor, Adélard Godbout, attempted to put an unemployment insurance
program in place.537 Duplessis was ultra-conservative and immediately put an end to any
program that distributed provincial money to the unemployed. He believed Quebec was,
and should remain, a primarily agricultural province and was prepared to intervene in
order to support this ideal.538 Duplessis was a sharp turn away from the longstanding
policies of the Liberals, which had held office since 1897. The Duplessis government
turned its back on suffering industrial communities like Asbestos.
The Depression and the aid distributed during it, combined with Duplessis’ new
policies, helped illustrate the benefits of collectives to those in industrial towns. Slowly,
left-wing idealists began to infiltrate the Catholic union movement and leaders lobbied
workers in the industries of the greatest importance to the province.539 The union in
Asbestos, still ignored by JM, suddenly became energized under the activist leadership of
Sherbrooke’s abbé Aubert in 1936.
The workers had allowed JM to disregard their union because of the industry’s
instability. Furthermore, the company built and owned the houses many of them lived in,
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supplied medical care to the town, and was the main source of revenue and employment
in the community: the workers had become dependent on JM. While Jeffrey Mine
employees did not want to enter into an antagonistic relationship with the company, the
Depression and its subsequent relief in 1937, combined with the recent urging of the
Catholic union movement, convinced the workers to do as they had done when JM first
came to Asbestos and go on strike to regain some control over operations at the Jeffrey
Mine. The workers demanded a wage increase of 33% and recognition of their Catholic
union.540 These demands were given to the company two weeks before the strike with the
promise from JM’s Shoemaker that they would have a response by 22 January. When no
response was given, the workers in the manufacturing plant walked out and were soon
followed by the men in the Jeffrey Mine.541 In total, 1,100 men and 50 women went on
strike for eight days.542
The Toronto Clarion called this “one of the most important strikes in the
province” in recent memory because of the financial value of the asbestos industry,543 but
the dispute had an even greater significance in the minds of the strikers: their labour was
pulling JM out of the Depression and their role in the company’s success had to be
acknowledged. Despite the economic significance the industry had in the province, the
workers believed this was a local issue and they wanted it to stay that way. This belief
was articulated when they refused Duplessis’ demand that negotiations take place in
Quebec City under government supervision.544
The workers picketed the gates to the mine in such great numbers that JM staff
could not enter the buildings.545 The workers did not own the mine, but their picketing
showed the belief that their labour gave them some authority over how the Jeffrey Mine
was run. When P.P. Bartleman, the official in charge of JM’s employment office, rode his
horse around the striking workers on the morning of the 26th, the picketing crowd forced
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him back home. Later that afternoon, Bartleman once again rode around the strikers on
his horse, this time pointing his revolver at the crowd and “displaying a spirit of
bravado.”546 He was quickly disarmed and taken to the mayor’s office where a committee
that included three JM heads publicly judged his conduct. The committee found
Bartleman guilty and banished him from Asbestos. He was put on a train bound for
Cornwall, Ontario that night.547
This was not an example of mob rule, but rather an upholding of certain values the
entire town held dear. Bartleman had worked in Asbestos for almost a decade548 and for
an impromptu court made up of JM officials and a portion of the striking employees to
order him out of town was a sign of the strength of the workers and the company’s
commitment to a cooperative spirit within the community. This stood in stark contrast to
the failed attempts of the Thetford miners in 1923 to have their assistant manager fired.
Two days following Bartleman’s banishment, C.H. Shoemaker returned to Asbestos to
participate in strike negotiations. After a day of not coming to any resolution on increased
wages, a group of 500 striking workers entered the Hotel Iroquois where negotiations
were taking place, grabbed Shoemaker, and led him to city hall where they ordered him to
leave Asbestos.549 He left town the next morning.
Although the Sherbrooke Record claimed, “the vice-president was severely beaten
up by a crowd of hoodlums,” several other newspapers reported that neither official was
harmed and Mayor Philippe Roy denied that any violence occurred.550 A reason for the
Record’s conservative take on the events in Asbestos was that Sherbrooke was becoming
increasingly powerful within the region and the province, as a local bourgeoisie rose with
the increased industrial development along the river system. These new bourgeois elite
were not sympathetic to an unruly working class, especially when it negatively impacted
industry. H.K. Sherry took over Shoemaker’s job and a settlement was soon reached. The
employees received the wage increase they had asked for, as well as recognition of their
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union. President of JM, Lewis H. Brown, wrote to union head Olive Cyr, “we depend
upon you and your organization to keep the peace and maintain order and preserve
property at Asbestos and with the understanding that our employees will return to work as
rapidly as arrangements can be made by our local manager.”551 Brown also published his
letter in the major newspapers that covered the labour dispute. The strike was over, the
workers had succeeded in getting rid of two upper level officials, and JM entered into its
first collective agreement with its Canadian employees and their union.552 The people of
Asbestos had yet to experience an unsuccessful strike, and these victories contributed to
the confidence they felt and helped further develop the local cultural identity. While
claims to mob rule in Shoemaker’s removal were made, the company’s willingness to
cooperate with the workers, as well as its unwillingness to hold those who accosted
Shoemaker accountable, demonstrates JM’s understanding of the need to share its
authority with the workers in Asbestos.
Newspaper reports detailing the workers’ success in redefining industrial relations
in Asbestos spread throughout the country. On 24 March 1937, the Duplessis government
enacted la loi du cadenas, also known as the “Loi protégeant la province contre la
propagande communiste,” which forbade groups of people meeting to discuss or publish
pro-communist ideas and actions.553 This law heavily restricted union operations and
actions because the government saw labour organizations as communist entities
committed to overthrowing capitalism. Labour relations were changing in the province
almost as fast as they were in Asbestos.
The Tug of War, 1938-1949
The post-strike environment in Asbestos was a cautious one, with attempts made
on both sides to improve the relationship between the company and the workers. In
February 1938, CJM Director A.O. Dufresne wrote,
We have received a letter…informing us of complaints made by Frenchspeaking workmen of their inability to get employment in the mines
because they could not make themselves understood by the employment
agents…who spoke only English. The suggestion is made that the mine
551
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companies make it a requisite in the choice of their employment agents
that they speak sufficiently well French and English.554
Although it did not mention him by name, this letter indicates that one of the problems
the workers had with P.P. Bartleman, aside from his antics during the strike, was that he
was in charge of the employment office at the Jeffrey Mine yet did not speak French, the
only language the majority of employees spoke. The communication problems that arose
from this situation were frustrating on both sides and this change of policy was an attempt
by JM to build a better relationship with its workers. The company also wrote to the
province asking if any of “our local boys” would be eligible for a government-sponsored
program that helped French Canadians qualify for executive positions by getting
university degrees in Mining Engineering.555
Attempts to improve company-worker relations addressed one of the key points of
conflict between the two groups: JM management was exclusively Anglophone while
almost all Jeffrey Mine employees were Francophone and had no opportunity to rise
within the company ranks. The company hoped that this difference, and the animosity
that arose because of it, would be minimized by these changes. On 20 September 1938,
JM president Lewis H. Brown stated in the company’s Creed of Management, “business
in this country has never been what it could be and never what it yet will be,” and by
bringing Francophones into the upper ranks of the company, JM would attempt to change
the almost-exclusively Anglophone business landscape of Quebec.556 Despite this goal,
there is no evidence of JM actually instituting any such changes in Asbestos.
JM did attempt to bridge the Anglophone-Francophone divide in Asbestos with
the 1938 introduction of the bilingual Johns-Manville Photo, a monthly newspaper that
featured photographs of employees and their families at work and in the home. The first
issue explained that while newspapers from outside the community were helpful, “there
are always a lot of things going on in the Canadian Johns-Manville organization which
are of particular interest to the people here…which are not carried by the daily
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newspapers because they are not of general interest outside this community.”557 The
company was not only a contributing member of Asbestos; it was a friendly one as well.
JM used the newspaper to boost its image and encourage subtle changes in the behaviour
of its employees. When company officials noticed that some of its workers were wasting
material in the mining and milling process, they explained the problem as a household
issue via the Johns-Manville Photo:
If your wife…were to burn the meat and spill half the potatoes on the
floor, you probably would charge it up to bad luck…But, if this continued
to happen every few days and you had to spend a lot more money for
supplies just to make sure that there would be enough…then you’d try to
do something to cut down on the waste...Of course, you could “Fire” your
wife. But good wives are hard to find these days and, besides if you did
that, there wouldn’t be ANYTHING to eat.558
The company went on to explain that the same was true for wasting material at the Jeffrey
Mine, which cost the company—the head of the household—a significant amount of
money that could have been spent on higher wages.559
By comparing the operations at the Jeffrey Mine to how the average Asbestos
household was run, JM wanted to foster an image of the company being one large family.
In 1940, JM hosted the first “open house” at the Jeffrey Mine, where townspeople could
see “how their husbands, fathers, brothers and sisters turned out the products which have
made the name Johns-Manville world famous.”560 The absence of mothers from this list is
significant. While married women in Asbestos did work at the Jeffrey Mine’s Textile
Department, this was discouraged because of the belief that a married woman’s place was
in the home raising children. The Jeffrey Mine was often celebrated as the location where
young “Asbestos Beauties” would find husbands, but they were expected to stop working
once they did.561 The reality of this quickly changed with the labour demands of the
Second World War.
Although the outbreak of the Second World War once again closed European
markets to asbestos imports, the demand for the mineral rose exponentially because of the
North American market. The government of Canada contracted JM to equip the Canadian
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Army with fireproof material. In 1940, this included over $50,000 for firefighting
equipment, building supplies, and asbestos fabric to make fireproof uniforms.562 The
United States Army and Navy Munitions Board also had asbestos on its “critical
minerals” list and was prepared to protect its Canadian suppliers via invasion if enemy
powers took control of the mines.563 Canada was rapidly becoming a fully industrialized
nation and the asbestos industry was a major part of this change. The people of Asbestos
were not aware that the United States planned to invade their community if the Germans
seized control of the Jeffrey Mine, but they were overtaken by a sense of importance
because the mineral was so vital to the war effort. During the First World War, industry
leaders deemed Jeffrey Mine workers “heroes,” and the community was excited to take
on this role once again, especially because most of the eligible men in Asbestos chose not
to enlist in the Canadian Forces.564
The mass industrialization and urbanization that took place in Quebec during the
Second World War worried the Catholic clergy, who feared that social problems like
class conflict and communist ideals would come with the shift.565 This concern was partly
because the Church’s hold on the union movement in Quebec was slipping, as more
secular labour leaders emerged. Union membership grew across Canada during the war
and by 1943 one in three unionists was on strike. In Quebec, where the wartime economy
was booming, there were 135 strikes in 1942 alone.566 While this was worrisome to the
clergy and their union representatives, there was no unrest in Asbestos. The most socialist
activity that occurred was when a group of local citizens founded the “Chez Nous Ideal”
in 1942. The aim of the group was to have community members, not JM, construct houses
for townspeople so that home ownership would increase and workers would not be
dependent on the company for rented accommodation.567 Although JM attempted to
strengthen its relationship with employees after the 1937 strike, the Chez Nous Ideal
indicated that the people of Asbestos did not fully trust the company as a landlord and
wanted to own their property, and adhered to the “maître chez nous” philosophy
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encouraged by a burgeoning group of nationalists. By applying this provincial “chez
nous” movement—committed to getting French Canadians in charge of the economic
destiny of the province—to their local situation, this group began to subtly change how
the community functioned. The workers did not have to be dependent on the American
company that owned the mine; they could rely on themselves.
Although the clergy, JM, and the Quebec government feared that strikes and “chez
nous” housing organizations meant that the people were becoming increasingly radical,
conservatism still reigned in Asbestos. In 1938 the community once again voted to
continue the prohibition of alcohol within town boundaries.568 The workers, who were
affectionately described by JM as an “industrial army,”569 successfully lobbied to cancel
shifts on Sundays, a major coup considering the rising demand for the mineral during the
war.570 Furthermore, the local newspaper preached the importance of women staying at
home with their children rather than working in the “industry of war” because it believed
mothers working industrial jobs led to a sharp rise in juvenile crime throughout the
province.571 This maintenance of conservative values was not limited to Asbestos, and in
1944 Duplessis and his Union nationale government were elected once again. Asbestos
voted in favour of the conservative leader, and the shift back to Duplessis’ conservative
policies worried leaders of the province’s labour movement, because his government was
fervently anti-union and attracted foreign investors by advertising Quebec’s docile
working class.572 In 1944, Duplessis enacted the Labour Relations Act, which gave the
government the power to recognize or discredit unions and to supervise collective
bargaining procedures.
Union sympathizers believed the Labour Relations Act was a result of the
government’s denial of how much the province was changing during the Second World
War. Journalist and politician Gérard Pelletier wrote, “[a]près la guerre, au moment où la
révolution industrielle s’était accélérée ici à un rythme effarant précisément à cause de la
guerre, [Duplessis] tenait dur comme fer à l’agriculturisme, il était l’ennemi juré d’un
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syndicalisme libre, ouvert et militant.”573 Despite the vast wealth the industrialization of
land brought the province, Duplessis continued to believe Quebec should be an
agricultural province. In response to Duplessis’s labour policies and the changes it had
experienced during the war, the CTCC elected social activist Gérard Picard as the
organization’s new president. This coincided with the gradual abandonment of the
union’s policy of cooperation with employers, focusing instead on economic
democracy.574 No longer concerned with the good faith of companies, the post-war CTCC
became focused on how industry was run in the province.
The war transformed Quebec industrial society and how workers organized, and
further encouraged Jeffrey Mine workers. In the June 1942 issue of the Johns-Manville
News Pictorial, an editorial cartoon explained that the “four ways to hang Hitler” were to
avoid accidents, smash sabotage, eliminate waste and increase production.575 By doing

Editorial cartoon distributed to Jeffrey Mine workers, June 1942.576

these things during the war, JM led Jeffrey Mine workers to believe they were partly
responsible for defeating Hitler. Heroes once again, the workers began to assert their
confidence and began a trend of short labour disputes in Asbestos that would last for
years. This was first seen even before the end of the war on 22 March 1945 when the men
who had been hired to sink the shaft mines beside rue Bourbeau went on strike.577
Eighteen of the 34 shaft sinkers struck, but they were subcontracted workers and were not
represented by the union. They demanded higher wages and more reasonable expectations
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for production, claiming that the footage expected of them each day was “almost
impossible to reach.”578 Jeffrey Mine workers believed they had a right to influence
production levels because of their primary role in the process, but JM disagreed and the
demands were refused. Only two of the striking shaft sinkers returned to the job, with
local men replacing the other 16, “as fast as they [could] be located.”579
While this strike was unsuccessful, more labour disputes erupted, although never
again without a union. These strikes create the context for the lengthy strike at the start of
1949 that changed so much in the community. They also advance our understanding of
the increasingly militant cultural identity in Asbestos that drastically changed in the years
following the 1949 strike. Going over the major issues of these earlier strikes establishes
a foundation of working class agitation and the willingness of JM to accommodate the
demands of their employees to ensure the smooth functioning of operations at the Jeffrey
Mine and in the community.
In November 1945, 300 men and 60 women, all union members working the
midnight to 8am shift at the manufacturing plant, went on a short wildcat strike.580 In this
case, the conflict was not between employees and JM, but rather between unionized and
non-unionized workers. Union members complained that non-unionized employees
reaped the benefits won from their labour disputes without paying into the union or
standing alongside their fellow workers. Non-unionized Jeffrey Mine employees felt
unionized workers slowed production by going on strike with outrageous demands. This
was a problem solved in Ontario in 1945 with Justice Ivan Rand’s ruling on a strike at
Ford. The resulting Rand Formula declared that all employees had to pay union dues,
although they would not be forced to join the union.581 This formula was initially enacted
only in Ontario, but its adoption was one of the major demands made by the striking
Jeffrey Mine workers in 1949.
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The November 1945 dispute was followed by a 4 hour strike on 14 January 1946
that involved 150 Jeffrey Mine railway employees.582 Reminiscent of the 1937 strike, the
men objected to the way they were treated by a JM foreman currently up for promotion.
They claimed that he was prone to “swearing when giving orders to his men, being
unnecessarily rough at work, expecting too much to be done, [and was] unqualified for
the job.”583 The foreman was refused promotion when the accusations were investigated
by JM and found to be true.584 During the 1949 strike, JM would accuse union officials of
wanting to have a say in company promotions and operations, but the strikes in 1937 and
1946 clearly demonstrate that this was something the workers had a history of demanding
and receiving from JM.
Generally, the union was wary of pushing JM too far in this period. When 36
diggers working inside the Jeffrey Mine went on a wildcat strike in May 1946 that
prevented 175 pit employees from working because they depended on the striking men,
the union ordered them back to work.585 The dispute only lasted one hour and the wage
increase employees were demanding was refused because JM and the union agreed they
were “making actually enough money.”586 Having the strike stymied by their own union
was a blow to Jeffrey Mine workers and demonstrated that even with the social activist
Picard as the new president, the CTCC was still less militant than other unions in the
province and the workers they represented. As a result, their membership dropped to
24.2% of Quebec’s union members, down from 37% in 1936587 when the economy was
not doing half as well as it was following the Second World War. This was frustrating for
the workers of Asbestos, who knew that the mineral they mined and processed was in
great international demand, and should be giving them lobbying power, especially as
JM’s annual report for 1948 acknowledged, “there is almost no field of human endeavour
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in which, at some stage or another, some JM product does not play a part.”588 Workers
were growing convinced that the company depended on them, not the other way around.
With the asbestos industry thriving, it seemed to workers that it was an ideal time
to negotiate with JM. By the end of 1947, the workers at Asbestos and Thetford
successfully lobbied their respective companies to establish uniform contract and
negotiation procedures throughout the entire Quebec asbestos industry.589 Despite this
agreement, 2,650 workers at Thetford acted independently from those in Asbestos and
went on strike in January 1948 in order to gain union security, a raise in wages, and the
adoption of the Rand Formula.590 The strike lasted almost three days and workers
returned to the pits without a resolution.
As Jeffrey Mine workers and JM grew more confident, tension in companycommunity relations rose. In April 1948 JM officials from New York visited the town to
discuss improving public relations through a weekly company radio show, better
circulation of information pamphlets, and closer ties with the local newspaper.591 The
company wanted to avoid a major confrontation with its workers, but following the visit,
Quebec Minister of Labour, Antonio Barrette, wrote to the Commission des relations
ouvrières and the provincial arbitrator that there was “a problem brewing” in Asbestos.592
Seventy-two Jeffrey Mine employees were upset with JM for introducing new shovels in
the pit that required fewer men to work them.593 This was a major issue that was directly
connected to the increasing industrialization of the Jeffrey Mine, which the workers did
not support.
Highlighting signs of growing worker frustration, the local newspaper reported
that there had been incidents of sabotage at the Jeffrey Mine, with foreign objects being
placed in the raw asbestos that broke processing machines and damaged JM’s reputation
when tainted bags of the mineral were sold.594 The company responded that these
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incidents constituted negligence, not malicious sabotage, but townspeople were shocked
that workers had been accused.595 Relations between JM and its employees were
crumbling. From January to April 1948, there were 92 suggestions for workplace reform
made by Jeffrey Mine workers, more than the entire number given in 1947.596 Despite
letters sent to JM by Barrette asking that there be no worker reductions at the Jeffrey
Mine, the company refused and employees became even more agitated.
The company wanted to reduce three people from every shift at the manufacturing
plant and two people from every shovel working in the Jeffrey Mine. The new shovels
reduced the need for employees in the pit by 40%,597 and this was attractive to JM
because the machines would increase extraction levels and profits while decreasing the
company’s reliance on an increasingly disgruntled and demanding workforce. The
reduction would not be severe, but the provincial arbitration board reported that there was
a “serious threat of strike” if it were to happen.598 The warning went unheeded by JM and
the company held its ground at the arbitration table. Officials were aware that the union
wanted fixed salaries included in the new collective agreement that would ensure a steady
wage if new technologies that made employees redundant were introduced.599 This goal
became even more important when JM announced that the Wool Rock Department at the
factory would be closed in July and moved to Toronto where furnace products could be
manufactured at a reduced cost.600 Workers were angry and their response to these
changes suggests that they believed that JM had a responsibility to employ the people of
Asbestos and not replace them with machines or cheaper labour in other provinces. Local
union leader Armand Larivée wrote to the community’s MNA Albert Goudreau that if the
company did not agree to fixed wages for its employees and no reduction in staff, the
workers would lose faith in JM and would remember the trouble the company has caused
when the next collective agreement was being negotiated.601
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As tension rose in Asbestos, a provincial election took place. In January 1948,
Duplessis unveiled a new flag for Quebec and this, combined with his repeated speeches
on provincial autonomy and promises to protect French Canadians from “outsiders,” won
his Union nationale government another record majority.602 The people of Asbestos again
supported the Duplessis government, and Mayor Adélard Godbout ran as the Union
nationale representative for the county of Richmond and won.603
The townspeople’s support of the Union nationale was shaken, however, with the
introduction of the draft provincial labour code Bill 5 in November 1948. This bill was
supposed to bring recommendations and suggestions from employers and employees to
the provincial government, but the CTCC rejected it completely, not trusting that
Duplessis would acknowledge the concerns of workers.604 This was a sharp departure
from the spirit of cooperation preached by the Catholic unions before the Second World
War and showed just how much the organization, and the people it represented, had
changed. Because of the CTCC’s public and hostile rejection of Bill 5, it was withdrawn
from the Quebec legislature, making it appear as though the government had retreated
under union pressure.605
The defeat of Bill 5 was a significant victory for the union movement in Quebec.
In January 1949, when CTCC President Gérard Picard arrived in Asbestos with newly
appointed Secretary Jean Marchand, the community greeted them with a parade as though
they were war heroes returning from the front. Picard and Marchand gave the local union
its own flag and every worker at the Jeffrey Mine and their families were required to
attend a meeting with them on 14 January in the basement of l’Église St-Aimé.606 CTCC
officials went to Asbestos to negotiate a new collective agreement with JM that, in the
wake of the introduction of the new shovels in the pit and the closing of the Wool Rock
Department, would include salary and job security.607
Of JM’s 2,083 employees at the Jeffrey Mine, 1,733 would be directly affected by
the negotiations; this number excluded only those who had worked for the company for
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less than 16 years, employees under 16 years old, and office staff.608 While a percentage
of JM’s workforce came from outside Asbestos, the majority of employees came directly
from the community itself, and as the main source of employment for the town, the
majority of the local population was directly invested in Jeffrey Mine operations. Despite
the faith the workers had in Picard and Marchand, negotiations broke down after only two
weeks of meeting with JM officials.609 At the start of February 1949, the community was
uncertain over what would happen next during the standoff between the fundamental
factions of the community: the working class Francophone majority, the town council
now allied with the Union nationale, and the elite Anglophone minority running the
Jeffrey Mine. As the strike of 1949 began, the local cultural identity in Asbestos was
challenged by internal and external forces and it would be radically changed during the
five months of the dispute. The community of Asbestos would never be the same.
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Chapter 5: Bodies Collide, The Strike of 1949
Just before midnight on 13 February 1949, Jeffrey Mine workers met in l’église
St-Aimé and, against the advice of their union leaders, voted to strike. A few days later,
every other asbestos mining community in l’Estrie except East Broughton followed.610
Because they did not wait for an arbitration board to be established, this violated
Quebec’s Loi des Relations ouvrières and the strike was illegal,611 but this did not
concern the workers. The 1949 strike was not the first time the workers had challenged
JM, and they had a history of short, successful strikes. The workers hoped that after the
dispute was resolved, Asbestos would be fundamentally changed, but they had no idea
how much this would be true.
Although the 1949 strike had provincial, national, and international repercussions,
the strike was a profoundly local affair, with land, people, and the community all being
radically redefined. The 1949 strike was primarily a battle over bodies and an articulation
of the local cultural identity. The workers went on strike to reform their collective
agreement with JM, but their demands can be placed on three main pillars: how land was
used in Asbestos, how issues of occupational health were addressed, and how community
decisions and dynamics were negotiated among the working class, town council, and JM.
Operations at the Jeffrey Mine were frozen for five months as workers demanded to have
a say over how the company industrialized the land. After Bruno LeDoux’s exposé on
asbestosis, JM employees no longer trusted the company and refused to return to work
until the health hazards the mineral posed were properly addressed and toxic dust was
eliminated. Furthermore, the strike revealed a broader struggle in Asbestos, and Quebec,
over who would dictate the development of communities and industry in the province: the
French Canadian working class majority or the Anglophone managing elite. The striking
workers and JM fought over who had the authority to dictate how people and place were
understood in the community, and their battle focused on the Jeffrey Mine, which had
brought them “un progrès aussi rapide et si constant.”612 Using a combination of local and
company accounts, such as the town’s newspaper and JM correspondence, which have
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never been used before, this chapter will offer a renewed analysis of the dispute,
dispelling myths of revolution and victimization, and focusing on the community directly
involved in the conflict. The people of Asbestos knew the strike had implications beyond
the limits of the town,613 but it was their own, local concerns that shaped their actions and
reactions during the strike.
“Cette grève ne durera pas 48 heures,” February to March 1949
February 1949 began unexceptionally. Town council appealed to the province for
a grant to attract new industry and annexed more land on which to build new houses.614
JM paid over $8,000 in municipal taxes and Dr. Kenneth Smith wrote a report on the need
for better dust control measures at the mill.615 JM also announced to its employees that
1948 was “BIG NEWS!” as the company prospered from a postwar boom that led to
record profits.616 The people of Asbestos were partly responsible for these profits, as the
Jeffrey Mine provided JM with the vast majority of the company’s supply of mineral.
One hundred and thirty one of these local workers had been employed by JM for over 25
years, longer than many of the company’s officials, which gave them a unique
understanding of how the Jeffrey Mine had been run in the past, and how it could be run
in the future. Goods were purchased, bills were paid, but a sense of uneasiness reigned:
the workers had been without a contract for over a month, and they had recently read
Burton LeDoux’s exposé on how asbestos dust affected the human body.
It was amid this atmosphere that union members met in the basement of l’église
St-Aimé at 11pm on 13 February. Despite CTCC Secretary Jean Marchand’s request that
they wait for contract negotiations to address their concerns, workers overwhelmingly
voted to strike. The local role they had played in bringing global economic success to the
community via international trade networks gave the workers confidence in their own
abilities to achieve contract reform without being dependent on their union. JM officials
knew something was wrong when the Jeffrey Mine went silent at midnight as the evening
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shift ended.617 This silence would have been noticed throughout the community, too,
which was used to sleeping with the noise of production. The 2,100 striking workers set
up headquarters at city hall after local police chief Albert Bell willingly gave them the
keys.618
The strike eventually involved 5,000 workers throughout l’Estrie, but newspaper
accounts of the dispute made it clear that those at Asbestos were the ones to watch
because of the size of JM, its workforce, and the Jeffrey Mine, “l’une des plus
importantes mines d’amiante du monde.”619 Because the workers at Asbestos were the
first to strike, they also dictated the terms on which the conflict would end. Their major
demands were a raise of 15 cents to bring wages to $1.00 an hour, plus 5 cents more for
night shifts (which would cost JM an additional $120,000 each year), job security so
machines would not replace workers, better dust control to prevent asbestosis, more time
off, and union input in promotions. The workers also wanted the adoption of the Rand
Formula, requiring 3% of the wages of all employees, even nonunionized ones, to be paid
as union dues.620 These were all types of demands the workers had made in previous
strikes, but had yet to achieve.
JM in response refused to accept the Rand Formula, to allow unions to have a say
in promotions,621 or to admit to a health problem at the Jeffrey Mine, but the workers
believed they could force the company into submission because by being on strike,
workers stopped the flow of asbestos to the company’s 20 manufacturing plants across
North America and forced the 300 non-unionized employees at the Jeffrey Mine to stop
work because of a lack of raw mineral.622 At the start of the strike, the company was
dependent on them.
Chief Bell reported that the workers were acting calmly and quietly. When not
picketing at the gates to the Jeffrey Mine, strikers held meetings in which only union
members were allowed except for one reporter, Gérard Pelletier, who worked for Le
Devoir. Pelletier was friends with CTCC Secretary Jean Marchand and when he was sent
to Asbestos at the start of the conflict, Marchand told him, “[s]i tu as ta brosse à dents, ca
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suffit. Tu n’as même pas besoin d’un pyjama; cette grève ne durera pas 48 heures.”623
Pelletier remained in Asbestos for five months. Although he was the only member of the
press who stayed in the community for the duration of the conflict and the only reporter
whom workers allowed into their homes, Pelletier’s reports have never been studied in
depth. This is possibly because his criticism of Duplessis and his later career as a federal
Liberal cabinet minister led scholars to interpret his reports as simply yet another young
intellectual attack on the government’s conservative hold of the province,624 when they
actually offer valuable insight into the thoughts and experiences of those on strike.
Pelletier spent months getting to know the people involved in the strike and how
they interpreted and coped with the changes it brought to their community. The regional
newspaper, Sherbrooke’s La Tribune, supported JM and promoted the belief that the
workers were bitterly divided over whether to stay on strike or not, and had enough
money and health benefits already.625 On the other side of the spectrum, according to
Pelletier, Le Devoir “not only took the side of the striking workers, but conducted a
systematic campaign on their behalf throughout the course of the conflict.”626 Pelletier’s
experiences in Asbestos and those of other reporters who were allowed temporary access
reveal the townspeople to be strongly conservative and religious, not the left-wing,
secular idealists Trudeau’s 1956 collection on the conflict implied.627 At least once a day
strikers celebrated mass at St-Aimé and when outsiders arrived with alcohol to raise the
spirits of the workers they were chased out of the dry community.628 Showing just how
non-confrontational the conflict was, picketers even let some JM employees pass the
gates to the Jeffrey Mine so they could pump out the groundwater filling the pit, ensuring
equipment would not be damaged.629
Despite the initially peaceful nature of the dispute, on 18 February, just after the
local paper published a message from JM stating that the demands of the workers were
unreasonable,630 200 strikers broke through the gates at the Jeffrey Mine and forced the
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factory manager and two female office staff members off JM property, while taking their
pay cheques from the week before.631 The company wrote frantic telegrams to Quebec
Minister of Labour Antonio Barrette and Premier Maurice Duplessis requesting the
assistance of the Sûreté provinciale.632 JM officials described the community as being in a
state of anarchy and “[w]hen the municipal council is silent can we not count at least on
the immediate assistance of the police force of this province….We have been here more
than a half century operating and maintain that our record and our rights call for a
measure of protection.…If you ignore further request we feel that any consequence from
violence will be your responsibility.”633 The fact that town council was not intervening in
the strike at this time shows that the community did not believe the labour dispute would
be long enough to significantly impact local affairs. The longest Jeffrey Mine workers
had been on strike in the past was eight days, and this was only day four. Neither Chief
Bell nor town council were alarmed by the situation, although four more officers were
hired to bring the local police force to 11 men. Bell himself went into the Jeffrey Mine to
make sure the pumps were running.634 The workers and the local police were neighbours
and even played cards together at the beginning of the strike; there was little evidence of
anarchy.635
After strikers forcibly entered company property, JM sued the union for $500,000
worth of damages, and filed an injunction to prevent picketing outside the Jeffrey Mine.
At 2am on 20 February, at the request of JM and on Duplessis’ orders, 60 provincial
policemen arrived in Asbestos. The presence of the provincial police was unnecessarily
heavy-handed based on the patterns established over the past decade of labour conflicts in
Asbestos, and immediately changed the character of the strike. Company-community,
upper class-working class, Anglophone-Francophone relations had radically shifted away
from the established spirit of negotiation and would never be the same again. While JM
and Duplessis may have believed this was a necessary force in order to control the
workers, the people of Asbestos saw it as an invasion of their community and an insult to
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striking workers. Bell reacted to the provincial police in Asbestos by telling La Tribune
that “S’ils viennent, c’est alors que cela va aller mal…Les grévistes sont paisibles et ils
n’ont fait aucun dommage à la propriété,”636 and Pelletier reported that the arrival of the
police was “considérée à Asbestos comme un geste de méfiance que rien ne justifie.”637
The company and the government deeming the strike illegal and sending provincial police
to the town suggested that striking workers were criminals, an idea offensive to the local
population, so proud of the labour they had done to make the Jeffrey Mine so successful.
Once the provincial police had arrived, seven young strikers followed one of their patrol
cars through the streets and were apprehended after one said, “[n]ous sommes des
grévistes et nous voulons savoir ce que vous faites.”638 This again expressed the
confidence of the workers, bold enough to demand information from the provincial
police, but following several hours of interrogation—which ended in the strikers crying
and apologizing—they were released with their confidence shaken.
While council attempted to remain neutral, it had to address the new police
presence, especially because the policemen were each paid $50 a week by JM639 and
brought alcohol into Asbestos to drink between patrols. The minutes of the 21 February
council meeting show how badly the force was received. Council believed there were
now 150 officers in the community who had arrived in a state of inebriation, and, “un
certain nombre se sont même rendu coupables d’actes indécents dans les rues de la ville
et aussi d’avoir été des causes de désordre dans les places publiques...dans certains cas les
polices provinciales ont usé de violence…[et] ces actes ont été accomplis sans
avertissement et dans le but évident de provoquer des troubles.”640 The presence of the
provincial police immediately changed town dynamics and the way the community
related to JM. Understanding the threat the police posed to community-company
relations, council voted unanimously to request the immediate removal of the force. The
entire country was suddenly acquainted with the “indecent acts” of Quebec’s provincial
police through the press.641 Mayor Albert Goudreau, a member of the Union nationale
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government, brought the resolution to Duplessis himself in hopes that the premier would
recall the force.
In response to council’s resolution, the director of the Sûreté provinciale, Hilaire
Beauregard, issued a statement saying that there were only 60 provincial police in
Asbestos and while some had beer with their dinner, none had time to become drunk.642
Pelletier contradicted this, saying that many provincial policemen were seen bringing
supplies of beer into Asbestos from Danville and Richmond to store it at their new
barracks, JM’s Hotel Iroquois,643 which was where single male Jeffrey Mine workers
usually lived. Duplessis denied town council’s request and the police remained.
The continued presence of the provincial police changed the character of the strike
and the town. They escorted office staff through the gates of the Jeffrey Mine and
patrolled the streets, telling anyone who was outside at night to return home. At a union
meeting at St-Aimé on 22 February, strikers expressed their outrage but renewed their
commitment to a non-violent strike. This inspired parish priest and union head curé
Louis-Philippe Camirand to poke fun at reports that said the people of Asbestos were
uncivilized, stating he was “très heureux de vivre avec de tels sauvages,” much to the
delight of the crowd.644 Camirand’s support convinced workers that their strike was
morally just, and encouraged them to remain committed to achieving their demands.
JM reacted to the arrival of the police in a different manner. The company wrote
in the local paper that council’s resolution against the police ignored the real violence of
the dispute, which included an illegal strike and the invasion of JM property.645 Local
opinion did not agree with the company, and Pelletier’s description of JM as being “la
plus coriace des companies,”646 was deemed apt at the beginning of March when rumours
began to spread of JM looking for replacement employees from outside Asbestos.647
No replacement workers were seen at this time to confirm the rumour, which JM
denied, but the company warned that a long strike would have wide-ranging effects far
beyond the community and region.648 The company also sent strikers weekly letters
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urging them to return to work so negotiations could begin. The letter of 28 February
claimed that the union was concealing facts from strikers, and focused on the illegality of
the conflict and the claim that Jeffrey Mine equipment had been damaged because of it.649
To bypass the union in this manner and appeal directly to the workers’ sense of law, order
and duty was an attempt by JM to weaken the connection between strikers and their
union, and to work within the closed framework of Asbestos without relying on outsiders.
The company’s attempt to convince strikers not to rely on their union demonstrated JM’s
mistaken belief that its employees were not as militant as their outside union leaders. This
was certainly not the case, as demonstrated by the workers’ vote to strike without the
consent of the CTCC. It also showed that the company underestimated the intelligence of
the community: if the workers should not rely on outside union aid, why was it okay for
JM to call in the provincial police? Summing up the collective response to the company
letter, Pelletier wrote, “les résultats sont nuls.”650
As the strike continued, and the injunction against picketing at the Jeffrey Mine
was extended to April, Mayor Goudreau began to express his fears for the future of
Asbestos:
le commerce commence à souffrir de cette grève et partant, toute notre
ville, car il ne faut pas oublier que la “Johns-Manville” est à peu près la
seule industrie d’Asbestos et qu’elle emploie 2,100 ouvriers. L’activité
municipale est aussi paralysée; la ville a suspendu des travaux en cours et
elle a remis à une date ultérieure et indéterminée la mise à exécution de
nombreux projets dont l’urgence était pourtant incontestable.651
The strike had already deeply affected the town. Council could not proceed with its plans
for development and, with 2,100 citizens not receiving wages, commercial businesses
began to struggle for lack of customers.
Asbestos was caught in a state of uncertainty as rumours of a lengthy strike
plagued the community. It was clear that this was not going to be another short and
simple strike. In order to ease these worries, Marchand and local union head Roldolphe
Hamel held a meeting on 6 March solely for the wives of the men on strike. This was
highly unusual for a labour dispute in Canada at this time, but the CTCC wanted to make
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sure that workers had the support of their families, many of whom were worried about the
length of the strike.652 Pelletier was the only member of the press allowed to attend the
meeting and the only one to report on it. He wrote that the hall at St-Aimé was full of
“jeunes femmes, de vielles mamans, quelques enfants pour lesquels on n’avait pas trouvé
de gardiennes (ou de gardien, puisque la plupart des papas étaient restés pour une fois à
prendre soin de la maison).”653 The role reversal of wives and mothers at a union meeting
while the striking men of Asbestos remained at home shows how much the conflict, and
the issues it raised, had affected the entire community. The women listened to union
representatives speak about the goals of the strike for two hours and then had the chance
to ask questions, which they did with enthusiasm, revealing their prime concerns. Their
questions addressed worries over the union having its certification revoked by the
government, concerns about the illegality of the strike, fears of what asbestos did to
human health, and how their families were to be supported without any wages.654 The
inclusion of health-related questions reveals just how much LeDoux’s exposé on
asbestosis had permeated the community.
After their questions were answered the women left the hall and strikers, both
male and female, entered, “plus graves, moins légers, après ces trois semaines de
grève.”655 Pelletier reported that morale remained high, however, especially as the
meeting turned into a rally for Marchand, whom JM had named the “biggest obstacle” to
a resolution and who had been banned from negotiations by the Quebec government.656
The meeting provides insight into how deeply families were involved in the dispute.
Having a “wives meeting” showed that the union understood its members and the
questions they asked indicate that women were not passive bystanders in the strike.
JM attempted to follow this example of inclusivity when it sent a second letter to
its employees, which again stressed the illegality of the strike and stated, “[n]e tenant pas
compte de ce qui peut avoir été écrit avant ou pendant la grève, vous devriez comprendre
de plus en plus que votre échelle de salaire et vos conditions de travail sont parmi les
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meilleures au Canada?” 657 The letter suggested that strikers should return to the Jeffrey
Mine, proud of what they had already accomplished in past negotiations. JM again failed
to understand that what the workers were proud of was the international role they played
in the industry, extracting fibre that went around the world, helping armies achieve peace,
keeping people safe from fire, and making the company an incredible amount of money.
These accomplishments gave strikers the confidence to insist their salaries and working
conditions, although among the best in Canada, still were not good enough for them.
They operated on a different scale and wanted more. This feeling was seen in the
workers’ response to the ballot JM included with the letter, asking, “Désirez-vous, oui ou
non, reprendre le travail?”658 Each employee was to return the ballot to JM offices, but
Pelletier claimed that none of the striking men he talked to intended to do so. A lack of
trust in the company, disbelief that the vote had any validity, and fear of betraying the
union by being seen entering JM offices were all reasons for this reluctance.
The company also published a full-page advertisement in the local newspaper
reinforcing its belief that strikers wanted to return to work, adding that each employee
lost $7.90 in wages every day and Asbestos lost $90,000 each week because of it.659 This
was a significant amount of money and speaks not only to the severity of the situation,
but also the resolve of those on strike. The newspaper ad was an attempt by JM to bring
the community around to its way of thinking, showing how the company understood the
labour dispute affected the entire town while still failing to appreciate how the
community’s cultural identity gave the workers support and the confidence to strike.
The loss of wages and JM’s continued focus on the strike’s illegality did not
convince the people of Asbestos to push for an end to the conflict. Instead, it angered the
community, and townspeople expressed their anger by accusing the editor of the local
paper of being against strikers because of how often he published the opinions of JM.660
Although the editor claimed union heads ignored his requests for information, the
accusation demonstrates that the letters and ads from the company were changing the
dynamics of the entire community.
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JM’s attempts to win the opinion of the public were counteracted by the fact that it
was lodging the provincial police on company property. The police narrowly defined
“order” in Asbestos and at the slightest offence, such as driving without a license, citizens
were immediately sent to a Sherbrooke jail.661 This created a deep divide between JM and
the community, with townspeople believing they were being treated as criminals by an
outside police force funded and housed by the company. Town council attempted to
mediate this issue, as well as the strike, when it met with JM on 11 March to determine
the company’s terms for negotiations to begin and for the police to leave, then reported
these demands to strikers.662 Although the company stopped emphasizing the illegality of
the strike, workers continued to distrust JM officials, and these talks had little effect.
Tension finally erupted in the community just after 11pm on 14 March, when
twenty feet of railway line running between the Jeffrey Mine and the Grand Trunk station
at Danville was blown up.663 The attack was a response to rumours of outside
strikebreakers being brought in to work the Jeffrey Mine. Blowing up the tracks was a
dramatic articulation of the local cultural identity: even though JM owned the mine and a
small percentage of the company’s workforce came from the surrounding area, the Jeffrey
Mine belonged to the people of Asbestos, through their labour, their sacrifices, and their
history. The mine, and its valuable fibre, became hostages in Asbestos. The strike had
been peaceful up to this point, but as soon as the local connection to the Jeffrey Mine was
threatened, strikers reacted with force.
With the rising tension in the community came a tightening of the definition of
“local.” The night following the explosion on the train tracks, a group of strikers attacked
a non-unionized worker, Paul Beauchemin, outside city hall. Beauchemin had worked at
the Jeffrey Mine for only three months and was not on strike. The thought that this
relative newcomer continued to earn wages and helped keep the mill running angered
strikers, and he was beaten until the provincial police arrived and took him to the JM
hospital.664 This stood in stark contrast to when striker Edmond Delorme broke his leg
attacking a company truck the evening after the Beauchemin attack. Delorme was taken
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to a hospital in Sherbrooke, not the local one run by JM,665 reminding workers how
dependent they were on the company’s health facilities in the community. A local Jeffrey
Mine employee who did not strike or belong to the union was now someone who did not
abide by the cultural identity of the town: in the new Asbestos that the labour dispute was
creating, people like Beauchemin were betraying the community, and their “local” status
was questioned. Although tension between unionized and nonunionized employees was
not new, Asbestos was changing and neighbours, buildings, and streets were taking on
new characteristics.
The union excused this violence as being a reaction to provocations of the
provincial police and encouraged by JM so that workers would lose the support of the
public.666 The union’s claim was more self-serving than likely. The constant threat of
strikebreakers led union heads to request that town council refuse to allow “scabs” into
the community.667 Despite the history of labour disputes in Asbestos, strikebreakers had
never been used at the Jeffrey Mine before, and the request expressed the genuine fear
strikers had of outside workers threatening their place at the mine and their role in the
international markets it fed. To have outsiders filling these jobs would drastically affect
the local cultural identity and company-community dynamics. Council did not have the
power to restrict who JM could hire, but the violence showed that the workers were
prepared to protect their connection with the Jeffrey Mine any way they could.
“Notre grève est juste et morale,” March to April 1949
JM responded to the violence by placing advertisements in the local newspaper’s
18 March edition, attacking CTCC officials for lying about the issues of the strike. The
ads accused the union—not the strikers—of breaking the law, in another attempt to put a
wedge between the workers and the CTCC, and to suggest that JM understood the anger
felt by those on strike when told that the dispute was illegal.668 The ads stressed that the
company would protect the rights of its employees with whom JM had worked in
harmony for over 12 years, conveniently forgetting the 6 other strikes that had occurred in
Asbestos over that time period. JM claimed that the ballots it sent out the week before
showed that 97% of strikers wanted to return to work, but as Pelletier pointed out, “[l]a
665

La Tribune, 17 March 1949, p. 1.
Ibid, p. 3.
667
Ibid, p. 1.
668
L’Asbestos, 18 March 1949, pp. 5-6.
666

153
statistique fantastique de la compagnie a fourni aux ouvriers une des meilleures rigolades
depuis le début de la grève.”669 The people of Asbestos did not believe the company’s
claims, and workers had begun to laugh at JM’s efforts to bring the community over to its
way of thinking. The company had no chance of gaining the support of workers until it
addressed issues of land, health, and community. Even JM doctor Kenneth Smith
believed JM could not ignore these issues and wrote to company officials to try to
convince them to stop their denial of the negative health claims and concerns being
voiced by workers. 670 Doing this would have been an official acknowledgement of the
threat asbestos posed to human health, an acknowledgement the company could not
afford to make.
Although attempts to swing the opinion of strikers and other community members
in favour of JM were constant, the increased presence of provincial policemen since the
train tracks were dynamited prevented progress. The arrival of a truckload of provisions
donated by the people of Sherbrooke on 18 March boosted the spirits of those on strike
and made them even more determined to continue the dispute. An estimated $1,500 worth
of food filled the truck and strikers greeted it with cheers and gratitude.671 The company
could not starve them back to work, and strikers’ worries over how to support their
families were eased.
Although the donated food boosted community spirit, Asbestos remained bitterly
divided along linguistic, class, and religious lines, and this divide reached the town’s
churches. The largely-Catholic provincial police heard mass and took communion at JM’s
Hotel Iroquois, so they were fully removed from the townspeople when not on patrol. The
majority of JM officials were protestant, but which of the two Catholic Churches in
Asbestos a citizen chose to attend during the conflict revealed who sided with the
company and who sympathized with the workers. Local union official curé LouisPhillippe Camirand gave mass each day at St-Aimé and publicly defended the workers.
By contrast, curé Alphonse Deslandes at St-Isaac-Joques spoke against the strike as being
bad for the families of Asbestos, of whom 50 to 60 would be unable to pay rent by the
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end of March.672 In response to Deslandes’ opinion, people stopped donating during mass
and several citizens expressed their desire to “casser le gueule au curé.”673 The threat to
kick a priest’s teeth in showed just how deeply the striking workers had internalized the
conflict, making their cause more important than respecting a church official. The
differences between Camirand and Deslandes indicates how divided the opinion of the
Catholic Church was when it came to labour issues at the time, but Camirand’s support
was enough to convince the workers that the strike was morally justified.
Tension was especially high in Asbestos because JM had begun employing
strikebreakers to process what fibre remained. Anyone who threatened one of these
strikebreakers was arrested. On the night of 22 March, over 30 policemen arrived at
Roger Beauchemin’s674 home on rue Albert to arrest Émilien Richer. The charge was
intimidation against a strikebreaker and when Beauchemin refused to allow the police
into his home, they stormed in and dragged him, Roland Paradis, Rosario Bernier, Richer,
and his screaming, pregnant wife out into the street.675 The group was then sent to a
Sherbrooke jail.
This was not how order was usually preserved in Asbestos and the community
was outraged. A local policeman commented that “[j]’aurais pas cru qu’on trouvait des
hommes pour des ouvrages sales comme celui-là,” and Pelletier reported that “[n]on
seulement les grévistes, mais aussi bien toute la population d’Asbestos est dégoûtée de
ces procédés.”676 The entire community was disgusted by the “dirty work” of the
provincial police and this disgust extended to JM. Community-company relations in
Asbestos were rapidly deteriorating. Curé Camirand spoke out against the actions of the
police and told La Presse that “si j’étais mineur, je serais moi-même en grève et dans les
circonstances, j’aurais la conscience parfaitement tranquille. D’ailleurs, sans être mineur,
je suis avec eux jusqu’au bout et ils le savent.”677 Camirand’s support continued to
encourage the strikers and helped them maintain the belief that their actions were just.
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The company responded to the situation by sending yet another letter to its
employees on 24 March and printing it in the local newspaper for the entire community to
read. This letter was different from the others in how it presented the dispute: it stated that
the strike was not going well, that negotiations had not taken place since early February,
that the company was not going to give in to demands, and that it would not fire
strikebreakers when the dispute was over.678 Tired with not getting a positive response by
projecting a friendly image, JM officials took on a more unforgiving nature to frighten
employees back to work. Although the post-strike situation the company presented was
terrifying, JM again underestimated the militancy and the confidence of its employees,
which had developed over years of industrial contribution and success.
The length of the strike had already far exceeded predictions and people were
becoming alarmed. Two more truckloads of food from Sherbrooke and Montreal arriving
in Asbestos on 24 March helped alleviate some of these worries, however, as did the
financial donations from union members in Shawinigan and the local comité de secours
paying the grocery accounts of the striking workers.679 This was the committee
established during the Great Depression and the strike had made it necessary once again.
The loss of wages and the truckloads of food from outside the community meant that
local merchants suffered greatly during the strike, and this group tried to take matters into
their own hands. These citizens believed the strike was lasting so long because of a lack
of an intermediary, which they thought they could be. They attempted to meet with JM
and union heads, but were unsuccessful.680
On 27 March the striking workers held a parade in Asbestos in honour of two
more truckloads of food arriving from Montreal. Although the provincial police walked
through the streets singing songs of their own during the parade, there was no reaction
from the strikers and the attempt to provoke trouble failed.681 The lack of violence
inspired the editor of the local paper to report that calm had settled on Asbestos and that
an end to the strike would come soon,682 but tension remained between those on strike
and non-unionized JM employees who did not join them. On 29 March, Gérard “Tiny”
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Newcombe was assaulted outside a company-owned club in Danville by a group of
strikers, one of which was Jean-Noël Hamel, son of local union leader Rodolphe Hamel.
Newcombe was taken to JM’s hospital in Asbestos and Hamel was arrested.683 This attack
was revenge against Newcombe because he had allegedly beaten a striker outside a club
in Richmond the night before. Animosity reigned on both sides of the dispute and
Rodolphe Hamel accused JM of planting spies in the town, further showing just how
much the community was changing during the strike.684
While this suspicion inspired some townspeople to stay indoors, those on strike
used the idea of spies to send a message of defiance to the company and the provincial
government that had sent the police to the community. When three more trucks of food
arrived in Asbestos from St-Hyacinthe on 3 April, strikers carried signs in the welcome
parade that depicted those whom they considered were the key antagonists of the dispute:
CJM President G.K. Foster, CJM lawyer Yvan Sabourin, and Minister of Labour Antonio
Barrette. Signs bore the slogans “Ils ne l’auront pas, notre syndicat,” “Pas de contrat, pas
de travail,” “Notre grève est juste et morale,” as well as the mocking, “Vive la police
provinciale,” and “Qui a fait sauter les rails?”685 The workers also handed out fliers to the
crowd depicting the eight wives of Tommy Manville, the “multimillionaire d’amiante,”
whose seventh marriage had lasted less than 8 hours.686 The emphasis the strikers placed
on the morality of their cause shows just how important faith was to the local cultural
identity in Asbestos. The idea that the strike was morally just was an attack on the
illegality of the conflict and shows that the strikers chose to adhere to the laws of the
Catholic Church rather than the provincial government.
The humour that strikers displayed on their signs also reveals an important
characteristic of the community and shows that even when a significant portion of the
population could not afford to feed their families, a local camaraderie remained. This
spirit was also seen when strikers produced a board game resembling Snakes and Ladders
that dealt with the major issues of the labour dispute. At the top of the ladders were
positive things like a growing union membership or a happy family because of affair
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wage. At the bottom, were the negative aspects of the industry: company heads paying for
tropical vacations with the money workers earned them, and deaths due to asbestosis.687

“L’amiante-jeu,” dealing with the issues of the 1949 strike688

Proceeds from the sale of the board game went directly to the union. The people of
Asbestos found humour and camaraderie in delivering powerful messages about which
group involved in the dispute was morally just. This was especially important at the start
of April, when 17 people from Asbestos were brought before a magistrate in Sherbrooke
and found guilty of intimidation and resisting arrest.689 In the opinion of those who
supported the strikers, these citizens were innocent and it was JM and the provincial
government who were breaking moral laws.
Regardless of who was in the right, Asbestos town council had to ensure the
community would survive the conflict. JM paid over $8,000 in municipal taxes in April,
but because of the social assistance the town was providing for the workers and their
families—$24,729.34 in March alone—Asbestos was falling into debt.690 Each week
council paid for 2,000 to 2,500 bottles of milk and 4,000 loaves of bread in addition to the
200 sacks of potatoes already handed out during the strike so far.691 While this was
helpful, the families in Asbestos often included more than 10 children, and were capable
of consuming “half a peck of potatoes at one meal and ten loaves of bread a day.”692 The
fact that council continued to annex land from Shipton Township to accommodate the
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growing community further added to the financial burden. Even though the strikers did
not want to admit it, the community was dependent on JM.
The financial troubles of Asbestos were severe despite the continued donations of
food from Quebec communities. By 8 April, the 2,100 employees on strike had passed
their seventh week without a paycheque. Despite the $100,000 in aid donated by the
CTCC, Mayor Goudreau stated that “the loss in wages in Asbestos alone [was] about
$800,000…The town has been hard-hit by this…[and] there is a danger of some
merchants going bankrupt.”693 The entire community was in full crisis mode and this
shook the local cultural identity, so confident and proud.
For its part, JM was just beginning to feel the effects of the strike on its profits. La
Tribune reported that many of the company’s American processing plants had “fermer
leurs portes ou soit congédier un grand nombre d’employés. À Manville, N-J…[l]es chefs
ouvriers de l’endroit prévoient que l’usine fermera complétement ses portes si la grève
dure un tant soit peu.”694 The article also indicated that the American auto industry was
suffering because of the lack of supply coming from the Jeffrey Mine and prices for
asbestos were higher than they were during the Second World War because of the
shortage, which explained why the company’s profits were only beginning to suffer. The
local labour at the Jeffrey Mine was connected to a vast international trade network that
was weakening because of the strike. The damage the conflict was causing demonstrated
just how central to the global asbestos industry the people of Asbestos were, and this
knowledge convinced JM that it had to compromise with its workers.
Because of the threat to profits, JM recruited more strikebreakers to process the
raw fibre remaining in the mills at the Jeffrey Mine. Officials also stated that they would
be willing to give its workers a 10 cent raise, rather than 15 cents, and 4 paid holidays.
Although the strikers were suffering, the offer was refused, showing that the financial
crisis the strike inflicted on the community and the humility required to accept food
donations had not shaken the striking workers too fundamentally. If anything, JM’s
sudden willingness to compromise gave the strikers more confidence and made the more
dedicated to their goals. This dedication was seen when one worker responded to the
increased presence of strikebreakers by telling Pelletier that maybe “ils réussissent à faire
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un peu de poussière.”695 JM had yet to mention the health issues raised by the workers
during the conflict in its letters and newspaper ads, but the threat of asbestosis remained a
major concern and the strike would not end until issues of dust and risk were addressed.
The threat of strikebreakers was not yet great enough to seriously worry employees on
strike and JM’s offer was a sign that the company was weakening.
Aside from lost profits, occupational health may also have been a reason behind
the company’s sudden willingness to compromise. In a letter from JM lawyer J.P.
Woodard to CJM president G.K. Foster on 15 April, Woodard detailed Leroy Gardiner’s
study, which showed that even a small exposure to asbestos dust caused serious lung
damage. Woodard encouraged Foster to investigate the levels of dust at the Jeffrey Mine
to see how dangerous working conditions were.696 If the mineral affected workers the
same way it affected Gardiner’s mice, the company would be inundated with
compensation claims and bad publicity that could seriously damage the industry. Even
though this had not yet happened, it did not mean that asbestos-related disease was not
progressing in Jeffrey Mine workers and their new heightened awareness of the
symptoms associated with asbestosis, combined with the recent media coverage of the
community, put the company at risk. The issue of dust raised by the strikers was
connected to a much larger health problem within the asbestos industry and JM needed to
determine how to address the issue of dust without damaging the safe image of the
mineral. Gardiner’s study would not be publicized, but the longer that employees were on
strike and publicizing the effects of “un peu de poussière,” in Le Devoir, the more likely it
was for additional studies to be done that would not be subject to JM privacy agreements,
such as those produced by doctors at Laval. Even though the mineral was not being
mined, bags of fibre were still being processed throughout North America and the lungs
of asbestos workers would surely show signs of damage. The strike needed to end before
this issue was made even more public.
After the workers rejected JM’s offer, the editor of the local newspaper felt it was
necessary to intervene in the strike. In an editorial published on 15 April, J. Osias Poirier
wrote that Asbestos was one of the most important communities in the region, poised to
become even greater. He believed the key to this was not relying on a single-industry for
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success, but warned that no new industry would come to the community if it gained a
reputation for having unruly workers.697 He urged the strikers to accept the compromises
made by JM for the future success of the entire town.
Poirier’s argument had little impact, even though he was correct in emphasizing
the necessity of bringing new industry to the community. What he failed to consider,
however, was that Asbestos had become such an important community in l’Estrie because
of the Jeffrey Mine, and no new industry could possibly compete. Furthermore, workers
were not interested in the different types of jobs new industries could offer; they showed
this in their dedication to their employment at the Jeffrey Mine despite the fact that they
knew the mineral was negatively affecting their health. That strikers remained committed
to the toxic industry immediately following LeDoux’s warnings illustrates the strength of
the connection between people and land in the community, built over generations of work
at the Jeffrey Mine. This connection was also demonstrated in the frustration strikers felt
towards the people in Asbestos who threatened their ties to the mine by continuing to
work for JM. With the police presence in the community reduced, on the night of 17 April
strikers threw rocks through the windows of the homes of nine nonunionized Jeffrey
Mine workers, allegedly hitting Adélard Fortin and the head of Ernest Dionne’s sleeping
baby.698 As seen earlier when Paul Beauchemin was attacked, this violence indicated that
the community was rapidly changing and neighbours were becoming enemies.
More provincial policemen arrived in Asbestos to enforce order against, as
director of the Sûreté provinciale Hilaire Beauregard saw it, “le terreur qui régne”—
which Pelletier believed was a gross exaggeration.699 The following day the strikers sent a
telegram to provincial Minister of Labour Antonio Barrette demanding his resignation
because he had termed the strike illegal and said the community was in a state of anarchy
that went against the doctrine of the Church. The telegram stated that the “mineurs
d’Asbestos considèrent que vous agissez comme ministre du Capital,” not Minister of
Labour.700 This telegram shows that strikers were not afraid to challenge the provincial
government when their motives or morals were questioned, especially when confronted
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by the increased number of police patrolling their streets. The confidence of the local
population remained three months into the strike.
In response to this violence, JM went on the offensive once again. To combat the
growing press coverage of the workers’ concern over asbestosis, on 20 April the company
had Dr. Kenneth Smith issue a statement to the press that claimed the population of
Asbestos was a healthy one. He, not Burton LeDoux or Le Devoir, was the expert on the
bodies of those who worked at the Jeffrey Mine, and he stated that only two cases of
asbestosis had been found in the community in the past 50 years.701 He claimed that
studies showed that the air quality in Asbestos was similar to any other industrial city in
Canada. He also falsely stated that each JM employee was given yearly x-rays that were
available for anyone to see, when, in fact, annual exams were running years behind and
nobody outside the company was allowed to see the workers’ medical files. Smith’s
statement contradicted everything he had confidentially reported to JM and it showed the
degree to which he was involved in covering up the health risks of the mineral.
JM also informed its striking employees that they and their families would be
removed from their company-owned homes. Because rent was taken directly out of
wages, the company had not been paid since the strike began,702 and JM wanted the
houses for the strikebreakers it had hired from outside the community. G.K. Foster wrote
to Barrette that the company needed to house its employees where,
we have been operating for more than half a century and which has been
experiencing in recent years an acute housing shortage. More than three
hundred employees are now lawfully at work…[and] we have felt duty
bound to inform the occupants of our dwellings that they must consider
resumption of work and understand that we must sooner or later make
room for actually working employees so that we respect the objective for
which these houses have been built.703
Foster’s letter portrayed JM as a victim to a negligent working class, which was the only
way the company could not appear to be a villain forcing families out of their homes.
Evictions would cause problems in Asbestos, where the population was concerned over
providing food for local families. Now they had to worry about housing them, too.
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The workers took this especially badly. Not only were their houses and families
threatened, the fact that it was inspired by the need to accommodate strikebreakers from
outside the community filled them with anger and worry. Responding to this threat, “une
gréviste d’Asbestos” wrote to Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent asking him why he was
not intervening in the crisis of the strike and wondering if he cared more for the lies of
Duplessis than the plight of the workers who shaped the economy of Quebec and perhaps
even Canada.704 This letter shows how vital the workers rightly believed they were to the
success of the industry and its economic impact on the province and the country. It also
shows how much the strikers distrusted Duplessis, who was in full support of JM and the
company’s decision to evict workers. Local union official curé Camirand,705 who
represented one side of the Catholic Church’s divided opinion on the conflict, declared
that the company and its “scabs” would have to trample over his body to evict the striking
workers,706 and Marchand stated that “la Canadian J-Manville n’exécutera pas sa menace
parce que les Canadiens français se sont pas prêts ç’accepter l’esclavage surtout d’une
compagnie qui explicite l’une de nos meilleures richesses naturelles.”707 The French
Canadian majority in Asbestos was no longer going to be slaves to a foreign company
which exploited them and their land. Camirand assured them they had God on their side
and Marchand encouraged them to think of the asbestos found in the Jeffrey Mine as
theirs, which strengthened the local cultural identity, based on the connection between the
workers and the land.
That evening a group of strikers went to the neighbouring community of Stoke,
where several strikebreakers lived. Once there, they cut the community’s telephone wires
and assaulted strikebreaker Gaston Malenfant. The men then invaded the homes of other
strikebreakers, “pour faire le désordre, battre les occupants et casser des vitres.”708 The
2,100 workers on strike in Asbestos would not allow the threat of homelessness to defeat
them, and made it known that outsiders were not welcome in their community.
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“Such Explosive Possibilities,” April to May 1949
The following day the striking population of Asbestos threw insults and rocks at
strikebreakers on their way into the community.709 JM was pressured by Barrette to hold
off evictions, but the severity of the local situation was increasing. To counteract this, JM
President Lewis H. Brown published a report on the strike to stockholders in every major
newspaper in Canada and the United States, revealing his belief that the main issue of the
conflict was union control over the Jeffrey Mine. Blaming the CTCC rather than the
workers, Brown wrote that the “crux of the strike is the insistence by the union leaders
that they secure for themselves certain controls over managerial policy. It is the
revolutionary doctrine that the right of owners hitherto unchallenged to select
management to operate the property must be subjected to the veto power of union
leadership.”710 Since the 1937 strike, when workers succeeded in getting both P.P.
Bartleman and C.H. Shoemaker removed from their positions with JM and banished from
the community, Jeffrey Mine employees had shown their desire to have a say in how
promotions were granted. JM had also to some degree acquiesced by dismissing
Bartleman and Shoemaker and establishing programs that would help local Francophone
workers attain managerial positions at the Jeffrey Mine. The workers had yet to see any
real advancement on this front and Brown’s suggestion that the CTCC, not the strikers,
was responsible for the demand, angered the people of Asbestos. It was unusual for
workers to have a say in company promotions, but that did not make it any less deserved
in the opinion of the strikers.
While Brown’s report rallied the support of stockholders, it did little to appease
the population of Asbestos, frustrated by how the presence of strikebreakers and
provincial police was affecting their community. Strikers continued their attacks on the
houses of non-unionized JM employees and they also threw rocks through the windows
of Mayor Goudreau’s house on 24 April.711 Goudreau had let strikers down by allowing
the police to remain and Jeffrey Mine mills to be run, as well as by being a member of the
Union nationale government, supporting the anti-union views of Duplessis. Lines of
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loyalty were being drawn and in the opinion of the workers, those on strike, not
Goudreau, represented Asbestos.
In response to the attack on Goudreau’s house, at the 26 April meeting of council,
“il est résolu comme suit: 1: …le couvre-feu aura lieu à 1 heure de matin pour se terminer
à 5 heures; 2: Que la salle municipale de l’Hotel-de-Ville à l’avenir soit fermée à minuit
et trente du matin.”712 Council unanimously passed the imposition of a curfew in
Asbestos and restricted the use of city hall at night. Anyone found on the streets of the
community between 1am and 5am would be arrested, and workers moved strike
headquarters to the basement of St-Aimé after being locked out of city hall. Council
hoped that this would prevent further violence from happening in the town, but it did little
to alleviate the growing frustration of the striking workers and their families.
Following the resolution, over 500 wives of strikers went to St-Aimé to pray the
rosary. Although this was hardly a radical act, provincial policemen apprehended many of
the women on their way out of the church and took them to the Hotel Iroquois where they
were interrogated about curé Camirand.713 The women refused to give any information—
if there was indeed any to give—and were released, but this was a sign that JM believed
Camirand was a radical who negatively influenced workers with socialist thoughts. It also
showed how the entire community was now involved in the dispute—not even praying
women were exempt from suspicion.
The townspeople were incensed when they heard that police had harassed the
women. Local union leaders went to council to demand that the provincial police be
controlled, that the curfew be lifted, and that the union be allowed to pay for any damages
the striking workers caused.714 The council agreed to consider this at its next meeting, but
in response to the union’s request that it forbid any outsider from entering the town to
work at the Jeffrey Mine, council replied that it “ne croit pas qu’il possède les pouvoirs
nécessaires pour passer un règlement empêchant les gens de l’extérieur de venir travailler
à Asbestos.”715 Council’s reluctance to act on behalf of the union led the strikers to
believe they would have to take control of the town by force.
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May began and the strike entered its 13th week. Production numbers for February
were released and showed that, although half the month had been strike-free, the month
showed only half of the asbestos production of the previous year, falling from 48,873
tonnes to 26,148 tonnes.716 To combat how its stockholders would react to these numbers
JM used an article in the Johns-Manville News Pictorial to calm worries by stating that
750 Asbestos employees had returned to work. Conscious that the magazine was sent to
its employees throughout Canada and the United States, the article also stated that if the
strike continued, “a number of plants…will be forced to shut down [and]…as many as
100,000 employees will be thrown out of jobs, resulting in suffering and hardships not
only to themselves but also to their families numbering perhaps 400,000 more human
beings.”717 Highlighting the wider effects of the strike and the potential victims beyond
the boundaries of the town took focus away from Asbestos and the local struggles
occurring there. The article also emphasized how important the community was to the
global success of the industry: while strikers did not want 400,000 people to suffer, the
international reach of their labour gave them bargaining strength.
Although JM was skilled at rallying outside support for its side in the dispute, the
strikers in Asbestos had their allies outside the town as well. Archbishop of Montreal
Joseph Charbonneau instructed every Catholic Church in the city to raise monetary
donations for the victims of the strike throughout May, and Archbishop of Quebec City
Maurice Roy followed suit. These efforts showed that Camirand was not the only Church
official supporting the strikers, and in addition to money, the archbishops provided
valuable moral encouragement. Charbonneau asked the people of Montreal to think of the
mothers of Asbestos, “qui se demandent ce qu’elles donneront demain comme nourriture
à leurs enfants,” and stated that “[q]uand on conspire à écraser l’ouvrier, l’Église a le
devoir d’intervenir.”718 Making the strike a community issue, rather than simply an
industrial dispute was effective, but while this meant that money would be sent to the
families of Asbestos, the community needed more to stop the sharp increase in anxiety
the town felt after JM announced that the 700 strikebreakers working at the Jeffrey Mine
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would not only keep their jobs when the conflict was over, but also threaten the seniority
of strikers when it came to promotions.719
The local population was enraged by the idea that strikebreakers would remain at
the Jeffrey Mine after the labour dispute was over. Anticipating violence, town council
resolved that it would “demande instamment à la Canadian Johns-Manville Co. Ltd.
d’engager ses anciens employés de préférence à toute personne venant de l’extérieur, ceci
afin que la situation économique d’Asbestos soit affectée le moins possible.”720 It did not
have the power to prevent strikebreakers from entering the town, but council could try to
reason with JM in a way angry workers could not. The retention of strikebreakers at the
Jeffrey Mine was a major problem because it suggested that 700 of the 2,100 strikers
would not have jobs when the dispute was over because new employees would have taken
their place. The single-industry town could not support that great a number of
unemployed people.
Council’s request was as close as it had ever come to dictating how JM should run
the Jeffrey Mine, but it also showed the tradition of cooperation and negotiation that had
been established in the community. This was not good enough for those directly affected
by the strike, however, as they struggled to feed their families. Pelletier wrote that the
workers wondered if they could replace JM management as easily as the company
seemed to be able to replace them, but despite this humour, the presence of the
strikebreakers, “met en rage les ouvriers réguliers fidèles à la grève et qui voient leurs
emplois confiés à des inconnus.”721 Frantic with worry over losing their jobs and homes
to outsiders, the workers on strike were compelled to assert their authority in Asbestos.
At 5am on the rainy morning of 5 May, about 800 of the Asbestos strikers began
to barricade the roads leading into the community. Loading pickup trucks and station
wagons with lumber and other heavy materials, and parking them across the width of the
roads, all the entrances to Asbestos and the Jeffrey Mine were blocked by 7am when the
strikers were joined by some fellow union members from Thetford.722 Their goal was to
prevent any outside strikebreakers from entering the town and any locals from entering
JM property. Asbestos was closed. Positioned at the entrance to the mill just before 8am,
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Pelletier saw 30 provincial policemen armed with machine guns, revolvers, and grenade
launchers approach a large group of men picketing outside the Jeffrey Mine in defiance of
the injunction placed against them. The community had become a battleground, but
before any violence happened, “[p]lusieurs centaines de femmes, défilant en bon ordre,
arrivèrent d’une rue adjacente en récitant le chapelet. Lentement, sans le moindre signe de
nervosité, elles passèrent devant les barrières et l’arsenal de la police.”723
The image of a large group of women reciting the rosary in the rain between
picketing strikers and heavily armed provincial police is haunting. It conveys the
Catholicism of the people of Asbestos and the determination of women to be a part of the
conflict. It also shows the belief amongst those on strike that although they were breaking
the laws of Quebec, they were justified by the laws of God. Five minutes after the women
proceeded down the road to pray with other groups of strikers, the police launched teargas bombs into the picketing crowd, allegedly hitting Rodolphe Hamel’s 12 year old son
Jacques in the face.724 The gas was effective in clearing the gates to the Jeffrey Mine, but
did little to disperse the gathering crowds at the road barriers, where any strikebreaker
who ventured too close was beaten, and three cars were turned over and lit on fire.
Danville soon filled with those who were unable to enter Asbestos.725 The community
remained closed and firmly under the control of those on strike. JM and strikebreakers
had threatened the local cultural identity, so rooted to employment at the Jeffrey Mine, for
too long. It was time to retaliate.
The barricades were maintained for the entire day and the group of praying
women continued to walk the streets of Asbestos, bringing food to those guarding the
town as other strikers smashed the windows at the homes of local strikebreakers.726
Although no JM official was harmed, provincial policemen were. Targeting them as
invaders of their community, the strikers attacked and disarmed any policeman who came
close to the barricades, overturned a patrol car and broke the arm of Lieutenant Émile
Contant as his vehicle drove away from the “wet, determined” strikers.727 CTCC
Secretary Jean Marchand was not present on 5 May and the union did not sanction the
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barricades or the violence: this was something, much like the call to strike, that came
directly from the people of Asbestos.
The policemen who did not retreat in the face of the barricades were taken by the
strikers and forced to march through the streets of Asbestos with their hands up until they
arrived in the basement of St-Aimé. Police later reported to the Globe and Mail that eight
of them were led to the platform where they were booed and ridiculed by a crowd of 400
strikers. According to Detective Quevillon, “[t]hey called us everything you can say…All
had clubs. The women especially screamed and kept yelling ‘Beat them, beat them.’”
Detective Therrien claimed that he was kicked in the stomach several times and that
“[y]ou couldn’t talk to them. They just don’t understand anything.”728 Curé Camirand was
present, but told the policemen that the matter was between them and the striking
workers, not him. The willingness of Camirand to witness these actions without reproach,
combined with the noted enthusiasm of the women of Asbestos to inflict violence on the
policemen, demonstrates how deeply the strikers and those who supported their cause
resented them in the community. It also shows how violent the people of Asbestos had
become through the duration of the strike. They were not innocent victims of an
oppressive corporation and the strikers, their families, and their priest believed that these
actions were sometimes necessary in the pursuit of victory.
After these confrontations Pelletier reported that “[t]out le monde est sur la rue et
rares les citoyens qui ont eu le temps de se raser. La tension nerveuse, grande au début de
la matinée, diminue d’heure en heure.”729 Press helicopters circled overhead and 32 press
envoys waited for more drama beyond the barricades, further adding to the war zone
atmosphere that had settled on the community. Although few members of the press were
allowed into Asbestos that day, those that were already there were not allowed out.
Pelletier was a friend of the strikers, able to move throughout the community; he had no
intention of leaving. Financial Post reporter Ron Williams, however, was terrified and
tried to leave town. While he got past one barricade, he was forced back by the second
after he was pulled from the car and told, “too bad and I’m sorry, but if we know you,
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fine; otherwise you stay.”730 Phoning the Globe and Mail, Williams described the
community as a beleaguered citadel under a reign of terror and said that he was being
guarded by provincial police, armed with shotguns…There is a mass
meeting going on in the basement of St. Aimé Church and everyone in the
room is fearful that when it breaks up, violence will break out. As I speak,
church bells are ringing. This is the first time in two months they have
been heard…I can see strikers patrolling the streets…The streets, apart
from the strikers’ cars, are deserted…I’ve never been in a situation before
which has such explosive possibilities.731
Williams was terrified of what the striking workers would do next and his description of
Asbestos illustrates just how drastically the community had changed during the labour
dispute. Church bells were now signs of danger and citizens on the street were assumed to
be violent aggressors. Nevertheless, when the church bells stopped around 2:30am, the
meeting at St. Aimé dispersed and the strikers “vanished into thin air.”732
The strikers had been “maîtres de la situation”733 throughout the day and intended
to continue the barricades until Camirand warned them against it after mass, saying,
“[a]llez-vous en chez vous et restez là jusqu’à nouvel ordre. Il est inutile d’offrir une
résistance physique devant une force policière armée. Allez-vous coucher maintenant
parce que vous avez fais une grosse journée d’ouvrage et vous méritez du repos.”734 As
militant as the priest’s support for local workers was, he did not want them to be involved
in a violent confrontation with the provincial police who were surely on their way to the
community. Camirand was wise to warn them. Hilaire Beauregard had requested more
policemen from Sherbrooke and Montreal: “[n]ous avons atteint la limite de la patience.
Nous nous sommes retenus depuis quelque temps mais à la suite de ce qui se produit
aujourd’hui, nous répondrons à la violence par la violence.”735 Beauregard’s open
admission that the provincial police would be bringing violence to Asbestos because they
had lost patience with the strikers foreshadowed what was to come. The workers listened
to Camirand and while leaving, one told a reporter, “[t]here will be no fight tonight.”736
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The barricades were abandoned and the Thetford strikers who had come to
Asbestos to help barricade the community slept in the basement of St-Aimé, while local
strikers went home. They were not surrendering, but rather regrouping to see what would
come during the next day of battle. They were unprepared. By 3am a contingent of 291
provincial police broke through the barriers to Asbestos and after seeing only a few
journalists wandering the streets,737 decided to reinstate their definition of order in
Asbestos by taking back sections of the town. Their first target was St-Aimé.
Arriving at the church at 4am when the men—almost 40 in number—were just
waking up, the police stormed into the basement led by Detective Daniel Nadeau, who
had been injured by picketers the day before. Bursting into the church, Nadeau was struck
with a wooden club.738 Heavily outnumbered, the strikers ran towards the stairs to the
chapel where they felt they would be safe. Thetford worker Laurent Bernatchez was hit
from behind on the stairs by an officer and punched until he lost consciousness. The press
photographed him as he was led from the church asking if he could go to the hospital, but
he was taken to the Hotel Iroquois instead.739 Maurice Kirouac, also a Thetford worker at
the church, was beaten on the way to the Hotel Iroquois because he told police,
“Duplessis, il est fort; il vient chercher le monde dans les églises.”740 Kirouac’s mention
of Duplessis reveals the political consciousness of the strikers and how much they
believed the premier was aligned with JM, against the plight of the workers.
The church, so important to the citizens of Asbestos, had been violently invaded.
Pelletier reported that while in the church, “la police a saisi 15 haches dont plusieurs
étaient tachées de sang ainsi qu’un bon nombre de bâtons également entachés de sang.”741
Violence and blood in their church was shocking to the people of Asbestos, but more was
to come. After the police had rounded up 40 men, Justice of the Peace Hertel O’Bready
read the Riot Act on the front steps of St-Aimé, forbidding anyone to gather in groups of
more than two. O’Bready added to the small crowd before him, “[r]etournez à vos
occupations régulières. Ceux qui n’obéiront pas sont passibles d’emprisonnement à
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vie.”742 What occurred at the church was described by the Globe and Mail as “an action
without parallel in Canadian history.”743 If reporters were horrified by the actions of the
provincial police from a national perspective, the people of Asbestos were even more so
because it happened in their place of worship. Outsiders had invaded the community and
church, and the people of Asbestos were now prisoners in their own homes.
Before townspeople had time to react, provincial policemen escorted
strikebreakers into the community and through the gates of the Jeffrey Mine. They then
raided the homes of strikers and the local businesses where they gathered, arresting 125
citizens and taking them to the Hotel Iroquois. Pelletier described the scene of Asbestos
following the raids: “[l]es trottoirs d’Asbestos sont aussi déserts, ce matin, qu’ils étaient
encombrés dans la matinée d’hier. Mais dans la rue, le va-et-vient des voitures de la
police provinciale a remplacé ce-lui des piqueteurs.”744 The war zone atmosphere in
Asbestos had continued, but this time, outside invaders were in control. The local paper
took this eerie calm to mean that the strike was over and everything would soon return to
normal.745 This was not the case.
The provincial police’s treatment of strikers after they were arrested that morning
was later revealed to be ordered by JM officials who were present at the Hotel Iroquois,
and court records taken when these men sued the police for brutality give an account of
what they experienced. These records have not been used in previous studies of the strike,
because of their inherent bias and because the experience of the workers has been of less
interest to scholars than that of the notable public figures involved in the conflict.
Although testimonies may have been exaggerated, they convey how the strikers felt they
were treated under the supervision of JM officials. The company later claimed that the
violence of 5 May was the fault of Thetford miners, but these accounts prove that the
barricades and violence came from the local population, an important distinction that
shows the militancy and agency of the strikers in Asbestos.746
After the Riot Act was read the morning of 6 May, police raided Rodolphe
Lassond’s restaurant for local strikers. Among others, they took Joseph Beaudoin, Bruno
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Champagne, and Alfred Blanchette, all JM employees on strike who were taken to the
Hotel Iroquois for questioning before they were sent to jail in Sherbrooke or Montreal.
Beaudoin was taken to a bathroom in the hotel where he would later claim two provincial
policemen beat him until he lost consciousness. When he revived, his eyes were swollen
shut and he could not hear out of his right ear, but the policemen allegedly continued to
berate him, saying, “que j’étais un maudit lâche, que j’étais en grève depuis trois mois et
que j’étais trop lâche pour travailler mais qu’avec eux autres.”747 Beaudoin claimed that
he was not even present at the barricades and that he was 55 years old and had worked at
the Jeffrey Mine for 27 years. This distinction now meant nothing to company officials or
the provincial police under their control and Beaudoin was sent to Montreal along with
many others, where he was questioned for the rest of the night.
The strikers believed that what had happened in the basement of the Hotel
Iroquois was indicative of how JM attempted to reassert its authority in Asbestos. They
believed this because the company paid the salaries of the policemen sent to the
community and, even if officials did not call for physical harm themselves, CJM
President G.K. Foster and others supervised many of these interrogations without
intervening when violence began.748 The workers interpreted the lack of company
intervention to stop the violence as approval, and Foster’s presence reveals just how
connected the JM was to the police and to Duplessis. Bruno Champagne claimed to have
had an experience similar to Beaudoin’s after he was taken from the restaurant. He stated
that he also was beaten at the Hotel Iroquois, with policemen focusing their efforts on his
face and ears while saying, “[p]arle, ou bien tu vas mourir.”749 Champagne expressed his
offence at the language the policemen used, especially religious curses and assaults on the
priest at St-Aimé, such as, “[v]otre Christ de Curé Camirand, ses hosties s’il les avait
icitte, on lui ferait ravaler.”750 This language was especially offensive to the religious
strikers and an attack on Camirand was an attack on their faith, their union, and the idea
that the strike was moral.
The police appeared to take pleasure in assaulting the strikers, but not all of the
people under JM control agreed with what was happening. After Alfred Blanchette was
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allegedly beaten by police in a second floor washroom until his dentures no longer fit his
mouth, he was taken to Dr. Kenneth Smith, who secretly fed him two eggs, tomato juice,
and baloney.751 Smith’s actions reveal how conflicted he was in his role with JM at
Asbestos. He actively downplayed the risks associated with the mineral, but was deeply
concerned with the wellbeing of community members. Although Blanchette admitted to
being at the barricades, he was told at 9pm that, “[o]n va te lâcher sur ta parole d’honneur
de ne pas te montrer la face à Asbestos d’ici la fin de la grève; sans ça ma job est en jeu.
Tu n’iras pas à la messe dimanche.”752 Blanchette’s banishment from Asbestos and from
Camirand’s mass revealed how important the community and the priest were in
maintaining the spirit of the strikers.
While the police did not arrest Camirand, they did take reporter Jacqueline Sirois
to the hotel after she was seen talking to the priest in his car.753 To the provincial police,
Camirand was a dangerous influence in the community, but they could not accuse him
publicly. Both Willie Champagne and Gérard Chamberland of Thetford claimed that
police insulted the priest while they beat them, with Chamberland testifying, “[i]ls nous
feront mettre à genoux on disant: ‘Le curé Camirand les fait mettre à genoux, nous autres
aussi on va les faire mettre à genoux.’”754 Part of the reason Camirand was ridiculed and
mentioned so often while the workers were allegedly being beaten was that he had
allowed them to meet in his church and encouraged them to remain strong during the
labour dispute. The strikers emphasized this in their testimonies against the police
because it supported the idea that they were morally justified: the priest supported the
workers while company-paid provincial police defied the laws of the church by treating
Camirand with such disrespect. In 1949 Catholic Quebec, this was a serious offense with
the power to sway public opinion in favour of the workers.
Striker Jean-Paul Houle’s account of what happened to him at the hotel reinforces
this idea. Detective Émile Contant, who had his arm broken the day before, singled Houle
out of the crowd, allegedly saying that someone had to pay for hurting him. He told
another detective in English that Houle should have special attention placed on him.
Houle claimed that before he was beaten until he lost consciousness, a policeman told
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him, “[v]ot’ C…. de grève on va la casser! Vot’ curé en tant que curé il est bon, mais en
tant que Camirand il est écoeurant.”755 The police spoke in English both because they
believed the working class in Asbestos could not understand it, and because the JM
officials who were present were unilingual Anglophone. Although he did not recognize
Foster, Houle was allegedly told that “[c]e gars là c’est Monsieur Foster, le gérant général
de la Compagnie. Il t’a vu. Tu vas retourner travailler et il va te donner des
chances…Quand tu auras du temps, sors et cherche nous des tuyaux. Si tu entends parler
des gars qui ont battu les polices, viens à l’hôtel et dis-moi ça.”756 The direct inclusion of
Foster in Houle’s violent interrogation proved to strikers the involvement of JM officials
in the brutal actions of the police. The alleged attempt to use Foster’s presence to bribe
Houle into betraying his fellow strikers also suggests that JM continued to underestimate
how loyal Jeffrey Mine workers were to each other, not the company.
Houle was released and told that if anyone asked about his battered body, he was
to use the ridiculous excuse that it was nothing but a sunburn, even though it was only
early May and the sun did not cause bruising. The release of local strikers suggests that
JM was reluctant to arrest them because it would go against the company’s public
statement that the violence was the action of Thetford workers, not the people of
Asbestos. Furthermore, Foster’s direct supervision indicates that he wanted workers to
fear what JM could do while continuing to portray the strike as being an attack on, “la loi,
l’ordre, et l’édifice social tout entier,”757 notwithstanding the physical proof of the
beatings.
Although the majority of local strikers taken by the police on 6 May were released
that night on various conditions, Émile Grimard and Jean-Noël Hamel were sent to a
Sherbrooke jail. Their experiences being interrogated by the police were similar to the
others, which Time and Life Magazine photographer Mike Rougler said made him “sick
to watch.”758 Although Rougler was present in the main holding area at Hotel Iroquois, it
is unclear as to why JM or the police allowed him to be, and no photographs were ever
released of the events that occurred that night. The police took particular joy in beating
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Hamel, who had already been charged with intimidation and whose involvement in the
violence would discredit his father, Rodolphe Hamel, the local union leader. Hamel was
taken to JM’s hospital rather than the hotel, and once there, Hamel was allegedly told by
his interrogator, “je viens de Montréal. Ça fait deux que je tue et si tu ne parles pas tu vas
être le troisième.”759 The animosity that had grown between the strikers and the
policemen being paid by JM had reached terrifying levels.
Both Hamel and Grimard were beaten severely, and required stitches on their
limbs, torsos, and heads. Kenneth Smith took x-rays of both of their heads to make sure
their skulls had not been fractured, gave them food, and according to Grimard,
confidentially told them, “qu’il était 100% avec nous autres et qu’il désapprouvait ce qui
se faisait là.”760 While we cannot be sure Smith actually told Grimard this, his efforts to
convince JM to reduce the amount of dust at the Jeffrey Mine suggests that he did
sympathize, at least somewhat, with the workers. Smith then offered the injured strikers
beds in the infirmary while he guarded the door as they slept before being transported to
Sherbrooke. Because of this alleged support, Smith was the only JM employee not on
strike that emerged from the conflict with a positive reputation in the community. Of
course, the town did not know the extent to which Smith had helped JM cover up the
damage the mineral was doing to their bodies.
The families and friends of the men taken by police the morning of 6 May had no
idea what was happening to them at the Hotel Iroquois. The Globe and Mail described
Asbestos that afternoon as being a deserted city with blood-spattered streets761 and
Pelletier reported that “[u]n grand nombre d’épouses d’Asbestos sont extrêmement
inquiètes…Certaines de ces femmes n’ont pas eu de nouvelles de leurs maris depuis
qu’ils ont quitté le foyer le 6 au matin.”762 Uncertainty reigned in the once so confident
community and Camirand spent the day going from home to home comforting families
and becoming, “a pillar round which the strikers and their friends have rallied.”763 No one
knew how the police used his name to justify their violence. In total, 150 men were sent
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from Asbestos to Sherbrooke and 53 of them were sent onto a Montreal jail because there
was not enough room.
“Malaise et l’Amertume,” May to June 1949
The events of 5 and 6 May changed the community of Asbestos in ways that the
first few months of the strike had not. La Tribune reported that “malaise et l’amertume
règnent dans la ville…où la grève interminable a irrité les caractères et les nerfs,”764
which stood in stark contrast with the jovial spirit the strikers showed months before. The
town was on edge and because of JM’s connection to the provincial police and the violent
interrogations of local workers, the people of Asbestos turned against the company in a
way that showed that the strike was not just a labour dispute: it was personal.
The personal element of the strike was reinforced when the imprisoned men were
released from the Hotel Iroquois and the Sherbrooke jail. These men were husbands,
fathers, and friends, and they remained in their homes for days to hide their injuries, as
instructed by the police, but the community still saw their swollen faces, and La Presse
reported that “[l]es mesures de rigueur ont naturellement soulevé à la fois l’ire et le
dégoût, non seulement des grévistes, qui devaient en être les premières victimes, mais
tout aussi bien des autres citoyens qui rageaient littéralement à la vue des contingents de
policiers arrêtant à vue tous ceux qui leur semblaient un peu suspects.”765 The image of
JM in Asbestos had been damaged throughout the strike, but it worsened as townspeople
became aware of the violence Foster sanctioned at the Hotel Iroquois. Since 1918, the
company had been an important influence on the local cultural identity, often making the
community proud because of global economic success, but after these events companycommunity relations were no longer so harmonious.
JM continued to blame radical union leaders and Thetford miners for putting up
the barricades to Asbestos,766 and G.K. Foster, who had seen local workers admit to their
involvement at the Hotel Iroquois, refused to admit it and stated that the “radicaux qui
dirigent cette grève refusent ainsi de fait à des ouvriers le droit de travailler et de faire
764
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Thetford workers were a convenient group for JM to blame the violence on because they were not
connected to the community in the same way Jeffrey Mine workers were. They were not friends or
neighbours, and it was easier to blame strangers for the violence than it was to blame locals. Furthermore, it
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decisions. Thetford workers were present during the violence, but they did not initiate the barricades.
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vivre leur famille. Dans leur lutte pour le pouvoir ces meneurs de désordre restent froids
aux misères qu’ils infligent à nos employés, à notre ville et au public.”767 By referring to
local strikers as “our employees” and to Asbestos as “our town,” Foster attempted to
create the image that company-community relations had not been damaged by the strike
or police violence, but this was certainly not the case. JM workers began the strike on 13
February, they had clear goals they wanted to achieve with the conflict, and they fought
against the presence of the provincial police and strikebreakers on 5 May. They did these
things of their own accord, often against the wishes and advice of their union leaders and
Foster’s attempt to take these actions away from local strikers illustrated how much JM
had failed to understand its workforce and the militant, confident cultural identity of the
community surrounding the Jeffrey Mine.
On Sunday, 8 May, 350 provincial policemen watched the people of Asbestos go
to mass at St-Aimé, which was a significant presence in the community of 6,000. After
mass had finished, the crowd did not react when they were told the Riot Act had been
lifted and they were now free to meet as they pleased.768 Camirand became a spokesman
for the people of Asbestos, and told the press that locals were appalled by the “profane
acts” committed by the police in their church, which was now “battle-scarred as well as
hallowed ground.”769 He also reported that the police had raided and eaten the donated
food organized by Archbishops Charbonneau and Roy, which turned the opinion of the
community even more against them. Rodolphe Hamel had not seen his son Jean-Noël
since he was taken from his home and did not know that he was in a Montreal jail with
almost 60 others awaiting charges. These men were unable to see their lawyer, Jean
Drapeau, who sent letters of protest to Duplessis on their behalf.770 A sense of the
unknown settled on Asbestos.
The members of the press allowed into the community once the barricades had
come down believed they knew what was to come. On Monday, 9 May at 8am, in the
words of Pelletier,
un grand nombre de journalistes ont guetté à toutes les entrées de l’usine,
de la mine et des moulins, pour suivre le mouvement des ouvriers qui
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rentraient au travail. Après toute la violence et les menaces de ces derniers
jours, plusieurs s’attendaient à voir des centaines de mineurs reprendre
leurs emplois. Mais ceux-là ont été déçus. Il ne s’est rien passé ce matin à
Asbestos qui ressemble même de loin, à une rentrée en masse. Sans doute
quelques ouvriers qui avaient tenu bon jusqu’ici ont-ils cédé aux terribles
pressions de ces derniers jours.771
The violence had not broken the strike, nor the spirit of the workers, and Pelletier wrote
that reporters from Ontario and the United States “à Asbestos depuis les troubles de jeudi
n’en croient pas leurs yeux” when the strikers did not return to work at the Jeffrey Mine
that morning.772 He knew the character of the people of Asbestos better than these
newcomers and was not at all surprised when Hamel stated that the workers were
prepared to remain on strike for at least five more months.773 To ensure this would be
possible, Hamel placed an ad in Le Devoir asking Montrealers to “adopt” a family in
Asbestos by donating $5 each week for every married couple in the community and $1
more for each child they had.774 While it is unclear if the people of Montreal chose to
adopt Asbestos families, Hamel’s confidence was remarkable following the violence that
had occurred just days earlier and the suffering of the community after 4 months of strike.
The 28 local men jailed in Sherbrooke were released on 9 May after the union
paid their $800 fines. That night, the strikers met in the basement of St-Aimé to discuss
the brutality of the provincial police. Local union head Armand Larivée opened the
meeting with humour when he said, “le ‘panier à salade’ si actif qu’il ait été en fin de
semaine, n’avait quand même pas tout ramassé et qu’il restait quelques grévistes.”775
Larivée’s tone lightened the atmosphere as he highlighted the dedication of the strikers,
and after both he and Marchand spoke, Camirand told the crowd that their commitment to
the strike was upholding the social doctrine of the church and that “[i]l a souligné surtout
que les grands responsables des récents troubles, ce sont ceux qui importent à Asbestos
des ouvriers étrangers pour voler leurs emplois aux ouvriers en grève.”776 That the
Asbestos workers continued to believe they were doing God’s work by striking is
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significant, as is the blame Camirand placed on strikebreakers from outside the
community. Both of these ideas removed any blame that could be placed on the strikers
without denying that they began the labour dispute and reacted violently on 5 May.
To combat this attitude, JM president Lewis H. Brown distributed a pamphlet on
the strike to employees as well as the press because, “[i]t is our hope that every leader of
every group in the Province of Quebec will read this report and from it obtain a clear
understanding of the revolution that has been attempted by the leaders of the Asbestos
Syndicate.”777 This pamphlet has not been studied in examinations of the strike due to an
apparent lack of interest in the local dynamics of Asbestos, but it is an important piece of
evidence in assessing community-company relations during the strike. Brown correctly
assessed the main issues of the conflict except that he gave agency to the CTCC, not
Jeffrey Mine workers. Brown wrote that the demands to have a say in how land was used,
how health issues were managed, and how promotions were awarded were what the union
wanted, not the workers. He also stated that this was not a conflict over health or wages,
but rather ownership. Quoting Pope Pius XI, Brown stated that “in the application of
natural resources to human use the law of nature demands that right order should be
observed. This order consists of this; that each thing have its proper owner.”778 JM owned
the Jeffrey Mine and had the right to dictate how it was run, but the striking workers were
the majority in this situation, and the company was dependent on them. This, as well as
their history of sacrificing community land to pit expansion, gave them the
“revolutionary” belief that they had the authority to decide how the Jeffrey Mine was
developed. Brown did not understand this reasoning. He believed that the people of
Asbestos should be grateful to JM. The company had spent over a million dollars on dustcontrol equipment in the mills and another million on hospitals and recreation centres in
the community.779 The townspeople were appreciative, but Brown could not understand
that they could want more: that was just not how single-industry working class
communities were run.
Brown blamed the violence entirely on a group of outsiders who terrorized the
police and the people of Asbestos, especially the wives and children of JM officials,
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although no reports of officials or their families being targeted exist. Brown also subtly
attacked Camirand when he wrote, “[w]e are appreciative of many years of help from the
late Father Castonguay, Asbestos parish priest for nearly half a century, with whom we
cooperated in trying to improve the home and community life of the town of
Asbestos.”780 Camirand now ran Castonguay’s parish and this statement shows JM’s
conviction that the priest was agitating his congregation into rebelling against the
established order of the community.
Brown’s reasoning was ineffective in turning the opinion of Asbestos in the
company’s favour. The provincial policemen in the town were reduced to 50 on the day
the pamphlet was released and while this brought the population “un soupir de
soulagement,”781 the knowledge that Foster and other officials had been present at the
Hotel Iroquois while workers were being beaten weighed heavy on their minds. Pelletier
explained that “jamais l’appui des gens aux grévistes n’a été plus complet que depuis la
fin de semaine…[la violence] a ouvert les yeux à nombre de personnes qui n’avaient
jamais manifesté clairement leur sympathie pour les ouvriers. Des professionnels et des
marchands, qui avaient gardé jusqu’ici une prudente réserve se prononcent désormais en
faveur des mineurs.”782 Even friends of JM officials, he wrote, had become disgusted with
the company. The general sympathy the public had towards the workers, combined with
disgust felt towards the company for sanctioning the violence of the police, ensured that
community dynamics in Asbestos had radically changed.
For once, the local paper supported Pelletier’s assessment of the town. While it
still did not completely side with the strikers, L’Asbestos acknowledged the atmosphere
of despair that had taken over the community. In its 13 May edition the headline read,
“Désolation règne à Asbestos,” and stated that the first half of 1949 had brought a degree
of suffering the town had never experienced before.783 There was no chance of alleviating
this sadness, in the paper’s opinion, because aside from the majority of the population not
receiving wages for 13 weeks, JM announced it would have to cut back on its workers
due to global economic conditions. This was a serious threat to the community, which
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based its entire economy on the success of the industry,784 but the article concluded on a
positive note, suggesting that the violence had ended the strike, an opinion held by many
in Asbestos even though the workers had not yet returned to the Jeffrey Mine.
CTCC officials did not believe the workers were giving up hope and demanded a
federal inquest into the role JM played in the violence of 6 May, which had been
committed in “les chambres de tortures” owned by the company and, in the opinion of the
union, scarred some workers for life.785 These claims were based on the testimonies of the
arrested strikers, whose allegations against the police were believed by those who had
seen their bruised faces. Jean-Noël Hamel, Gérard Chamberland, Alfred Blanchette, and
Jean-Paul Houle sued JM for $25,000 each because they were “savagely beaten” on
company property and they had the bruises to prove it.786 Adding to JM’s worries over a
public lawsuit damaging company finances and reputation was a confidential report given
to W.H. Soutar, CJM Assistant Mine Manager, which stated that cancer rates were rising
in both Thetford and Asbestos, with 22 workers at the Jeffrey Mine having died of it
between 1943 and 1947.787 The company could deal with a few lawsuits launched by men
who had been arrested, but if workers and the general public found out the mineral caused
cancer, JM would be ruined. This concern was heightened in the middle of June when
British doctor E.R.A. Merewether suggested a link between asbestos and cancer in an
address he gave to the Canadian Medical Association.788 Why Merewether did not spread
this information to the asbestos mining communities in Quebec is unclear, but JM
officials were fortunate he did not and they knew the company needed to resolve the
strike in order to get the attention of the press off the industry before the threat of cancer
was exposed.
Unaware of the connection between the mineral and cancer, the people of
Asbestos continued the pattern of life that had been in place since mid-February. On 26
May, 800 books sent by Ligue ouvrière catholique arrived in Asbestos along with eight
tonnes of food donated by the streetcar workers of Montreal.789 Although it was a rainy
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day, the townspeople organized a parade of cars to welcome them. The joy felt by the
community was quickly lost three days later when a street dance on the highway linking
Asbestos and Danville suddenly turned into a brawl between strikers and strikebreakers,
demonstrating just how much tension remained in the community.790
Tension increased as strikers in the neighbouring community of St-Remi de
Tingwick returned to work.791 While many took this to mean that all strikers in the
asbestos region of Quebec would return to their mines and mills, JM was uncertain. In its
June issue of the Johns-Manville News Pictorial, the company stated that the people who
worked the Jeffrey Mine, “have lost more than $1 1/2 million in wages as a result of the
strike. An increase in wages amounting to $5 a week would have been granted without
any strike. With such an increase, it would take each employee over three years to get
back what he has lost [but the] losses to the Company are much greater.”792 The expense
of the strike had been great for the company, but few strikers in Asbestos could believe
JM’s suffering was greater than theirs.
The magazine also made it seem as though nothing was happening to bring an end
to the strike, when in fact negotiations were constantly going on even though the workers
turned down a JM offer to raise their hourly wage by 10 cents on 2 June.793 On 19 June
the workers held a vote in St-Aimé on another proposed contract; 976 of them rejected it
and only 37 supported. Pelletier explained that less than half the strikers voted because
“plusieurs grévistes ont été placés ici et là par le syndicat et bon nombre d’entre eux
travaillent maintenant en dehors d’Asbestos.”794 The fact that the majority of the 2,100
workers now lived or worked outside the town demonstrates just how much their lives
and community had been shattered by the strike. The new faces of strikebreakers in
Asbestos made this sad reality even more disturbing to the local population.
Adding to the worries of the community and the desire to leave town was JM’s
announcement that it had discovered a new asbestos deposit near Munro, Ontario and was
shipping equipment and $10,000,000 in development funds from Asbestos to this
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location.795 This was terrifying even to those who relied only indirectly on the Jeffrey
Mine for their income. The entire community was connected to the mine, and even if
JM’s image had been damaged during the strike, the people still needed it to survive.
Town council was hopeful the conflict would soon end, but the strike and the
Munro development soured relations between them and the company. No longer
comfortable with relying so much on JM, council negotiated a deal with the Shawinigan
Water and Power Co. to supply Asbestos with electricity.796 Although this was an indirect
way to articulate the new distance between council and company, it was clear that the
way the community would function after the strike ended would be much different from
how it did before the conflict.
Changes to the community would also be great because of JM’s demands in the
negotiation room. Although JM claimed it had always treated its employees fairly,797
behind closed doors the company refused to rehire at least 20 of its striking workers who
had been present at the barricades at the start of May and insisted on its right to retain
over 100 strikebreakers from outside Asbestos.798 This would change both the community
and the spirit of camaraderie and authority the workers had at the Jeffrey Mine. When the
Thetford strikers voted to return to work on 24 June due to desperation and a slightly
improved contract, the people of Asbestos knew their strike would not last much longer;
they were losing valuable allies and bargaining power for contract negotiations.
Although their list of demands was long in February, by the end of June all the
strikers at Asbestos wanted was for JM to promise that they would be able to return to
work at the Jeffrey Mine. JM did not want to rehire employees who had been arrested and
warned that global economic conditions would prevent them from hiring everyone back.
The strike ended on 30 June after lasting 137 days and an arbitration board was
established to negotiate the details of the new collective agreement, which was a risky yet
necessary move for the workers to make after suffering for almost 5 months without any
income. Le Devoir reported that following the vote to accept the new contract in the
basement of St-Aimé at 1:30am, “les ouvriers sont sortis de la salle et ont manifesté leur
joie par les rues d’Asbestos. Fanfare en tête les grévistes ont paradé. Les femmes ont
795

The Globe and Mail, 23 June 1949, p. 1.
Procès-verbal, La ville d’Asbestos, 22 June 1949, p. 61.
797
L’Asbestos, 23 June 1949, p. 4.
798
Le Devoir, 25 June 1949, p. 1.

796

184
rejoint le groupe pour démontrer qu’elles étaient tout aussi contentes que leurs époux de
la fin de la grève.”799 The entire community was relieved and celebrated long into the
early morning with a street dance in the town square. The morning of 1 July saw a
continuance of celebrations, with the church bells at St-Aimé ringing between 7:30 and
8am to summon a full-capacity crowd to Camirand’s mass. Afterwards Camirand
expressed his hope, “que tous, ouvriers, professionnels et dirigeants de la compagnie
s’uniraient pour rétablir la prospérité de la ville d’Asbestos,”800 which was quite
optimistic considering how much the community had changed since February.
The townspeople were jubilant, but this was not the resolution for which the
workers had sacrificed almost five months of salary and security. JM promised to rehire
all of its striking employees without discrimination and they were allowed to keep their
seniority rights over the strikebreakers who would remain at the Jeffrey Mine. In addition
to this, the workers received what JM offered at the start of April: a 10 cent wage
increase, four paid holidays a year, and no promises on dust elimination at the Jeffrey
Mine or a say in company promotions. The residual financial losses suffered by JM, the
strikers, and the other businesses and people in the community would take years to
overcome. The local newspaper illustrated the conflict between joy and sorrow when it
announced the end of the labour dispute only in a small corner at the bottom of its front
page.801 While it may have seemed as though the workers were forced to end the strike
for financial reasons without making major gains on the issues the conflict highlighted,
Asbestos had undergone radical changes in land management, human health awareness,
and community power during the 5 months of the dispute. These changes were dramatic
and were revealed in the months and years that followed the strike of 1949.
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Chapter 6: “Une ville qui se deplace”: Bodies of Land, 1949-1983
As I stood on the observation platform overlooking the Jeffrey Mine on one of my
first research trips to Asbestos, I was distracted from the pit by the sounds of children
playing below me. On each side of the platform are piles of raw asbestos still embedded
in rock taken from the Jeffrey Mine. Two young boys had leaned their bicycles against
the chain-link fence that guards the mine and were playing in and with these piles of
asbestos, throwing the rocks up into the sky and taking much delight when they came
back down and exploded in clouds of dust. When I drove away from Asbestos that day,
foolishly holding my breath and trying not to rub my suddenly itchy eyes, the children
remained, laughing and holding pieces of the mineral up to the sun so it would sparkle
and shine. These are not the first children in Asbestos who saw the mineral as a source of
entertainment, and they will not be the last. To write them off as uninformed or their
parents as irresponsible is to ignore the rich history of Asbestos that has been shaped by
the interconnection of people and the natural world.
The town of Asbestos offers an in-depth look at Quebec’s second industrial
revolution, when the entire province, not just its major cities, experienced massive
technological transformation. A major reason for the 1949 strike was that the local
interconnectedness of people and land had become threatened as giant electric shovels
began to replace workers in the Jeffrey Mine. These shovels took away not only jobs, but
also the traditional ways a significant portion of the community had interacted with the
land for generations. In the years following the strike the struggle over how the land
would be used continued. This chapter will examine the efforts the working class majority
made to expand and maintain their connection to the land, the methods JM used to make
land in Asbestos more industrialized and “efficient,” and town council’s attempts to
mediate the two opposing philosophies to ensure the continued development of the
community. The way land use was managed in Asbestos from 1949 to 1983 sharply
contrasts the pattern of sacrifice the community had accepted in the years since JM took
ownership of the Jeffrey Mine. This chapter will show that the changed attitude towards
land use during this period was a direct result of how the strike altered the local cultural
identity in Asbestos, inspiring townspeople to become even more independent from JM
and develop a “chez nous philosophy.”
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“Chez nous philosophy” refers to how the people of Asbestos became increasingly
focused on their personal attachment to, and authority over, the land in the community. At
the heart of this process was the townspeople’s commitment to no longer rely on JM for
community development and support, inspired by the animosity that arose during the
strike of 1949. They used the local Chez Nous Ideal, the cooperative home-building
group formed during the Second World War, in new, more sophisticated ways to achieve
this independence. Townspeople bought shares in the group and pledged material and five
hours of labour towards the building of a new house for every member.802 This was to
construct homes independent of JM so that residents of the community could control their
own land and prevent pit expansion into the town if they did not believe it necessary. The
strike demonstrated the importance of this when JM threatened to evict those living in
company houses so that strikebreakers could inhabit them. The Chez Nous Ideal became
more active after the strike, and dealt not only with housing, but also with how the land of
the entire community, including the Jeffrey Mine, was understood and used. Although
they had enjoyed the perks of living in a company town, such as health care and
electricity, the 1949 strike made the people of Asbestos more fully aware of how
vulnerable this made them and they needed to protect themselves.
The chez nous philosophy is similar to the “Maîtres chez nous” campaign slogan
of the Quebec Liberal Party that defeated the Union nationale in 1960. That phrase,
coined by André Laurendeau long before Liberal Minister of the Environment René
Lévesque adopted it, expressed a new type of Québécois reform nationalism:803 in order
to control their own destiny, French Canadians had to control their natural resources.
Following the end of the strike in July 1949, Asbestos was turned into a historical event,
people and place forgotten. Pierre Trudeau’s 1956 interpretation of the strike’s
importance to Quebec ensured the dispute, not the community, would be remembered in
historical texts on the province, the country, and the working class movement.804 This
does Asbestos a disservice. The strike of 1949 was a profoundly local crisis that was first
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and foremost about the increased industrialization of the land and its effects on human
health. As the land in Asbestos became increasingly industrialized between 1949 and
1983, we can see how fervently townspeople understood this idea and how determined
they were to gain control over the mine and the land surrounding it by rejecting the
traditional patterns of community life that had been negotiated since JM bought the
Jeffrey Mine in 1918. In the process, they distanced themselves from JM and redefined
how their local cultural identity was rooted in their interaction with the land through
labour still present in Asbestos today.
Struggle for Ownership, 1949-1959
The people of Asbestos knew that land held great value in the community because
of its rich mineral deposits and a booming industry, and everyone wanted a piece of it. As
much land as possible was purchased by townspeople, JM, and town council after the
1949 strike, and because of the ever-expanding nature of the Jeffrey Mine, the land and
the people who owned it continuously changed as the pit grew and local understandings
of land use changed. Although the strike damaged the finances of the workers and the
town as a whole, it had been good for the industry, which was suddenly confronted with a
shortage of approximately a quarter million tonnes of asbestos because no fibre was
extracted during the conflict.805 Although JM’s image was tarnished by the labour
dispute, the global asbestos demand and price rose dramatically and production rapidly
increased at the Jeffrey Mine, benefiting the company. Although the community had
suffered during the strike, the land remained valuable and in high demand.
The land in Asbestos was valuable before the strike, but it became even more so
afterward and issues of use quickly arose. Town council anticipated the effects of the
boom market by annexing over 7,000 cubic metres of land from Shipton Township in
August 1949 and prepared for the town’s population to grow along with the Jeffrey
Mine.806 Council purchased land from Shipton and individual property owners throughout
1949 so that the roads and boundaries of Asbestos could be expanded, while pulling away
from JM and the close working relationship they had shared prior to the strike.
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When the company asked council to repair the sewers close to the Jeffrey Mine in
September 1949, JM was told that the issue would have to be put to a community
referendum.807 This response was in sharp contrast to town dynamics before the strike,
when council agreed to almost everything JM requested. It also differed with how council
reacted to a request made by the members of the Chez Nous Ideal in March 1950, which
asked for land at a reduced price to build 20 family homes and 1,000 feet of new road and
sewers.808 In June 1950 council purchased 99.27 acres for the Chez Nous Ideal.809
Community funds were no longer going to go towards the company and decisions on land
use in Asbestos would be made by the townspeople. Accommodating the needs of the
working class majority over those of the company in charge of the industry that was so
vital to the community showed just how much Asbestos had changed since the strike of
1949. The people were taking control of the land.
Besides purchasing more land in 1950, council refused to pave JM-owned rue
Webb with the rest of the town’s roads and community members demanded that the
company reopen rue St-Georges near the Jeffrey Mine.810 Prior to the strike, council not
only allowed road closures whenever JM requested them, they also relied on the company
to modernize community roads by laying gravel on them, but the local situation had
changed. The townspeople were rapidly developing an independent cultural identity and
the continuous industrial boom the community experienced returned some of the
confidence that had been lost during the final weeks of the strike. Although Russia was
emerging as a major source of asbestos, Canada continued to provide 61% of the world’s
supply, worth over $64 million.811 While Asbestos was not the only Quebec community
mining the fibre, because of how it was deposited in the land it was by far the most
productive source, extracting on average three times as much as the mines at Thetford.812
The community’s confidence did not make sense to JM because it went against
the basic foundations of how business worked in a capitalist society and how singleindustry towns were managed. In many ways, the strike should have reminded
townspeople that they completely relied on the company for the success of the
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community, and should not resist JM’s ideas for proper land use. The people of Asbestos
were aware of this dependence, but their confidence was tied to the local role they played
in the success of the global industry, which was something the company could not deny.
Asbestos was featured in JM’s monthly employee magazine in October 1950 because of
its remarkable production and value. Entitled “Asbestos, PQ, Canada: Where We Live
and Work,” the article explained that because of this production and the usefulness of the
mineral, “asbestos serves nearly every man, woman and child at least once a day in our
modern civilization.”813 The land was global, modern, and internationally vital. Jeffrey
Mine employees were the ones who facilitated this international reach and this role gave
them a close attachment to the land they worked and the community they lived in.
Despite the connection Jeffrey Mine workers felt to the land, and their rebellion
against its increased industrialization as seen in their protest of new electric shovels prior
to the 1949 strike, JM introduced more machinery into its operations. In 1951 the
company stopped using trains to carry loads of fibre from the bottom of the pit. Instead, it
adapted the spiral benches of the Jeffrey Mine to accommodate giant 35-tonne trucks that
would continuously travel from the bottom to the top of the pit, loading and unloading
fibre.814 These trucks would grow in size as the years went on, eventually reaching a
capacity load of 200 tonnes in the 1970s. JM also altered how shifts were run at the
Jeffrey Mine, explaining in February 1951 that now “one shift of miners leaves for the
washroom for a shower and change to street clothes before heading home as another shift
waits to enter the cage” that would take them down into the pit.815 The Jeffrey Mine had
indeed become a giant factory without a roof, its workers were the tiny gears that kept it
running, and the land was constantly changing because of it.
While the company continued to industrialize the land and its workers, in an
attempt to appease its Francophone employees, JM produced a bilingual local magazine
for the people of Asbestos called Entre Nous, which replaced the Johns-Manville News
Pictorial that had ceased publication in 1949. The name of the new magazine was an
attempt by the company to include itself in the community’s understanding of “us.” In
one of its earliest issues, JM furthered this sentiment when it featured the Chez Nous
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Ideal, jovially calling it “typical” of the way things were done in Asbestos.816 While the
company did not mind its workers building their own homes, it did mind the trouble this
would cause in later years when the Jeffrey Mine needed to expand onto the land where
these houses were located. Home ownership meant land ownership and this changed how
land was used in the community. If the people of Asbestos lived in JM housing, they were
easy to move and the land could be sacrificed to the Jeffrey Mine, as it had been for
decades. Private property would prove to be a problem.
The town continued to purchase more land for expansion throughout 1951 and
granted the Chez Nous Ideal more acreage, providing it with sewers, roads, and
electricity.817 These land acquisitions became routine in Asbestos well into 1952, but JM
was removed from it, having further developed its “block caving” underground system at
the Jeffrey Mine that required little additional land. Each block was now 200 square feet,
had crushing plants 816 feet below ground, and loading facilities 950 feet down.818 JohnsManville was a leading international asbestos company at this time and new methods and
techniques introduced at the Jeffrey Mine were quickly adopted by other companies. The
industrialization of the land was massive and yet subtle, occurring throughout JM
property but deep enough that townspeople were not confronted by it as they were with
the open pit. This subtlety also prevented the community from seeing the progress of
extraction operations. Not seeing how the Jeffrey Mine was growing closer and closer to
community land meant that when JM needed to expand the pit, the people of Asbestos
would be unprepared.
By 1952 Canada supplied the world with 1,000,000 tonnes of asbestos each year,
70% of the global supply.819 The Jeffrey Mine remained the largest chrysotile mine in the
world and JM capitalized on this accomplishment by spending $14,000,000 on a new
mill. This would be the world’s largest, most modern asbestos mill, 14 storeys high and
75,000 square feet, or 3 football fields in size.820 These were all signs of progress in the
community and again contributed pride and confidence to the local cultural identity, as
the labour of Jeffrey Mine workers was responsible for this success. While it would only
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require 200 feet of new land for an entranceway, the mill would be built on JM property
and would be an imposing presence in the community, seen from every location. By 1953
the global market price for the mineral exceeded that of gold, making the land at Asbestos
even more valuable.821 By building a new mill, the company anticipated further profits
and put its idea of proper land use on display.
Although Jeffrey Mine workers were connected to the natural world in Asbestos
through their labour, and other community members through their everyday lives, JM also
possessed a close understanding of the land. When town council and the Chez Nous Ideal
attempted to build 100 homes on newly annexed land, JM warned against it, stating that
they had already considered building on the land, but it was an unstable mixture of sand
and gravel and there were several large, deep holes that the company had created while
determining if it had any value.822 The project was suspended on this advice and JM
proved itself to be an expert on land use in Asbestos. It also proved that through rapid
industrialization the land in the community was becoming scarred and valueless. The fact
that there were giant holes on land surrounding the town because of JM prospecting
efforts advances our understanding of land use in Asbestos: the land was to be used to the
advantage of industry, not community.
JM’s expertise and ideas of land use were seen in both local and global ways.
Locally, it allowed JM to dominate the land and the community, preventing townspeople
from becoming too independent from them. Globally, JM reaped the commercial benefits
of business and became known as the company in control of the Jeffrey Mine, 2,000 feet
wide and 405 feet deep in 1954, extracting between 4,000 and 6,000 tonnes each day.823
While 60% of the fibre at the Jeffrey Mine was taken from underground caves, heavy
investments continued to make the pit more factory-like. The giant trucks that hauled the
fibre out of the Jeffrey Mine via 15 foot high spiralling benches were now 22.5 tonne
diesels that made 22 trips to the surface during each of the three daily shifts, five days a
week.824 The land facilitated its own increased industrialization. In 1954, JM developed a
new form of blasting that used dynamite without wires so the Jeffrey Mine’s fibre would
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remain pure and clear from foreign materials. These technologies replaced employees
who gathered asbestos by hand at the bottom of the pit and those who picked through the
rock for blasting debris. The relationship the workers had with the land was changing.
Further industrialization of the land dramatically increased Quebec’s asbestos
production in 1954, which had reached 914,864 tonnes worth almost $80,000,000. These
numbers led the Canadian Mining Journal to state that the technological advancements
that allowed for the Jeffrey Mine to provide 1/3rd of the world’s supply of the fibre in
1954 would “ensure asbestos mining as a principal industry in Quebec for at least another
century.”825 Wealth and stability came from the land at Asbestos and it seemed
unfathomable that something could prevent this future success. Believing in the continued
prosperity of land and community, everyone in town tried to capitalize on it.
There were almost 10,000 people living in Asbestos in 1955 and anticipating a
further population growth because of the prosperity of the Jeffrey Mine, town council
bought massive quantities of land from Shipton Township on which to expand.826 Council
paid for this expansion in part from the $900,000 in fees collected from construction
permits, a portion of which came from JM to build 61 company houses and 78 garages.827
Even though the Chez Nous Ideal was working towards local home ownership, JohnsManville continued to encourage its employees to rent more affordable housing from it,
ensuring JM would have the power to move them when the Jeffrey Mine needed to be
expanded. The company also built 70-foot long tunnels that ran underneath the
community in order to transport the large trucks full of fibre without disrupting traffic.
This was a way for JM to alter the land outside the limits of its property at the Jeffrey
Mine while being considerate of community comfort.
The Chez Nous Ideal remained active in the years following the strike, and
constructed 124 homes during 1956, which made it, not JM, the largest provider of
housing in Asbestos.828 While these were signs of prosperity, the editor of the local paper
was worried. Knowing the wealth of Asbestos came from the land, J. Osias Poirier
questioned the longevity of these developments because of the ever-expanding nature of
the Jeffrey Mine. New homes were good, but not if they would be torn down in order for
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the mine to grow, and Poirier suggested that one day the pit would be so large that the
people of Asbestos would have to live in Danville.829 Homes built by the Chez Nous Ideal
were signs that community land was meant for the community, not the industry, but
although JM had not greatly expanded the mine in many years, Poirier’s concern suggests
that JM’s idea land use in Asbestos would overpower that of townspeople. If what the
Canadian Mining Journal claimed was true, and the industry would boom for the next
hundred years, homeowners would be constantly forced to sacrifice their land to the
Jeffrey Mine until they no longer lived in Asbestos. In fact, Asbestos would cease to exist
as a community.
JM was unconcerned with community disruption or dissolution as long as it
continued to profit in Asbestos. Termed the “giant of the industry” because the Jeffrey
Mine provided 60% of the country’s exported fibre,830 the late 1950s were years of
record-breaking profits for JM, which made more than $100,000,000 in 1957.831 Because
of this, the company decided to close down its difficult underground operations in
Asbestos and focus solely on the Jeffrey Mine. Officials saw this as a good business
strategy because the open pit could be industrialized much more easily than underground
mines and new technology could be applied that required less manpower. The reason the
company began to mine underground in the 1940s was to minimize the expansion of the
pit into the town, which had angered residents, but soaring profits and changed companycommunity dynamics meant that comfort was no longer a main concern for officials. JM
presented plans to expand the Jeffrey Mine to town council in January 1958.832
The expansion would be gradual, but massive. One of the problems with the
subtle nature of mining asbestos underground was that when open cast methods were
reintroduced, extraction had to begin beyond the unseen limits of the block caves, which
meant that a good portion of “buffer land” between the pit and community was actually
barren and would immediately be destroyed. The company would give the town some of
its own unused land further away from the pit in exchange, but another problem with this
expansion was that one of the roads it would partially destroy was rue St-Aimé. This was
a central road and the location of the church so important during the 1949 strike. Council
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agreed to the extension because JM “donne de l’emploi à un grand nombre de résidants
d’Asbestos,” and the development of the mine was good for the community.833 The
company appreciated this compliance, but made it clear that they were enlarging the
Jeffrey Mine for the benefit of JM, not the town, by cautioning council against purchasing
any more new land, stating that they had no intention of hiring more workers in the
future.834 The church was destroyed in 1967 and the land quickly became part of the
Jeffrey Mine.
The fact that the company did not intend to hire more workers during the
expansion of the Jeffrey Mine was a dramatic break in the pattern previously seen in
town-community relations and showed that the land in Asbestos was to be used for
mining purposes, not for community development. The town would grow only if the
company decided it should and technological advancements in the Jeffrey Mine gave JM
the ability to increase production without increasing its workforce. To illustrate this point
the company laid off 80 of its underground miners in July 1958 and 40 more in April
1959.835 To lay off 120 of its workers during a time of unprecedented profits and demand
was a sign that JM was becoming less involved in the community in the years following
the strike, as the land and the local connection to it in Asbestos rapidly changed.
The townspeople were worried. Lost jobs, annexations, and the increased use of
new technology in the Jeffrey Mine challenged the connection the local population had to
the land and shook their confident local cultural identity. In an attempt to regain some
control over land use, townspeople voted against a proposed annexation of more land
from Shipton Township in a community-wide referendum and waited to see how JM
would alter the land next.836 The changes made by JM to the land in Asbestos were quick
and dramatic. The Jeffrey Mine soon began to eat away at rue Notre Dame, which
required the relocation of a number of families and businesses on both it and rue
Bourbeau.837 The first stage of expansion would soon affect all those living on rue
Laurier, Panneton, Lafrance, St-Jacques, St-Dominique, St-Aimé, Legendre, St-George,
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and Amyot.838 While JM would provide the infrastructure for the roads that would have to
be constructed to accommodate these displaced families, it was clear that while its local
power had diminished in the years following the strike, the economic success and
determination of the company ensured that JM dominated land use in Asbestos and there
was nothing townspeople could do to stop it.
“Asbestos doit produire plus d’amiante,” 1960-1971
By 1960, the Quebec asbestos industry was worth more than $100 million
annually as global demand continued to increase. JM cleared 12 million cubic yards of
useless overburden from the land in order to achieve the company’s goal of extracting a
massive 30,000 tonnes of fibre and 12,000 tonnes of waste each day from the Jeffrey
Mine.839 The expansion was not only in response to increased global markets for the raw
mineral. JM was experimenting with adding the fibre to asphalt to increase the durability
of roads, and anticipating that the new product would create another boom in the industry,
the company added more shifts at the Jeffrey Mine. These developments inspired the
local newspaper to declare, “Asbestos doit produire plus d’amiante,”840 and town council
asked JM if it would pave the Asbestos-Danville Road with the new asphalt as the
community grew to 10,709 people with the addition of new shifts at the pit.841 The
Quebec government also asked JM for enough asbestos asphalt to pave the roads and
highways of the province.842 The reach of the Jeffrey Mine was growing as new
applications increased market demand for its mineral and made the industry in Quebec
worth over $130 million in 1961.843
Although they knew the mine had to expand for the continued prosperity of the
community, people resented the company demolishing the town. The major problem the
local population had with JM’s expansion was that it destroyed the religious and
commercial centres of the community. Asbestos had already sacrificed the original core
of the town, which included both a church and a commercial district, during the
expansions in the 1930s, and they were reluctant to do so again. Home and business
owners refused to sell their property and a standoff began between company and
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community over how land in Asbestos was to be used. The townspeople revealed their
confident local identity with this standoff, as well as their belief that land use in Asbestos
could be balanced much like their daily lives: between liveable and workable space.
Because 1964 saw record profits for JM yet again, however, and the industry was vitally
important to the province’s economy, the company appealed to the Quebec government
and despite his government’s Maîtres chez nous slogan, Minister of Natural Resources
René Lévesque declared that he would pass a bill of expropriation mandating the
expansion of the Jeffrey Mine if the town agreed to it.844
Lévesque’s decision gave some control back to the people of Asbestos, but his
support of JM revealed that the government also believed the industry was more
important than the community. Business owners on rue Bourbeau wanted assurances from
JM that their profits would not be affected by the expansion and other citizens worried
that the growth of the mine would create massive amounts of “mort-terrains.” The land
that was so closely connected to the people in Asbestos could not be allowed to suffer an
industrial death. Le Citoyen, the local newspaper had a different opinion, however, and it
stressed that if JM was not allowed to expand when and where it needed to, the company
would leave and Asbestos would become a “ville fantôme.”845 Townspeople had the
choice between living on dead land or in a ghost town.
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Because their livelihoods depended on JM’s continued use of the land,
townspeople allowed the expansion to proceed, and the company purchased St-Aimé
from the community for $1.2 million in February 1964 to ease local resentment.847 JM
also provided land for two new churches to be built, one of which would be named StAimé, to maintain as much continuity as possible. The local newspaper paid tribute to the
church when the sale was announced and stated that Asbestos had witnessed so much
destruction over the past years so that the pit could grow and the people could prosper.
The loss of the church was simply another addition to the history of the community.848
Although the townspeople seemed ready to give up their religious foundation and the bad
memories of provincial police invading their place of worship in 1949, the business
owners on rue Bourbeau were less compliant.
The merchants of Asbestos did not want their businesses sacrificed to the Jeffrey
Mine. Many believed that the town would do better if the bill failed, and the business
owners of Asbestos went to Quebec City to protest it.849 Their appeals were considered,
but the Quebec government knew that the land in Asbestos could only maintain its value
if it was used for mineral extraction. Although the town was beginning to be seen as the
“bouge au Québec”850 because of its landscape, this was a hellhole that was too important
to the financial gains of the province to prevent JM from expanding the Jeffrey Mine. Bill
192 authorizing the expropriation was passed in June 1964.
JM had more authority over land use than local business owners in Asbestos did,
but the government stated that the company had to wait three years before it began its
expansion plan and it was to use this time to negotiate fair land sales.851 While this
sounded reasonable, especially after the town gave up St-Aimé, Asbestos residents who
owned their homes because of the Chez Nous Ideal refused to sell their property and JM
had to appeal to council to forcibly buy the land and sell it to the company.852 Both
council and the local newspaper supported JM and the editor of Le Citoyen urged people
to think of the gains that would come from the expansion, not the losses. Asbestos was
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founded on a tradition of building and rebuilding to accommodate the needs of the Jeffrey
Mine, and because of this, it had become “[u]ne ville qui se deplace.”853
Although the global demand for the mineral doubled between 1955 and 1965 and
the industry was worth over $148 million to the province, the townspeople were
dissatisfied with JM treating the community as though it was of little importance
compared to the Jeffrey Mine.854 Giant rocks were blasted out of the pit and into the
homes of the people living in the west end of the town in April and May 1965.855 The
company stated that it had invited the people living in at-risk areas to leave their homes
when dynamite was being set off and it was not JM’s fault if they refused.856 This was an
effective, although unintentional, way to get the people of Asbestos to sell their property
to JM, but it was ineffective in making the community content with the company. It also
distanced the people from the land, with the Jeffrey Mine becoming a dangerous and
invasive presence in the community, rather than their main source of pride and cultural
identity.
By 1967, after having 54% of town land consumed by mine expansion and 250
buildings destroyed, Asbestos was without a central district and its people had to adapt to
a new sense of place and community.857 Because of technological advancements, the
workforce at the mine had only grown by 200 since 1949, even though operations had
increased exponentially. The town did not look upon this favourably, but JM saw cutting
labour costs while increasing profits as a real indication of success. The Canadian Mining
Journal dedicated an article in 1967 to “The Free World’s Largest Asbestos Producer,”
contrasting it with Russia’s growing production because JM had turned the community
into an “industrial complex” producing over 600,000 tonnes of the mineral annually.858
The article praised the technological advancements JM had introduced, and attributed the
industrialization of the pit to a combination of the rising cost of labour, the increasing size
of haulage equipment, and the nature of the land, which demanded greater extraction rates

853

“a town that is on the move” Le Citoyen, 19 December 1964, p. 4.
Canadian Mining Journal, February 1965, p. 129.
855
Antonio Hamel to Bérubé, Government of Quebec, 10 October 1979, BANQ, E78 S999, 7 A 009 03-06-004B-01;
1993-06-004\12.
856
Ibid.
857
Ross, “Encroachment of the Jeffrey Mine on the Town of Asbestos, Quebec,” p. 534.
858
Canadian Mining Journal, May 1967, p. 45.
854

199
because the quality of the mineral was decreasing.859 What the Canadian Mining Journal
failed to mention, however, was the local response to becoming an industrial complex.
The people of Asbestos remained proud of their local connection to the global industry,
but they also valued community and JM had drastically reorganized the town to
accommodate its industrial commitment to how land and labour should be used.
Rather than consider community needs and opinions, the journal stated that the
future of Asbestos depended on further industrialization of the Jeffrey Mine, and trucks
that could carry 100 tonnes of fibre from the bottom of the pit were soon introduced.
Despite this industrialization, and despite the danger of huge rocks blasting through the
community, the people of Asbestos managed to maintain their connection to the land.
This connection was illustrated during the 1967 St-Jean Baptiste Day parade in Asbestos
when the community cheered for a float with a sign that read, “Amiante: Notre
Patrimoine.”860 The float demonstrated that the people of Asbestos believed that the
mineral, and therefore the land, was their cultural heritage. While JM looked at the land

The float made by Jeffrey Mine workers, 1967861

for profit, the townspeople looked at it for pride and identity. While they did not want to
sell their homes, they continuously lobbied town council to introduce more asbestos
products into the infrastructure of the community, including the new city hall and new
roads.862 Furthermore, they were proud that their land was used in the construction of
Montreal’s Expo ’67 buildings and was featured in the 4,000 square foot plaza sponsored
by the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association at the exhibition.863
JM came to the community for business, but the workers at the Jeffrey Mine went
there to live. When business got in the way of life, the people confidently and strongly
objected, believing there could be a balance between the two. They did not do this prior to
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the strike, however, and their new reluctance to sacrifice the community to the mine
reveals a change in how they believed land should be used in Asbestos. In April 1968, the
effects of the Jeffrey Mine’s expansion on the community became unbearable and led to
the belief that “[n]ous en avons soupé de la poussière et du bruit.”864 Living in Asbestos
had become like living in a soup of noise and dust that no longer resembled the
community people were so attached to: the town was quickly becoming an inappropriate
place for families to live as the new machinery used in the Jeffrey Mine’s expansion
produced more dust than had previously been seen in the community. Citizens went to
council to urge them either to reroute JM’s expansion plans so they would not come so
close to local neighbourhoods, or establish a 1,000-foot buffer zone between the pit and
the town. The new technology JM introduced to the Jeffrey Mine was louder, noisier,
smokier, and more disruptive to the land than any other previous extraction method the
community had experienced before and they believed that “la vie normale est intenable
dans les conditions actuelles.”865 For townspeople to find life in Asbestos unbearable
because of the Jeffrey Mine is a remarkable change in how they related to the pit for
much of their history, and has much to do with increased industrialization distancing the
people from the land.
The 1,000-foot buffer zone between the Jeffrey Mine and the community was
established in September 1968, while JM destroyed more roads and houses, and gave
$20,000 to town council to help with urban development.866 This buffer was reinforced in
July 1969 when a 200 foot long wall was constructed between boulevard St-Luc and the
Jeffrey Mine.867 The wall marked a drastic change in the relationship between the people
of Asbestos and the land. Once a place without a fence and where children would play on
weekends, the Jeffrey Mine had become closed off to the community at the request of the
people. The visible removal of the pit was a way for townspeople to have some control
over land and identity in Asbestos.
In September 1969, the Government of Quebec ruled that the people of Asbestos
had to agree to the relocation of boulevard St-Luc before it became official.868 That the
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company was not granted automatic permission to use the land as it saw fit is remarkable,
especially because its management of the Jeffrey Mine was largely responsible for the
industry being worth $196.8 million in 1969 and the unobstructed expansion of the pit
was supposed to raise local production levels to 100,000 tonnes of fibre a year.869 The
needs of the people of Asbestos were recognized as being just as significant as those of
the company and this validated the community’s cultural identity, which was confident in
knowing the important local role it played in the profitable global industry. Although the
town extended almost all of its roads in 1970 in preparation for the Jeffrey Mine
destroying parts of current neighbourhoods, because of this ruling JM turned its attention
to the massive piles of pit tailings that had been part of the landscape since before the
1930s.870 Advanced technology at the Jeffrey Mine was now able to sift through the waste
gathered before 1930 and extract the smaller asbestic fibres that were overlooked in the
past. This mirrored the efforts Feodor Boas made after Jeffrey and Webb sold the mine
and discovered the value of the land at Asbestos, which contained very little waste rock.
Focusing on the tailings would also slow down expansion plans and hopefully improve
company-community relations. JM needed to stop expanding the mine temporarily
because the town could not keep up and there were not enough new homes for displaced
citizens to move to once the company took their land.
Housing was a major issue in Asbestos at the start of the 1970s because while the
town’s population was not significantly growing, residents who were being forced to
move because of the expanding Jeffrey Mine had nowhere to go. Both the Chez Nous
Ideal and the company had stopped purchasing new land and building houses because the
increased industrialization of the pit had capped employment numbers. When JM told the
Quebec government that the 1971 housing shortage was not the company’s fault,
however, town council lashed out and called company officials Pontius Pilates, showing
just how severely land use issues had altered community relations.871 Many families lived
in dangerous proximity to the Jeffrey Mine without any alternative place to go, but the
company believed this was not its concern. JM was turning its back on Asbestos, as new
technology made its human workforce less and less fundamental to industrial success, and
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as officials began to understand that because of the negative health effects of the mineral,
the future of the community—and that of the industry—was limited. Although it was still
a single industry and single company town, JM began to focus solely on the land as it let
go of its past responsibilities in Asbestos.
Replacing the local Chez Nous Ideal, the provincially-run Société d’Habitation du
Québec united with town council in 1971 to construct 151 new houses in Asbestos that
JM promised would be safe from the expanding Jeffrey Mine for at least 50 years.872 The
fact that the Chez Nous Ideal had disappeared in favour of government control is
significant. While the need for new housing had diminished in previous years, when it
suddenly became an issue in the 1970s, the townspeople and the province changed with
the establishment of government organizations concerned with social issues and needs.
The political landscape of Quebec had transformed since the Duplessis years, and as seen
with the case of housing in Asbestos, so had the people. The new homes built by the
Société d’Habitation du Québec would be for families displaced by the growing pit as
well as those living in the petit Nicolet sector of town because the expansion cut them off
from all amenities.873 The housing crisis showed the growing authority of the
townspeople and the province in deciding how to balance land and people in Asbestos.
Change in Command, Change in Direction, 1972-1983
The new authority the townspeople had in Asbestos became more apparent as the
1970s progressed. Signs of local confidence grew and differed from the protests of the
first major expropriation in the 1930s because it involved the entire community, not
simply the merchants. One-third of fibre production at the Jeffrey Mine was now from
pre-1930s tailings, but JM wanted to increase the amount of asbestos it extracted.
Although the industry was worth over $210 million in 1972 and the Jeffrey Mine
produced 30,000 tonnes of fibre annually, well ahead of its closest competitor near
Thetford producing around 12,000 tonnes, the company wanted to raise its yearly tonnage
to an astonishing 700,000 by 1975.874 The desired tonnage was outrageous because it
would flood the market with a mineral the western world was beginning to reject due to
an increased awareness of its negative health effects. Publicity surrounding the health
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risks of asbestos meant that the Jeffrey Mine had a limited future, and JM extracted as
much mineral as it could before the industry collapsed. Increasing production to this
extent would require the Jeffrey Mine to be rapidly and exponentially expanded to the
point where the town of Asbestos would be completely overtaken by the growing pit and
the historical balance between liveable land and workable land would be destroyed.
The people of Asbestos refused to allow JM to follow through with its plans. By
1975, yearly extraction levels at the Jeffrey Mine had risen to only 35,000 tonnes and the
townspeople continued to resist the company’s development plans. The local newspaper
became critical of JM and termed the pit a “mauvaise mine” while reporting on the forced
evacuations of citizens from their homes, which were falling into the pit.875 This was not
difficult, as the company was always forthcoming with its intentions for community land.
Sections of boulevard St-Luc were soon closed for safety reasons and JM announced that
160 people had to move in order for the pit to incorporate part of the road, despite the
paper asking, “Mais, pour aller où?”876 The local cultural identity in Asbestos was rooted
in a fine balance between people and land, and the community would not compromise
this coexistence to satisfy the ambitions of JM. All 160 people refused to move.
By this point, the community was aware it would not share in the profits increased
extraction would bring the company. Due to technological advancements and a
diminished global market, JM laid off 154 of its workers in 1975.877 Although
townspeople rallied behind the expansion of the Jeffrey Mine in the 1930s with the hope
of getting out of economic depression, JM’s plans of the 1970s had a completely different
feel and purpose. The industry continued to be worth millions of dollars, but as global
opinion of asbestos changed with an increased awareness of the health risks associated
with it, the Jeffrey Mine’s importance changed as well.
The rapid expansion of the pit and the refusal of families on boulevard St-Luc to
move their homes led to more accidents caused by rocks flying into the community
during blasting.878 The mine itself was also being adversely affected because of its rapid
development. Landslides occurred throughout 1975 that destroyed large portions of the
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pit’s southeast spiral benches.879 In response, town council launched a claim against JM
forcing the company to restrict its expansion plans to protect the community.880
The town of Asbestos had become increasingly dangerous as rocks continued to
fly through neighbourhoods at all hours. In 1976, projectiles from the Jeffrey Mine
crashed into one of the few remaining stores on rue Bourbeau and hit the son of the
owner. Months later, a flying rock went through the roof of M. Hyppolyte’s home on rue
St-Barnabé and landed in his baby’s empty bassinette.881 The provincial government
ordered JM to be more careful with blasting in the pit, but the company instead decided to
invest $77 million dollars in a new factory and new equipment that would decrease a
reliance on manpower and increase production levels by enabling more blasting each
day.882 Nothing would get in JM’s way, especially the community, as the company
frantically extracted as much fibre as it could while the industry was still viable.
The townspeople had radically different views than JM on how the land in
Asbestos should be used. The community believed that both it and the Jeffrey Mine
needed to coexist in a relationship balanced between progress and stability. This balance
was the identity and heritage they would defend against JM’s notions of success. In 1977,
council articulated this belief when it described flying rocks as “actes de vandalisme” and
complained of rising “rafales de poussière” that were so thick that “la situation présente
est inacceptable et intolérable pour les résidents de la Ville.”883 The town was not against
progress and even purchased more land on which to expand in June 1977, but it was
becoming increasingly frustrated with the way JM treated the people of Asbestos as
though they were of little importance. Thick clouds of toxic dust, flying rocks, and the
constant noise of new machines had transformed the community into an industrial horror.
This was not how land and people were supposed to interact in Asbestos.
As a corporation with shareholders to answer to, JM was principally concerned
with getting as much fibre out of the Jeffrey Mine as quickly as possible, and the
company was able to spin the damage it was doing to Asbestos and turn it into something
positive. A 1977 Canadian Mining Journal article on the Jeffrey Mine highlighted the
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fact that in the next three years, JM “will have purchased 40 multifamily buildings, 93
duplexes, 49 houses and 41 commercial buildings. Another 29 houses, a hotel, company
office building and some vacant lots owned by the company will also disappear.”884 The
article excused these actions when it stated that “Asbestos is after all, a fairly old town
and…[this is] a form of forced urban renewal that has so far been to the benefit of
Asbestos, turning it into a pretty well-planned town that boasts the latest and best in
community facilities.”885 The article misunderstood Asbestos. The historical pattern of
Jeffrey Mine expansion and community relocation meant that new buildings and town
infrastructure were constantly constructed.
These changes may have brought Asbestos new facilities, but the fact that they
were forced suggests that it went against what the community wanted. The Jeffrey Mine
had grown to 6,500 feet east to west, 6,000 feet north to south, and 1,000 feet deep, and
its immense size was making life in the community difficult. No longer caring much for
community-company relations if it got in the way of production, JM continued to
industrialize the land and the people who worked it. By introducing the “hot shift
change,” the company ensured the Jeffrey Mine would be constantly worked, with one
shift ending only when the men starting the next shift were dropped off at the bottom of
the pit by a small truck that would then deliver those done for the day to the top of the
mine, avoiding the usual brief stop in production between crews.886 JM also planned to
introduce “autonomous working crews” that would be stationed in “mini mines” all
around the pit. These crews would only work with each other and would not have contact
with other Jeffrey Mine employees, which seriously affected workplace camaraderie.
Technological and organizational changes to the land in Asbestos in the late 1970s
brought JM their largest profits in company history, but also required fewer men; 60
employees were laid off in 1977.887 This pattern of increased profits and layoffs was
common in industry during the second half of the 20th century, but to add to the problems
arising in Asbestos, in January 1978, three large rocks were blasted into the town. One
crashed into the home of Adrien Sirois on rue St-Jacques, another, weighing 23 pounds
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broke through the exterior wall of Yvette Boucher’s house on rue Notre-Dame, 1,800 feet
away from the pit, and the final rock destroyed the kitchen of another citizen.888
The residents reported JM to the police and the Quebec government. In their eyes,
this was not business nor resource development, it was assault and vandalism, and the
people of Asbestos asked the company to establish set blasting times so they could
evacuate their homes for fear of further damage or injury.889 Although not intentional,
these accidents allowed the company to successfully expropriate the homes closest to the
Jeffrey Mine even though the owners did not want to sell. Marie Fortin-Drouin was
informed in September 1979 that her house on boulevard St-Luc was no longer safe.890
Although she got an injunction against the expropriation, Fortin-Drouin was forced to
vacate her home with JM employees helping her move furniture. A week following the
expropriation of Fortin-Drouin’s house, a rock blasted through the roof of the Desrochers
funeral home and destroyed a ceramic figure of a praying Jesus. Cars and windows along
boulevard St-Luc and rue Roi were also damaged.891
These accidents allowed JM to expropriate the houses and businesses located near
the Jeffrey Mine and relocate boulevard St-Luc in May 1980,892 but the people of
Asbestos were becoming increasingly resentful of how the company treated their land and
community. Townspeople maintained their rigid position against further expropriations
and sought new ways to gain control of the land in Asbestos as council enforced
restrictions on the company when it agreed to the expropriations for safety reasons. In
September 1980 council agreed to the relocation of boulevard St-Luc, rue St-Dominique,
and rue Laurier, but told JM that the current plans could not be altered in any way, that
officials would have to negotiate with every property owner individually for the sale of
the land, and that the company would have to pave the newly relocated roads at their own
expense.893 The community was finally taking control.
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Because the slow collapse of the global market for the mineral sped up during the
early 1980s due to increased awareness of asbestos-related disease,894 JM was losing its
authority in the town, in the province, and in the industry. The people of Asbestos showed
this loss of authority when council heard from citizens concerned with how the
development of the Jeffrey Mine affected their lives in January 1981. Frustrated with the
constant noise and dust emerging from the pit, they asked, “[e]xiste-t-il une loi
provinciale ou municipale fixant une limite entre un cratère d’explotation et une
résidence?”895 Although this appeared to be a simple request for a new buffer zone
between the pit and the community, the language used is telling. It was only as the 1980s
began that the people of Asbestos started to look at the Jeffrey Mine as a “crater:”
something that happened to their land, not something they did to it. The people of
Asbestos had always lived in close proximity to the Jeffrey Mine, but this relationship
changed during the 1970s and 1980s because of new technology that decreased the
interaction between workers and the pit, turning the land into something mechanical and
foreign. The people wanted the reestablishment of the balance between mine expansion
and town expansion that this new technology had destroyed.
JM had not lost all its power with the provincial government, however, and when
council asked for a minimum buffer zone of 150 feet separating the edges of the Jeffrey
Mine and the community, the Minister of Natural Resources replied that doing so was
unthinkable.896 This sharply contrasted the accommodating process of establishing a
1,000-foot buffer zone in Asbestos in 1968, which had disappeared by 1981: keeping the
industry afloat had become more important than maintaining the community. The
economic strength of the industry was weakening, but JM continued to be a financial
powerhouse in the eyes of the government and it would not restrict its development. The
company continued to purchase individual plots of land along rue Noel, St-Jean-Baptiste,
Chassé, St-Edmond, St-Hubert, and du Roi, and yet JM announced that it would reduce
its workforce from 2,200 to 1,500 people.897 The global industry continued to collapse
and the machines the company used in the Jeffrey Mine required fewer employees.
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Not only did the people of Asbestos have nowhere to live because the Jeffrey
Mine was expanding faster than new homes could be built, they also had nowhere to work
as machines replaced them. Town council acknowledged this new reality in June 1982
when it discussed a plan for the Société d’Habitation du Québec to build 10 new houses
to accommodate citizens displaced by the Jeffrey Mine. Council refused this opportunity
because “suite aux mises à pied à la Johns-Manville Canada Inc., il y a eu une baisse dans
la population...et l’exode de la population d’Asbestos vers d’autres villes a libéré
plusieurs logements.”898 People were leaving the community because the industry was
collapsing and the land was turning toxic. The proud local identity was seriously
threatened by the international downturn of the industry and many had given up.
Asbestos had suffered through economic collapse and depopulation in the past,
when William H. Jeffrey declared bankruptcy in 1892 and JM closing the mine during the
Great Depression. But the 1980s were different. Townspeople were not ignorant of the
negative light in which the mineral the community was named for was now seen
throughout the world; they knew the industry was suffering. Local fears were confirmed
when JM filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States in August 1982.
International markets had been shying away from the mineral because of the increased
knowledge of its potential health risks since the early 1970s, and the industry was no
longer profitable. Although the local newspaper claimed that without JM, Asbestos would
collapse,899 the people of the town refused to believe this because of their faith in the land
and their fears of what would become of the community if the mine failed.
Although JM’s future was unstable, it continued to purchase land to expand the
Jeffrey Mine. Daily extraction levels remained at 30,000 tonnes of fibre, but global prices
and demand for the mineral had dropped 26% in the past year and a change in this trend
did not seem possible.900 Suspecting abandonment was coming, town council demanded
an immediate billing system for sales in 1983 so the people of Asbestos would not lose
their land without compensation if JM left.901 It was time for the community to take
control of its land and its future. Insisting on immediate financial compensation was one
way people did this, but the town also participated in the creation of the Municipalité
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Régionale de Comté du Québec (MRC) de l’Or Blanc,902 a new name for the region of
l’Estrie of which Asbestos was a part.903
Renaming the town’s geographical region “white gold” at the height of the global
rejection of the mineral was a defiant act by the people of Asbestos and the provincial
government. It shows just how willing they were to stand behind the mineral despite
international opinion turning strongly against it. Townspeople balanced their memories of
profitable glory days with their fears for the future. They refused to accept that the land
was dangerous and became determined to continue working the Jeffrey Mine because it
was their proud heritage and their hopeful future. Council approved $45,000 to create the
Musée Minéralogique in Asbestos, which featured samples of the fibre that came from the
Jeffrey Mine in its raw, milled, and manufactured forms.904 Establishing the MRC d’Or
Blanc and the new museum put the town into deficit, but these expenses were justified
because they were to celebrate the land that was back under their control.905
Local control was made official at the end of 1983 when JM sold its property in
Asbestos for $117 million to 12 former company officials who felt that they could
manage the land, the community, and the industry better than the massive corporation,
even though market demand for the mineral continued to decline rapidly.906 The negative
feelings townspeople had towards the Jeffrey Mine during JM’s recent expansion of it
disappeared when the company left the community and locals had more control over
issues of land use. Profits were down, but the mine was still producing 30,000 tonnes of
fibre a day and the people of Asbestos had faith in their ability to work with the land to
obtain a steady future.
The community demonstrated this optimism at the end of 1983 when it declared
that 1984 would be the “Année de l’Amiante.” Town council justified this when it stated
that it was because of “les décisions arbitraires de l’EPA concernant les produits de
l’amiante…[et] les effets néfastes de cette décision; [et] l’importance que revêt ce marché
de l’amiante pour le Canada, le Québec et notre région; [et] que des milliers de
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travailleurs vivent de cette richesse naturelle.”907 The people of Asbestos decided that it
was their duty to defend the mineral and the land from the attacks the American
Environmental Protection Agency had been launching against the fibre due to its harmful
health effects; the townspeople felt that this negative publicity was what was causing the
industry, and their community, so much damage.
The community was able to overlook the health threats and the industry’s lack of
future in 1983 for the same reason it continues to do so today: a psychological and
physical attachment to the land and the industry that defines it. In a federal-provincial
study on Canadian mining towns in decline during the 1980s, researchers concluded that
locals developed an emotional attachment to these communities and with this, “comes a
sense of spirit and purpose, and commitment to a place…[M]ajor layoffs or a closure may
have a more severe impact than where such spirit is lacking. Another psychological factor
is the uncertainty of being dependent on one major employer, and the probable lack of
alternatives for employment in the immediate vicinity.”908 The people in Asbestos dealt
with the collapse of their industry in ways that showed how deeply they were attached to
the mine. Although money was a factor, this was more than a simple desire for a
paycheque: this was a deep sense of home and tradition rooted in the community’s
cultural identity, which connected them to the Jeffrey Mine through the work they did and
the lives they led. It was founded in the late 19th century when the mine was first carved
out of the land, and for over a hundred years, it has permeated the cultural identity of the
people who chose to live and work in Asbestos. This can further be seen in the ways the
community knowingly put their bodies, and the bodies of their children, at risk, which
will be examined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7: Useful Tools: Human Bodies, 1949-1983
In April 1997, four men from Asbestos ran in the Paris marathon wearing t-shirts
that read, “on peut vivre en vainqueur.” Eudore Lemay, Michel Champagne, Pierre
Laliberté, and Guy Guerette ran to prove to the world that the mineral was not dangerous
and should not be banned from global markets. France had come out against the fibre and
their run was an attempt by the people of Asbestos to enter the political debate on the
issue. Champagne stated that “[m]y house is 800 metres from the mine and I am in great
shape….We want to prove to France that we live here and are not affected by disease.”909
When the men held a press conference at the Eiffel Tower, however, only four journalists
showed up: three from Quebec and one from a French scientific journal.910
While the men did not change international opinion on the mineral, Prime
Minister Jean Chrétien applauded their efforts at the time and responded positively when
busloads from Asbestos and Thetford Mines arrived in Ottawa in September 2003 to
demand Parliament continue financially and publicly supporting the industry. The
government agreed and has not withdrawn this support despite a provincial study released
in 2004 that stated rates of mesothelioma, a particularly deadly asbestos-caused cancer,
had increased in Quebec since 1982.911
This chapter will examine the health issues of Asbestos from the1949 strike to
when JM left the community in 1983. During this period, as in Paris in 1997, the workers
at the Jeffrey Mine used their own bodies as increasingly important tools to combat
overwhelming medical evidence that proved asbestos was dangerous. As long as the
people of Asbestos were healthy, the mineral—and the industry—was safe. The health of
the people of Asbestos has not been examined by historians, aside from brief mentions of
the issue being a complaint during the 1949 strike. By using a combination of medical
literature and confidential JM documents, this study will advance our understanding of
why the industry remains sacred to the province even today.
In Danger, Death and Disaster in the Crowsnest Pass Mines, 1902-1928, historian
Karen Buckley writes that miners develop a cultural identity founded on the acceptance
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of risk and danger.912 This chapter will trace how this cultural identity and acceptance of
risk was also present in Asbestos, growing militant in the years following the 1949 strike.
JM helped begin this tradition by having company-paid medical professionals like Dr.
R.H. Stevenson and Dr. Kenneth Smith falsely inform Jeffrey Mine workers that they
were healthy during annual medical checkups and union-supervised contract negotiations.
The company also promoted the idea that the mineral was synonymous with safety and
that the community was supplying health to the world. Furthermore, JM sent the medical
reports it approved for public distribution—those that showed that Jeffrey Mine workers
were healthy—to both the provincial and federal governments,913 strategically building a
defence before any other party was alerted to a problem. When JM began to pull away
from the health debate because of overwhelming evidence that showed asbestos was
dangerous, however, Jeffrey Mine workers took over and used the methods they learned
from the company to prove they were healthy.
From 1949 to 1983 there was a steady role reversal in Asbestos, with the local
community taking the lead role from JM in defending the mineral’s safety by using their
own bodies to prove the fibre was safe, even when they knew it was not. The people of
Asbestos were not ignorant of what was happening to their bodies and it was not an easy
decision to sacrifice their health for their livelihood. This chapter will show how the
community’s acceptance of risk prior to 1949 discussed in Chapter 3, became even more
ingrained into the local cultural identity of Asbestos after the strike, as the industry
collapsed and the land they worked was revealed to be toxic.
“Another Storm is Brewing in Quebec,” 1949-1955
A firm understanding of what the mineral does to the human body was one of the
major reasons the workers in Asbestos went on strike in February 1949. They understood
Bruno LeDoux’s frightening exposé on asbestosis and because of it, they knew better than
to trust JM doctors, who were instructed to deny occurrences of disease in local workers.
In agreeing to end the strike and return to work without any clear changes in dust
elimination at the Jeffrey Mine, however, the workers showed a renewed acceptance of
risk that remains in the community today. The people of Asbestos have never complained
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about the negative health effects of the mineral since 1949, making risk a fundamental
element of their local cultural identity.
Not being able to predict the local acceptance of risk, the company was worried
about the health of its employees at the Jeffrey Mine. As the strike of 1949 ended,
company Vice President Vandiver Brown was warned by officials at the Gatke
Corporation, JM customers and manufacturers of asbestos-containing insulation, that
“unless [asbestos producers] do something about [the health effects of asbestos] these
little cases will breed like rabbits and they may grow as big as hares…”914 This was
particularly threatening to the company because the strike had brought international
attention to the hazards associated with the mineral. Arbitration meetings continued
throughout the second half of 1949 to settle the dispute and come to a resolution on the
dust-elimination demands made by the workers. A contract clause dealing with the
dangers of dust at the Jeffrey Mine would be disastrous for JM, which had always
maintained that dust was not a problem. In order to support this position, Dr. Kenneth
Smith was once again asked to study the bodies of the workers in Asbestos and prove
they were healthy.
Although he had sympathized with the plight of the men on strike just months
before, Smith did as he was instructed and protected JM by reporting falsified study
results that showed the mineral did not harm Jeffrey Mine workers. The actual results of
his study were top-secret and have never been examined in the historiography of
Asbestos. Of the 708 employee x-rays he studied in 1949, Smith found that 89% of them
had been in dusty areas for over 20 years and only 4 Jeffrey Mine workers had “normal”
lungs. Of the remaining 704, 468 were in the early stages of asbestosis and 7 had fullblown cases.915 Although JM knew its employees were getting sick, these were
shockingly high numbers, especially during contract negotiations to settle a labour dispute
that had focused on the issue of health. However, the union heads negotiating the terms of
the new collective agreement in Asbestos would never hear of this report.
Smith justified his policy of not informing the union or employees of their
illnesses, which were permanent and irreversible, when he stated, “[a]s long as the man is
not disabled it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so that he can live and
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work in peace and the Company can benefit by his many years of experience. Should the
man be told of his condition today there is a very definite possibility that he would
become mentally and physically ill, simply through the knowledge that he has
asbestosis.”916 Smith continued to believe that he was on the side of the workers, but his
statement also reveals that he thought the symptoms of asbestosis were so subtle, the
people suffering from them would not notice. Smith seriously underestimated what the
people of Asbestos knew about their own bodies as he helped protect JM from a scandal
that could ruin it. The Jeffrey Mine was the major source of the world’s supply of
asbestos and the industry would collapse if the mineral caused its workers to become sick:
the bodies of the people of Asbestos had to be viewed as healthy.
In order to ensure this, Smith suggested continuing to transfer employees to lessdusty areas of the Jeffrey Mine when their x-rays became alarming and “before there is
any possibility of a claim for compensation being submitted and accepted,” although the
cases were too numerous for everyone to be transferred.917 The workers would not be told
that they were being transferred because they were sick, but it is unlikely that they did not
link sudden job changes with their decreased ability to breathe. Smith’s medical authority
held weight in the community, despite his affiliation with JM, and workers accepted these
relocations as part of their interaction with the Jeffrey Mine. As he ordered employee
transfers, Smith urged the company to invest more money in better dust control because
he had noticed significant exposure in the community down-wind of the mine and mill,
showing that he understood that the entire town of Asbestos was at risk.
JM officials absorbed Smith’s report with their usual combination of worry for
their financial future and confidence in their ability to contain the situation. Company
attorney J.P. Woodard casually warned, “dust is causing significant lung changes in many
cases, it largely being a matter of time” before serious health effects occur,918 but C.M.
McGaw, an official at the Jeffrey Mine, was a little more concerned. In the middle of
contract negotiations he forwarded Smith’s report to JM’s head office and stated that it
“shows our tremendous potential liability on exposure. Hope you can help speed approval
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of the dust control appropriation.”919 Although JM President Lewis H. Brown claimed
during the strike that the $1 million already spent on dust-elimination technology at the
Jeffrey Mine was sufficient, Smith’s study frightened the company enough that it
approved an additional $5.5 million for better dust control. Woodard wrote to McGaw
that he hoped “this will make a real improvement in your working condition situation,
both within and without the plant,”920 which acknowledges how much dust had become a
community issue because of the strike: health reforms needed to be visible both at the
Jeffrey Mine and throughout the town of Asbestos.
Despite Woodard’s belief that the new funds for dust control would help ease
tension in the community following the strike, JM kept both Smith’s findings and the plan
for improved dust-elimination technology secret during contract negotiations. Admitting
there was a dust problem would prove that the company knew the mineral adversely
affected its workers, and union heads would use this to their fullest advantage. The
company’s reputation had suffered during the strike and would only worsen if
townspeople who did not work at the Jeffrey Mine knew they were getting sick due to
clouds of dust. JM instead relied on the testimony of Dr. John Vorwald during contract
negotiations, who had helped hide the stolen lungs of Asbestos workers earlier that year.
In the arbitration meetings of 1949 Vorwald downplayed the severity of asbestosis
and testified, “I would like to compare lungs with our two arms, two legs and our two
eyes. When one goes bad we can use the other one, and we have two lungs in case of
disease.”921 When pressed by union lawyers who suggested that this logic meant that if a
man without an arm was impaired, a man with asbestosis was as well, Vorwald replied,
“No, I don’t think so. He has an impairment of his lung tissue but he is not suffering from
it.” Vorwald’s nonchalant attitude is especially shocking considering he had just
instructed Smith to commission a confidential inquest into the link between asbestos and
cancer because of the presence of it in the stolen lungs from Asbestos at Saranac.922
Vorwald’s testimony helped convince the arbitration board to rule in favour of JM and
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better dust control was not made part of the new collective agreement in 1949, something
the workers would never have accepted at the beginning of the strike.
Health issues took up 10 of the 57 pages of the arbitration ruling, far more than
any other topic, and while JM had to publicly admit that asbestos was harmful, it was
granted full control over how it dealt with this fact both within the barriers of the Jeffrey
Mine and throughout the community of Asbestos.923 There was some debate over how
long a worker had to be exposed to the mineral’s dust before he or she began to show
signs of disease, and uncertainty was expressed over how much dust was too much.
Neither the company nor the union leaders were inclined to think asbestos could be mined
or processed without dust, and total elimination was never a consideration, which
reflected the local cultural identity in Asbestos, the community’s acceptance of risk, and a
widespread, longstanding societal belief that mining was dirty and no amount of reforms
would change that. The willingness to live and work surrounded by dust they knew to be
harmful indicates the extent to which the people of Asbestos had already decided to
sacrifice their bodies in favour of a continued tradition of working at the Jeffrey Mine.
As far as asbestosis was concerned, JM medical professionals convinced the
arbitration board that Smith’s policy of removing workers from dusty areas when their xrays showed signs of fibrosis was effective in stopping the progression of the disease,
while also allowing the bodies of employees time to heal themselves, falsely suggesting
asbestosis was not permanent. JM manipulated medical evidence to maintain the image
that the Jeffrey Mine did not give the people of Asbestos an incurable disease. The
company did so because if they admitted to the severity of asbestos-related disease, the
industry would be seriously threatened. JM was confident that it could contain the
problem in the mine and mill.
The 1949 strike was settled at the height of community concern over asbestosrelated disease and the potential toxicity of their land. While townspeople attempted to
return to a pre-strike way of life at the start of 1950, JM was busy preparing its defences
against another health threat caused by asbestos: cancer. While “asbestosis” was a
confusing term to the general public, “cancer” was something everyone understood.
Although Smith had not yet seen evidence of asbestos-related cancer in Jeffrey Mine
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employees, he was worried about the increasing number of international medical reports
on the topic.924 Whether he knew of the cancer cases discovered in the stolen lungs at
Saranac is unclear. Smith re-studied all the x-rays he had on file in Asbestos and told Karl
V. Lindell, the new president of CJM, that “[i]f we are to defend ourselves in the
compensation courts we must have proof.”925 Smith also instructed Lindell to ignore
Quebec’s new health regulation requiring occupational diseases to be reported because,
“[w]e would not want to have this industry unjustly penalized.”926 JM was lucky to have
resolved the strike without the full health risks of asbestos being made public, but the
company needed to be prepared in case the dangers were exposed. It was necessary to
deceive its workers and the government to ensure industry stability. The fact that Smith
warned that JM would be “unjustly” penalized if the occupational illnesses in Asbestos
were reported suggests that even though he appeared to sympathize with the workers and
advocated for better dust control, Smith wanted to protect the company.
It was crucial that the employees at the Jeffrey Mine had healthy bodies. Asbestos
was the main source of the world’s supply of the mineral and because very little
processing occurred, JM maintained that the fibre was in its purest form there. If medical
studies of workers in other locations found a link between asbestos and disease, JM stated
that it was because other materials or chemicals had been added after it left the Jeffrey
Mine, which meant there was a problem with the processing, not the fibre. This was a
wise defence because manufacturers, especially those in Great Britain where many of the
damning medical reports originated, usually mixed Canadian chrysotile with South
African crocidolite asbestos, seen as a more hazardous fibre.927 Smith had to show that
the asbestos in the Jeffrey Mine did not make people sick, and he had to use the bodies of
the workers in Asbestos as proof. As long as the workers were healthy, the company and
the industry would be as well.
From the private correspondence of JM officials it is clear that they were not
convinced of their own argument. At the beginning of 1950, Canadian lobby groups were
pushing to have lung cancer recognized as an industrial disease, and Dr. Paul Cartier at
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Thetford Mines confidentially reported 9 cases of lung cancer in his patients.928 Smith
acknowledged the potential threat of cancer when he told Woodard in February 1950 that
while he had not seen any evidence of the disease in Jeffrey Mine employees, this did not
mean it was not there.929 Woodard replied that Smith should publish a report on what his
x-rays showed as long as he was “sure” it would be favourable to the industry.930 A letter
from Vorwald to Smith soon followed, urging him to quickly use the healthy bodies of
Jeffrey Mine employees as a defence against damning medical reports because “another
storm is brewing in Quebec, this time concerning a case of asbestosis with cancer.”931
Vorwald did not expand on who or where this case referred to, but he did not need to: the
presence of asbestos-related cancer in humans, rather than Gardner’s mice, was
worrisome enough. The people of Asbestos could not be told of this new threat.
JM had narrowly escaped catastrophe over the issue of asbestosis in 1949 and
wanted to avoid any suggestion that asbestos was carcinogenic. The company was not
alone in this endeavour, as the Quebec government had its own interests to defend.
Asbestos was one of the most profitable industries in Quebec and Premier Maurice
Duplessis wanted to keep it that way. In May 1950 he eased JM’s fears with an assurance
that asbestos-related disease was not something with which his government was
concerned. Duplessis wrote, “[l]es companies ayant fait tout ce qui était humainement
possible de faire pour éliminer la poussière, et l’amiantose étant presque inexistante dans
la province de Québec, il ne convenait pas d’imposer des clauses impératives à ce
sujet.”932 Duplessis did not sympathize with the workers who had gone on an illegal strike
for almost five months only a year before, and he left their occupational health in the
trusted hands of JM.
The Quebec government was committed to the promotion of the asbestos industry
and used its citizens’ health as proof that the mineral was safe. In fact, the idea that
asbestos was not only safe, but helped ensure the safety of the entire population, was a
common mantra during the 1950s. One of the most extreme examples of this came at the
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beginning of the decade when asbestos paste was used in heart surgeries to glue the heart
and left lung together to promote new, healthy tissue and blood channels.933
JM was not comfortable relying on these assurances, however, and in July 1950
the company considered shipping raw asbestos from the Jeffrey Mine in paper rather than
burlap bags to prevent dust from escaping during transport.934 CJM attorney Yvan
Sabourin and president G.K. Foster also met with QAMA, the lobby group made up the
province’s asbestos producing companies, to urge them to fund a study on the link
between the mineral and cancer.935 JM was confident that by indirectly funding a study on
the workers at the Jeffrey Mine, the company would continue to control the information
discovered and released. Vandiver Brown wrote to Woodard to justify this and stated,
“[w]e, of course, have never intended to suppress information obtained as a result of
experiments financed by us, and on the occasions when we insisted that there be no
publication without our advance ‘approval,’ we have had in mind that we might possibly
wish to defer release until we could make such defensive moves as might be appropriate
and available to us.”936 What Brown failed to mention was that if a study was particularly
damning, its release date would be indefinitely deferred.
JM had established a pattern of indefinite deferment over its history in Asbestos,
and it was seen again when Smith notified JM of a new test for asbestosis developed by
Dr. Wright while visiting operations at the Jeffrey Mine in 1950. By measuring the
oxygen absorption in the blood of JM employees, Wright was able to determine the level
of pulmonary fibrosis without relying on x-rays. A degree of interpretation remained with
this new test, however, and Wright had the authority to determine the “normal” level of
oxygen in blood and all other doctors had to follow his standards. Smith recommended
that the release of Wright’s study be deferred because it “might change our whole
examination program and seriously affect the field of compensation.”937 Wright had
found at least 8 workers with definite signs of asbestosis in their blood who Smith had
previously give a clean bill of health.938 Before this discovery, Smith was the ultimate
authority on the bodies of the workers at the Jeffrey Mine because of how he chose to
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interpret shaded x-ray films, but a simple, non-interpretive blood test could destroy his
reputation and result in an onslaught of compensation claims.
Not only did the company agree to delay releasing this new study, it also chose to
keep Gardiner’s old report on asbestos-related disease secret. Smith whole-heartedly
agreed to this policy, especially after he discovered a case of asbestos-related skin cancer
on Margaret Wolfe, an employee in the Jeffrey Mine’s Textile Department.939 The
presence of cancer showed how serious the threat of dust was at the mine and mill. Wolfe
was not informed of her illness and in 1951, JM erased all references to asbestos and
cancer from their Industrial Hygiene Meeting Minutes.940
Although these studies were suppressed, the people of Asbestos knew that they
were of interest to the medical community. Job transfers and visiting doctors were not
signs of a healthy workforce, but those employed at the Jeffrey Mine did not want to go
on another strike over dust issues so soon after the one in 1949 destroyed their savings
and failed to significantly improve conditions. They confronted the risks they suspected
by continuing to work the Jeffrey Mine and by relying more on the opinion of JM doctors
than their own bodily knowledge. The company had been good to Asbestos since it
arrived in the community in 1918, bringing the first x-ray machines in the 1920s and
funding a new hospital in 1948, even though examinations were running 3 to 4 years
behind schedule because of the thoroughness with which their bodies were now
studied.941
JM used this trust to its fullest advantage. In 1952 Illinois ruled that all asbestos
products entering the state must carry a warning label that read: “‘CAUTION—
ASBESTOS FIBER’ Inhalation of asbestos fiber over long periods may be harmful. The
material should be so used as not to create dust or, if this is not possible, employees
should be equipped with adequate protective devices.”942 Jeffrey Mine officials defied the
ruling and refused to put the warning on their shipping bags so as not to alarm their
employees or customers. What people did not know about the dangers of the asbestos
industry was security for the company.
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The 1952 interim report of QAMA’s study on asbestos and cancer indicated that
tumours were starting to develop in mice exposed to high quantities of the mineral’s
dust.943 By this time, Smith had retired and left Asbestos, although he continued to
consult with JM. Dr. Anthony J. Lanza at Saranac Laboratories stepped into Smith’s role
as the medical authority on the health of Jeffrey Mine employees. Although he privately
told the company that Canada, not England, had the first cases of asbestos-related disease
fifty years ago,944 he publicly stated that the cancer and asbestosis rates being reported by
E.R.A. Merewether in Britain were strikingly different from the Canadian and American
experience with the mineral. In Lanza’s public opinion, however, neither of these diseases
were particularly problematic when only Canadian chrysotile asbestos was used.945
British medical professionals did not enjoy being told their research results were
questionable and Turner & Newall’s Dr. John Knox was granted permission to visit
Asbestos and Thetford Mines in 1952 to see for himself. Knox found that there “has been
a serious attempt to improve conditions in the mill here…but as it is made to deal with
more material than originally designed for, it is practically ineffective on that account.”946
Because of the large asbestos manufacturing industry in Britain, Knox was aware of the
most modern methods used to prevent workers from being exposed to toxic dust, which
included a limit on the amount of fibre processed each day and a sophisticated wetting
and ventilation system that prevented dry particles from floating in the air. The great
amount of fibre being processed in Asbestos, however, meant that JM operations there
could not possibly accommodate these new methods.
The safety standards in Asbestos were appallingly low to Knox, who was unable
to take a dust-count measurement because the mill was too dusty for his equipment to
work. He also stated that the “[w]eaving [department] was to me really shocking…Good
dust counting would have revealed a disturbing state here. There was no wetting...and no
exhaust used.”947 The alarming state of the area where a number of local women worked
was worrisome, but not especially embarrassing for JM because the company had medical
evidence to disprove Knox’s comments. Since 1918, only 8% of their total workforce had
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ever filed claims for compensation due to occupational disease, and this was considered
to be an insignificant number compared to medical reports confirming the extreme
toxicity of the mineral.948 In the opinion of JM officials this meant that 92% of their
employees had been unaffected by asbestos. Rather than indicating a lack of underreporting of medical evidence, this was used as proof that the Canadian chrysotile
contained within the Jeffrey Mine was relatively benign.
Statistics like this maintained the image that asbestos was not as harmful as some
believed, but Knox’s appraisal of operations at the Jeffrey Mine was taken seriously.
Because dust levels could not be further reduced without great expense to the company,
officials began to renew their efforts to get employees to wear respirators. Many did not
want to wear these protective devices because they continued to clogged easily and
restricted breathing. It also challenged their concept of how to work in a dangerous
profession and workers rejected these artificial extensions of their bodies. Employees
refused to wear respirators that were re-used from shift to shift, and when personal
devices were introduced, the company found that workers had to be watched at all times
to ensure they were being worn.949 The fact that Jeffrey Mine employees continued their
tradition of refusing to wear respirators even after LeDoux’s exposé had made them fully
aware of the risk of asbestosis reveals how deeply an understanding of risk had permeated
the local cultural identity. This action does not mean that workers intentionally made
themselves sick, but rather that they did not, or could not, believe that their bodies would
be adversely affected by the mineral. If the people of Asbestos only worked at the Jeffrey
Mine because it was the largest employer in the community and it provided them with a
steady paycheque, they would have worn the respirators while lobbying for even more
dust control measures. Their refusal to do so advances our understanding of how
community members understood the risks associated with the mineral while maintaining
their local identity, rooted in their connection to the land and the steady income it
provided.
The fact that workers refused safety measures to protect them from dust they
knew to be dangerous only five years following the 1949 strike puzzled JM officials, who
knew that the image that Jeffrey Mine employees were healthy had to be maintained. The
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image of a healthy workforce was especially important in 1955 because of a report by Dr.
W.C. Hueper that claimed asbestosis led directly to lung cancer and had already done so
in 21 cases in the United States, 6 in Canada, 88 in Great Britain, and 12 in Germany.950
Although JM restrictions on visiting doctors ensured that none of the 6 Canadian cases
were Jeffrey Mine employees, Hueper’s report was dangerous. In response, the company
authorized the publication of a thoroughly edited version of Smith’s 1949 assessment of
the health of Jeffrey Mine employees.
Whereas Smith’s original report stated that only 4 had “normal” x-rays, his
published work claimed that 91% of the men he studied had no signs of asbestosis.951 It
continued to state that of the 52 employees who showed signs of pulmonary fibrosis, none
had signs of asbestosis and many of them had worked at the Jeffrey Mine for 20 to 40
years. Smith’s published report only admitted to there being 7 employees who had
definite asbestosis, but none of them were impaired in any way and continued to work
without trouble. He concluded by stating that few employees exposed to chrysotile
asbestos develop any signs of fibrosis, and those that do have asbestosis, “have been
known to carry on their usual work and live fairly comfortable lives for several years.”952
Smith did not say whether the 7 men he admitted to having asbestosis had been informed
of their disease or not, and if the reason they lived “fairly” comfortable lives was because
he reassured them their painful symptoms were nothing to worry about.
That Smith did not publish his 1949 study without JM’s approval of his altered
conclusions shows how much control over medical evidence the company had. The
workers at the Jeffrey Mine were relatively isolated and no doctors from outside the
community or the company could examine their medical files without JM consent. While
closed files may not sound unusual, within the context of the international medical
community’s interest in the mineral, it was, as visiting doctors were common in industry
towns throughout the 20th century. The health of Jeffrey Mine employees appeared to
remain—at least publicly—and this strength would become increasingly important as the
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years passed and the amount of medical evidence contradicting Smith’s altered
conclusions grew.
“‘ignorance is bliss’ has been expensively disproved,” 1955-1972
Smith’s work was taken seriously within the Canadian medical community, which
had difficulty making inroads in Quebec because of linguistic differences.953 His study
convinced Canadian doctors that asbestosis was a rare, non-fatal disease,954 but JM
remained concerned over QAMA’s study on the links between asbestos and cancer led by
Drs. Daniel C. Braun and T. David Truan. Because he was employed by the asbestos
producers of Quebec, Braun tried to make the study’s findings positive when he wrote to
H.M. Jackson in 1957 that of the 99 cases of asbestosis and lung cancer studied, only 19
of them were miners, which suggested that “the possibility of an association between lung
cancer and asbestosis is much more likely to exist in asbestos factories than in mining
operations.”955 The Jeffrey Mine could still be perceived as safe, even if the mineral was
continuously shown to be toxic. Although operations at Asbestos included a mill, the size
and repute of the pit meant that the dustier mills were often overlooked.
The belief that milling was more dangerous than mining was not reassurance
enough for JM, and this information was taken out of the final report, termed the “BraunTruan Report,” before it was released. In the confidential draft submitted to JM in 1957,
Braun and Truan stated that they believed incidences of asbestosis were considerably
under-reported by company doctors, which directly led to an increase in asbestos-related
lung cancer.956 The underreporting of asbestos-related disease certainly existed at the
Jeffrey Mine, but there was no way JM would sanction the publication of this
information. Braun and Truan concluded in their draft that independent medical
professionals, not company-paid doctors, should evaluate all x-rays of asbestos
workers,957 which suggested that company doctors were partly responsible for the
increased occurrence in asbestos-related cancer because they had been instructed by their
companies to not report the first signs of illness. This was a serious accusation and
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highlighted the very real problems of medical care in Asbestos. If the company was
seriously concerned about preventing occupational disease to save the industry from
potential collapse and itself from certain litigation, officials would have to reform the way
JM handled the issue of health at the Jeffrey Mine.
As correct as Braun and Truan were in their assessment of health in asbestos
mining communities, their statements on the dangers of working in processing factories
and the irresponsibility of company doctors resulting in more numerous and more severe
cases of asbestos-related disease were deleted from the publish report. JM wanted to
know what was happening to the bodies of Jeffrey Mine employees, but officials needed
this knowledge to be kept contained and confidential. The sanitized copy of this report
was released by JM in 1958 and emphasized the smoking habits, rather than dust
exposure or negligent medical professionals.
The perspective Braun and Truan were allowed to take in the eventual publication
became clear when they stated that the lung cancer rates of the workers they studied at the
Jeffrey Mine were actually slightly below the provincial average. Braun and Truan
studied 2,273 workers in Asbestos who were alive in 1950, the majority of whom were
under 44 years old and smoked more than five cigarettes a day.958 Over the five years of
the study, three of the 49 Asbestos workers who passed away died of lung cancer. Braun
and Truan reported that of these three, “A.J.” was a 66 year old smoker who worked for
26 years in a moderately dusty environment, “N.O.” was a 65 year old smoker who spent
34 years in a mildly dust area, and “R.M.” was a 65 year old smoker who worked 37
years in the same mild section of the Jeffrey Mine as “N.O.”959 These numbers allowed
them to conclude that while they found a greater chance of those with asbestosis getting
cancer, “the mortality rate from lung cancer does not appear to increase with length of
exposure or with degree of exposure, a fact which presents strong evidence against the
carcinogenicity of asbestos. On the other hand, the study indicates that cigarette smoking
is a very important factor in the incidence of cancer of the lung.”960 The study also stated
that none of the 1,265 non-smokers at the Jeffrey Mine developed lung cancer. Braun and
Truan’s emphasis on smoking rather than on toxic dust shows just how much JM was in
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control of medical literature on asbestos-related disease at this time. Jeffrey Mine
employees did smoke, but lung cancer caused by cigarettes manifests differently in the
body than cancer caused by asbestos, which stores tiny fibres of the mineral in tumours.
Braun and Truan would have seen the unique type of lung cancer asbestos causes,
but they were hired to boost the image of the industry, not expose its risks. The tobacco
industry became a convenient scapegoat for asbestos companies looking to preserve the
mineral’s image of being safe. Although Smith did not agree with this strategy, he
believed that “[t]his publication should form the basis for future surveys and reports,” and
would be a great tool to refute the studies of other medical professionals who did not have
such a concentrated cohort of bodies to study.961 The people of Asbestos were the human
equivalent of mice in a laboratory and they were constantly monitored to determine the
progression of the diseases the mineral inflicted on the human body.
The Journal of the American Medical Association accepted the Braun-Truan
report for publication and editor Herbert E. Stokinger wrote, “I, myself, was particularly
pleased to learn the main conclusion of the paper was against the association of lung
cancer with asbestos, for I had come to a similar conclusion on obviously far less
information but was afraid to say so for this reason.”962 The bodies of the workers at the
Jeffrey Mine remained useful tools to ensure the legitimacy of the asbestos industry.
Braun and Truan knew nothing of the post-retirement cases being secretly studied at
Saranac Laboratories, which had discovered over 70 cases of unreported lung cancer in
Asbestos by 1958.963
This information is crucial to understanding how the people of Asbestos viewed
their bodies at this time. They knew they had respiratory problems because of their work
at the Jeffrey Mine, and they had not forgotten LeDoux’s 1949 exposé on the industry,
but they did not know about the risk of cancer, and they chose to accept the threat of
asbestosis. The Braun-Truan Report bought the industry time, and was effective in
refuting international medical studies that proved the mineral caused cancer. Capitalizing
on this, JM launched a series of print advertisements supporting the idea that asbestos was
safe. One ad featured a baby sitting on a floor and saying, “What do you mean I’ll catch
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cold on the floor? Our house is insulated with Johns-Manville Spintex!” The late 1950s
also saw the launch of “Jim Asbestos,” a JM mascot in a lifeguard uniform that instructed
consumers on how the mineral helped make everyday products safer.964 The message was
clear: asbestos saved lives, it did not take them away.
These medical reports and advertisements worked to maintain the safe image of
the mineral and the continued economic success of the industry: Despite this outward
sense of calm, JM was having difficulties in Asbestos. In a letter to company
headquarters, Jeffrey Mine official J.R.M. Hutcheson wrote, “a possible health hazard is
only part of the problem. We have the ever-present, and increasingly onerous problem of
public and industrial relations. This facet of the problem is serious enough, the mere
suggestion of a health hazard on top of the present problem would make the necessity that
much more urgent.”965 Hutcheson’s letter reveals that workers knew their bodies were
getting sick and they did not believe JM was particularly concerned with their health.
Company-community relations had not improved since the 1949 strike and while workers
were willing to accept some risk, it was because it was part of the local cultural identity
they had developed over generations of working with the Jeffrey Mine, not because of
affection for the company.
By 1960, the link between asbestos and cancer was beginning to be understood by
the general public966 and studies on asbestos factory workers began to show that lung
cancer was only the start of what the mineral could do to the human body. For
generations the literature on the health effects of asbestos centred on the respiratory
system, but the 1960s brought a new challenge to JM’s assertions that the mineral was
safe. In an article published in the Lancet’s 3 December 1960 issue, E.E. Keal provided a
table listing the deaths of men and women suffering from asbestosis in British processing
and manufacturing plants over a prolonged period of time. While the majority of male
subjects with asbestosis died of carcinoma of the lung, the bulk of the female asbestosrelated deaths were caused by carcinoma of the ovary and breast, suggesting that the
interaction between asbestos and the female body was unique.967
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Aside from the confidential study Joan Ross performed in 1944,968 none of the
JM-sanctioned articles mentioned the female employees at the Jeffrey Mine who worked
in the dusty Textile Department, which Braun and Truan reported to be one of the most
dangerous places at the Jeffrey Mine. There was an understanding among male asbestos
workers that by belonging to a masculine industry, it was acceptable that their bodies
were at risk. Women were a different story altogether, and if the people of Asbestos were
alerted to this report they would be horrified. A British medical journal was not
something the Francophone workers at the Jeffrey Mine had access to, however, and
neither the English nor the French medical communities in Canada were concerned with
the link between asbestos and cancer before 1965. The mineral was only mentioned once
between 1955 and 1965 in the Canadian Medical Association Journal, and that
occurrence dealt again with asbestosis, not cancer. Two mentions of mesothelioma occur
in 1957 and 1959, but the link between the mineral and the specific cancer it causes was
not acknowledged.969 Asbestos and the Canadian public were isolated from the discovery.
JM knew this and wanted to maintain the idea that the pure asbestos taken from
the Jeffrey Mine was not carcinogenic. JM President C.B. Burnett believed this could be
done through more medical studies on the bodies of Jeffrey Mine workers, continuing the
practice of not informing workers of their disease and treating them like mice in a lab. He
explained that by simply saying, “‘no one has been hurt’ is to ignore a basic management
responsibility of getting the facts upon which to make a decision. The old adage
‘ignorance is bliss’ has been expensively disproved.”970 Burnett was referring to the
compensation litigation brought on by American factory workers against the company in
the late 1950s. JM could not afford people knowing that Jeffrey Mine fibre was toxic, and
officials needed to know the complete progression of asbestos-related disease in order to
prevent it from continuing and to keep the industry alive. The following year, Dr.
Kenneth Smith went further than Burnett and asked if JM was comfortable continuing “to
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impair the health of men and women [and] to shorten their lives by our actions.”971 Smith
was losing interest in protecting the company as his sympathy for Jeffrey Mine workers
continued to grow even after he retired and left the community because he knew the
severity of the diseases they were suffering from.
Smith also knew that it was only a matter of time before a full exposé on the
health effects of the mineral was released with results even more dramatic than LeDoux’s
1949 pamphlet on asbestosis. Dr. Irving J. Selikoff at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York
was working on just such an exposé. Selikoff published a report in 1964 on 632 American
asbestos insulation workers and found that consistent exposure to asbestos led to
increased rates of cancer of the lung, pleura, stomach, colon, and rectum, further
suggesting that asbestos-related disease went beyond the respiratory system. It also noted
that the “incidence of more than 1% of deaths from pleural mesothelioma is strikingly
high for a tumor which is generally considered to be extremely rare.” 972 Mesothelioma is
a fast-acting cancer of the lining of major organs, such as the lung, heart, and abdomen,
and this study implied that asbestos was making it common. Selikoff also directly refuted
the conclusions Braun and Truan made in 1957 when he wrote that “the smoking habits
of the asbestos workers cannot account for the fact that their lung-cancer death rate was
6.8 times as high as that of white males in the general population.”973 With this study,
Selikoff changed how asbestos and asbestos-related disease would be studied
internationally in the future. Selikoff’s findings discredited JM and QAMA reports that
claimed cigarettes, not asbestos, harmed workers, and his study received a lot of press
because of it. Medical professionals with ties to the industry would no longer be trusted,
and by extension, neither would companies.974
This was a serious threat to JM’s health propaganda, which had used the
connection between cigarettes and cancer to maintain the image that the mineral was safe.
The company had even used a picture of a smoking Jeffrey Mine worker on the cover of
its newsletter to shareholders in 1950. Of all those connected to JM, however, Smith took
Selikoff’s study the worst. Condemning Selikoff as being someone who is “ambitious and
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unscrupulous and is out to make a name for himself at the expense of the asbestos
industry,” Smith reiterated that Jeffrey Mine employees were healthy and had none of the
malignancies Selikoff claimed were common. He then related how Selikoff acted when
JM allowed him to visit Asbestos years before: “he told Dr. Grainger in a rather pompous
manner that Grainger didn’t know anything about reading [x-ray] films and that he,
Selikoff, in that short period of time had seen much more disease than he imagined
existed.”975 Smith’s contradictions illustrate the difficult situation he was in. He did feel
sorry that Jeffrey Mine workers were put at risk, but he did not want his medical authority
questioned any more than he wanted JM’s reputation to be tainted by health-related
revelations.
Selikoff’s study of American factory workers challenged Smith’s authority and
suggested that the rate of disease at Asbestos was significantly higher than reported.
Smith claimed that the men Selikoff studied had been exposed to chemical additives in
the asbestos and pleaded with JM to make the medical records of its employees open to
outside studies to prove Selikoff wrong.976 Fearful of what other medical professionals
could discover, JM refused Smith’s request, knowing how dangerous it would be for
someone like Selikoff to examine Jeffrey Mine workers. Despite this refusal, however,
the company acknowledged that the mineral did pose some risk to human health when, in
1965, the United States mandated that shipments of asbestos had to have warning labels
placed on them and JM complied. The regulation showed that Selikoff was not alone in
suspecting the dangers of asbestos, but the situation in Canada was different. Although
the CMAJ finally published an international study on the link between asbestos and
cancer in 1965,977 the federal government did not regulate the industry. Because of this,
company official W. Hodgson wrote to JM’s head office and stated, “[w]e have been
assured by Dr. K.W. Smith that it is not necessary to use the caution label in Canada, and
therefore, we obviously do not want it on any of our cartons.”978 Placing stickers over the
warnings on empty cartons sent to Asbestos was discussed, but the company decided it
was too risky and chose to sand off the labels before they entered Canada instead. JM did
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not want to risk their employees and other Canadians seeing the warnings and turning
against the mineral. The company needed Jeffrey Mine workers, as well as Canadians in
general, to continue believing the mineral was relatively benign in order to maintain
production levels, industrial relations, and the idea that Canadian chrysotile was safe.
JM also initiated a new QAMA study of Quebec asbestos workers in 1965. The
company provided over half the funds for this organization and exercised a great deal of
control over its actions.979 McGill University’s Dr. John Corbett McDonald was chosen to
head this study. McGill had first allied itself with JM in the 1930s with the establishment
of the university’s Industrial Hygiene Department, so this seemed a natural partnership.
JM’s aim for the study was to “preserve the industry on which their business
depends…[and] avoid any undesirable publicity or any precipitate action by the USA or
Canadian Federal Government which might be detrimental to the industry.”980 Statements
like this continue to show that JM was more concerned with bad publicity affecting
profits than the health of its employees. The company had dozens of confidential medical
reports supporting the fact that Jeffrey Mine employees were at serious risk by working
with such a dangerous mineral. Rather than fund better dust elimination equipment in
Asbestos, the company chose to pay for false medical reports to use as propaganda.
JM hoped that McDonald’s study would eclipse Selikoff’s and assure employees,
shareholders, and the general public that pure chrysotile asbestos was safe. This was
especially important within Canada because of a 1965 study of 100 randomly chosen
autopsies at 4 Montreal hospitals that showed the large presence of asbestos fibres in 57%
of the men examined and 34% of the women.981 The air in all major Canadian and
American cities at this time was full of asbestos fibres because of the mineral’s use in
brake linings, pavement, and construction, all of which created toxic dust. That the
Canadian medical community had finally become interested in the mineral was
significant in itself, but the fact that airborne fibres could contaminate people not directly
involved with the industry was a new discovery that could potentially ruin the company if
anyone developed asbestos-related disease. The Francophone medical community in
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Quebec also began to publish on incidences of mesothelioma in asbestos workers who
had worked in the industry for over 20 years.982 The company had to protect its interests
in the province by proving that the people who worked at the Jeffrey Mine were healthy.
The need for McDonald’s study increased as Selikoff continued to publish on the
negative health effects of asbestos, and public opinion turned against the mineral.
Although QAMA admitted in their confidential meeting minutes that there was a direct
link between asbestos and cancer, and described Selikoff as “a healthy nemesis,”
members worried that “[w]e continue to receive an extremely bad press concerning the
question of asbestos and health…the time has come for us to produce some rebuttal
ourselves, either in a general way or medically substantiated to the extent possible at this
time.”983 The industry was panicking, and it looked for any evidence to prove asbestos
was not as bad as it seemed. Such panic was not only due to bad press. In July 1967,
dockworkers in England refused to unload shipments of the mineral unless it was packed
in dust-proof containers, and in March 1968 crocodolite asbestos was banned completely
in Britain.984
Adding to these difficulties was the realization that if asbestos products were not
shipped with warning labels, JM could be liable for any damaging health effects the
mineral caused. Worried over potential lawsuits, the company informed QAMA in 1968
that even if the rest of the industry voted against placing warning labels on their
shipments, JM would. The multilingual labels would read, “This product contains
asbestos. Inhalation of asbestos dust over long periods of time may be harmful.
Employees exposed to dust during use in application should be equipped with adequate
personal protective devices.”985 Jeffrey Mine workers read these labels, but they
continued to refuse to wear respirators and they did not lobby JM for better working
conditions.986 The lack of fear shown by workers in 1968 sharply contrasts how they
reacted in 1949 when LeDoux’s report on asbestosis was released, and shows how fully
they accepted the risks associated with the mineral. Risk had become such a fundamental
part of the local cultural identity that by the late 1960s, it had become habit.
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Manufacturers all over the world objected to JM’s labels and believed the
warnings would cause unnecessary concern within their workforce. A tile manufacturing
company in Connecticut suggested that JM distribute an information pamphlet instead of
the warning labels987 and the Asbestos Fibre Importers Committee in England stated that
“[l]abour might refuse to handle asbestos unless packed in an impervious bag and
probably insist on metal containers or fibre board drums,” if the labels were visible to
those in the shipping industry.988 Complaints arrived from manufacturers in the
Netherlands and Belgium, which explained that that the labels caused financial trouble
and emotional trauma so JM should avoid the mistake of putting warnings on their
shipments again.989 These reactions show how uniquely the people of Asbestos were
internalizing the risks associated with the mineral their town was named after and that
they were unafraid of. Workers in Belgium were experiencing emotional trauma, but
those living next to the world’s largest chrysotile asbestos mine were calm. This put JM
in a difficult position. Increased lawsuits against the company made the labels necessary
so they would not be responsible for any additional illnesses, but warnings angered
customers. In 1972, JM removed all warning labels from its Canadian products, on the
basis that they were exempt from U.S. regulations.990 With an estimated 15,000 to 30,000
Canadian jobs at risk if the industry collapsed, the company continued the “ignorance is
bliss” policy even officials admitted was no longer working.
In 1968, the mills in Asbestos were finally refurbished with new dust-collecting
technology. Only two years later, however, after learning that 175 of its Jeffrey Mine
workers suffered from asbestosis, company officials notified JM head office that the mill
was too old to fix and that “we will have to live with the conditions until our new
complex is in operation. We will encourage use of the Dustfoe 77 mask despite its
practical and personal comfort limitations [but] [d]isciplinary action to the point of layoff
will be avoided.”991 JM needed to invest even more money in updating its operations in
Asbestos than it did in 1968. The fact that employees continued to refuse to wear
respirators did not help the situation, but once again expressed how the people of
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Asbestos internalized the risks associated with the mineral despite being informed of the
dangers it posed to their health. Yes, respirators were uncomfortable, but the workers had
seen family members and friends die of asbestos-related disease and many were
experiencing the painful symptoms of asbestosis and cancer. The reluctance to admit they
were sick furthers our understanding of local cultural identity and risk.
“Poussière à Vendre: Rue Bourbeau,” 1971-1983
JM did a study of asbestos-related cancers in community members not directly
involved in the industry in 1971. The study found that not only was there a higher
occurrence of bronchial cancer in Jeffrey Mine employees compared to JM’s American
factory workers, but the people living in Asbestos also had a heightened risk of
developing similar diseases because of their proximity to the mine and the clouds of
mineral dust that hovered over the town.992 This threatened JM’s claim that Canadian
chrysotile was relatively benign and it needed to fix the situation before the community or
the press discovered it. Workers accepted risk while they were at the Jeffrey Mine, but the
company was unsure if the community would mirror that acceptance.
Fortunately for JM, the occupational culture that led Jeffrey Mine workers to
confront risks with their bodies had extended into the community of Asbestos. Those who
did not work at the Jeffrey Mine were not ignorant of the dangers the mineral posed
through press coverage of LeDoux’s exposé, the demands of the workers during the 1949
strike, and more recent warning labels that had been placed on shipments leaving the
Jeffrey Mine. It was clear that dust was dangerous at the mine and in the mill. The clouds
of dust that hovered over the community were just as dangerous and the local population
was able to make this connection. Despite this, no mention of community concern for
health appeared in the local newspaper or town council minutes during this period.993 By
the 1970s, JM doctors were informing employees of many of their asbestos dust-related
illnesses,994 including cancers, so the workers and their families were even more aware of
what was happening to their bodies than they had been years before, but children
continued to play in the dust that hovered over the community, writing their names in it as
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it settled on local parked cars.995 Even with this information, the workers did not strike to
ensure better dust control measures were taken at the Jeffrey Mine so that they, and the
broader community, would not be exposed to it. Dust and risk had become part of the
local cultural identity, and as we will see when the industry collapses in the early 1980s,
without this risk, the community struggled to maintain this identity.
An indication of this communal acceptance of risk was seen on 13 July 1971,
when the headline of the local paper read, “Poussière à Vendre, Rue Bourbeau,” and an
editorial cartoon depicted a woman crossing the road covering her face against the
blowing dust while her dog exclaimed, “If I had known that she wanted to cross the desert
today, I wouldn’t have gone out with her!”996 The air in Asbestos was thick with toxic
dust, but while community complaints suggested that townspeople were frustrated with its
presence, the spirit of the editorial cartoon was playful and accepting rather than angry
and frightened: the people of Asbestos were not afraid of the dust.

Editorial cartoon illustrating the streets of Asbestos, 1971997

The company took this as a good sign. It did not want its employees or their
family members to become sick, but until they discovered a way to eliminate the risk they
appreciated the faith their workforce placed in the mineral. Before 1972 it had generally
been accepted that the “safe” level for dust exposure in asbestos workers, known as the
Threshold Limit Value (TLV), was five fibres per cubic centimetre. A survey of the dust
levels in Jeffrey Mine operations at this time showed that the mills had over 100 fibres of
asbestos dust per cubic centimetre,998 but the company disregarded the report because of
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its plans to build a new factory. At the suggestion that JM reach only 2 fibres per cubic
centimetres at the new plant, officials replied that this goal would be economically
unfeasible and that it would lay off its employees rather than achieve it.999 Reducing the
level of dust would mean reducing the amount of fibre processed, which would affect
profits. Furthermore, the employees at the Jeffrey Mine were used to working with dust
and even though the company failed to significantly lower dust levels, the workers did not
notify the union and demand JM do so, as they had done during the 1949 strike.
The acceptance of dust was partly due to the local cultural identity in Asbestos
that included a certain level of bodily risk. Because of this, Jeffrey Mine workers were the
ideal cohort for the McGill study JM and QAMA had been funding since 1965, and
although Dr. John C. McDonald found that there were incidences of pleural thickening in
the lungs of his subjects at Asbestos, he did not believe this was caused by the mineral.
He stated that high levels of dust did lead directly to the development of mesothelioma,
but believed that cigarettes caused more lung damage than asbestos.1000 McDonald also
studied 428 female employees but found that while they worked in extremely dusty areas,
few of them exceeded over 10 years of employment at the Jeffrey Mine, which resulted in
fewer cases of disease.1001 McDonald did not mention whether he looked for cancer of the
breast or ovary when he examined these women, which may have had an impact on his
results.
McDonald’s conclusions were well received by JM because they followed Braun
and Truan’s lead and blamed the tobacco industry for heightened cancer rates rather than
asbestos. The fact that McDonald was employed by McGill initially suggested that his
was an independent study of Quebec’s asbestos workers and even Irving J. Selikoff was
hesitant to attack his conclusions. While he disagreed with the results, Selikoff was only
able to state that the level of dust a Canadian asbestos miner was exposed to was
apparently less than that of an American insulation worker. Selikoff also accepted the
idea that pure Canadian chrysotile may be less toxic than other types of asbestos,
especially in its raw form.1002 Again favouring good publicity over the health of its
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employees, this was a real victory for JM and the company used McDonald’s report to its
fullest advantage.
In its 1973 newsletter to shareholders, JM claimed, “Much adverse, inaccurate
publicity has surrounded the discussion of asbestos and human health. The mineral
asbestos is unique and too valuable to do without…As with many materials, asbestos can
be harmful if not used properly.”1003 The company relied on McDonald’s study and the
fact that it had spent over $20 million on improvements since 1962 to support its claims
that the way JM handled asbestos made the mineral completely safe and that dust counts
in its manufacturing plants were below 5 fibres per cubic centimetre. This statement was
misleading and focused solely on JM factories in the United States. It avoided any
specific mention of the mill at the Jeffrey Mine, which still had not been replaced and
continued to have dust counts above 100 fibres per cubic centimetres.
McDonald further aided JM’s claims that the mineral was safe when he published
his study in the Canadian Medical Association Journal in 1973. He stated that there was
no significant occurrence of mesothelioma in asbestos workers compared to the entire
province between 1960 and 1970. Although he conceded that some victims of
mesothelioma were domestically exposed to asbestos through interaction with family
members who worked in the industry, McDonald emphasized that this did not mean the
mineral was especially deadly, nor was it the only cause of the disease.1004 The report
suggested that the asbestos industry had been victim to faulty medical reports that blamed
the mineral for any disease that occurred in those who worked with it.
Following McDonald’s publication, company officials hosted a QAMA meeting
with other international asbestos manufacturing companies. Confidential minutes from
the meeting suggest that although McDonald’s report had bought the industry some time
to regroup after being so thoroughly attacked in the medical community and press,
officials knew this calm would not last long. One official stated that the “all important
problem…is how to deal with Selikoff…Within the Industry, Johns-Manville is the only
Company with sound acknowledged expertise…The battle is still continuing and Industry
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needs help.”1005 JM was so important to industry heads because of its control over the
world’s largest and “safest” chrysotile mine and its international reach through trade and
manufacturing networks.
Another advantage JM had, according to QAMA, was that “the question of
asbestos & health was not as big a problem in Canada as in the USA. Besides, the
audience is mostly confined to Quebec and more in the English than in the French Press.
It seems that the French media have never tackle[d] too strongly the asbestos & health
problem. It should be pointed out, however, that the release of the McDonald report
received excellent press coverage.”1006 Because JM’s workforce was mainly unilingual
Francophone, the industry felt that there was a safe buffer between them and damning
reports on the health effects of asbestos. Furthermore, aside from LeDoux’s 1949 exposé
and Pelletier’s coverage of the resulting strike in Asbestos, QAMA’s observations were
correct and the Francophone press in Quebec did not concern itself with health issues
affecting the workers in one of the province’s most lucrative industries. Both LeDoux and
Pelletier moved on to other issues and nobody took their place. English Canada did not
care about it because it was in small-town Quebec, and French Canada, already lacking a
critical mass sufficient to make an impact, was distracted at this time with issues of
Québécois nationalism and independence, which dominated the Francophone media and
medical community.1007 For the time being, at least, the industry was safe in Quebec, and
JM established a Health, Safety and Environment department in 1974 to address concerns
over occupational health and to prepare defences should their fortune in the province run
out.
The larger problem JM had to deal with at this time was the English media, which
listened to Selikoff’s speeches and reports on the damaging effects of the asbestos
industry. In 1974, CBC radio interviewed McDonald and repeatedly asked him if his
study was funded by the asbestos industry. Although he stated that McGill supplied his
funds, McDonald eventually admitted that QAMA had donated a significant amount of
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research money to the university.1008 Coinciding with this revelation, the New York Times
ran an article condemning McDonald’s study because of its links to the asbestos industry.
McDonald threatened to sue the newspaper’s editor for libel and claimed that while
QAMA had provided funds for the study, he was acting on the request of the Canadian
government, not the industry.1009 Adding to the situation was the sudden resurgence of the
Francophone medical community’s interest in asbestos-related disease because of the
continued international focus on the province’s mines, with one report indicating that
while mesothelioma occurrences were 1 in 10,000 for the general population, they were 1
in 10 for those working in the Quebec asbestos industry.1010
These numbers were alarming and JM’s reliance on the Jeffrey Mine as the
perfect example of health and profits was weakening. In May 1975, JM’s Health, Safety
and Environment Vice President Paul Kotkin sent filmmaker Walter Cooper to Asbestos
to make a pro-industry documentary called “Asbestos and Health.” Upon his arrival,
Cooper immediately wrote back to Kotkin, “the bagging operation on the main floor was
shocking. There were accumulations of dust everywhere. It took more than an hour to
clean up one bagging unit of visible dust before filming. At another bag unit, I noticed an
ankle-high accumulation of fiber, which was being shovelled into an open cart for
disposal by a worker, who was not wearing a respirator.”1011 Cooper’s observations
echoed those of John Knox, the British doctor who had inspected operations at the Jeffrey
Mine in 1952. The fact that dust levels remained high after more than 20 years
demonstrates how ineffectual JM’s efforts were to reduce dust in the mill, despite its
awareness of the severe health risks associated with it. It also reveals the extent to which
employees had grown comfortable being surrounded by dust they knew to be dangerous.
Cooper’s observations in Asbestos offer a rare perspective on what it was like to
work at the Jeffrey Mine in 1975 because of the lack of oral histories and diaries from
now-deceased workers. He explained, “Fiber continued to spill from the bags onto the
floor, where other workers tracked through it...I saw a QC man at the bagging operation
open at least four bags, grab a handful of fiber, throw it into an open plate, and then break
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it apart and swish it around. He did not wear a respirator.”1012 The emphasis placed on
employees at the Jeffrey Mine working in dusty areas of the mill without respirators is
telling. Protective devices were provided by JM, but the workers continued to refuse to
wear them even though they knew breathing in the dust was dangerous. Employees also
showed their willingness to confront the risks of the asbestos industry by continuing to
work at the Jeffrey Mine rather than organizing another strike over health issues or
moving their families elsewhere and retraining for another occupation. These were
options available to Jeffrey Mine employees, but the fact that conditions had not
significantly changed in the mill since Knox’s 1952 visit suggests that over decades of
working with dust, risk acceptance had become a permanent feature of the local cultural
identity. Not understanding the historical context of this identity, Cooper was astounded
at the amount of dust in the air at the Jeffrey Mine and had to stop filming three times to
clean his equipment. He noted that the mill he was filming in had been closed for repairs
and had just completed its weekly 2-hour cleaning session, done mostly with brooms,
which did a better job of stirring up clouds of dust than eliminating them. When the
filming was over, Cooper and his cameramen found that along with their clothes, bodies,
and hair, their cars in the parking lot were covered with dust.1013
Cooper showed how the people of Asbestos lived and worked with the mineral
and that dust was something that affected and covered the entire community. Soon after
his visit, Health and Welfare Canada released its first study on asbestos-related disease
and reported that Ontario, which had a large manufacturing industry that relied on the
mineral, had 69 cases of mesothelioma between 1960 and 1970, while Quebec had at least
102. It concluded that while chrysotile was safer than other types of asbestos fibre,
“[d]efinite health hazards exist in the Canadian workplace due to high levels of
occupational exposures to asbestos together with inadequate health surveillance and
protection.”1014 This statement shows that by 1975 at the latest, the Canadian government
knew asbestos workers were at risk because of the harmful effects of the mineral, and that
companies like JM were not adequately addressing the issue. The company proved Health
and Welfare Canada correct when it told its shareholders in 1975 that occupational and
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community exposure to asbestos dust was not a significant issue.1015 Nevertheless, the
Canadian government did not insist that companies reform their approach to occupational
health and safety. Despite this lack of action, and although there was little JM could do
until the new mill in Asbestos was constructed, the company finally made the use of
respirators mandatory if exposure was above 2 fibres per cubic centimetre.1016 The
respirators designed for this type of filtration, however, were useless in environments like
the Jeffrey Mine, where the concentration of dust was so high that the filters clogged
immediately, making it even harder to breathe.
This was yet another sign that working conditions at the Jeffrey Mine were
dangerous, but when Thetford workers went on strike in 1975 because of heath concerns,
the employees at Asbestos followed them but kept their dispute to wages.1017 By choosing
to leave health issues out of the strike, the people of Asbestos showed their conviction
that the adverse bodily effects of the mineral were not an issue for them. While they did
not fully trust JM, they accepted the health risks associated with the industry and enjoyed
the rewards of working jobs their fathers and grandfathers had before them. Furthermore,
the people of Asbestos were aware of the growing negative publicity surrounding the
mineral their community was named for and they understood that it needed to be
supported if the industry—and the town—was to survive.
Although workers continued to support the Jeffrey Mine, publicity on the negative
health effects of asbestos was rapidly increasing and the Environmental Protection
Agency became involved as American mothers began to fear for the safety of their
children who attended schools insulated with the mineral. In order to gain some control
over the situation, in 1976 JM funded a program designed by Selikoff to research ways to
detect mesothelioma cases early enough to cure them. In addition to this, in 1977 the
company introduced a “no smoking” policy for its workers in all JM operations because
“Research shows that asbestos workers who do not smoke cigarettes have no greater
incidence of lung cancer than is found in the general population. Asbestos workers who
do smoke, however, have an incidence of lung cancer that is 92 times greater than
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asbestos workers who don’t smoke.”1018 The tobacco industry was once again a
convenient scapegoat, but the policy had little effect on how outsiders would perceive
operations at the Jeffrey Mine. The federal-provincial Beaudry Inquiry of 1976 looked
into the health of the province’s asbestos workers after the Thetford strike, and reported
that it was appalled at the levels of dust workers were exposed to each day.1019
Governments were beginning to take notice of the health problem in the asbestos
industry, but loose regulations were blamed, not the inherent toxicity of the mineral.
JM’s Health, Safety and Environment Vice President Paul Kotkin actually echoed
this sentiment, writing, “[i]f the division cannot complete the environmental clean-up of
this textile operation, then serious consideration should be given to shutting down the
operation [in Asbestos]. The Jeffrey Textile Plant is an embarrassment as it does not meet
J-M’s standards and has not met them for a good number of years.”1020 Jeffrey Mine
operations could not be shut down because it was the main source of JM’s raw mineral
and the foundation of its defence against reports that claimed asbestos was dangerous.
The company introduced a policy that made the wearing of protective clothing and
respirators mandatory in areas that had a higher fibre count than 1.2 per cubic
centimetre.1021 This was well within the new limits set by the Quebec government in
1976, which dictated a maximum TLV of 2 fibres per cubic centimetre.1022 JM also
effectively closed Asbestos off to outside media and medical professionals until the new
mill was completed. As a result, a 1978 CBC radio report on Quebec’s asbestos industry
left the Jeffrey Mine out and instead spawned headlines such as, “Véritable génocide à
Thetford.”1023 The press could not say the same about Asbestos, however, as the local
population did not make health an issue.
The lack of agitation for health reform at the Jeffrey Mine allowed JM to pose as
an industry leader in occupational safety. In its 1980 edition of JM Today, the company
provided a “Special Asbestos Update,” which stated that JM would refuse to sell its
products to countries and places that would not uphold the strict health regulations placed
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on the American asbestos industry. It denied that the company had ever withheld damning
medical reports from their employees and emphasized that asbestos did more good than
harm. JM products were essential in developing countries that required both shelter and
reliable water and sewer systems because “[p]roviding these with asbestos cement
products does not require sophisticated technology. It requires for the most part simply
the importation of asbestos fiber—a material much less costly than substitute building
materials such as steel, imported wood or petroleum-based products.”1024 Despite its
negative health effects, according to JM, the mineral still saved and improved lives.
The town of Asbestos was featured in the update as the source of all the potential
good that could come from JM products. The magazine profiled Norman Chartier, who
had worked at the Jeffrey Mine for four decades and was now a mill supervisor. Although
we need to remember that his statements were made with the intention of boosting the
image of JM and the mineral, Chartier hinted at the local cultural identity in Asbestos
when he stated that no job was 100% safe, but “if a man uses common sense on the job
and follows the rules set down for his protection, he’s more apt to get into trouble when
he’s not working.”1025 In Chartier’s opinion, workers were so fully protected at the Jeffrey
Mine that the only time anything bad could happen to them was when they were at home
or socializing in town, unsupervised by JM.
This was the type of information the company wanted its employees to believe
and publicize. Chartier also dismissed the negative reports the industry had received
recently as meaningless “propaganda” that more accurately described the situation 20 to
40 years before. He stated that the “enormous effort and energy devoted by the company
over the past several years in protecting workers’ health is beginning to pay off....If you
believe everything you read in the newspapers or watch on television about asbestos, then
there’s no future for our industry.”1026 The idea of there being no future for the industry,
and therefore for Asbestos, was more terrifying to Chartier than the potential health
threats the mineral caused, and it is likely other Jeffrey Mine workers felt the same.
In Chartier’s opinion, he had lived “the good life” in Asbestos thanks to the
mineral and that “[u]nder today’s conditions, I’d encourage people to work in this
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industry. As a matter of fact, if I were starting all over again, I wouldn’t hesitate—I’d
apply for the same job again.”1027 Chartier was not worried about his health despite the
fact that he had worked in one of the dustiest areas of the Jeffrey Mine since 1936. His
life, and the risks he faced, was what was expected and accepted in Asbestos as part of a
local cultural identity developed over generations. The company knew the strength of this
identity and while JM now informed its employees of their illnesses when they were
discovered, officials still believed the company had done no wrong by keeping reports
secret in the past. JM justified this belief because Asbestos was a company town and if
the population could not work at the Jeffrey Mine, no alternative jobs were available and
the community would collapse.1028 The company also released a pamphlet in 1981
entitled, “Asbestos, Health and Johns-Manville” which stated that the asbestos-related
diseases of today were due to a lack of knowledge 20 to 40 years before and that no new
cases would develop now that the company was aware of the risk.1029 This dissertation
has shown that JM 1981 statement was false: the company had known of the health risks
associated with the mineral since the early 1920s when the first asbestos-related death
was reported, but chose not to act because of fears of bad publicity and litigation. The
Canadian medical community supported JM’s claim that while carcinogenic, chrysotile
was not as dangerous as other types of asbestos and working with the mineral was
equivalent to smoking only 3 to 4 cigarettes a week.1030
The support of the Canadian medical community was important because it
legitimized JM’s claim of past ignorance and drew public attention away from the issue.
The Canadian medical community—both Anglophone and Francophone—was exposed to
international reports detailing the epidemiology of asbestos-related disease, but chose not
to investigate further, as seen with the lack of publications on the mineral during the
1980s, possibly because industrial diseases were no longer as funding-attracting or as
interesting to medical researchers as “newer” disease such as AIDS were. While national
and international focus on the health effects of the mineral came and went, the people of
Asbestos were constantly aware of them. Dealing with risk at the Jeffrey Mine and in the
community had become habit for the local population, but not because they did not know
1027

Ibid, p. 7.
Hugh Jackson, JM, 13 March 1981, “Asbestos Chronology,” ACRF, p. 188-189.
1029
“Asbestos, Health and Johns-Manville,” 1981, ACRF, p. 3.
1030
F.D.K. Liddell, “Asbestos and Public Health,” CMAJ, vol. 125 (1 August 1981), p. 237.
1028

245
or feel how the mineral was affecting their bodies. This chapter has shown that Jeffrey
Mine workers were aware of the health issues surrounding their industry and their land
not because of the Canadian medical community, French Canadian journalists, or
government officials, but rather shockingly because of JM’s increased willingness to
finally inform employees of their illnesses when they were detected and introduce
mandatory occupational health and safety measures at the Jeffrey Mine. The fact that
local knowledge of the risks associated with asbestos came from the company meant that
the community’s understanding of the mineral’s dangers was shaped by JM officials. It
was difficult to deny that the health effects of the mineral were bad, but the way the
people of Asbestos rooted their local identity in their connection to the land, combined
with how they were made aware of the mineral’s risk, meant that they remained
committed to JM, and the belief that the health of their bodies was tied to the health of the
industry.
Despite local support, JM continued to be plagued by litigation in the United
States, where workers compensation laws made the company liable for multi-million
dollar class-action suits, and bad press around the world. Relying on the supposed
healthiness of Jeffrey Mine employees was no longer enough. In 1982, unable to
financially support itself due to the rising costs of litigation, and anticipating 52,000 new
lawsuits averaging $40,000 each to appear in the future, the company filed for
bankruptcy.1031 JM left the Jeffrey Mine in 1983 after having been such an important,
although controversial, presence in Asbestos for more than half a century. Despite JM’s
bankruptcy and abandonment of the Jeffrey Mine, the people of Asbestos remained
committed to the industry. Some citizens left town to seek more stable, healthy
employment, but most remained.
The Quebec government under the control of René Lévesque’s Parti Québécois
nationalized the industry and eventually subsidized the town as a new public company
named JM Asbestos took over the Jeffrey Mine. Nationalization effectively blocked any
outside inquiries into the health of the workers in Asbestos1032 and began a trend in which
the provincial and federal governments would support the industry by doing what JM
could no longer do: denying damning medical reports, overlooking the welfare of
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community members, refusing to properly label shipments of asbestos to other countries,
and agreeing to sell the mineral to developing nations that would not uphold the strict
health regulations needed to make the industry safer. These are actions JM could not
continue, and while the government did not resort to the most severe of JM’s cover-up
methods—altering and suppressing medical reports, stealing lungs from dead miners and
sanding off its own warning labels—its continued support of the toxic industry remain
shocking.
Although government subsidies often gain coverage in the national and
international press, the more significant aspect of this issue is the continued acceptance of
risk in Asbestos. Generations of citizens have worked at the Jeffrey Mine surrounded by
dust they knew to be dangerous, and they continue to do so today despite the widespread
knowledge of how the mineral can affect human health. JM employees consistently
refused to wear respirators when they were provided and chose not to push the company
for better workplace safety in the years following the 1949 strike. This chapter has shown
that the 1949 strike changed the way the people of Asbestos understood and accepted risk
as part of their local cultural identity. In order for their community to survive, the mineral
had to be safe. Because they interacted with asbestos in its purest form, right from the
Jeffrey Mine, it was crucial that they did not fear the dust or what they knew it was
capable of doing to their bodies. JM manipulated medical evidence and human bodies in
Asbestos, but this chapter has also shown that the community played an active role in the
local understanding of bodies and management of risk after the 1949 strike.
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Chapter 8: Altered Authority: The Body Politic, 1949-1983
In 2004 Asbestos and Canada made international headlines at the United Nation’s
Rotterdam Convention when government officials prevented chrysotile asbestos from
being placed on the Prior Informed Consent list of dangerous minerals, which would
hinder trade of the fibre. The government justified this manoeuvre by stating that asbestos
is safe, “provided it is manufactured, handled with care, and exposures to dust are
stringently prevented or controlled to low levels.”1033 No mention was made of the
dangers the mineral posed in its raw form. Furthermore, just because it could be used
safely does not mean it would, and the government has never ensured that proper health
and safety regulations are upheld in the developing countries to whom it sells the mineral.
Canada mainly competes with Russia for asbestos markets in developing nations, which
makes American environmental consultant Barry Castleman believe, “If the only people
saying it’s good are the Russians, we can deal with that. Canada saying it’s good makes it
more complicated.”1034 Castleman’s reasoning is based on the idea that Canada is often
seen as an “international Boy Scout”1035 when it comes to human rights and safety, which
makes its support of the industry shocking.
This chapter will argue that Canada’s ongoing support of the industry is rooted in
the local cultural identity in Asbestos, which gives the community the confidence to
successfully lobby for its survival. Global asbestos trade historians Jock McCulloch and
Geoffrey Tweedale believe that one of the major constants in the history of the industry is
“the malevolent role played by Canada in promoting asbestos use in the developing
world. Canada is a member of the G8 and it carries some influence on the global stage. Its
industry and government, backed by a sophisticated scientific community, have used their
access to elite forums, including the WHO [World Health Organization] and the WTO
[World Trade Organization], to promote asbestos.”1036 When examining how the people
of Asbestos understood their community and their industry following the 1949 strike,
however, we can see that the selling of the mineral today is based on a desperate local
attempt to preserve the cultural identity formed in Asbestos through generations of
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confronting risks to community, health, and finances working the Jeffrey Mine posed.
Asbestos has a past that far exceeds the 1949 strike. By examining the community from
1949 to 1983, this chapter will show how the people of Asbestos developed new ways to
articulate their cultural identity to influence both industry and politics, and how they
continue to do so by looking to their past.
“Le travail, c’est la lutte pour la vie,” 1949-1952
After people celebrated the end of the strike on the streets of Asbestos in July
1949, the local paper printed the agreement so that everyone would be aware of the terms.
Although some issues would be reserved for continued arbitration, the union was to be
recertified and JM would bring the striking workers back to their jobs as quickly as
production rates allowed.1037 The company would also expand its underground mining
operations to allow for 100 more employees.
Despite the efforts of the union and the local paper, JM president Lewis H. Brown
did not trust that the finer details of the agreement were being related to the workers,
which made them mistakenly believe that they had won the five-month battle that had just
taken place. Brown sent a letter to each JM employee in Asbestos detailing the terms of
the agreement and making it clear that the company, not the working class of the
community, was victorious.1038 The letter emphasized that many of the striking workers
would not be taken back at the Jeffrey Mine due to a global recession. Brown explained
to lead arbitrator Quebec Archbishop Maurice Roy that the “reduction in employment
would have taken place even had there been no strike at all. This fundamental fact of the
recession in business as the basic cause of unemployment which will exist in Asbestos, is
still the heart of the problem and everyone there must be made to understand the
facts.”1039
While there was a global recession that had impacted the asbestos industry before
the strike, the five months of the conflict, which saw no fibre extracted from the vital
Quebec mines, in truth meant there was now an increase rather than a drop in demand for
the mineral.1040 Brown was misleading in more than this one instance. He explained that
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all the workers except those facing criminal charges would be “put back to their
occupation” at their 1948 wages, but this meant any job at the Jeffrey Mine, not their
former placement, which was a significant difference, especially because their original
positions had been taken by strikebreakers, who, Brown explained, would not be affected
by employee cutbacks due to the recession.1041 The message was clear: Brown wanted the
people of Asbestos to understand and accept their defeat.
The thought that strikebreakers would keep their jobs while unionized workers
who had not earned wages for the past five months had to face the uncertainty of
unemployment angered the people of Asbestos. While Brown misled employees in his
letter to demonstrate the degree of JM’s power over the community, and replacement
workers hired by the company after 1 May were let go once the conflict was settled, only
260 strikers were taken back at the Jeffrey Mine in July. Over the duration of the strike,
workers had each lost an average of $1,066 in wages1042 and they were outraged that they
would continue to earn nothing while strikebreakers from outside Asbestos worked their
jobs. After receiving Brown’s letter, groups of men who had been on strike and who were
now unemployed roamed the streets late into the night, throwing rocks through the
windows of homes where strikebreakers or JM sympathizers lived, violently attacking
any “scab” they encountered, and burning down a garage in Tingwick, home of many of
the strikebreakers keeping their new jobs at the Jeffrey Mine.1043 Local police received 15
calls in one night from townspeople afraid of the mob of workers who were expressing
their anger with the current situation and their fear for the future. Although the strike was
over, the ways in which it had affected the dynamics of the entire community were just
beginning to be revealed.
JM responded to the threat of angry, unemployed workers by having more
policemen patrol the Jeffrey Mine 24 hours a day to ensure that the disgruntled men
would not attack company operations.1044 The Jeffrey Mine was once again firmly under
the control of JM, but remained a potential battleground. The local newspaper continued
to deny its bias in favour of the company and decided to do its part to calm the people of
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Asbestos by reporting that enough had been written on the conflict and that it needed to
be forgotten,1045 which the local population could not do with so many Jeffrey Mine
employees still out of work. Furthermore, the strike was continuously discussed in
Quebec, with new labour disputes that arose being compared to the one in Asbestos. The
strike was over, but the years that followed would show that the pain it caused the town
would not go away. The blend of local pain and province-wide celebrity directly affected
how people saw their community in the years following the strike.
The post-strike community in Asbestos grew to be radically different than its prestrike manifestation. While still confident that the Jeffrey Mine would provide for them
despite their hardships, the townspeople were worried about how the strike would be
settled outside of contract negotiations: they were concerned about how poor relations
and power struggles between JM and the workers would continue to harm the community.
In August 1949, local resident Bertrand McNeil wrote to Quebec Minister of Labour
Antonio Barrette and expressed the uncertainty that reigned in Asbestos in the months
following the strike: “[j]’ai 20 ans, j’avais 1 ans et demi de service et j’ai besoin de
travailler. Je n’ai pas de mauvais raports avec la compagnie. Je voudrais savoir s’ils vont
tous nous reprende où s’ils nous font attendre pour rien. Mon père a une grosse famille et
une maison à payer et je suis seul pour l’aider. Je payais pour mon frère de 16 ans qui fait
des études pour devenir religieux.”1046 McNeil’s letter offers insight into the post-strike
atmosphere of uncertainty in Asbestos, expressed in his desire to know if he and his
fellow workers would actually be taken back at the Jeffrey Mine. His concern for his
father and the rest of his family demonstrates how much townspeople depended on JM for
employment and how hard it must have been for these large families to survive during the
strike. McNeil’s case was brought to the attention of the arbitration board and he was told
that unemployment in Asbestos would end soon, but was given no definite date to ease
his worries.1047
McNeil was indicative of the type of people who lived in Asbestos in 1949. His
letter showed that he aspired to nothing more than a life of stable employment at the
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Jeffrey Mine. He was not a left-wing radical who wanted to overthrow the socio-political
system of the province. The humble nature of McNeil’s letter was echoed in September
1949 by Madame Eugène Tourigny, who also wrote to Barrette. Tourigny asked the
minister why strikebreakers remained at the Jeffrey Mine while locals were unemployed
indefinitely. She wrote, “[v]ous allez peut-être me trouver exigeant mais vous savez j’ai
un coeur de maman et lorsque je vois mes enfants sans ouvrage cela me peine beaucoup
de voir les briseurs de grève pour la plus part faire souffrir des femmes et enfants des
grévistes… c’est un grand malheur pour Asbestos que cette triste grève.”1048 The sorrow
she expressed over seeing strikebreakers taking the jobs of her children gave her the
authority to be heard. Her letter also claimed that the strikebreakers were not simply
victims of mob violence but rather they had developed a hubris that led them to intimidate
local women and children. Whether true or not, this idea contrasted the idea that
replacement workers were simply victims of unruly mobs of unemployed men.
Tourigny’s letter was also sent to the arbitration board1049 and showed that the
involvement of the community’s female population in Jeffrey Mine affairs seen during
the strike was not unusual. Although the people of Asbestos had turned against Maurice
Duplessis and his Union Nationale government during the strike, Tourigny’s letter
showed that some townspeople were still willing to ask them for help. Re-employment
was a slow process, however, and the community would become increasingly self-reliant
in the years to come.
The self-reliance of the community was seen in October 1949, when town council
began negotiations with the Shawinigan Water & Power Co. to install power lines in the
newer sections of town.1050 The establishment of new power lines was normally
something JM would have facilitated, especially considering streetlights were needed for
Jeffrey Mine employees working nightshifts. The situation in Asbestos had changed since
the strike and the way town council distanced itself from JM was simply one indication of
this.
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The town officially took control of its electricity on 12 December 1949 and
purchased trucks to help transport and install the poles required for the new lines.1051 The
year ended with JM and the local newspaper hoping for peaceful company-community
relations in the future,1052 but many former strikers remained unemployed and everyone
worried about future contract negotiations. As 1950 began, however, it became clear that
a new era had as well. JM sent American Karl V. Lindell to replace G.K. Foster as
president of CJM. Foster had become wildly unpopular in Asbestos since his involvement
in the brutality of the provincial police at the Hotel Iroquois during strike, and JM was
wise to replace him. In an attempt to improve company-community relations, Lindell
spoke to townspeople of his hopes for the future and his commitment to learn French. The
town remembers Lindell fondly even today as being someone who brought a new attitude
of cooperation and consideration to Asbestos.1053
Lindell’s attitude complemented the approach town council now took with
community affairs. In February 1950, “le conseil demande instament à la Canadian JohnsManville Co. Ltd., de faire tout en son pouvoir pour trouver dans son industrie de
l’emploi pour les personnes sans ouvrage qui demeurent à Asbestos.”1054 Council was
frustrated with the company’s handling of re-employment and made it clear that JM’s
priority should be the citizens of Asbestos, not strikebreakers. If Lindell was sincere in his
commitment to the community, he needed to return the formerly striking workers to their
jobs at the Jeffrey Mine. The majority of these workers were taken back by April.
A week following this demand, the collective agreement between the workers and
JM that had been pending since December 1948 was finally signed. The workers received
a 10-cent per hour raise, one additional paid holiday, and two weeks of vacation after
being employed at the Jeffrey Mine for three years.1055 These terms failed to address the
major issues of land use, dust control, and the desire for employees to have a say in
company promotions the strikers had fought for at the beginning of 1949. Their
acceptance of the terms shows us how desperate workers were to return to their jobs at the
Jeffrey Mine. These were battles the workers could fight in the future.
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The community saw the new contract as an achievement because it officially
ended the strike, but many worried about how the conflict had affected the town’s image.
New labour disputes in Quebec were still being compared to the one in Asbestos, which
prevented the town from moving past the painful memories it caused.1056 Furthermore,
Duplessis used the violence of the strike to reinforce his anti-communist loi du cadenas
and limit the power of unions in Quebec.1057 When Archbishop of Montreal Joseph
Charbonneau was removed from his position and forced into a west-coast retirement in
February 1950, the international press believed it was because of the role he played in the
strike.1058 Many also speculated that Sherbrooke’s bishop, Philippe Desranleau, would
soon follow Charbonneau for similar reasons, but his untimely death prevented it. The
strike was becoming part of Quebec’s political culture and the people of Asbestos were
awarded a power they neither sought nor fully understood.
Although they heard through newspaper reports how the strike was transformed
into legend outside the community, townspeople remained removed from it and continued
to focus on their work at the Jeffrey Mine. Despite Brown’s previous recession claims, in
April 1950 the company announced that it had a $70,000 surplus from 1949 that it would
share with its employees, almost all of whom had been hired back.1059 Part of Lindell’s
approach to industrial relations in Asbestos, JM’s profit sharing fed the cultural identity
because it acknowledged the important local role employees had in the global industry.
Despite the positive feelings this bonus brought, Asbestos held a referendum in May and
the town voted to spend $100,000 to attract new industries to the community.1060 The
unemployment problem following the strike reinforced a lesson the people of Asbestos
already knew: relying on a single industry and employer was dangerous. A new industry
has never come to Asbestos, however, which has influenced the development of the local
cultural identity and forced townspeople to accept that without the asbestos industry, the
community would not survive. This knowledge is part of the reason why the people of
Asbestos continue to fight for the survival of their industry today.
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Despite the referendum, company-community relations continued to improve
under Lindell’s management. In 1950 the company celebrated both St-Jean-Baptiste Day
in June and Labour Day in September with its employees and their families for the first
time.1061 Union heads were present and the militant curé Camirand gave a picnic mass.
Unheard of just a year before, the workers and the company had come to terms with the
power each held in the community and were able to coexist because of their
understanding. Twenty-nine new members of the Quarter-Century Club were inducted in
1950, bringing the total number of employees who had worked at the Jeffrey Mine for at
least 25 years up to 205, which was longer than many JM officials in Asbestos.1062 By
October, almost half the town’s population worked at the Jeffrey Mine, matching the prestrike employment rate.1063 Authority in Asbestos was shared between the workers, JM,
and town officials because they knew they depended on each other for survival. Town
council did not suddenly renew its close ties with JM when it came to infrastructure,
however, and council purchased its own snowplows to clear the winter streets so it would
not have to rely on JM as it had in the past.1064
A balance between dependence and independence was maintained in Asbestos
into 1951 when a new collective agreement was signed with little dispute between the
company and union representatives.1065 The workers received a 15% wage increase, a
bonus for those on night shifts, one more paid holiday, and a social security plan that both
JM and its employees paid into equally, which were significant accomplishments. The
company also promised to rehire all of the remaining workers who had been unemployed
since the strike within three months. These harmonious relations led the local paper to
write that there was no news report because “C’est tranquille, dit-on, à Asbestos”1066
There was no conflict in the community just two years after the most bitter strike the town
had experienced, a sign of the new spirit of cooperation and cohabitation in Asbestos.
The new spirit was further illustrated in May 1951 when JM opened Jeffrey Mine
operations to the community to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the pit. This contrasted
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the heavily guarded property during the strike of 1949, and over 3,500 people visited.1067
JM also acknowledged the importance of working at the mine to the people of Asbestos
when Lindell stated in his Labour Day message that “Le travail, c’est la lutte pour la vie.
Le Créateur nous a entourés de richesses qu’Il veut que nous exploitions à notre
profit.”1068 Work, religion, and the Jeffrey Mine were interwoven for the townspeople
who built their lives and cultural identity around them.
These good relations occurred independently of how others were beginning to see
the community and what it could represent. In the summer of 1951, 75 union heads
representing miners throughout Quebec held their annual meeting in Asbestos.1069 The
town had maintained its reputation for being a place of importance for the labour
movement in the province. Because industrial relations had improved remarkably, local
workers continued their belief in the strength of unions, as it was the CTCC that had JM
drop the charges against labour leaders Rodolphe Hamel and Armande Larivée, along
with 19 others, for their roles in the riot of May 1949 as part of contract negotiations at
the end of 1951. The union also convinced the company to finally rehire the last
remaining worker who had not been taken back at the Jeffrey Mine since the strike and to
return all its workers to their original positions.1070 JM and its employees were on
excellent terms in the early 1950s, but this was largely due to Lindell. The people of
Asbestos continued to remember the pain the strike caused the community, and expressed
it by directing anger towards Premier Duplessis.
Asbestos had previously voted in favour of the Union nationale by electing Mayor
Albert Goudreau as their provincial representative, but his popularity had disappeared in
1949 and he was defeated in the next municipal election. Goudreau remained committed
to Duplessis and to representing the people of Asbestos despite this loss, but when he
campaigned in the 1952 provincial election, he was harassed by townspeople.1071 They
had not forgotten how the government sent provincial police to the community and
Goudreau’s ineffectiveness in sending them away.
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Local support for candidates in the Quebec election of 1952 was shown much in
the same way support for the strike of 1949 was in Asbestos: through church alliances.
On 3 July, Goudreau held a Union nationale rally with Minister of Industry and
Commerce Paul Beaulieu in St-Isaac Jogues, the church that was boycotted during the
strike because its priest was against the conflict. Hundreds of disgruntled local residents
attended, but only one was brave enough to yell, “Parlez-nous de la grève!” Beaulieu
condescendingly replied, “La grève, c’est une affaire réglée, mon garçon,” which only
further angered the crowd.1072 Despite harmonious company-community relations, the
strike was not a settled affair and Liberal candidate Émilien Lafrance would not make the
same mistake. The Liberals held their rally at St-Aimé, the church of choice for the
workers during the strike and still a politically charged place because of the police
violence in May 1949.
Lafrance dared Duplessis to come to Asbestos and say that he sympathized with
the workers. Carrier Fortin, a CTCC lawyer, also spoke and said, “Duplessis a plus que
prouvé son aversion pour la classe ouvrière...Si vous, travailleurs, le reportez au pouvoir,
vous serez en lutte ouverte avec le gouvernement...Mais il y a un jour par 4 ou 5 ans où
les ouvriers sont les maîtres, où ils sont les plus forts. Ce jour-là, c’est à eux de se
prononcer.”1073 Calling the workers “masters” and inviting them to engage in battle with
the Duplessis government through their votes was an effective election strategy for the
Liberals, who knew that Asbestos was theirs to lose. That Goudreau had asked the crowd
at St-Isaac Jogues if they thought things would be better if the community returned to a
time before Duplessis showed that he did not understand his constituents at all. They did
not want to go back in time: the people of Asbestos were looking to the future.
The Duplessis government was re-elected in almost every riding in Quebec, but
Asbestos was one of the few places outside of Montreal where the Liberals won.1074 The
Union nationale dropped 17% in the popular vote and the Liberals increased their
presence in the legislature from eight seats to 23. The people of Asbestos celebrated the
results in the streets of the town and in the basement of St-Aimé, happy to have won this
battle.
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“Une personnalité remarquable se révèle,” 1953-1972
The town of Asbestos continued to vote Liberal until 1970. Although Duplessis
visited the town in 1954 to open a new mill at the Jeffrey Mine,1075 townspeople would
not forgive him as they seemed to forgive JM. Company-community relations in Asbestos
continued to be good, with JM now providing a minimum pension of $110 per month for
its retired employees.1076 The company and its workers had come to an understanding
about the important roles both played in the success of the community and the industry.
JM continued to run PR campaigns in Asbestos and in May 1955, its employee newsletter
emphasized the importance of JM workers in an article in which a son questioned his
father on the value of his job. The father replied, “Mon fils, il est vrais que je porte des
habits de travail, et que je me souille les mains. Mais, n’aies pas honte de dire bien haut à
tes compagnons que la fibre d’amiante, que j’aide à usiner et à manufacturer, joue un rôle
dans l’industrie nationale et mondiale.”1077 While it was a fictional conversation, this
article highlighted some major characteristics of the cultural identity in Asbestos. Jeffrey
Mine workers were proud of the role they played in the global industry, and it was
common in the community for sons to follow fathers into employment at the mine.
Articles like this spoke to the issues that concerned the community, supporting the
idea that their labour, while dirty, was valuable and should be appealing to their children
for future careers. A group of intellectuals from outside Asbestos, however, overlooked
these local issues and attempted to assign the community different priorities. Pierre
Trudeau’s La grève de l’amiante was released in 1956 and detailed how the 1949 strike in
Asbestos radically changed Quebec society and politics. Trudeau was especially effective
at using the strike to shape the Quebec he envisioned, which was one where French
Canadians rebelled against their foreign employers and claimed their natural resource
industries for themselves.1078 Maurice Sauvé wrote the only chapter in the collection that
actually studied the community in detail and acknowledged the harmonious industrial
relations in Asbestos since the conflict. Sauvé also showed that many of the demands
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made by the workers in 1949 had been implemented, making JM employees the best paid
miners in the country.1079
Despite this perspective, Sauvé’s chapter was overshadowed by Trudeau’s
introduction and conclusion. These pieces announced a radical change in Quebec’s sociopolitical culture and, according to Trudeau biographer John English, “immediately set off
intellectual explosions,”1080 discussed in newspapers, journals, and academic and
religious circles throughout the province.1081 While not everyone agreed with Trudeau,
his personality and convictions gave first the collection, then the town of Asbestos, a
degree of power the community did not appreciate. No mention of the collection was
made in either the local paper or town council minutes, which was unusual because these
were the venues in which the community’s wider reputation was often discussed. This
absence was explained in the 1999 local history of the town, which stated that the
collection “n’est pas sur les résultats de la grève que le débat entre chercheurs va se
faire…Nous souhaitons plutôt apporter une attention particulière au débat local, voir en
quoi ce conflit va modeler la conscience collective des gens d’Asbestos.”1082 The
townspeople were not concerned with what a group of intellectuals read into their local
conflict: they knew what it meant to the community and that was what mattered. While
Trudeau’s collection did not anger the people of Asbestos, it did not concern them.
The strike was deeply personal for the community and taking it out of its local
context put their painful memories on display. Quebec labour historian Jacques Rouillard
writes that Trudeau’s book, not the strike, affected how the province viewed its workingclass in the decades to come,1083 which was a reflection of how the community viewed the
strike and the publication. The people of Asbestos did not see themselves as being at the
forefront of radical political change and they did not want the notoriety that came with
this new reputation. Instead, the community remained focused on working the Jeffrey
Mine, which brought their attention to the fact that a small portion of JM’s workforce
came from the communities surrounding Asbestos.
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Although this had always been the case, the strikebreakers the company had hired
in 1949 came from these neighbouring towns and turned the local population against
anyone at the Jeffrey Mine who was not from Asbestos. Although it had no authority to
do so, council lobbied JM to stop hiring workers from outside the community and tried to
encourage non-local employees to move into Asbestos by offering free rent for a year and
a special discount at certain local stores.1084 Council attempting to attract new residents by
reducing living expenses directly defied their own Règlement 163, which was passed in
1927 and levied an extra tax on all residents who had not lived in the town for at least a
year.1085 Following the 1949 strike, if people were going to profit from the community,
they had to be contributing members of it, not outsiders who took what they wanted and
left. The changed attitude towards non-locals helps illuminate the cultural identity of the
post-strike community in Asbestos, showing us how the presence of strikebreakers during
the dispute solidified the connection between townspeople and the Jeffrey Mine. They did
not want people who were not part of the community to disrupt this connection.
Because of Trudeau’s collection, the people of Asbestos could not keep their
history free from the political discourse of the province.1086 This became even more
apparent 10 years later when Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) member Pierre
Vallières wrote White Niggers of America from jail and rooted the terrorist movement in
the 1949 strike. Vallières argued that the workers took control of Asbestos and, “refused
to obey their leaders, including Jean Marchand, and even their curé. Duplessis’ police
crushed their revolt, and this action aroused the people against the monarch of ‘the great
darkness.’”1087 Vallières’ gross misrepresentation of the strike and the people of Asbestos
exceeded the claims in Trudeau’s 1956 collection. In reality, townspeople continued to
have warm feelings towards Marchand because of his role in the strike and they
remembered the support Laporte gave them while reporting for Le Devoir. Despite the
sentiments of the local population, these books influenced the way Asbestos would be
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treated in the coming years within Quebec’s political realm. This was first seen with how
Trudeau’s collection impacted the provincial election of 1960, which saw Liberal leader
Jean Lesage running against the Union nationale’s Antonio Barrette, Minister of Labour
during the 1949 strike. Asbestos was used as political capital during the campaign.
Lesage attacked Barrette’s image by invoking the strike and continuously stating,
“pendant la grève sanglante de l’amiante, Barrette était aux Bermudes” with JM
officials.1088 Although there had been relatively little blood spilled in the 1949 strike, it
was now seen as “bloody” in the collective memory of Quebec. Lesage’s accusation was
reported throughout the province and Barrette had to address the newly symbolic nature
of Asbestos and its strike.
J-Osias Poirier was the Union nationale’s candidate for the town’s riding and
Barrette spoke in Asbestos to try to convince them he had always looked after their
interests.1089 What Barrette failed to understand was that the people of Asbestos still had
not forgotten that he and Poirier, the editor of the local newspaper, had taken JM’s side
during the strike; the people were not ready to forgive either of them for this betrayal.
With their new campaign slogan, “C’est le temps que ça change,” the Liberals were
victorious in the election of 1960. The people of Asbestos were happy knowing that the
Union nationale was out of power, but they were also fully involved in the new political
reality of the province. Because of the government’s interest in natural resources and the
province’s interest in Asbestos, Minister of Natural Resources René Lévesque visited the
community in 1961 to talk about the importance of the Jeffrey Mine to Quebec.1090 Jean
Lesage followed Lévesque, and announced the plan to nationalize the hydroelectric
industry there as part of his “Maîtres chez nous” election campaign.
Nationalization of hydroelectricity would see the province take control of the
industry from individual companies to make it a government corporation. Lesage told
Asbestos that this was the time to take Quebec’s economic destiny in hand and that it was
necessary for French Canadians to control the province’s profitable resource
industries.1091 Lesage believed this message would be well received in the community
because an American company owned the Jeffrey Mine. Lévesque followed Lesage in
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October, speaking for two hours to the townspeople of his plans for the nationalization of
Quebec’s natural resources.
Although the bitterness between JM and its employees had diminished in the years
following the strike, the people of Asbestos rallied behind the “Maîtres chez nous” plan.
The Liberals won a majority government in 1962 and the local newspaper proudly
displayed Lesage’s victory statement about the people of Quebec finally becoming
masters in the province.1092 Despite this rhetoric, JM was not concerned with the election
because officials had a larger issue to deal with: health. The growing international
awareness of asbestos-related disease had become a main focus for the company, and
upon Lindell’s insistence, QAMA aligned itself more fully with the federal government in
hopes that it would prevent any new regulations being passed that would hinder
production.1093 Lindell also spoke to the people of Asbestos and urged them to work with
the company to fight against the mineral’s tarnished image.1094
JM did not suspect Lesage’s message would have a great impact on its employees,
but it did. In May 1967, sixty-eight men who were a part of the bagging crew at the mine
walked off the job.1095 This was the first labour dispute in the community since 1949—a
remarkable fact, given Asbestos’ history—but it shows the degree to which the
population had grown averse to strikes. The men walked out because of a disciplinary
problem in the mill, but the union instructed them to return to work and they did. The
walkout, while short, demonstrated that Jeffrey Mine workers remained confident in their
important roles at the mine and would take action whenever they were challenged.
The 1967 strike also showed the power the union still had in Asbestos, which was
worrisome for JM. The federal election of 1968 saw Trudeau, Marchand, and Gérard
Pelletier run for office. All three had been present in Asbestos during the 1949 strike and,
with Trudeau’s 1956 collection, had a hand in turning the conflict into a political symbol,
although Marchand did not contribute a chapter. JM worried that new Quebec Premier
Daniel Johnson “might try to be more friendly with labour, should Trudeau and Marchand
become the leaders in Ottawa; as a result industry could be affected.”1096 Trudeau,
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Pelletier, and especially former CTCC secretary Marchand, knew of the health risks of
asbestos and of the history foreign companies like JM had of treating their French
Canadian employees poorly. If there was an industry in Quebec primed for
nationalization as hydroelectricity had been, it was asbestos, and these federal politicians
had the power to influence Daniel Johnson into making it happen.
The three men were elected in April 1968 with Trudeau as Prime Minister and
Marchand and Pelletier serving in his cabinet. JM reacted to their victory by going on the
offensive and meeting with union leaders and town council to negotiate the rebuilding of
a factory that was being destroyed because of health violations.1097 Despite their
continued reliance on their union and their aversion to the Union nationale, the people of
Asbestos were not full participants in the socio-political revolution sweeping Quebec in
the 1960s. They supported the CTCC becoming the Confédération des syndicats
nationaux (CSN) and breaking away from the Catholic Church in 1960, and they were
comfortable with the CSN demanding that the provincial government make French the
official workplace language in order to change the socio-economic structure of
Quebec.1098 When the CSN supported striking Montreal postal workers launching a
political war against the federal government in the Lapalme Affair of 1970,1099 however,
the community was shocked.1100 Later that year, when the CSN criticized the Trudeau
government for invoking the War Measures Act that sent the Canadian military into
Montreal to combat the FLQ, which had kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James
Cross and murdered Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte, the people of Asbestos
felt that the union had become too radical and no longer represented the interests of
Jeffrey Mine workers. The town protested the radical actions of the CSN when Jeffrey
Mine employees voted to break with the union in 1972 because they believed “le statue
quo [of the CSN] étant inacceptable et le nettoyage impossible.”1101 Workers did not want
the union representing them and longer, nor did they like their painful history being a
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political tool for any organization. A few weeks later, the local union joined the more
moderate Centrale des syndicates démocratiques (CSD).
“un tel conflit devient quelque chose de spectaculaire,” 1973-1983
Content with their new, more moderate union, at the end of 1972 the workers at
the Jeffrey Mine produced 13% of the global supply of asbestos and shipped 94% of it to
over 70 countries.1102 Because asbestos companies were increasingly worried about the
health effects of the mineral negatively affecting trade, they formed the Asbestos
Information Committee, an international association between Canada, the United States,
and the United Kingdom that would promote the industry.1103 Although QAMA did not
think the Canadian industry was as threatened as those in other countries, it joined the
new organization because the CSN came out against the ways in which companies had
diminished the health effects of the mineral.1104
Fortunately for JM, its Asbestos employees were no longer members of the CSN
and were proud of their local contribution to the global industry. Relations between the
company and the workers were no longer as harmonious as before, however, because of
the land expropriations that were taking place throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The
community discord was expressed in the local newspaper’s special edition on the 75th
anniversary of the town in 1974. The paper not only memorialized all the neighbourhoods
that had been destroyed by the expanding Jeffrey Mine, but also dedicated three pages to
the 1949 strike. In these pages, the paper stated, “on ne peut ignorer que ce souvenir est
tellement bien buriné dans le coeur et l’esprit de bien des gens que, pour plusieurs, il
serait presque vain de rappeler cet événement important,” and described it as “l’épisode le
plus dramatique du syndicalisme au Quebec.”1105 While they disagreed with those outside
the community appropriating their past for political ends, the people of Asbestos had
grown accustomed to its symbolic value. The paper explained that because of the major
political and religious figures involved in the strike “on peut dire qu’un tel conflit devient
quelque chose de spectaculaire.”1106 The continued use of the conflict by major political
figures in Quebec suggests that the spectacular nature of the conflict, and thus of the
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people of Asbestos, remained in the 1970s and began to influence the local political
culture, suggesting that the community had a significance that surpassed the industry.
The special edition also featured letters from Pierre Trudeau congratulating the
town on its anniversary and Gérard Pelletier reflecting on his experience during the strike.
Trudeau remained convinced of his 1956 interpretation of the strike and claimed that the
townspeople always had a remarkable faith in the future and possessed a courage and a
determination that the entire country admired,1107 which further supported the idea that
the community possessed an importance beyond its role in the asbestos industry. Pictures
of Trudeau, Pelletier, and Marchand in Asbestos were displayed throughout the special
edition, although there remained no mention of Trudeau’s collection on the strike, as an
English translation was released.
As head of the new sovereignist Parti Québécois (PQ), René Lévesque was also
featured in the special edition. Lévesque held his party’s regional convention in Asbestos
in 1974 and the local newspaper further encouraged the idea that the town had a
significance unrelated to the industry by claiming that any politician who wanted votes in
Quebec had to visit the community and sympathize with its working class.1108 Although it
helped solidify this idea as part of the local cultural identity, this was a daring claim to
make as the industry began to suffer global collapse because of increased awareness of
the mineral’s health risks.
The political attention Asbestos received in the 1970s gave townspeople the
impression that the industry and the community were not as threatened by negative global
opinion as first believed. Driven by the confidence, from 19-21 February 1975, 2,000
Jeffrey Mine workers went on strike to gain a wage increase, health insurance, and shifts
that were at least 8 hours long each day.1109 The dispute was quickly resolved with both
sides compromising for the sake of production.
With the slow global collapse of the industry, workers in Asbestos did not strike
again. To push the company too far with labour issues would be to tip the balance needed
to maintain the success of the Jeffrey Mine. The history of Asbestos had shown
townspeople that when JM suffered, the community suffered in turn. Coinciding with the
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balanced approach to industrial relations in Asbestos was the election of Lévesque’s PQ
government in 1976, which marked an official passing of the early 20th century panCanadian nationalism espoused by politician and journalist Henri Bourassa in favour of a
pro-Québécois nationalism. While not all PQ supporters were sovereignists, they did
share an awareness of the need for French Canada to assert its authority over its own
destiny, and Lévesque was the spokesman for the “maîtres chez nous” movement in
Quebec. Asbestos articulated this awareness when it supported the Association des Gens
de l’Air du Québec’s struggle for language rights. Town council justified this support
when it declared, “l’enjeu de cette lutte, c’est la reconnaissance de la langue française sur
notre propre terriotoire.…[Qui] nous échappe au profit des anglophones des provinces
voisines...[et] cela influera grandement sur notre avenir économique.”1110 This was an
important stance for the people of Asbestos to take because of their bicultural heritage
and reliance on an Anglophone company for their success.
This dependence was subject to change, however, as Lévesque targeted asbestos
as the next resource industry to become nationalized and made a government corporation
as he had promised the townspeople when campaigning for Lesage in 1960. Although the
industry was suffering, it continued to be profitable and the 1949 strike had become such
a powerful symbol of modernity and Québécois strength in the political discourse of the
province that the PQ found the industry especially desirable. The Quebec government
created the Bureau de l’amiante in 1977 to study the economic potential and health risks
of the mineral.1111 Believing the benefits outweighed the risks, the PQ began the process
of nationalization, which worried JM. The company admitted that nationalization would
create 7,000 to 8,000 new jobs due to government capital used to increase the
manufacture of asbestos products,1112 but officials were wary it threatened their position
in Asbestos. Nevertheless, JM’s 2,500 workers voted in favour of nationalization because
government officials told them it would rescue the community from the industry’s
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problems.1113 Furthermore, because the town housed the largest chrysotile mine in the
world, Asbestos was sure to have a leading role in the new organization of the industry.
Nationalization was going to be the salvation of Asbestos, and Lévesque would
bring it to the town. The new Premier of Quebec had already proven himself to the
townspeople by rewriting many of the province’s labour laws and passing Bill 45 in July
1977, which forbade the employment of strikebreakers during a legal strike, guaranteed
the reemployment of striking workers once disputes were resolved, and implemented the
mandatory contribution of union dues from all workers, unionized or not.1114 These
reforms made Quebec a leader in North American labour legislation1115 and were things
the workers in Asbestos had been fighting for since 1949.
The PQ was more concerned with the interests of Quebec’s working class than the
success of the multinational companies that owned many of the province’s natural
resources, and this worried JM officials. Still believing in the profits the Jeffrey Mine
could bring them, JM objected to government control of the industry. When this objection
was leaked to the press in 1977, however, company president J.A. McKinney attempted
to spin it in a positive way. Not wanting to offend the provincial government during a
time of industrial uncertainty, McKinney wrote to Lévesque, “[o]ur attitude from the
beginning has been one of cooperation and not confrontation…Our statements have
consistently reflected our belief that your actions…will be responsible and constructive.
We will continue to support your efforts to improve the economic well being of Quebec
through betterment of the asbestos industry.”1116 JM did not want to antagonize the
government, but officials were not sure how to survive during the nationalization of the
industry.
The government passed Bill 70 in 1978 to form the Société nationale de l’amiante
to promote the production and trade of the mineral. In order to make the industry a crown
corporation under Quebec’s Minister of Natural Resources, the government spent $200
million buying the rights to the Thetford mines from the Asbestos Corporation and $50
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million on plans for expansion and promotion.1117 JM officials refused to sell the rights to
the Jeffrey Mine, which they believed was still profitable and worth more than the
province was offering. Not being able to force JM to sell the Jeffrey Mine, the Quebec
government became the company’s leading competitor in the country.
Not being included in the nationalization of the industry frustrated the people of
Asbestos, who remained under the control of an Anglophone American company. Not
being part of the new plan to revolutionize the industry and save it from collapse was
worrisome, especially when the government held the first Fête de l’amiante to promote
and bring positive attention to Thetford in 1978.1118 The town and the Jeffrey Mine were
left out of provincial efforts to restore the industry.
Community members attempted to boost the image of Asbestos themselves by
requesting that JM repaint the exteriors of the factory buildings at the Jeffrey Mine to
beautify the town,1119 but the company had a different strategy. In 1979, JM official
J.R.M. Hutcheson wrote Yves Bérubé, Quebec’s Minister of the Environment,
complaining that the company was paying 71% of its profits in taxes.1120 Hutcheson said
that if the province continued to tax the company this much, the company would be
forced to reconsider its future in Asbestos. The attempt by local residents to beautify the
town reveals their commitment to the community and its future success. Hutcheson’s
complaints and threats show how unattached JM was to Asbestos: as soon as business
became too difficult, the company would leave. The lack of attachment or responsibility
JM felt towards Asbestos was demonstrated again in June 1980 when the company
protested the new fixed price for the mineral that the Société nationale de l’amiante
established and informed the government that it expected Jeffrey Mine shipments to
decrease in the coming years.1121
The government had begun to realize the industry was not as profitable or stable
as it seemed, and was no longer looking to expand its nationalization plans, so JM’s
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threats were well timed.1122 JM was not only prepared to act on these threats, it was
forced to do so because of the rapidly declining market for asbestos. In September 1980,
the company reduced the working days for 150 of its employees at the Jeffrey Mine from
six to five,1123 and in January 1981, 400 workers were laid off. The fact that so many
employees worked six days a week until the end of 1980 shows that JM was trying to
extract as much raw asbestos as it could before the industry collapsed. Shift reductions
and layoffs worried the people of Asbestos, who knew that the market showed no signs of
a rebound. Town council sought the advice of the Société nationale de l’amiante and
formed a committee composed of the local union, the company, and both the federal and
provincial Ministries of Labour to solve the unemployment problem in Asbestos.1124
Because of the rising amount of litigation the company was facing in the United States,
the continued collapse of the global industry, and the price-fixing and taxation policies of
the Quebec government, JM would soon opt out of trying to solve the problem.
Although JM remained in charge of the Jeffrey Mine until 1983, by 1981 it was no
longer financially sustainable. The community would have to ensure it survived the
industrial crisis itself. The population of Asbestos had already dropped from 10,254 in
1971 to 7,967 in 1981 and this exodus had to be stopped.1125 No longer considering JM a
vital part of the community, council and unemployed workers held meetings throughout
the year to try to solve the crisis of a collapsed industry. In a major policy shift, the
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) stopped attacking the industry’s health issues to help it
survive.1126 When considering the best interests of its members, the union understood that
jobs were more important than health. While it continued to advocate for occupational
health and safety regulations to protect workers from industrial disease, the CLC no
longer made the toxicity of the mineral a major issues, stating instead that it could be
extracted and processed safely if proper regulations were followed.
The people of Asbestos appreciated the support of their industry. Not knowing
what the community would do if the markets completely collapsed, townspeople became
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comfortable with government protection, to the point of expecting it. The expectation of
government aid remains today and differs greatly from the fiercely independent
community this dissertation has shown Asbestos once was, showing just how
dramatically the local cultural identity changed in order for townspeople to adapt to the
realities of a collapsing industry. Council used the money it received to create new jobs
for its citizens and generated 72 temporary positions for the summer and an additional
114 with more funding.1127 These efforts were not enough, however, and in March the
Comité des Chômeurs requested that the local outdoor skating rink remain open as long
as weather allowed and asked for the donation of a ping-pong table in order to give
unemployed Jeffrey Mine workers something to do.1128 The community had become a
place where people drifted from activity to activity with no real purpose and no real
connection to the Jeffrey Mine. Their cultural identity was shaken.
The people of Asbestos had worked throughout the community’s history to
negotiate a balance between the interests of the workers, the company, and the town
council, but with the collapse of the industry, JM began to opt out. Council funded
activities for its unemployed citizens, but it was not successful in generating jobs. The
Jeffrey Mine defined Asbestos and the land was the community’s reason for existence.
Aside from providing temporary summer jobs and activities, there was little the town
could do to help its citizens.
Fortunately for Asbestos, both the provincial and the federal government were
supporting its cause. Council met with the PQ cabinet minister Yves Duhaime in March
1982 to discuss how his government would help the community. Duhaime had just
returned from a European trip to evaluate the global market for the mineral and suspected
the industry would soon rebound.1129 In June 1982, the Department of National Defence
contacted town council and asked to extend their business agreement for another 5
years.1130 This meant that Jeffrey Mine fibre would continue to be used in military
equipment despite growing health concerns. The federal government also showed its
support at Montreal’s 1982 World Symposium on Asbestos when Minister of Industry
Herb Grey spoke out against countries that banned shipments of the mineral, and sought
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markets in developing nations.1131 Grey also stated that 9 out of 10 Canadian provinces
supported the continuation of the industry because the health risks were manageable.
The provincial and federal governments were aware that reinvention possibilities
were limited for a place named Asbestos, but while its population was not large and the
revenue from its industry dwindled each year, the community refused to be abandoned.
International asbestos markets had collapsed and there was no sign public opinion on the
mineral would change. The land was scarred by a century of mining and Asbestos and
Thetford were too far away from Montreal and Quebec City to be viable for smaller scale
industrial development: they had to be closed and there were ways to do so without it
looking like the province was abandoning the people. The government instead chose to
sustain the dying industry and its collapsed communities to avoid having to address the
problem of entire towns of unemployed asbestos workers in l’Estrie.
While JM did not see itself having a future in Asbestos, it asked the Canadian
government for $35 million in order to support the industry. An earlier Récupération
Régionale Richmond-Wolfe project had only created 9 new jobs in the region1132 and so
chances were good that the funding JM asked for would be granted, as the continued
mining of asbestos was the only way the town would survive.1133 By the start of February
1983, the people of Asbestos were more hopeful about their future and JM told town
council that the company was optimistic about the Jeffrey Mine’s future.1134 The
company’s optimism was contagious and townspeople expressed their hope for the future
by organizing community activities to keep spirits up while waiting to be sent back to the
Jeffrey Mine.1135 Their hope was short-lived. A week later, JM suddenly lost its optimism
and revoked its request for money from the federal government.1136 The company would
not be rehiring any of its laid-off workers in the near future and in June 1983 it sold the
Jeffrey Mine to a handful of JM executives and left Asbestos. It was now up to the town
to solve its problems.
The survival of Asbestos depended on new industrial development and in the
spring of 1983, council allocated half a million dollars to attract new industry, and
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partnered with federal Minister of Employment and Immigration Lloyd Axworthy and the
Société nationale de l’amiante to create 300 new jobs with almost $10,000 given for
industrial development,1137 but no new industry has since come to the town. While the
workers, company, and council had not always cooperated with each other, there was
stability in their relationship. Without the company and its global reach, the community
lost a portion of its local cultural identity and was left with an uncertain future. Projects
and subsidies continued to pour into the town and there were hopes for a time that the
community would become a regional centre for a variety of educational and health
services.1138 These efforts were in vain. The Jeffrey Mine is so large and physically
central in the town that it cannot be covered up and Asbestos is not a community that can
be reinvented. Although the industry has collapsed, the people of Asbestos remain,
committed to their past, and waiting for a new creation story.
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Conclusion: Surviving Collapse, Asbestos Post-1983
In 2009 I was interviewed by Lorraine Mallinder, an investigative journalist
reporting on Canada’s continued support of the asbestos industry for BBC Radio. As I
explained to her the local historical context of this support, mainly the depth of the
interconnection between people and the natural environment, Mallinder interrupted me,
asking if what I was saying meant that I was “pro-asbestos.” The question was startling,
because knowing what the mineral does to the human body has convinced me that the
industry is dangerous and cannot continue. Reflecting on what I had told Mallinder, I
realized why she had become confused and I explained that after all my research and
writing, while I was not pro-asbestos the mineral, I was pro-Asbestos the community.
This dissertation has shown that the history of Asbestos—glory and shame,
rewards and sacrifices—was driven by the complex interaction between the people of the
community and the land, as they worked together locally to supply a global industry. In
the process, townspeople developed a cultural identity rooted in this interaction that has
given them a pride, an ambition, and a confidence, which has enabled them to keep the
industry alive through government support. Contemporary critics of this support calling
for its immediate end1139 fail to consider the local perspective of the issue and how we as
a society are to manage collapsed resource communities. Closure is one option, of course,
but it would be more effective and appropriate to find solutions that address and maintain
the historical interconnection between people and the natural environment.
The situation surrounding Asbestos the place and asbestos the mineral in Canada
today has much to do with the marked lack of interest the national press and the national
medical community had in the issue during the second half of the twentieth century. The
lack of outside interest and pressure allowed the people of Asbestos to further develop
and refine their local cultural identity around the Jeffrey Mine and their historical,
complex interaction with the land. Contemporary press coverage of the community
attacks this identity without attempting to understand it. The townspeople are confronted
with the realities of their past each day, inscribed on the land around them, dominated by
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the Jeffrey Mine, on their own bodies and those of their family and friends who have
died, and on the local cultural identity of the community, uncertain of its future.
The collapse of Asbestos was unlike that of other mining communities like
Cobalt, Ontario, or St. Clair, Pennsylvania, because the local mineral deposits have not
been exhausted.1140 It was different than the bust of the uranium towns of the American
west, which survive by marketing their communities to tourists in search of 1950s
nostalgia-inspiring destinations.1141 Furthermore, Jeffrey Mine employees have never
tried to romanticize the work they do unlike Cape Breton coal miners who sing in the
“world-renowned” Men of the Deeps choir dressed in their work uniforms,
overshadowing occurrences of coal worker’s pneumoconiosis1142 (black lung disease) and
putting a positive, friendly image on another deadly industry that has allowed them to
effectively lobby for the establishment of new coal mines as recently as May 2010.1143 In
fact, throughout their history and during the present collapse, Jeffrey Mine workers were,
and continue to be unlike other asbestos industry employees, including those who worked
for JM. They were not the industry’s only miners, they were not its only French Canadian
workers, but this dissertation has shown that the community interpreted its local role in
the global industry in such a way that complicates and challenges the international
literature on the asbestos industry that places workers firmly in the role of victims, not
agents.1144
Their past agency has carried through to the present, and instead of fighting for
workers compensation, they instead utilize a lobbying strength greater than a town of
6,000 typically has in order to keep the industry—and the community—alive. “Asbestos”
is more than the name of the community: it is a past, it is a heritage, and it is a
fundamental part of the town’s cultural identity. Because of their continuous lobby of the
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provincial and federal governments, the Jeffrey Mine continues to be worked today,
although only for half the year, while during the other six months much of the local
population survives on unemployment insurance. Once described as heroes who helped
the allies win the First and Second World Wars, townspeople are now criticized for
supplying asbestos to developing countries that do not uphold strict occupational health
and safety regulations for handling the mineral. International criticism was seen on 24
June and 1 July 2010, Quebec’s Fête nationale and Canada Day, respectively, when antiasbestos organizations held demonstrations in several countries to protest continued
government and local support of the industry.1145
This has been a steady, yet radical local-global reorientation for the people of
Asbestos since the early 1980s, and many have left the community due to lack of work.
Schools are boarded up, houses are for sale, and the local cultural identity, so rooted in a
connection to the land, has been profoundly shaken with the collapse of the industry, as
have the town’s political, economic, and societal foundations. The name of the
community once connoted notions of safety and reliability, but now it invokes ideas of
cancer and death, and the people who have remained in Asbestos have had to reconcile
their cultural identity to accept this transformation while continuing to have faith in the
land and their ability to work with it for survival. The Jeffrey Mine continues to have the
potential to be a profitable asbestos mine if the international image of the mineral became
favourable once again, which allows the community to hope for its revitalization as they
continue to root their identity and their future in the land.
The purpose of this study has been to question the historical interaction and
exchange of bodies of land, human bodies, and the body politic. The insistence of G.
Claude Théroux at the Société d’Histoire d’Asbestos that we must understand asbestos
the mineral in order to understand Asbestos the place played a fundamental role in
pursuing the answer to this question. Asbestos houses the largest chrysotile mine in the
world, but the physical, psychological, and political impact of the Jeffrey Mine has never
been mentioned in previous studies on the community or the mineral, which have focused
only on the 1949 strike or on the diseases asbestos causes. By using sources never
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examined before and by looking at the global issues facing the community from a local
perspective, this study has shown how the people shaping the land in Asbestos led to the
land shaping them and their community. This dissertation has also challenged the
historiography on resource communities, the asbestos industry, and environmental
history, showing what can be gained by looking beyond declensionist narratives of
destruction and victimization.
If not for the land, and the mineral found in it, the community as it was and as it is
would not exist. Every decision that was made in Asbestos by the working class, the town
councillors, or JM officials was made with consideration to the land and how it would
impact the future of the industry and the community that relied on it. Over their history of
interacting with the land, the people of Asbestos developed a balanced system of land use
and a sense of ownership of the Jeffrey Mine, which they were never hesitant to defend,
as seen in the labour disputes and civil protests against mine expansion this dissertation
has highlighted. With this balance and ownership came a sense of trust in the land. The
continued reluctance of Jeffrey Mine workers to wear respirators and the fact that the
1949 strike was the only time they raised the issue of occupational health with JM and the
media demonstrates that local residents were not committed to the town because of a
steady paycheque, but rather because of their connection to the land and the local cultural
identity they created with it. The understanding of risk in Asbestos is remarkable, as it
was based on a combination of bodily knowledge and several exposés that informed them
the mineral was dangerous.
Agricultural land has been an important historical figure in much of Quebec’s
past, but this history of Asbestos has shown how the people of the province became
attached to industrialized land, which had powerful effects on the identity and pride of the
local population. The land could not and would never be harmful as long as a balance was
maintained between people and place. Critics and organizations from outside Asbestos
were, and still are, unable to understand this need for balance, and even though the
industry has now lost any resemblance to the profitable one it once was, the land remains
the same, and the people who choose to remain in Asbestos will continue to defend it.
This dissertation has shown the great lengths to which JM went to keep medical
reports and discoveries on the dangers of the mineral from the people of Asbestos and the
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general public, while slowly introducing inadequate dust control measures at the Jeffrey
Mine. By funding confidential medical studies rather than informing employees of their
illnesses or the risk the mineral posed to their bodies until the 1970s, the company used
the people of Asbestos as scientists used mice in a laboratory, watching and waiting for
the progression of disease. This study has in no way attempted to excuse JM’s actions,
but I have placed them in the local context of Asbestos and compared them to the ways
Jeffrey Mine workers learned of, and reacted to, the knowledge of what the mineral could
do to their bodies. It is here that we can advance our understanding of how a lack of
action to insist on better dust control methods at the Jeffrey Mine and in the community
can be seen as a reaction, an acceptance of risk. Medical knowledge and bodily
knowledge combined in Asbestos, sometimes complementing each other, sometimes
clashing. One of the major clashes occurred during the 1949 strike and drastically
changed how human bodies were seen and used in Asbestos. Townspeople read Burton
LeDoux’s exposé on the health effects of the mineral just before the strike and the things
he highlighted were things they recognized in their own bodies.
The strike was such a traumatic event for the community that in order for it to end,
the people of Asbestos had to put their concern for their lives behind concerns for their
livelihoods. If stricter health regulations were put in place, production would slow and
impact both the local and global economy. With the onslaught of international negative
publicity due to the mineral’s health effects, the people of Asbestos put their bodies on
display to defend the Jeffrey Mine and the mineral it contained. The land had to be safe
and the people had to be healthy for the community to survive, and this belief remains
strong in Asbestos today. In June 2010, the Canadian Cancer Society, which has only
come out against asbestos in the past three years, wrote to the Quebec government urging
it to stop supporting the industry because the mineral continues to cause the deaths of
around 90,000 people annually all over the world.1146 The people of Asbestos reacted
immediately and fiercely to this perceived attack and cancelled the town’s annual Relay
for Life, for which they have raised almost $350,000 for cancer research over the past
four years. André Beaulieu, a representative from the Canadian Cancer Society, attributed
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the town’s reaction to their concerns for their economic future, which is a simplification
of the complex local cultural identity of Asbestos. Mayor Hughes Grimard challenged
Beaulieu’s assumption and explained that, “We want to work with our partners and not
with our detractors...It’s our past, it’s our history, therefore the population is united in
support of the mining industry.”1147 The local cultural and community identity this
dissertation has traced, although battered by recent realities, remains strong. The cancers
the people of Asbestos are suffering from are fast-acting, painful, and often incurable,1148
yet they continue to support the industry, perpetuating the deadly cycle of work and
disease that has existed in the community for over a century. The decision to stop
supporting the Canadian Cancer Society could not have been made easily, but the
importance of history to Asbestos—the history this dissertation has examined—trumps
the severity of risk and disease.
Everything in Asbestos has occurred in the extreme: land exploitation, profits,
labour disputes, global renown, and industrial collapse. The global rejection of the
mineral led to the collapse of the community and the loss of JM, an important presence in
the town from 1918 to 1983. The different factions of the town did not always exist
harmoniously, and often went through periods of great animosity, as seen with the 1949
strike, but through constant negotiation and recognition that they shared common goals, a
unique and fierce identity was created in Asbestos; that identity did not leave with JM in
1983. When faced with the collapse of the industry, the community clung to this identity
and their trust in the land, which has allowed them to keep the Jeffrey Mine in operation
and the community in existence.
The provincial and federal governments have been receptive to the continued
support of Asbestos and its industry since 1983. This has required government officials to
use tax revenue to subsidize the industry and to minimize the negative health effects of
the mineral in order to keep international trade and health organizations from banning
asbestos in the global market. In 2005, the Canadian government attempted to justify its
actions when it filed an official World Trade Organization (WTO) complaint against
France for banning imports of asbestos, claiming that France was discriminating against
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one of Canada’s cultural industries.1149 Under WTO rules, cultural industries were
exempt from international policies and regulations on issues like health and safety.
Whether the government called asbestos a national cultural industry because it understood
the deep connection the people of Asbestos had with the land they worked, or whether it
was simply a useful loophole in global politics is unclear, but it does help us look at the
local-national-global issues raised by the community of Asbestos from a new perspective.
This dissertation should encourage us to question our assumptions of how people
and the natural environment interrelate, and reconsider how and why communities
internalize and accept risk. In doing so, we can gain a more holistic understanding of
resource communities and how they reflect and influence debate surrounding commodity
flows, industrial pollution, and environmental justice on a local and global scale. This
renewed perspective will help us create new solutions to address the problems facing
collapsed resource communities that sufficiently include their attachment to the natural
environment they live and labour in, and to the global trade networks they supply.
Although it is small, Asbestos has global reach, and this study of a single
community has also been a study of massive environmental change, controversial health
and safety issues, and clashes between local and international responsibilities. The
experiences the community, the province, and the nation have gained through the history
of Asbestos can lead to a re-evaluation of the way Canada industrializes and markets its
natural resources today. Many parallels can be drawn between Asbestos and the Alberta
tar sands, as millions rely on the oil found in communities like Fort McMurray, just as
people once relied on the asbestos found in the Jeffrey Mine. The natural environment in
Alberta is undergoing radical technological changes because of the market demand for
oil, despite the fact that global organizations are working against the industry and towards
reducing the use of petroleum because of its negative effects on the environment and
human health.
The situation unfolding in places like Fort McMurray mirrors what happened in
Asbestos when the public became aware of the health risks of the mineral. Just as
asbestos was to Quebec, oil is a main supply of wealth and employment in Alberta and it
will be extremely difficult to forego, having become a fundamental part of the economy
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and local cultural identity. When a reliable, more environmentally friendly and
sustainable replacement for oil comes to market, communities like Fort McMurray could
collapse much in the same way as Asbestos did in the 1980s, and all that will be left is an
industrialized natural environment built for an industry that is no longer viable, populated
by people who no longer have stable employment opportunities. The governments of
Quebec and Canada subsidize the Jeffrey Mine and Asbestos to the detriment of the
country’s international reputation, and it is possible that the same will happen in Alberta
with the petroleum industry. As long as there is demand, there will be supply, and what
reporters and officials of international organizations fail to understand when they criticize
this support is the historical and personal context of communities rooted in the
industrialization of the environment. There is an intimacy that forms through life and
labour in resource communities. Cultural identities based on past glories, if understood
from the perspective of the local population, are difficult to challenge and change. This
dissertation has show how international responsibility can clash with local obligation and
the choice communities and governments have to make in order to survive are not always
easy. The industrialization of the natural environment may be inevitable, but this study of
Asbestos should inspire us think of new ways to interact with the land, to use new
technologies, to rely on governments for guidance rather than damage control, and to
manage our own ambitions.
The way land, people, and politics interact in this examination of Asbestos also
advances our understanding of how humans articulate their connection with the natural
world. While each of these elements has had their own role in the history of Asbestos,
they reflect and shape each other, providing catalysts and cautions for change and shaping
a strong cultural identity. In Asbestos, the land is more than toxic, the people are more
than statistics, and the community is not something that history just happened to. This
was and is a living, breathing, working society. By remembering that the land, the people,
and the community depend on each other for existence, we can draw larger conclusions
about the way nature and culture interact. They are not mutually exclusive, and to treat
them as such is to ignore the richly textured traditions negotiated between people and
place that have shaped cultural identities and have allowed a resource community like
Asbestos to survive collapse.
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Appendix
Confidential Sources
In the course of exploring the global asbestos trade, historians David Egilman and
Geoffrey Tweedale compiled a considerable body of primary sources about the Canadian
industry, via archival research and legal subpoena. They were generous enough to share
much of this material with me.
What follows is an accounting of these sources as they were used in this dissertation.
More details as to the sources can be provided upon request.
Asbestos Claims Research Facility, Aurora, Colorado, United States of America
All documents from this archive have been obtained by David Egilman via a combination
of access to the archives and legal subpoena. The Research Facility is run by the Claims
Resolution Management Corporation, which states that the “facility is available for use by
beneficiaries of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust and others who are
interested in asbestos claims, litigation and history. The Research Facility contains a
collection of more than 32,000 boxes, 7,200 rolls of microfilm, and 5,000 subject-related
and witness files turned over to the facility by the Johns-Manville Corporation.” (For
more information, please see: http://www.mantrust.org/ “Asbestos Claims Research
Facility.”) Egilman, archivist Maggie Baumgardner, and the facility’s legal counsel, Jared
Garelick, have each given me permission to use these files.
“Asbestos Chronology”
This 200-page document was created during workers’ compensation litigation against JM
in the United States. It provides correspondence between JM officials and the medical
professionals under their control from the 1890s to the 1980s, detailing the health and
safety issues arising in all JM operations, including Asbestos, Quebec.
“Doc 7”
This is Egilman’s name for a document he created in September 2001 using ACRF
documents comparing published medical reports and confidential medical research
funded by JM in the early 20th century.
Dr. Wright to Dr. Knight, 1926.
A letter arranging the establishment of McGill University’s Industrial Health Department
with funding from JM and Sun Life Insurance, explaining that a degree of company
control over what the department produced would be acceptable.
Frank G. Pedley, “Report of the Physical Examinations and X-Ray Examination of
Asbestos Workers in Asbestos and Thetford Mines, Quebec,” 1930.
A confidential medical report submitted to JM and detailing the occurrence of asbestosis
in Jeffrey Mine and Thetford Mine workers.
Kenneth Smith, “Industrial Hygiene—Survey of Men in Dusty Areas,” 1949. A
confidential medical report commissioned by JM that details the results of Smith’s study
on the health of 708 Jeffrey Mine employees.
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David C. Braun and Daniel T. Truan, “An Epidemiological Study of Lung Cancer in
Asbestos Miners,” 1957.
A confidential report for the Quebec Asbestos Mining Association detailing the
occurrence of asbestosis and lung cancer in the workers at the Jeffrey Mine and at
Thetford Mines.
Herbert E. Stokinger to Daniel C. Braun, January 1958.
A letter from the editor of the American Medical Association’s Archives of Industrial
Health thanking Braun for his published study on asbestos and human health and saying it
confirmed his own suspicions that the mineral was not harmful.
Turner & Newall Corporate Archives, Manchester, England
Turner & Newall was a British asbestos manufacturing company with holdings in Quebec
(including a mine in Thetford). All relevant documents here were obtained via legal
subpoena by Geoffrey Tweedale, who has granted me use of the files.
R.H. Stevenson, “Asbestosis: Talk by Dr. Stevenson to Quebec Asbestos Producers,”
May 1938. A Transcript of a talk Stevenson gave to convince Quebec asbestos producers
that Canadian asbestos was safe and did not cause industrial disease like South African
asbestos did. Correspondence between Turner & Newall officials suggesting that
Stevenson was wrong in his conclusions are attached to the transcript.
R.H. Stevenson, “Asbestosis,” 1940.
An industry report compiled by Stevenson detailing the absence of asbestosis in Jeffrey
Mine workers and explaining his methods of diagnosis. Letters between Turner & Newall
officials discussing Stevenson’s results are also included in this document.
J.F. Knox, “Report on Visit to Thetford Mines, Asbestos, and Montreal,” December 1964.
A report detailing Knox’s observations on working conditions at the Jeffrey Mine,
suggesting that they were not up to British standards of occupational health and safety.
Quebec Asbestos Mining Association (QAMA) Minutes of the Annual Meetings, 1950s1970s. Details the discussion and decisions of heads of the companies operating Quebec’s
asbestos mines. QAMA destroyed its files when it dissolved, and as a result these minutes
are unavailable in Canadian archives. Turner & Newall, however, as a member of
QAMA, retained a copy. Tweedale shared his full run of the organization’s annual
meeting minutes with me.
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